W. Curtis v. M. Canino, Hearing Examiner ( 2017 )


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  •         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Curtis,                          :
    :
    Petitioner           :
    :
    v.                           : No. 160 M.D. 2015
    : Submitted: October 14, 2016
    Mary Canino                              :
    Hearing Examiner,                        :
    :
    Respondent           :
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE COLINS                                        FILED: March 6, 2017
    This case in our original jurisdiction arises out of a pro se petition for
    review, in the form of an amended complaint, filed by William Curtis (Petitioner)
    naming as respondent Mary Canino (Respondent), a hearing examiner for the
    Department of Corrections (DOC).        In his amended complaint, Petitioner, an
    inmate who currently and at all relevant times of this litigation has been
    incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Graterford, alleges
    violations of his due process rights and rights under DOC rules and regulations
    during a misconduct hearing that took place at SCI Graterford on April 3, 2007.
    Presently before this Court are the preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer
    filed by Respondent. As described herein, we sustain Respondent’s preliminary
    objections in part and overrule the preliminary objections in part.
    Petitioner initially filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of
    Montgomery County on April 30, 2009. Respondent filed preliminary objections
    to the initial complaint on August 3, 2011, and Petitioner filed an amended
    complaint on August 23, 2011. Respondent then filed preliminary objections on
    December 12, 2011. Upon motion by Respondent, the Court of Common Pleas
    ordered that this matter be transferred to this Court by an April 9, 2013 order. In
    spite of this order, litigation continued in the Court of Common Pleas until January
    22, 2015 when the Court of Common Pleas finally transmitted the certified record
    to this Court.
    The following facts are taken from the amended complaint.          On
    March 30, 2007, Petitioner submitted two witness request forms pursuant to DOC
    policy DC-ADM 801 for a misconduct hearing to be held on April 3, 2007 before
    Respondent as hearing examiner, but Respondent denied the requests. (Amended
    Complaint ¶¶6, 10.) Respondent placed Petitioner under oath for his testimony at
    the April 3, 2007 misconduct hearing despite the fact that Respondent’s
    commission as a notary public in Pennsylvania had expired in 1998, nine years
    prior to the hearing. (Id. ¶¶10, 12, 13, Exhibit 1.) Petitioner was found guilty of
    the misconduct charges and given the sanction of 545 days of solitary confinement.
    (Id. ¶11.)
    Petitioner alleges that Respondent’s actions violate DOC policy DC-
    ADM 801, Respondent’s procedural rights under a DOC regulation, 37 Pa. Code §
    93.10, relating to inmate discipline, DOC’s Code of Ethics, the Notary Public
    2
    Law,1 the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
    Constitution, and the Crimes Code. (Amended Complaint ¶¶8, 9, 12-20 & Relief
    Sought.) Petitioner seeks a declaration that witnesses at a misconduct hearing are
    required to testify under oath and that Respondent lacked a valid notary
    commission. (Id., Relief Sought(a), (d).) Petitioner further asserts that the act of
    Respondent swearing him in for testimony without a valid commission violated his
    due process rights and that the denial of the testimony of his witnesses without any
    threat to institutional safety or correctional goals violated his due process rights.
    (Id., Relief Sought(b), (c).) In addition, Petitioner seeks damages pursuant to
    Section 8303 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8303. (Amended Complaint,
    Relief Sought(e).)
    In her preliminary objections to the amended complaint,2 Respondent
    argues that, to the extent Petitioner seeks a declaration that the misconduct hearing
    was invalid, such an order is not a final adjudication that is subject to this Court’s
    judicial review. Respondent asserts that to the extent Petitioner seeks review of the
    disciplinary proceeding under the guise of an original jurisdiction action, this Court
    1
    Act of August 21, 1953, P.L. 1323, as amended, 57 P.S. §§ 147-169. In 2013, the General
    Assembly passed legislation to adopt the Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts, 57 Pa. C.S. §§
    301-331, that will replace the Notary Public Law 180 days after the Department of State
    publishes notice of approval of basic and continuing education courses under Section 322 of
    Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts, 57 Pa. C.S. § 322. See Act of October 9, 2013, P.L.
    609, §§ 4, 5. The Department of State has not yet published this notice, and therefore the Notary
    Public Law remains the operative law.
    2
    In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, this Court must accept as true
    all well-pled allegations of material fact, as well as all of the inferences reasonably deducible
    from those facts. Armstrong County Memorial Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare, 
    67 A.3d 160
    , 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). We are not, however, required to accept as true legal
    conclusions, unwarranted factual inferences, argumentative allegations or expressions of opinion.
    
    Id. A demurrer
    is properly sustained where, based on the facts averred, the law says with
    certainty that no recovery is possible. Edmunson v. Horn, 
    694 A.2d 1179
    , 1180 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1997).
    3
    lacks subject matter over such claims.          Respondent objects to Petitioner’s
    purported due process claims, arguing that DOC regulations do not provide him
    with a protected liberty interest subject to a claim. Respondent further argues that
    neither a purported lack of a notary commission by a hearing examiner or the
    alleged denial of permission to call an inmate’s witnesses can serve as the basis for
    a claim of a violation of due process at an inmate disciplinary proceeding.
    It is well-established that DOC decisions concerning misconduct
    charges are beyond the scope of this Court’s appellate or original jurisdiction.
    Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 
    721 A.2d 357
    , 358-59 (Pa. 1998);
    Brown v. Department of Corrections, 
    913 A.2d 301
    , 305-06 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)
    (per curiam); Edmunson v. Horn, 
    694 A.2d 1179
    , 1181 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). As
    our Supreme Court explained in Bronson:
    [I]nternal prison operations are more properly left to the
    legislative and executive branches, and [] prison officials
    must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the
    execution of policies necessary to preserve order and
    maintain security free from judicial interference. ...
    Unlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a
    defendant is accorded the full spectrum of rights and
    protections guaranteed by the state and federal
    constitutions, and which is necessarily within the ambit
    of the judiciary, the procedures for pursuing inmate
    grievances and misconduct appeals are a matter of
    internal prison administration and the full panoply of
    rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not
    necessary in a prison disciplinary 
    proceeding... 721 A.2d at 358-59
    (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 
    Brown, 913 A.2d at 305
    . Thus, to the extent Petitioner’s amended complaint operates as an
    appeal of the misconduct hearing or an original jurisdiction challenge to the result
    of that hearing, such a claim is not cognizable in this Court.
    4
    We next address the allegations in the amended complaint that
    Respondent violated Petitioner’s due process rights by the way she conducted the
    misconduct hearing. Petitioner sets forth three grounds for the claim that his due
    process rights were violated in the amended complaint. First, Petitioner alleges
    that the Department violated his due process rights because the April 3, 2007
    hearing was contrary to the provisions set forth in DC-ADM 801 and DOC
    regulation 37 Pa. Code § 93.10, which empowered DOC to adopt the written
    procedures for inmate disciplinary proceedings set forth in DC-ADM 801.
    However, as this Court has held, DOC regulations and guidelines, even when
    written in mandatory language, do not create a liberty interest that can serve as a
    basis of a due process claim. Luckett v. Blaine, 
    850 A.2d 811
    , 820 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2004). Therefore, any lack of adherence to DC-ADM 801 or 37 Pa. Code § 93.10
    cannot form the basis of a due process claim.
    Petitioner also claims that Respondent violated his due process rights
    by denying his request to call two witnesses without any valid reason. In Wolff v.
    McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    (1974), the United States Supreme Court explained that
    while the procedural due process rights of an inmate in prison disciplinary
    proceedings are limited, the inmate does retain certain protections. 
    Id. at 561-72;
    see also Melton v. Beard, 
    981 A.2d 361
    , 364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Among these
    due process protections afforded to the inmate is the right to call witnesses and
    present documentary evidence in his defense, when permitting him to do so would
    not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. 
    Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566
    ; Jerry v. Department of Corrections, 
    990 A.2d 112
    , 115 n.4 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2010); 
    Melton, 981 A.2d at 364
    . The Court explained in Wolff that the
    inmate does not have an unrestricted right to call witnesses and that any analysis
    5
    into whether due process was given to the inmate requires the reviewing court to
    balance the rights of the inmate with the flexibility and discretion that is required
    for prison officials to administer prison affairs “without being subject to unduly
    crippling constitutional 
    impediments.” 418 U.S. at 566-67
    .
    Petitioner alleges that he submitted the requests four days prior to the
    April 3, 2007 hearing, that each of these witnesses would have given exculpatory
    testimony and that the witnesses were confined on the upper section of the housing
    unit directly adjacent to where the hearing was held. (Amended Complaint ¶¶6-7.)
    In the amended complaint, Petitioner identifies one of the two witnesses by name
    and alleges that this individual was his cellmate at the time that the incident that
    was the subject of the misconduct hearing occurred and would have corroborated
    Petitioner’s version of the incident. (Id. ¶9.) The amended complaint does not
    contain any allegations concerning whether Respondent based the denials on
    reasons related to institutional safety or correctional goals or whether Respondent
    announced any reason for denying Petitioner’s witness requests. In the absence of
    this information, we conclude that Petitioner has stated a claim that Respondent
    violated his due process rights by denying his requests to call two witnesses at the
    misconduct hearing. Cf. 
    Melton, 981 A.2d at 365
    & n.4 (dismissing inmates’ facial
    due process challenge to the policy in DC-ADM 801 that allows a hearing
    examiner to limit the evidence presented by inmates while noting that “an abuse of
    the hearing examiner’s discretion [to grant or deny requests for witnesses] as
    applied in a given situation could amount to a due process violation”). While we
    recognize that DOC was entitled to broad discretion in prison administration
    matters, in the absence of any indication that Respondent based the decision to
    6
    deny the witnesses for reasons related to institutional security and correctional
    goals we are constrained to overrule Respondent’s demurrer to this claim.
