L. Grimes v. Dept. of Ed. ( 2019 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Lance Grimes,                                  :
    Petitioner      :   CASE SEALED
    :
    v.                              :   No. 1365 C.D. 2018
    :   Argued: June 6, 2019
    Department of Education,                       :
    Respondent             :
    BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON                           FILED: July 12, 2019
    Petitioner Lance Grimes (Grimes) petitions for review of an
    adjudication        by   the   Professional   Standards     and    Practices    Commission
    (Commission), concluding that Grimes’s conduct constituted immorality pursuant to
    the Educator Discipline Act (Act)1 and directing the Department of Education
    (Department) to issue a public reprimand to Grimes. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    Grimes maintains an “Instructional I” teaching certificate in “Special
    Education PK-12 and Elementary K-6.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 21a.) The
    Altoona Area School District (School District) employed Grimes as an elementary
    school teacher in August 2009, and Grimes began teaching in the field of special
    education at Altoona Area Junior High School (School) in 2010. (Id.) The School
    1
    Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 2070.1a-.18c.
    District suspended Grimes from teaching in that district in 2015 because Grimes
    falsified certain students’ records, failed to attend scheduled faculty meetings, and
    damaged school equipment by punching a laptop and printer in anger.
    (Id. at 28a-29a.) Grimes resigned, and he and the School District entered into an
    agreement relating to his separation from employment (Release Agreement).
    (Id. at 10a-12a.)
    The     Department        initiated     its   action     against        Grimes   on
    December 6, 2016, by filing a notice of charges with the Commission, averring that
    Grimes’s      actions constituted         immorality, incompetence, negligence, and
    intemperance under the Act.2 (Id. at 81a.) Grimes filed a reply to the notice of
    charges, new matter, and a motion to dismiss on January 9, 2017. (Certified Record
    (C.R.), Item No. 3.) The Commission denied Grimes’s motion to dismiss by order
    dated January 10, 2017. (C.R., Item No. 5.) The Commission appointed hearing
    officer Maria Battista (Hearing Officer Battista) on January 12, 2017. (C.R., Item
    No. 6.) On March 21, 2017, Grimes filed a motion in limine and a memorandum of
    law in support thereof, requesting that “all evidence and testimony arising out of
    [Grimes’s Release Agreement, which he characterized as a] confidential settlement
    agreement[,] be excluded from any decision or hearing in this case.” (C.R., Item
    2
    Section 9.3(a) of the Act, 24 P.S. § 2070.9c(a) provides, in relevant part:
    The [C]ommission shall direct the department to impose discipline against any
    educator for conduct found by the [C]ommission to constitute:
    (1) Immorality.
    (2) Incompetency.
    (3) Intemperance.
    ....
    (5) Negligence.
    2
    No. 10 at 1.) Grimes filed an amended motion in limine and memorandum of law in
    support on April 28, 2017. (R.R. at 1a-13a.) By order dated May 26, 2017, Hearing
    Officer Battista denied Grimes’s amended motion in limine. (Id. at 14a-15a.) On
    May 30, 2017, the Commission appointed a new hearing officer, Christopher
    McNally (Hearing Officer McNally), who conducted a hearing on this matter on
    July 13, 2017, and July 14, 2017. (C.R., Item No. 24; R.R. at 18a.) After the
    hearing, Hearing Officer McNally issued a proposed report to the Commission that
    included findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R.R. at 17a-71a.) For the purposes
    of this appeal, we focus on the findings of fact addressing Grimes’s conduct with
    respect to the Department’s charge of immorality.
    The relevant findings of fact reveal that during the 2014-2015 school
    year, Grimes functioned as a special education teacher for the eighth grade and as an
    Individualized Education Program (IEP) case manager. (Id. at 21a.) An IEP is “a
    statement of the assessment, curriculum, instruction, and activities to be used by
    teachers, administrators, parents[,] and the student with disabilities to allow the
    student to advance appropriately.” (Id. at 21a-22a.) Part of Grimes’s job duties
    required him to schedule IEP meetings, implement students’ IEPs, conduct annual
    IEP meetings, confirm students’ receipt of services listed in their IEPs, update IEPs,
    communicate with students’ parents, keep track of students’ progress, and coordinate
    lessons. (Id. at 21a-22a.)
    When students with disabilities reach the age of fourteen, each student
    is entitled to “transition activities and services.” (Id. at 23a.) One such transition
    service is a transition interview, which is conducted by the Transition Coordinator
    prior to an IEP meeting. (Id.) In the transition interview, the Transition Coordinator
    inquires about each student’s postsecondary education plans, employment plans,
    3
    independent living goals, and how the student plans to achieve said goals. (Id.) The
    Transition Coordinator uses the data collected in the transition interview to create a
    transition plan.       (Id.)   These transition plans are required under the federal
    regulations related to the development of IEPs.3 (Id.) “[Grimes] and other special
    education teachers in the School District are not authorized to perform transition
    surveys.” (Id.)
    Patti Wendle is the Transition Coordinator for the School District. (Id.)
    Each academic year, the School sends each special education teacher an information
    packet that includes an IEP manual covering the School’s transition survey policies
    and procedures and the contact information for Ms. Wendle in her role as the
    Transition Coordinator.4 (Id. at 23a-24a.) Ms. Wendle requires special education
    teachers to provide her with a two-week notice period before a scheduled IEP
    meeting is conducted, so that she can conduct the transition interview and create the
    transition plan before the IEP meeting.              (Id. at 24a.)      Grimes is aware of
    Ms. Wendle’s request that teachers provide her with two-weeks’ notice prior to a
    scheduled IEP meeting. (Id.) Grimes’s conduct at issue related to IEPs for three
    students whom we will refer to as A.O., J.M., and B.R. (Id. at 25a.) Previously,
    Ms. Wendle met with J.M. and B.R., when both students were in seventh grade, and
    conducted the required transition process.5 (Id. at 25a-26a.) When A.O., J.M., and
    3
    See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320-.323.
    4
    Ms. Wendle’s contact information is listed as part of an instruction in the IEP manual
    providing: “If a child will be turning [fourteen] or older during the duration of the IEP, contact
    the Transition Coordinator so she can assist you developing an appropriate transition plan. The
    Transition Coordinator for the [School] is [Ms.] Wendle.” The IEP manual also provided the email
    address at which Ms. Wendle could be contacted. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 24a.)
    5
    Ms. Wendle did not meet with A.O. when he was in seventh grade because he was not
    yet fourteen years old.
    4
    B.R. were in eighth grade, Grimes scheduled IEP meetings with each of them.
    (Id. at 25a.)     Prior to the IEP meetings, which were to be conducted on
    February 3, 2015, Grimes reviewed each student’s IEP and noticed that the transition
    section was not yet completed; however, Grimes did not ask Ms. Wendle to conduct
    the transition process. (Id. at 25a, 27a.) Grimes, instead, completed the transition
    plans in the IEP of each student and inserted Ms. Wendle’s name and a date into the
    transition plans in such a way as to create the appearance that Ms. Wendle completed
    the transition plans. (Id. at 25a-27a.) Where A.O.’s transition plan is concerned,
    Grimes created the transition plan himself. (Id. at 25a.) With respect to J.M.’s and
    B.R.’s transition plans, Grimes accessed the transition plans that Ms. Wendle
    completed in the prior year and filled that current year’s transition plans with the
    prior year’s data.6 (Id. at 26a-27a.)
    Ms. Wendle discovered that Grimes completed the transition plans for
    the IEPs of A.O., J.M., and B.R. and reported the matter to Harry Gregg, who was
    the School’s special education supervisor at the time. (Id. at 27a.) Mr. Gregg
    reported the incident to Brad Hatch, the principal for the eighth grade at the time,
    who conducted an investigation into the matter. (Id.) Grimes admitted that he did
    not ask Ms. Wendle to conduct the transition process and that he revised the
    transition plans for students A.O., J.M., and B.R. to make it seem as though
    Ms. Wendle completed them herself. (Id. at 27a, 376a-77a.) Ms. Wendle has since
    interviewed all three students and revised the transition plans for their IEPs.
    (Id. at 28a.) On June 5, 2015, the School District suspended Grimes from teaching
    6
    IEPs are created in a software program called IEP Writer, to which each case manager
    has access, but only with respect to the case manager’s assigned students. (R.R. at 22a.) Case
    managers have the option to create a new IEP or to open old IEPs that contain the student’s
    information from the prior year. (Id.)
    5
    in that district indefinitely and issued a statement of charges to Grimes. (Id.) Grimes
    resigned from the School District on June 15, 2015. (Id.) The School District settled
    with Grimes to remove references to any disciplinary matters from Grimes’s
    personnel file and agreed to provide a neutral reference to prospective employers.
    (Id. at 32a.)
    With respect to the Department’s charge against Grimes for immorality,
    Hearing Officer McNally concluded that Grimes’s actions did not constitute
    immorality because the Department did not meet its burden of proving that Grimes’s
    falsification of students’ records offends the morals of the Commonwealth.
    (Id. at 33a.) Hearing Officer McNally also concluded that the Department failed to
    prove that Grimes’s conduct constituted incompetence, negligence, or intemperance.
    (Id.)   Hearing Officer McNally, therefore, recommended dismissal of the
    Department’s notice of charges. (Id. at 70a.) The Department filed exceptions to
    the proposed report, challenging Hearing Officer McNally’s conclusion that the
    Department did not prove immorality, incompetence, negligence, and intemperance
    with respect to Grimes’s actions. (C.R., Item No. 34 at 3.) The Department also
    argued that Hearing Officer McNally should have included certain crucial findings
    of fact in the proposed report. (Id. at 18.)
    On September 10, 2018, the Commission issued its final order and a
    memorandum in support thereof. (C.R., Item No. 36.) In its final order, the
    Commission modified Hearing Officer McNally’s proposed order by concluding
    that the Department proved Grimes’s acts constituted immorality and directing the
    Department to issue a public reprimand to Grimes. (Id. at 10.) In its memorandum,
    the Commission adopted Hearing Officer McNally’s findings of fact and added three
    more findings:
    6
    A. [Grimes] wrote Patti Wendle’s name under the section
    that states “written input received by the following
    members” on the IEP Team Signatures page of A.O.’s
    [eighth] grade IEP.
    B. [Grimes] wrote Patti Wendle’s name under the section
    that states “written input received by the following
    members” on the IEP Team Signatures page of J.M.’s
    [eighth] grade IEP.
    C. [Grimes] wrote Patti Wendle’s name under the section
    that states “written input received by the following
    members” on the IEP Team Signatures page of B.R.’s
    [eighth] grade IEP.
    (Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).) The Commission also adopted Hearing Officer
    McNally’s conclusions of law with respect to the Department’s charges of
    incompetence, negligence, and intemperance. (Id. at 5-6 n.3.) Concerning the
    charge of immorality, however, the Commission concluded that the Department
    sustained its burden to prove that Grimes’s acts offended the morals of the
    Commonwealth. (Id. at 8-9.) In coming to its conclusion, the Commission stated
    that it is responsible for setting the moral standards of the Commonwealth and may,
    therefore, determine what types of conduct offend those morals and set bad examples
    for students. (Id. at 6.) Grimes then filed the instant petition with this Court.
    II.    ISSUES
    On appeal,7 Grimes advances three arguments: (1) the Commission
    committed an error of law when it denied Grimes’s motion in limine to exclude all
    evidence related to the Release Agreement from consideration; (2) the Commission
    7
    This Court’s standard of review of an order of the Commission is limited to considering
    whether the Commission committed an error of law or violated any constitutional rights and
    whether any necessary factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704;
    Bowalick v. Dep’t of Educ., 
    840 A.2d 519
    , 522 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
    7
    committed an error of law in concluding that the Department met its burden of
    proving Grimes’s falsification of students’ IEPs constituted immorality under the
    Act; and (3) the Commission’s direction that the Department issue a public
    reprimand to Grimes is excessive because he has already been suspended from
    teaching since 2015.
    III.     DISCUSSION
    A. Motion In Limine
    Grimes first argues that the Commission erroneously dismissed his
    motion in limine to exclude all evidence related to the Release Agreement from
    consideration. Specifically, Grimes argues that the Commission should not have
    considered such evidence where:                 (1) the School District illegally submitted
    evidence by supplying witness testimony concerning Grimes’s actions in violation
    of the non-disclosure terms of the Release Agreement; (2) the doctrine of equitable
    estoppel precludes the Department from using the witness testimony supplied by the
    School District in violation of the Release Agreement; and (3) the Department and
    Commission violated Grimes’s due process rights under the United States
    Constitution8 and Pennsylvania Constitution by allowing the School District
    witnesses to testify concerning Grimes’s actions.9 The Department responds by
    stating that it is not a party to the Release Agreement, and, therefore, the arguments
    of breach of contract and preclusion by the doctrine of equitable estoppel are
    inapplicable to the Department. Further, the Department contends that it complied
    with all the requirements of due process during the disciplinary proceedings. Lastly,
    8
    See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
    9
    See Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 9, 11.
    8
    the Department argues that Section 9.1(a)(4) of the Act10 and Section 11(c) of the
    Act11 required the School District to supply relevant evidence—i.e., the witness
    testimony—to the Department.
    Where an appellate court reviews the denial of a motion in limine, our
    courts apply “an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.” Cmwlth. v.
    Hoover, 
    107 A.3d 723
    , 729 (Pa. 2014) (quoting Cmwlth. v. Rivera,
    
    983 A.2d 1211
    , 1228 (Pa. 2009)). In order for an appellate court to find that the
    tribunal abused its discretion in making the evidentiary ruling, the appellate court
    must find that the ruling was manifestly unreasonable, partial, prejudiced, biased,
    based on ill-will, or lacks such support as to constitute a clear error. 
    Id. 1. Breach
    of Contract
    Grimes contends that the Commission abused its discretion in denying
    the motion in limine because the Commission considered illegally obtained evidence
    where the School District allegedly breached its contractual obligations by offering
    witness testimony concerning Grimes’s actions as evidence. The School District,
    however, had a duty to report Grimes’s separation from the School to the Department
    pursuant to Section 9.1(a)(4) of the Act, which provides:
    (a) The chief school administrator or his designee shall
    file all of the following information with the department in
    writing on a form described by the department:
    ....
    (4) [Information concerning] [a]ny educator who
    has resigned, retired[,] or otherwise separated from
    10
    Added by the Act of December 20, 2000, P.L. 918, 24 P.S. § 2070.9a(a)(4).
    11
    Added by the Act of December 14, 1989, P.L. 612, 24 P.S. § 2070.11(c).
    9
    employment after a school entity has received
    information of alleged misconduct under this [A]ct.
    (Emphasis added.) Further, Section 11(c) of the Act, which addresses the duties of
    school entities concerning disciplinary proceedings, requires such school entities to
    “cooperate with the [D]epartment during its review, investigation or prosecution and
    promptly . . . provide the [D]epartment with any relevant information and
    documentary and physical evidence that the [D]epartment may reasonably request.”
    Also, Section 11(e) of the Act, prohibits school entities from entering into
    agreements with educators that require school entities to forego the duties in the Act
    and declares any such agreement to be void and unenforceable.
    We may infer from the evidence of record that the Department began
    to investigate Grimes’s actions because the School District complied with the
    mandatory reporting requirements of Section 9.1(a)(4) of the Act. The School
    District would, therefore, have an obligation to assist the Department with the
    investigation by submitting evidence related to this matter. Witness testimony
    concerning Grimes’s actions is, quite clearly, relevant to the matter. Further, the
    Release Agreement cannot preclude the School District from fulfilling its obligations
    under the Act pursuant to Section 11(e) of the Act. The evidence of record does not,
    therefore, indicate that the Department initiated disciplinary proceedings against
    Grimes based on illegally obtained evidence.
    Note that this conclusion relates only to Grimes’s contention that the
    Commission reviewed evidence that was illegally obtained. We do not reach the
    remainder of Grimes’s argument because it requires a conclusion as to whether the
    School District breached the contractual obligations created by the Release
    Agreement. Due to the fact that the School District is not a party to this action and
    the matter before us is simply a petition to review the Commission’s adjudication,
    10
    this is the incorrect forum to seek relief on any breach of contract claim Grimes may
    wish to assert against the School District.12 Grimes’s breach of contract argument
    is, therefore, without merit.
    2. Equitable Estoppel
    Grimes also argues that the Commission committed an abuse of
    discretion in denying Grimes’s motion in limine, because the doctrine of equitable
    estoppel precludes the Department from using the witness testimony supplied by the
    School District in violation of the Release Agreement. Grimes’s contention focuses
    on the notion that the School District somehow violated the Release Agreement by
    allowing its employees to testify about Grimes’s complained of conduct. This
    argument fails for the reasons discussed above, as the School District was statutorily
    obligated to report misconduct and cooperate with the Department, regardless of any
    agreement between Grimes and the School District.
    12
    Grimes fails to identify which specific term in the Release Agreement the School District
    violated. Based on our review of the Release Agreement, it appears that Grimes may be basing
    his argument on the following provision:
    To the extent permitted by law, the parties agree and represent that the
    existence of any terms of this [Release] Agreement are and shall remain
    confidential with the exception of disclosure by the [School] District to its attorneys
    and auditors and disclosure by [Grimes] to his attorneys, tax professionals, and
    members of his immediate family. All parties further agree that to the extent
    permitted by law, they will not disclose this [Release] Agreement or the contents
    thereof, to any person with whom they have contact, and will use their best efforts
    to ensure that any such contacted person will not violate the letter and spirit of this
    provision.
    (R.R. at 11a (emphasis added.)) Thus, pursuant to the Release Agreement, neither party is
    permitted to disclose the terms of the Release Agreement, except to the extent permitted by law.
    We note that the terms of the Release Agreement make no mention of Grimes’s complained of
    conduct. Further, the Release Agreement does not preclude disclosure of its terms outright; rather,
    it recognizes that in some instances the law may require disclosure of the Release Agreement and
    its terms. A mandatory report under Section 9.1(a)(4) of the Act could constitute such an instance.
    11
    Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable here.
    “[E]quitable estoppel recognizes that an informal promise implied by one’s words,
    deeds or representations which leads another to rely justifiably thereon to his own
    injury or detriment, may be enforced in equity.” Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v.
    Siskind, 
    457 A.2d 502
    , 503 (Pa. 1983). To the extent that Grimes contends the
    Department induced him to believe that the terms of the Release Agreement would
    not be disclosed, there is no evidence of record to support such an assertion. If
    Grimes is, instead, asserting that the School District induced him—by entering into
    the Release Agreement—to believe that the School District would not disclose
    Grimes’s actions leading up to Grimes’s discipline, such an argument may not be
    resolved in this forum. Grimes’s argument on this point, therefore, has no merit.
    3. Due Process
    Grimes next argues that the Commission committed an abuse of
    discretion in denying Grimes’s motion in limine because the Department and
    Commission violated Grimes’s due process rights under the United States
    Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution by allowing the School District
    witnesses to testify concerning Grimes’s actions. In J.P. v. Department of Human
    Services, 
    170 A.3d 575
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), this Court set forth the principles that
    govern procedural due process inquiries:
    The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment provides that no State shall ‘deprive any
    person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
    law.’ Though not explicitly mentioned, the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court has held that the guarantee of due process
    of law in Pennsylvania jurisprudence emanates from
    Article I, Sections 1, 9, and 11 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution. The due process standards of [the] United
    States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are essentially the
    same. In terms of procedural due process, the basic
    12
    elements are adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard,
    and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial
    tribunal having jurisdiction over the case. Courts examine
    procedural due process questions in two steps: the first
    asks whether there is a life, liberty, or property interest
    with which the state has interfered, and the second
    examines whether the procedures attendant to that
    deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.
    
    J.P., 170 A.3d at 580-81
    (citations omitted). As stated above, the initial question
    our courts ask is whether a life, liberty, or property interest is at stake. 
    Id. Under the
    Pennsylvania Constitution, each person in this Commonwealth has a protected
    interest in the practice of his or her chosen profession. Khan v. State Bd. of
    Auctioneer Exam’rs, 
    842 A.2d 936
    , 946 (Pa. 2004). When an individual acquires a
    license to practice a profession, the licensed individual has a protected property right
    in the practice of his or her chosen profession. 
    Id. The protections
    given to the right
    to practice a profession are, however, “subject to the lawful exercise of the power of
    the State to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals by promulgating
    laws and regulations that reasonably regulate occupations.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Once we determine the nature of the interest that is at stake, we turn to the second
    question—i.e., whether the State provided the individual being deprived of a
    protected interest with: (1) adequate notice; (2) an opportunity to be heard; and (3)
    an opportunity to defend himself or herself before an impartial adjudicator. 
    J.P., 170 A.3d at 580
    .
    Here, Grimes has a protected property right in the practice of the
    teaching profession. The Department and Commission have, however, complied
    with procedural due process procedures in the instant disciplinary action. The
    Department provided Grimes with a notice of charges.             (R.R. at 81a.)    The
    Commission conducted a hearing where Grimes was represented by counsel, given
    13
    the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and given the chance to testify and
    present witnesses in his defense.           (Id. at 18a-19a.)    The Department and the
    Commission did not, therefore, violate Grimes’s due process rights, and Grimes’s
    argument on this point has no merit. Accordingly, the Commission did not commit
    an error of law by denying Grimes’s motion in limine.
    B. Immorality Under the Act
    Grimes’s next contention on appeal is that the Commission erred in
    concluding that the Department met its burden of proving that Grimes’s falsification
    of students’ IEPs constituted immorality under the Act. In support of this contention,
    Grimes relies upon McFerren v. Farrell Area School District, 
    993 A.2d 344
    (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    12 A.3d 372
    (Pa. 2010), for the proposition that where
    immorality is unproven the charge may not stand. The Department responds by
    arguing that the Commission properly concluded that the Department proved that
    Grimes’s falsification of students’ IEPs offended the morals of the Commonwealth
    and, therefore, constituted immorality under the Act.
    In McFerren, this Court considered a high school principal’s petition
    for review of an adjudication by the Secretary of Education, affirming a school
    district’s termination of the principal’s employment under the Public School Code
    of 1949 (Public School Code).13 The complained of acts occurred in a meeting
    between the principal, a student, and the student’s parent, all of whom are of
    African-American descent.           During that meeting, in addressing the student’s
    complaints about his previous suspension, the principal explained to the student that
    a suspension from school is not as difficult as the challenges the student will face in
    the real world. The principal explained the above-stated sentiment in these words:
    13
    Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101 to 27-2702.
    14
    “you know what [Student], the white man [is] going to kick your ass.” 
    McFerren, 993 A.2d at 349
    . The school district subsequently suspended the principal from the
    school district. The Department issued charges against the principal, including
    immorality. The Secretary concluded that the principal’s statements to the student
    were per se immoral due to the racial implications therein. The Secretary determined
    that, although the school district did not provide evidence that the statement at issue
    offended the morals of the community, the statement was so offensive that it is
    immoral and sets a bad example to students.
    This Court disagreed with the Secretary’s conclusion and, instead, held
    that the principal’s conduct did not constitute immorality.         In coming to its
    conclusion, this Court discussed the definition of immorality as expressed by our
    appellate courts when deciding termination cases governed by the Public School
    Code. Immorality, in such cases, has been defined as “conduct that ‘offends the
    morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher
    is supposed to foster and to elevate.’” 
    McFerren, 993 A.2d at 353
    (quoting Horosko
    v. Sch. Dist. of Mt. Pleasant Twp., 
    6 A.2d 866
    , 868 (Pa. 1939)). Further, “the moral
    standards of the community will not be presumed; they must be proved by
    substantial evidence.” 
    Id. at 354.
    This Court concluded that case law in which acts
    were found to be per se immoral involved certain crimes of moral turpitude. 
    Id. at 354-55.
    The principal did not commit a crime, and, therefore, this Court found no
    precedent that could support a conclusion that the statement at issue was per se
    immoral. 
    Id. at 355.
    Accordingly, due to the school district’s failure to submit
    evidence proving that the principal’s comments offended the morals of the
    community, the Secretary committed an error of law in finding the principal’s
    conduct to be immoral. 
    Id. at 356.
    15
    McFerren is inapposite to the case before us. Here, the Commission
    concluded that the Department met its burden of proving that Grimes’s conduct
    constituted immorality under the Act by: (1) offering the testimony of employees of
    the School District, which avers that Grimes’s falsification of students’ IEPs
    offended them and was immoral to them; and (2) providing case law in which this
    Court and the Commission found acts of dishonesty to offend the morals of this
    Commonwealth. In contrast, the school district in McFerren offered no evidence
    whatsoever to prove that the principal’s actions offended the morals of the
    community.
    We now consider whether the Department’s proffered evidence was
    sufficient to prove that Grimes’s actions constituted immorality under the Act.
    Section 9.3(a) of the Act requires that the Commission direct the Department to
    discipline any educator who is found—by the Commission—to have committed acts
    that constitute, inter alia, immorality. The Act does not provide definitions for these
    offenses but instead requires the Commission to establish the definitions.
    24 P.S. § 2070.9c(b). To that end, the Commission has defined “immorality” as
    “conduct which offends the morals of the Commonwealth and is a bad example to
    the youth whose ideals a professional educator . . . has a duty to foster and elevate.”
    22 Pa. Code § 237.3. This definition is similar to the one discussed in cases of this
    Commonwealth that deal with terminations under Section 1122 of the Public School
    Code, 24 P.S. § 11-1122—i.e., conduct that offends the morals of the community.
    See 
    McFerren, 993 A.2d at 353
    ; Kinnery v. Abington Sch. Dist., 
    673 A.2d 429
    , 432
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); Balog v. McKeesport Area Sch. Dist., 
    484 A.2d 198
    , 200
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v. Krall, 
    445 A.2d 1377
    , 1378
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). Though the language is different, in that the cases that apply
    16
    the Commission’s definition of immorality require a finding that the acts at issue
    violated the morals of the Commonwealth as opposed to the community, the
    termination cases are persuasive as to what actions may offend the morals of the
    Commonwealth.
    In Balog, this Court reviewed a final order of the Secretary that affirmed
    a school district’s termination of an instructor. The instructor, in relevant part, made
    false statements to staff at the school district concerning whether he was in the school
    building while a robbery was in progress in the building. The school district
    terminated the instructor’s employment. It appears that the Secretary found that the
    instructor’s actions in this respect constituted immorality, and this Court agreed.
    Accordingly, this Court concluded that the instructor’s actions constituted
    immorality because “[i]mmoral conduct may include lying.” 
    Balog, 484 A.2d at 200
    .
    In Bethel Park School District, this Court determined whether the
    Secretary committed an error of law in sustaining a school district employee’s appeal
    from the school district’s decision to dismiss her on the basis of immoral conduct.
    The school district employee, having previously requested and been denied personal
    paid time off to attend conferences unrelated to work, attended one such conference
    without requesting time off. When the school district employee returned to work,
    she submitted a report of excused absences listing illness as the reason for her failure
    to report to work. The school district employee’s doctor eventually informed the
    school district of the school district employee’s misrepresentation, and the school
    district terminated her employment on the basis of immorality. The school district
    employee appealed the matter to the Secretary, who determined that the school
    district employee did not act immorally.         This Court disagreed, stating that
    17
    “questions of morality . . . may include lying.” Bethel Park Sch. 
    Dist., 445 A.2d at 1378
    . In dismissal cases, if a reasonable person would have reached the same
    result—i.e., to terminate the individual—then the decision to terminate should stand.
    
    Id. at 1378-79.
    Accordingly, this Court vacated the Secretary’s order and reinstated
    the school district’s decision to terminate the school district employee.
    In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that Grimes inserted
    Ms. Wendle’s name and a date into students’ IEP transition plans when Ms. Wendle
    is the only individual with the authority to do so and also committed these acts with
    the intent to deceive the reader into believing that Ms. Wendle completed the
    transition plans. (R.R. at 25a-27a.) These actions are more egregious than simply
    lying to staff of the school district, as in Balog, and lying on an excused absence
    form as in Bethel Park School District. Grimes falsified federally mandated IEPs to
    create the impression that Ms. Wendle completed the transition process herself.14
    Based on the factual findings and the state of the law, the Commission did not err in
    concluding that Grimes’s conduct offended the morals of the Commonwealth and
    constituted immorality.
    C. Excessiveness of Public Reprimand
    Grimes’s final argument is that, in light of the fact that he has been
    suspended from the teaching profession since 2015, the Commission’s demand that
    the Department issue a public reprimand to Grimes is excessive. Grimes also
    contends that the public reprimand will bar him from being employed as a teacher
    in the future. To begin with, there is no evidence of record that indicates that the
    Commission ever suspended Grimes’s license. Rather, the School District merely
    14
    See R.R. at 32a, Finding of Fact (F.F.) 76. We note that this finding of fact remains
    unchallenged on appeal.
    18
    suspended Grimes from teaching within that district, and Grimes then resigned from
    his employment. (R.R. at 10a, 28a.) Further, as stated earlier in this opinion, the
    Commission is required to direct the Department to impose disciplinary measures
    on any educator who is found by the Commission to have committed acts that
    constitute, inter alia, immorality. 24 P.S. § 2070.9c(a). Section 1.2 of the Act, added
    by the Act of December 20, 2000, P.L. 918, 24 P.S. § 2070.1b, includes public
    reprimand within the definition of “discipline.”15 The Commission is, therefore,
    well within its right to impose this disciplinary measure. In light of the facts of this
    case, the Commission’s order does not impose an excessive disciplinary measure.
    IV.     CONCLUSION
    Based on the discussion above, we affirm the Commission’s
    adjudication.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    15
    Section 1.2 of the Act defines “discipline” as:
    (1) Private reprimand.
    (2) Public reprimand.
    (3) Suspension.
    (4) Revocation.
    (5) Surrender.
    (6) Supplemental sanctions.
    19
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Lance Grimes,                                 :
    Petitioner       :    CASE SEALED
    :
    v.                              :    No. 1365 C.D. 2018
    :
    Department of Education,                      :
    Respondent            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 12th day of July, 2019, the order of the Pennsylvania
    Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) is hereby
    AFFIRMED.
    Because this Court intends to report this opinion should “proceedings
    result[] in public discipline,” such that the confidentiality requirements of
    Section 17.2(a) of the Educator Discipline Act (the Act)16 become inapplicable, the
    Department of Education, after the matter has been completed and all available
    16
    Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, added by Act of December 18, 2013,
    P.L. 1205, 24 P.S. § 2070.17b(a), imposes confidentiality and provides, in part, as follows:
    [A]ll information relating to any complaints or any proceedings relating to or
    resulting from such complaints, including the identity of the complainant, shall
    remain confidential, unless or until discipline is imposed, other than a private
    reprimand or a supplemental sanction deemed private by the commission . . . . All
    records pertaining to proceedings resulting in public discipline, excluding those
    records that are privileged or otherwise protected from release, shall become
    public after the exhaustion of all appeals except where the [C]ommission has
    determined that immediate discipline is necessary. Records pertaining to
    immediate discipline proceedings are public at the time that the immediate
    discipline is imposed.
    (Emphasis added.)
    appeal rights have been exhausted, is directed to inform this Court as to whether
    discipline has been imposed such that the opinion may be reported in accordance
    with Section 17.2(a) of the Act.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge