A.L. Colon-Vega v. PA BPP ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Angel Luis Colon-Vega,                  :
    :
    Petitioner            :
    :
    v.                          : No. 2496 C.D. 2015
    : Submitted: June 3, 2016
    Pennsylvania Board of                   :
    Probation and Parole,                   :
    :
    Respondent            :
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE COLINS                                    FILED: August 26, 2016
    Angel Luis Colon-Vega (Petitioner) petitions for review of a
    determination of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) that
    denied his administrative appeal of a Board order recommitting him as a convicted
    parole violator to serve 24 months backtime and recalculating his maximum
    sentence date to October 26, 2017. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    In 2012, Petitioner was sentenced by the Berks County Court of
    Common Pleas to a term of 1 year, 6 months to 4 years of incarceration for
    Manufacture, Sale, Deliver, or Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled
    Substance. (Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 2012 Sentence Status Summary.) The
    original maximum date for this sentence was March 15, 2016. (Id.) Petitioner was
    paroled on October 15, 2013, and was transferred to the Wernersville Community
    Corrections Center; he remained there until January 17, 2014, when he was
    released to his daughter’s residence in Reading, PA. (C.R. at 29, Supervision
    History.) On December 5, 2014, Petitioner was detained in county prison for new
    drug charges filed, and on March 10, 2015, having been advised that the maximum
    permissible sentence for each offense was 30 years imprisonment, Petitioner pled
    guilty to three counts of Delivery of a Controlled Substance – Heroin. (C.R. at 45-
    46, Statement Accompanying Defendant’s Request to Enter a Guilty Plea.)
    Petitioner was sentenced to 18 months to 60 months in a State Correctional
    Institution, with 96 days credit for time served. (C.R. at 38, 39, Sentence Order.)
    On April 28, 2015, Petitioner waived his right to a revocation hearing
    and to counsel at that hearing and the Board subsequently voted to recommit
    Petitioner as a convicted parole violator to serve 24 months backtime,1 denying
    him credit for time at liberty on parole and recalculating his new maximum date as
    October 26, 2017. (C.R. at 90, Waiver of Revocation Hearing and Counsel; C.R.
    at 100, Order to Recommit; C.R. at 102, Notice of Board Decision.) With regard
    to the issue of credit for time at liberty on parole, the Board checked “No” on the
    line of the Revocation Hearing Report that states “BOARD ONLY – Credit time
    spent at liberty on parole: [ ] No [ ] Yes (Excluded offenses on pg. 8)” and further
    noted “Writer does not recommend that the inmate be given credit for time under
    1
    Backtime is a penalty imposed by the Board for a parole violation; it is “that part of an existing
    judicially imposed sentence that a parole violator is required to serve as a result of violating the
    terms of conditions of parole prior to being eligible to again apply for parole.” Santiago v.
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    937 A.2d 610
    , 616 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
    2
    supervision. He suffered 2 new convictions for Drug Sales while on parole for
    Drug Sales.” (C.R. at 91-98, Hearing Report.)
    Petitioner filed, pro se, a timely administrative appeal, in which he
    requested a reduction in the amount of backtime ordered to offset the amount of
    time he must remain incarcerated. In so doing, Petitioner acknowledged that he
    was prohibited by statute from commencing service of his new sentence until May
    28, 2017, his reparole eligibility date, and that 24 months of backtime for the
    crimes to which he pled guilty represented a term well within the presumptive
    range guidelines. (C.R. at 104-108, Administrative Remedies Form.)
    On November 17, 2015, the Board denied Petitioner’s appeal, noting
    that the maximum term it could have imposed within the presumptive range was
    108 months, thus the 24 month recommitment term imposed falls within the
    presumptive range and is not subject to challenge. (C.R. at 110, Board Response.)
    Petitioner has timely appealed the Board’s denial of his appeal to this Court.2
    First, we reject Petitioner’s challenge to the period of backtime
    imposed by the Board. Where, as is the case sub judice, the amount of backtime
    falls within the presumptive recommitment range, both this Court and our Supreme
    Court have ruled that courts will not review the Board’s imposition of backtime. 3
    Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    574 A.2d 558
    , 560 (Pa.
    2
    Our review of the Board’s decision is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were
    violated, whether the adjudication was in accordance with law, and whether necessary findings
    were supported by substantial evidence. Miskovitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
    Parole, 
    77 A.3d 66
    , 70 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
    3
    Presumptive ranges for convicted parole violators are set forth in 
    37 Pa. Code § 75.2
    . For drug
    offenses, the range is based upon the maximum term of imprisonment associated with the
    offense; the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for each count of Petitioner’s felony
    convictions is fifteen years, and each carries a presumptive recommitment range of 24 months to
    36 months. 
    37 Pa. Code § 75.2
    .
    3
    1990); Lotz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    548 A.2d 1295
    , 1296
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), and we will not do so here.
    Before this Court, Petitioner also argues that the Board lacked
    authority to extend his maximum date, and failed to exercise proper discretion in
    denying him credit for time at liberty on parole. The Board counters that Petitioner
    did not raise these issues in his administrative appeal and has not therefore
    preserved such claims and is precluded from raising them before this Court. The
    record shows that Petitioner did not raise these issues before the Board, and this
    Court has ruled that an issue not raised in an administrative appeal to the Board is
    waived. McCaskill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    631 A.2d 1092
    , 1094-1095 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). However, even if Petitioner had not waived
    these claims, he would not be entitled to relief.