    The same fate, however, does not hold for Petitioner’s remaining
    claim of a violation of his due process rights based on the fact that Respondent had
    at one time been a notary but was not a notary at the time of the April 3, 2007
    hearing. Petitioner alleged that Respondent held a commission as a notary public
    in Pennsylvania from March 1994 through March 1998, but that commission
    expired more than nine years prior to the April 3, 2007 hearing. (Amended
    Complaint ¶13, Exhibit 1.) Petitioner alleges that the fact that Respondent swore
    in Petitioner to testify at the misconduct hearing despite the fact that she had
    allowed her commission to lapse and had ceased taking continuing notary
    education courses, was an act of bad faith and dishonesty contrary to DOC’s Code
    of Ethics and violated Petitioner’s right to fundamental fairness during the
    misconduct hearing.     (Id. ¶¶14, 16, 19, 20.)     Petitioner further alleges that
    Respondent acting as a hearing examiner without holding a valid commission was
    a criminal act, contrary to Section 4913 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 4913,
    which prohibits the impersonation of a notary public. (Amended Complaint ¶20.)
    The premise underlying Petitioner’s claim – that a DOC hearing
    examiner must hold a notary commission in order to swear in witnesses – is
    baseless. Petitioner cites no statute, regulation or rule that would require that a
    DOC hearing examiner be a notary. Furthermore, we are aware of no authority
    that would impose a notary requirement on DOC hearing examiners or any hearing
    officer, referee, judge, magistrate, court officer or any other individual who may
    administer an oath or affirmation to a witness, whether during a court or
    administrative hearing. While Section 16(a) of the Notary Public Law provides
    7
    that “[n]otaries shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations,” 57 P.S. §
    162(a), nothing in the Notary Public Law states that only notaries shall have that
    power.3 In fact, Section 517 of the Administrative Code of 1929 provides heads of
    administrative departments, deputy heads of departments and members of boards
    or commissions with the power to administer oaths or affirmations or to designate
    any officer or employee of those agencies to administer an oath or affirmation.4
    Accordingly, we sustain the demurrer to Petitioner’s due process claim related to
    Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain her commission as a notary.
    In addition to Petitioner’s claims seeking a declaration that his due
    process rights were violated, he also requests an award of damages pursuant to
    Section 8303 of the Judicial Code, which provides that a successful plaintiff in a
    mandamus action is entitled to damages when the defendant failed to perform a
    duty required by law.5 42 Pa. C.S. § 8303; Maurice A. Nernberg & Associates v.
    Coyne, 
    920 A.2d 967
    , 970 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). While Petitioner entitled the
    amended complaint “Amended Mandamus and Declaratory Judgment,” he does
    not in any way seek to compel the performance of a mandatory duty or a
    ministerial act, which is an essential aspect of a mandamus claim. 6 Kretchmar v.
    3
    The Revised Uniform Law of Notarial Acts, which the General Assembly has enacted but
    which has not yet gone into effect, see Footnote 1 above, similarly provides that a notary is
    authorized to administer oaths or affirmations under the laws of the Commonwealth, 57 Pa. C.S.
    § 302, but does not restrict this authority to notaries.
    4
    Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, § 517, as amended, 71 P.S. § 197.
    5
    Section 8303 provides that “[a] person who is adjudged in an action in the nature of mandamus
    to have failed or refused without lawful justification to perform a duty required by law shall be
    liable in damages to the person aggrieved by such failure or refusal.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8303.
    6
    Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to perform a duty required by law by not keeping her
    notary commission through the date of the misconduct hearing (Amended Complaint ¶14), but
    the amended complaint does not seek to compel Respondent to perform a mandatory duty or
    ministerial act.
    8
    Commonwealth, 
    831 A.2d 793
    , 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Saunders v. Department
    of Corrections, 
    749 A.2d 553
    , 556 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Thus, Petitioner’s action
    does not sound in mandamus and he would not be entitled to damages under
    Section 8303.
    Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s preliminary objections to the
    extent they seek the dismissal of the due process claim based upon Respondent’s
    denial of Petitioner’s request to call witnesses at the April 3, 2007 misconduct
    hearing and sustain Respondent’s preliminary objections in all other respects.
    _______________ ______________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Curtis,                          :
    :
    Petitioner           :
    :
    v.                           : No. 160 M.D. 2015
    :
    Mary Canino                              :
    Hearing Examiner,                        :
    :
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2017, the preliminary objections
    filed by Respondent Mary Canino, Hearing Examiner are OVERRULED to the
    extent that they seek dismissal of Petitioner William Curtis’s claim that his due
    process rights were violated because Respondent denied his request to call two
    witnesses at an April 3, 2007 misconduct hearing and SUSTAINED in all other
    respects.
    Within thirty (30) days of this Order, Respondent shall file an answer
    responding to the remaining paragraphs and claims of the amended complaint that
    have not been dismissed by this Order.
    _______________ ______________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge