P. Brennan v. WCAB (Com. of PA) ( 2016 )


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  •                 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Patricia Brennan,                             :
    Petitioner               :
    :   No. 270 C.D. 2016
    v.                              :
    :   Submitted: September 9, 2016
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal                  :
    Board (Commonwealth of                        :
    Pennsylvania),                                :
    Respondent                    :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                           FILED: December 21, 2016
    Patricia Brennan (Claimant) petitions for review of the January 28, 2016,
    order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed the
    decision and order of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) granting the
    suspension petition filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania
    House of Representatives) (Employer).1
    For thirteen years, Claimant managed the district office of an elected
    member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Claimant described her job
    duties as follows:
    1
    The WCJ also granted a petition to review compensation benefits filed by Claimant, but
    that petition is not at issue in the present appeal.
    I took constituent complaints and put them into the
    constituent tracking system. I followed up with different
    departments to resolve the concerns of the constituents. I
    took care of the legislator’s calendar again on the computer.
    I managed all of her activities, schedules, ordered supplies
    for the office…I greeted people as they came in, dealt with
    their problems, put away supplies, filed, faxed, data
    entry…day was spent on the computer keyboard…I’d say at
    least fifty percent.
    (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 5(b); Reproduced Record, R.R. at 245a-246a.) In June
    of 2012, Claimant began suffering pain in her left wrist and thumb, which ultimately
    caused her to stop working and seek medical treatment.                  Employer issued a Notice
    of Compensation Payable (NCP) dated September 24, 2012, acknowledging that
    Claimant sustained a work-related injury in the nature of a left wrist strain due to
    repetitive motion.2 On June 25, 2013, Claimant filed a review petition seeking to add
    deQuervain’s Syndrome to the description of her work injury.                    Employer filed an
    answer denying the allegations of this petition. On June 6, 2013, following an
    independent medical examination which determined that Claimant could perform
    sedentary work and the offer of a modified job on April 3, 2013, to which Claimant
    did not respond, Employer filed a petition to suspend Claimant’s compensation
    benefits. On January 15, 2014, as these petitions were pending, Employer issued an
    Amended/Corrected NCP to add deQuervain’s Syndrome to the description of the
    work injury. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact Nos.1- 5.)
    Nevertheless, both petitions were assigned to the WCJ, who proceeded
    with hearings. Claimant testified that she first noticed pain in her left wrist and
    thumb in June 2012, and that she subsequently commenced treatment with Dr. Mark
    Avart.         After a series of referrals and recommendations of surgery from several
    2
    The WCJ’s decision incorrectly identifies the date of the NCP as December 7, 2012.
    2
    orthopedic physicians, Claimant began treating with Dr. Robert Cabry in December
    of 2012.    Despite staying with Dr. Cabry for treatment, she noticed little if any
    improvement in her symptoms.          Claimant also testified that although she has
    difficulty performing activities of daily living, she was able to perform volunteer
    work for a community association and that she sent emails from her home computer
    and participated on the social media site Facebook. Additionally, Claimant admitted
    to receiving Employer’s job offer but felt she could not perform the duties of the
    modified job. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact No. 5.)
    In support of her review petition and in opposition to Employer’s
    suspension petition, Claimant presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Cabry, who
    is board-certified in family and sports medicine.    Dr. Cabry first saw Claimant on
    December 10, 2012, at which time he confirmed her diagnosis of deQuervain’s
    Syndrome.        Dr. Cabry noted that deQuervain’s Syndrome typically results from
    overuse and he related Claimant’s condition to her clerical work for Employer. Dr.
    Cabry performed regenerative injection therapy on Claimant’s left wrist during this
    visit, and performed the same procedure on Claimant’s right wrist during a second
    visit on January 9, 2013. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact No. 8.)
    Dr. Cabry testified that Claimant reported moderate relief from these
    procedures but that she still had ongoing complaints of pain throughout the course of
    her treatment.     Dr. Cabry specifically opined that Claimant could not perform the
    duties of the modified job offered by Employer.     On cross-examination, Dr. Cabry
    admitted that he was not aware that Claimant had ceased working as of July 2012 and
    that said facts do not change his opinion as to the causation of Claimant’s right wrist
    symptoms. Dr. Cabry also acknowledged that he imposed no restrictions on
    Claimant’s work activities following her initial visit in December 2012, or during any
    3
    subsequent visits until April 2013.   Finally, Dr. Cabry agreed that Claimant could
    perform sedentary work, such as sitting at a desk and answering phones. (WCJ’s
    Finding of Fact No. 8.)
    In support of its suspension petition, Employer offered the deposition
    testimony of Louise Reaves, the Human Resources Director of the Democratic
    Caucus of the House of Representatives, who had responsibility for employment
    issues, including working with employees with workers’ compensation issues. Ms.
    Reaves testified that Employer offered Claimant a job modified to meet restrictions
    imposed by Dr. Elizabeth Post, the physician who examined Claimant on behalf of
    Employer.    The proposed job offer contained modified duties but no wage loss for
    Claimant. The job was set to begin April 3, 2013, but Claimant did not appear for
    the modified job, which remained available to Claimant. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact
    Nos. 6.)
    Employer also offered the deposition testimony of Dr. Post, who is
    board-certified in neurological surgery. Dr. Post performed an independent medical
    examination of Claimant on February 12, 2013, and found an ongoing problem of
    deQuervain’s Syndrome, although she could not “specifically relate it to any incident
    at work,” but had “no reason to doubt” that deQuervain’s Syndrome was the result of
    repetitive stress at work.   Dr. Post approved the modified job offered by the
    Employer. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 7.)
    Ultimately, the WCJ issued a decision granting Claimant’s review
    petition and granting Employer’s suspension petition as of April 3, 2013.         In
    rendering her decision, the WCJ rejected Claimant’s testimony as not credible
    because (1) Claimant acknowledged volunteer and home activities inconsistent with
    her professed symptoms; (2) Claimant was unable to obtain relief from a number of
    4
    “well-credentialed orthopedic surgeons with a subspecialty in the hands;” (3) “[t]he
    Claimant has failed to adequately explain why and what portions of the light duty
    employment offer made by the Employer , she felt she could not have performed in
    light of her current activities;” and (4) “[t]he Claimant has failed to adequately
    explain why she did not respond to the employment offer made by the Employer until
    the day she was to return to work.” (WCJ’s Finding of Fact No. 9.) The WCJ
    credited Ms. Reaves’s testimony, especially in light of the fact that “there is no
    factual contest to the job offer being made and received by the Claimant” and Ms.
    Reaves’s testimony was consistent with Claimant’s own testimony regarding the
    modified job duties and Claimant’s failure to return to work. (WCJ’s Finding of Fact
    No. 10.)
    In resolving the differences of the medical experts, the WCJ found Dr.
    Post more credible than Dr. Cabry based on experience and qualifications, Dr. Post’s
    review of a broader array of medical records, and that “Dr. Cabry failed to adequately
    explain why the Claimant could not perform the employment duties set firth [sic] in
    the job offer in light of her activities of daily living, i.e., her volunteer activities along
    with her home activities.” (WCJ’s Finding of Fact. No. 11.) Claimant appealed to
    the Board, but the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
    On appeal to this Court,3 Claimant argues that the Board erred in
    affirming the WCJ’s decision because the record lacks substantial and competent
    evidence that she was capable of performing the modified job offered by Employer.
    3
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether findings of fact are supported by
    substantial evidence, whether an error of law has been committed, or whether constitutional rights
    have been violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §704; Meadow
    Lakes Apartments v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Spencer), 
    894 A.2d 214
    , 261 n.3 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2006).
    5
    More specifically, Claimant argues that the reasons stated by the WCJ for granting
    Employer’s suspension petition, i.e., Claimant’s ability to perform volunteer and
    home activities, her rejection of the opinions of respected orthopedic surgeons, her
    ability to perform the modified job, and the WCJ’s credibility determinations with
    respect to Dr. Post and Dr. Cabry were not supported in the record. We disagree.
    An employer is faced with the following process when a job offer is
    made:
    (1) The employer must show that the employee has
    recovered some or all ability, that is, a change in medical
    condition;
    (2) The employer must show that it offered referrals to
    then-open jobs for which the employee has been given
    medical clearance;
    (3) The employee must then demonstrate that he or she
    had in good faith followed up on the job referral; and,
    (4) If the referral fails to result in a job, the claimant’s
    benefits should continue.
    Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco Construction
    Company), 
    532 A.2d 374
    , 380 (Pa. 1987).4
    In a workers’ compensation proceeding, the WCJ is the ultimate fact
    finder and is the sole authority for determining the weight and credibility of evidence.
    Lombardo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Topps Company, Inc.), 698
    4
    Although Kachinski was superseded, in part, when the General Assembly amended Section
    306(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77
    P.S. § 512, to add subsection (2) in 1996, Riddle v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Allegheny City Electric, Inc.), 
    981 A.2d 1288
    , 1292-1293 (Pa. 2009), Kachinski “is still applicable
    in situations where an employer seeks a modification of benefits based on an offer of a specific job
    with the employer.” South Hills Health System v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kiefer),
    
    806 A.2d 962
    , 968 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002).
    
    6 A.2d 1378
    , 1381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). “As such, the WCJ is free to accept or reject
    the testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses, in whole or in part.” 
    Id.
    The WCJ’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal when they are supported by
    substantial, competent evidence. Greenwich Collieries v. Workmen’s Compensation
    Appeal Board (Buck), 
    664 A.2d 703
    , 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). “Substantial evidence
    is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
    support a finding.” Berardelli v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bureau of
    Personnel, State Workmen’s Insurance Fund), 
    578 A.2d 1016
    , 1018 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1990). Moreover, where both parties present evidence, it is irrelevant that the record
    contains evidence which supports a finding contrary to that made by the WCJ; rather,
    the pertinent inquiry is whether evidence exists that supports the WCJ’s findings.
    Hoffmaster v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Senco Products, Inc.), 
    721 A.2d 1152
    , 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    In the present case, while Claimant argues that the reasons underlying
    the WCJ’s grant of Employer’s suspension petition were not supported by substantial
    evidence, Claimant’s argument actually constitutes an impermissible attempt to
    relitigate the WCJ’s credibility determinations. As noted above, the WCJ accepted
    the testimony of Dr. Post as credible and rejected any inconsistent testimony of Dr.
    Cabry. Even under extensive cross-examination, Dr. Post repeatedly opined that
    Claimant was capable of performing the duties of the modified job offered by
    Employer. Further, the WCJ rejected Claimant’s testimony regarding her purported
    inability to perform these duties as not credible. In this regard, the WCJ weighed
    Claimant’s professed limitations with Claimant’s volunteer and home activities and
    found Claimant able to perform the duties of the modified job. Finally, the WCJ
    found the testimony of Ms. Reaves to be credible, which established an available job
    7
    within Claimant’s physical capabilities, at no wage loss, but which Claimant
    nonetheless declined to accept. Further, Ms. Reaves noted that the modified job
    remained available to Claimant after Claimant declined the position.
    Because the testimony accepted as credible by the WCJ supports her
    decision suspending Claimant’s benefits as of April 3, 2013, the date the modified job
    was set to begin, the Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s decision.
    Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Patricia Brennan,                  :
    Petitioner     :
    :    No. 270 C.D. 2016
    v.                     :
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal       :
    Board (Commonwealth of             :
    Pennsylvania),                     :
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2016, the order of the
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, dated January 28, 2016, is hereby
    affirmed.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Patricia Brennan,                       :
    : No. 270 C.D. 2016
    Petitioner     : Submitted: September 9, 2016
    :
    v.                  :
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal            :
    Board (Commonwealth of                  :
    Pennsylvania),                          :
    :
    Respondent     :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    DISSENTING OPINION
    BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN                            FILED: December 21, 2016
    Because the evidence credited by the WCJ fails to establish that
    Employer offered Claimant a position within her capabilities and restrictions, I
    respectfully dissent.
    Claimant worked for Employer for 13 years. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact,
    No. 5a.) Her duties included inputting constituent complaints into a tracking system,
    managing a legislator’s calendar on the computer, greeting people, putting away
    supplies, filing, faxing, and data entry. (Id., No. 5b.) Claimant spent approximately
    50% of her day on the computer. (Id.) Due to the repetitive motion at work,
    Claimant sustained a left wrist strain and suffers from deQuervain’s Syndrome, which
    results in constant wrist pain. (Id., Nos. 4, 5.) Claimant received benefits pursuant to
    a notice of compensation payable. (Id., No. 4.)
    Thereafter, Employer offered Claimant a position with duties similar to
    her pre-injury position except that it was “Modified to Accommodate Limited
    Typing/Filing Less Than Two (2) Hours Per Day.” (Job Description; Reaves Dep. at
    9-10.) The modified job required Claimant to answer phones, greet visitors, manage
    calendars and scheduling, maintain office supplies, prepare written correspondence,
    and perform clerical duties including: typing, faxing, filing, and collating. (Job
    Description.) Employer’s witness acknowledged that the modified position required
    Claimant to type 55 words per minute, with no more than four errors, in order to
    perform the duties of the modified position. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, No. 6e).
    Dr. Post, whose testimony the WCJ credited, acknowledged that
    Claimant has deQuervain’s Syndrome, which was the result of repetitive stresses at
    work. (Id., No. 7.) Claimant experiences constant wrist pain, which gets worse when
    she types. (Id., No. 7d, h.) “[Claimant] was very clear to me that the one thing that
    bothered her the most was the typing.” (Id., No. 7j.) Although Claimant’s “typing
    should be limited,” Dr. Post opined that Claimant could work in a sedentary capacity.
    (Id., No. 7g.) Dr. Post testified that Claimant could not perform her pre-injury job,
    but Claimant could perform the modified job, which restricted her typing to less than
    two hours. (Id.) Although not stated in the modified job description, Dr. Post
    “presumed” that continuous typing would not be required. Dr. Post testified:
    Q.    So a combination of filing and typing it’s your
    understanding [it] would be limited to less than two hours
    per day?
    RSF - 2 -
    A.     Yes.
    Q.     How do you arrive at that, Dr. Post, the two hour
    criteria?
    A.    To some extent it’s arbitrary, but it doesn’t seem to
    be a lot of time. It’s a very small percentage of the
    workday. It didn’t seem to be unreasonable, and I presume
    it would not be consecutive.
    (Post. Dep., 10/14/13, at 29-30.) (Emphasis added).
    I cannot agree with the majority that the modified job, which requires
    Claimant to type 55 words per minute on a consecutive basis for up to two hours a
    day, amounting to 25% of her workday, is within Claimant’s capabilities and
    restrictions. Dr. Post’s testimony does not support the determination that Claimant
    can perform the modified position. First, although Dr. Post acknowledged that typing
    caused Claimant the most pain, Dr. Post “arbitrarily” determined that Claimant could
    type for two hours. Secondly, Dr. Post “presumed” the modified position would not
    require consecutive typing. However, the modified job description did not contain
    this “presumption.” In fact, typing 55 words per minute was a requirement of the
    modified job.
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    RSF - 3 -