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made clear that the Board’s
    authority to recalculate the sentence of a convicted parole violator “is not an
    encroachment upon the judicial sentencing power.”        Young v. Commonwealth
    Board of Probation and Parole, 
    409 A.2d 428
    , 437 (Pa. 1979). Further, Section
    6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons and Parole Code provides the Board with discretion to
    award credit towards a convicted parole violator’s maximum term expiration date
    for time spent at liberty on parole, except where the parolee falls within one of
    three disqualifying categories of convicted parole violators. 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)
    (2.1). Under the prior version of Section 6138, recommitment without credit for
    time at liberty on parole was mandatory; this regime was altered on September 4,
    2012, when the Act of July 5, 2012, P.L. 1050, No. 122, went into effect, adding
    language to Paragraph 2 and adding Paragraph 2.1 to Section 6138(a) of the
    4
    Prisons and Parole Code. Section 6138(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code now
    provides, in relevant part:
    (1) A parolee under the jurisdiction of the board released
    from a correctional facility who, during the period of
    parole or while delinquent on parole, commits a crime
    punishable by imprisonment, for which the parolee is
    convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which
    the parolee pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time
    thereafter in a court of record, may at the discretion of
    the board be recommitted as a parole violator.
    (2) If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the
    parolee shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the
    term which the parolee would have been compelled to
    serve had the parole not been granted and, except as
    provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit
    for the time at liberty on parole.
    (2.1) The board may, in its discretion, award credit to a
    parolee recommitted under paragraph (2) for the time
    spent at liberty on parole, unless any of the following
    apply:
    (i)    The crime committed during the
    period of parole or while delinquent on
    parole is a crime of violence as defined in
    42 Pa. C.S. § 9714(g) (relating to sentences
    for second and subsequent offenses) or a
    crime requiring registration under 42 Pa.
    C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to
    registration of sexual offenders).
    (ii) The parolee was recommitted under
    section 6143 (relating to early parole of
    inmates subject to Federal removal order).
    5
    61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(1)-(2.1) (emphasis added). The disqualifying categories in
    Paragraph 2.1 that continue to require denial of credit do not apply here.
    As noted by the Board, this Court has most recently addressed the
    exercise of the Board’s discretion in Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
    and Parole, 
    131 A.3d 604
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc). In Pittman, we held that
    the checking of the “No” box on the “[c]redit time spent at liberty on parole” line
    in its hearing report “demonstrates that the Board exercised discretion in denying
    [inmate] credit for time he spent at liberty on parole,” and concluded that “the
    Board was not required to issue a statement of reasons for its decision” to deny
    credit. 131 A.3d at 609-10, 616.4 Moreover, even if this Court had not held in
    Pittman that checking “No” was a sufficient reflection of the Board’s exercise of
    discretion, in addition to checking the “No” box, the Board stated in its hearing
    report that it did not recommend that Petitioner be given credit for time at liberty
    on parole because he suffered two new convictions for drug sales while on parole
    for the same offense. (C.R. at 91-98, Hearing Report.) Accordingly, we find no
    merit in the argument that the Board abused its discretion by failing to award
    Petitioner credit for time at liberty on parole.
    Finally, Petitioner argues the Board did not indicate how it calculated
    Petitioner’s new maximum date.              Petitioner did not question the Board’s
    calculation of his maximum date in his administrative appeal; in fact, Petitioner
    indicated his full understanding of the pertinent dates as calculated by the Board,
    4
    On May 23, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in Pittman to
    address the following question: “Did the Parole Board abuse its discretion by summarily denying
    petitioner credit against his maximum sentence for time that he spent at liberty on parole
    following his recommitment as a convicted parole violator?” Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of
    Probation and Parole, __ A.3d __ (Pa., No. 90 MAL 2016, filed May 23, 2016).
    6
    correctly citing his reparole eligibility date and his recomputed maximum date, and
    noting that “the Board properly considered and applied the fact that because my
    new sentence is a state sentence, I cannot begin service of said sentence prior to
    [his reparole eligibility date].” (C.R. at 107, Administrative Appeal.) In his
    administrative appeal, Petitioner requests simply that the Board deduct six months
    from his backtime and reduce his maximum date by the same amount. (Id.) In any
    event, the record clearly reflects that the Board did not err in recalculating
    Petitioner’s maximum date. Petitioner had 882 days remaining on his original
    sentence at the time he was paroled, and following his arrest, he was confined on
    both the new criminal charges and the Board detainer from December 5, 2014 until
    March 10, 2015, the date on which he was sentenced, or a period of 96 days; thus
    the sentencing court properly awarded Petitioner 96 days credit toward his new
    sentence, representing the entire pre-sentence confinement term. (C.R. at 100,
    Order to Recommit; C.R. at 38-39, Sentence Order.) Our Supreme Court has
    established that pre-sentence confinement wherein a convicted parole violator is
    incarcerated on new criminal charges and a Board detainer must apply to the new
    sentence. Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    412 A.2d 568
    ,
    571 (Pa. 1980).   The Board thus properly denied Petitioner credit for the period
    during which he was detained on both the new criminal charges and the Board’s
    detainer.
    For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Board is affirmed.
    _________________ ____________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    7
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Angel Luis Colon-Vega,              :
    :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                       : No. 2496 C.D. 2015
    :
    Pennsylvania Board of               :
    Probation and Parole,               :
    :
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 26th day of August, 2016, the order of the
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole in the above-captioned matter is
    AFFIRMED.
    __________ ___________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge