The PSU v. WCAB (Underhill) ( 2019 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    The Pennsylvania State University,              :
    :
    Petitioner        :
    :
    v.                       : No. 1662 C.D. 2018
    : Submitted: April 5, 2019
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal                    :
    Board (Underhill),                              :
    :
    Respondent        :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                               FILED: November 15, 2019
    The Pennsylvania State University (Employer) petitions for review
    from the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s (Board) order that affirmed a
    Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) order granting William Underhill’s
    (Claimant) Claim, Reinstatement and Penalty Petitions and awarding counsel fees
    under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 Employer argues that the WCJ erred
    and abused her discretion by granting Claimant’s Penalty Petition and awarding
    counsel fees based on Employer’s alleged mishandling of the submission of
    appropriate documents. Employer also claims that the WCJ erred by granting
    1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
    Claimant’s Claim and Reinstatement Petitions and awarding indemnity and
    medical expenses beyond February 3, 2016. Upon review, we affirm.
    I. Background
    Claimant worked for Employer for 11 years as a catering employee.
    On March 14, 2016, Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that he sustained a
    left knee patella subluxation/meniscus tear occurring on November 5, 2015, in the
    course and scope of his employment. Claimant sought partial disability benefits
    from November 6, 2015, to November 8, 2015, and total disability benefits
    thereafter, along with the payment of medical bills. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
    1a-3a.
    Employer filed an answer stating that it issued a Notice of Temporary
    Compensation Payable (NTCP) on December 7, 2015, and paid benefits until
    February 3, 2016, when Employer issued a Notice Stopping Temporary
    Compensation (Notice Stopping) and a Notice of Compensation Denial (Denial).
    The Denial acknowledged a left knee sprain with a closed period payable from
    November 10, 2015 through February 2, 2016. Employer denied any ongoing
    disability. R.R. at 4a-5a.
    Thereafter, Claimant filed Penalty and Reinstatement Petitions
    alleging that Employer unilaterally stopped payment of total disability benefits on
    February 3, 2016, without following the statutory requirements. Claimant asserted
    that Employer’s Notice Stopping and the Denial, both dated February 3, 2016,
    were null and void because no NTCP was ever filed with the Bureau of Workers’
    Compensation (Bureau). Having failed to file an NTCP, Employer’s payment of
    total disability benefits up to February 2, 2016, constituted an admission of liability
    2
    tantamount to issuing a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).            Claimant
    asserted that total disability benefits are payable as of February 3, 2016, and
    ongoing. In addition, Claimant requested penalties in the amount of 50 percent of
    unpaid benefits along with the payment of counsel fees based on Employer’s
    violation of the Act. R.R. at 8a.
    Employer filed a timely answer denying all material allegations in
    Claimant’s Penalty and Reinstatement Petitions. Employer alleged that its carrier
    filed an NTCP dated November 30, 2015, by mail, which the Bureau received as
    acknowledged by its notice of receipt dated December 7, 2015. It also served the
    NTCP on Claimant by mail. Employer appropriately stopped benefits on February
    3, 2016. R.R. at 12a.
    Claimant subsequently amended his petitions to indicate that a
    suspension of benefits was appropriate as of September 19, 2016, based on his
    return to full-duty work.
    Hearings before a WCJ ensued on all petitions. Claimant testified and
    presented the deposition testimony of Bureau Representative Harte Pricer (Bureau
    Representative), and his treating physician, Mark Buseck, M.D., a board-certified
    orthopedic surgeon (Claimant’s Physician). In opposition, Employer presented
    Bureau documents, three surveillance videos, and the deposition testimony of
    Carrie Andrews, the carrier’s claims adjuster (Claims Adjuster), John Michael
    Lindner, Employer’s Director of Housing and Food Services, and Thomas Kramer,
    M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon (Employer’s Physician). A summary
    of the relevant testimony and findings follows.
    With regard to the injury, Claimant testified his job as a catering
    employee was relatively physical and involved lifting heavy boxes and moving
    3
    food carts. He testified that he injured his left knee while pulling a pallet jack with
    a heavy load that was stuck in an elevator. When he strained, he felt and heard a
    pop in his left knee, accompanied by an onset of pain, which continues. He
    worked the rest of his shift, then reported the injury to his supervisor and filled out
    an incident report. The next day, he returned to work, but could not continue
    working. He received treatment and returned to work with light-duty restrictions,
    which were no lifting over 10 pounds and no standing for more than two hours in a
    shift. Claimant worked Saturday, November 7, 2015, and was not scheduled to
    work on Sunday, November 8, 2015. He reported to work on Monday, November
    9, 2015, but only worked a couple hours before his manager told him there was no
    more light-duty work available.      Claimant testified that he received workers’
    compensation benefits until he returned to light-duty work on December 14, 2015.
    WCJ’s Op., 6/30/17, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 9; R.R. at 43a-51a.
    On December 16, 2015, Claimant returned to Claimant’s Physician’s
    office, reporting increased pain in his knee, at which point, Claimant was taken off
    work.    On February 26, 2016, Claimant’s Physician performed surgery on
    Claimant, where a cadaver bone was used to repair his medial patellofemoral
    ligament. After surgery, Claimant developed deep vein thrombosis blood clots and
    was treated with blood thinners, physical therapy, and a brace. In April 2016,
    Claimant underwent another anesthesia procedure, performed by his Physician, to
    manipulate his knee. Claimant’s condition improved and he was released to light-
    duty work on July 1, 2016, but work within his restrictions was not offered.
    Claimant testified that he returned to full-duty work on September 19, 2016, and
    has been working ever since. He continues treatment for his knee, which remains
    symptomatic and painful. F.F. Nos. 9, 13; R.R. at 51a-59a.
    4
    Claimant’s Physician testified that he examined and began treating
    Claimant’s left knee injury on December 7, 2015. Claimant’s Physician took a
    history from Claimant, reviewed his medical records, and conducted a medical
    exam. He observed swelling of the left knee and mobility issues. Claimant’s
    Physician diagnosed Claimant with patellar subluxation with disruption of the
    medial patellofemoral ligament. He released Claimant to light-duty work. Upon a
    return examination on December 16, 2015, Claimant reported that his knee pain
    had worsened and he had difficulty climbing in and out of his work truck. At this
    point, a physician’s assistant removed Claimant from work. At a follow-up visit in
    January 2016, Claimant continued to complain of pain and swelling.            The
    diagnosis remained the same. Due to the persistence of pain, Claimant’s Physician
    recommended surgical intervention. He operated on Claimant on February 26,
    2016. Thereafter, Claimant developed deep vein thrombosis, which slowed down
    Claimant’s therapy and recovery.     Claimant’s Physician performed a second
    surgical procedure to manipulate the left knee. Thereafter, Claimant’s condition
    continued to improve. Claimant’s Physician released Claimant to full-duty work
    as of September 19, 2016. Claimant’s Physician opined that Claimant’s left knee
    condition was causally related to the November 5, 2015, work injury as described
    by Claimant. F.F. No. 18.
    Employer presented surveillance evidence, in the form of three videos
    and a report. The WCJ found:
    The one dated December 22, 2015 is very unstable and
    difficult to watch, but appears to show . . . Claimant
    walking at the Grove City Outlet. The surveillance
    appears to be following three (3) young men, however,
    you can only see them from behind and the picture is
    extremely jittery and it’s impossible to note the gait of
    any of the individuals. Subsequent footage shows what
    5
    appears to be young men trying on shirts or jackets, but
    the footage is in shadows and you can’t make out who
    any of the individuals are let alone how they are moving.
    The other two (2) DVDs are of better quality, but
    similarly show . . . Claimant walking, sometimes with a
    limp, for relatively short periods of time. Sometimes the
    footage is of . . . Claimant going to or leaving physical
    therapy.
    F.F. No. 17.
    When questioned about the surveillance, Claimant explained that he
    “sucked it up” and was “willing to pay for it afterwards” in order to buy Christmas
    gifts for his children. F.F. No. 9; R.R. at 68a. He also testified that he was
    wearing a brace on his knee while shopping and it was very sore after the trip.
    R.R. at 73a.
    Employer’s Physician testified that he conducted an independent
    medical examination (IME) of Claimant on February 2, 2016.            Based on his
    understanding regarding the mechanism of injury, his review of medical records
    and diagnostic studies, as well as his physical examination of Claimant,
    Employer’s Physician testified that Claimant had some edema within the patella,
    but no evidence of tearing of the medial patellofemoral ligament, meniscal tear or
    any evidence to suggest any collateral ligament or cruciate ligament tear that
    would require surgery. Employer’s Physician opined that Claimant sustained a
    work injury resulting in a left knee sprain, from which Claimant had fully
    recovered as of his examination. F.F. No. 19.
    With regard to the submission of paperwork in connection with
    Claimant’s injury, Employer uploaded Bureau documents, which included:           a
    “Receipt of Temporary Notice of Compensation Payable” letter dated December 7,
    2015 (Receipt); a Statement of Wages dated February 3, 2016; a Notice Stopping
    dated February 3, 2016, providing that, as of that date, Employer decided not to
    6
    accept liability for the injury; and a Denial, also dated February 3, 2016. The
    Bureau records do not contain an NTCP (form LIBC-501). F.F. No. 5.
    The WCJ reviewed the Bureau documents in the Workers’
    Compensation Automation and Integration System (WCAIS), which confirmed
    that Employer uploaded a Statement of Wages, Notice Stopping, and Denial, all
    submitted February 3, 2016.2 The Bureau received a first report of injury (FROI)
    via an electronic data interchange (EDI) on December 1, 2015, at which point a
    jurisdictional claim number (JCN) was electronically assigned and sent to Claims
    Adjuster for future submissions. The WCJ also noted a subsequent report of injury
    (SROI) filed on December 7, 2015 and another SROI filed on February 4, 2016.
    Under correspondence, the WCJ noted that the Bureau sent the Receipt on
    December 7, 2015. The WCAIS does not note the filing of an NTCP. F.F. No. 6.
    Employer also uploaded into evidence an NTCP on April 25, 2016.
    However, the WCJ found that there is nothing on this NTCP to show that it was
    ever filed with the Bureau. There is no date or time stamp or numerals at the
    bottom as compared to other Bureau records that Employer uploaded. The NTCP
    bears the Claims Adjuster’s signature, but there is no indication as to the date that
    it was signed. Claims Adjuster did not upload this form into WCAIS as she had
    the other Bureau documents. F.F. No. 7.
    Bureau Representative testified that the Bureau sent the Receipt
    advising that an NTCP was being issued in response to an EDI transaction
    2
    The WCAIS is the Department of Labor and Industry’s web-based system that
    integrates the program areas of the Bureau, Workers’ Compensation Office of Adjudication
    (Office), and the Board. It enables users to file petitions, applications, forms and other
    documents online with the Bureau and the Office and is found at
    https://www.dli.pa.gov/Businesses/Compensation/WC/claims/wcais/Pages/PA-WC-Automation-
    and-Integration-System.aspx (last visited 10/15/19).
    7
    notifying the Bureau that the carrier intended to file an NTCP. However, she
    testified that the NTCP was never filed electronically in the WCAIS. It was not
    filed by mail. She acknowledged that the JCN was not issued until December 1,
    2015, with the filing of an FROI. She testified that, since September 2016, the EDI
    transaction generates the NCP, NTCP, Notice Stopping and Denial.             These
    documents can only be filed electronically. There are no longer paper filings of
    these documents. F.F. No. 12.
    Claims Adjuster testified that she has handled Claimant’s case since
    its inception. She works out of her home residence in Georgia and has done so
    since November 13, 2015; the office move occurred not long after Claimant’s work
    injury. She testified that she signed and mailed a hard copy of the NTCP on
    November 30, 2015, or December 1, 2015. She sent the hard copy of the NTCP by
    mail because the Bureau had not yet released a JCN on the claim because the FROI
    was not filed.   Claims Adjuster testified that, according to her log note of
    November 30, 2015, she mailed a copy of the NTCP to both the Bureau and
    Claimant. She received the Receipt dated December 7, 2015, indicating the NTCP
    was received. Claims Adjuster testified that she relied upon the Bureau’s Receipt
    and believed that the Bureau had received the hard copy of the NTCP filed by
    mail. It was not until after the litigation began that she learned the Bureau was
    contending that it never received the NTCP. She stated Claimant never told her he
    did not receive the NTCP. She testified that she ultimately stopped the NTCP and
    issued a Denial on February 3, 2016, based on the IME and her review of the
    surveillance videos. F.F. No. 14.
    In addition, Claims Adjuster testified regarding Employer’s “Three
    for One” Program (Program), which enables an injured employee to collect his or
    8
    her regular salary while out of work. Pursuant to this Program, Employer issued
    payments to Claimant from November 10, 2015, through February 2, 2016, with
    two exceptions: December 24, 2015, through January 3, 2016, when Claimant
    received holiday pay and December 14 and 16, 2015, when he returned to work
    and partial disability was issued. F.F. No. 14.
    On cross-examination, Claims Adjuster testified that an EDI
    transaction for FROI was filed with the Bureau on December 1, 2015, but she did
    not generate the FROI. Instead, it was generated by the WCAIS. While she had
    no specific recollection, she assumed that when she was preparing the NTCP on
    November 30, 2015, and found no JCN, she realized that there was no FROI on
    file. Typically, if she sees something missing, she will generate it. She planned to
    generate the FROI the following day, but did not do so because she saw that the
    system had just done it. She had no exact recollection of this, but was able to
    positively state that the FROI was generated on December 1, 2015. According to
    her notes, she received the JCN on December 2, 2015. At the time that she
    prepared the NTCP, she did not have the claim number. Claims Adjuster admitted
    that after mailing the NTCP, she did not check WCAIS to see if it was duly
    recorded. Once she received the Receipt, it did not occur to her that the NTCP had
    not arrived at the Bureau. On February 3, 2016, she prepared and electronically
    filed a Notice Stopping and Denial, and although she would have seen the NTCP
    was missing on WCAIS at that point, she did not look for it. F.F. No. 14.
    Claimant testified he did not receive the NTCP, but acknowledged
    receiving the Bureau’s Receipt. See F.F. No. 21; R.R. at 58a-59a. Claimant also
    acknowledged he was paid under Employer’s Program from the date of injury
    through February 2, 2016. F.F. No. 9; R.R. at 65a.
    9
    Ultimately, the WCJ credited the testimony of Claimant in its entirety.
    “His testimony was straightforward, consistent over several hearings and
    consistent with his medical evidence.” F.F. No. 20. The WCJ found Claimant’s
    Physician to be more credible than Employer’s Physician, noting that Claimant’s
    Physician treated Claimant over an extended period of time, saw the inside of
    Claimant’s knee during surgery, provided conservative treatment before surgery,
    and returned Claimant to work without restrictions. On the other hand, Employer’s
    Physician saw Claimant only once, his documented findings were inconsistent with
    other providers, and he conceded that his diagnosis of knee sprain would allow for
    a more specific subluxation diagnosis. F.F. No. 22.
    In addition, the WCJ found Bureau Representative more credible than
    Employer’s Claims Adjuster with regard to the filing of the NTCP. The WCJ
    explained:
    I do not dispute that [Claims Adjuster] may have
    intended to mail and even thought she would have mailed
    the [NTCP] to . . . Claimant and the Bureau. However,
    she was not sure whether this mailing occurred on
    November 30, 2015, or December 1, 2015 and she had no
    specific recollection of actually mailing the [NTCP]. Her
    Claim Notes, attached to the deposition as Exhibit 1,
    contain the note from 11/30/2015 at 10:26 p.m. saying
    “Issued [an NTCP] . . .” and “Will scan and image to SIR
    [(the carrier’s document storage program)]. . . .”
    According to her testimony, she prepared the [NTCP]
    that night, the copies were not mailed when the note says
    they were, WCAIS shows that the Statement of Wages
    was not filed when the JCN populated, but several
    months later on February 3, 2016 when the Notice
    Stopping and Denial were issued, and that she admitted
    she did not scan the images to SIR until months later,
    mistakenly just leaving it on her desktop. When she did
    not do any of the other things listed in her claim note, I
    am at a loss to believe that she mailed the [NTCP] to
    10
    . . . Claimant and the Bureau a day later. That the
    [NTCP] was not received by . . . Claimant or the Bureau
    is further indication of [Claims Adjuster’s] testimony not
    being credible. [Employer] asks me to believe that both
    . . . Claimant and the Bureau are not credible in their
    testimony that the [NTCP] was not provided. Had the
    Claim[s Adjuster] correctly mailed the [NTCP] to both
    the Bureau and . . . Claimant, one of them should have
    noted its receipt. I do not accept that both recipients
    made the same mistake at the same time. It is more
    likely that the mistake lies with [Claims Adjuster],
    particularly in light of her moving her office right around
    the same time and not completing most of the tasks listed
    in her Claim Note of 11/30/15. She also did not initially
    generate the FROI or even attempt to issue any other
    documents until November 30, 2015, when the injury
    occurred November 5, 2015. Had the FROI been timely
    recorded, this could have resolved every other issue that
    occurred. Finally, it is also noted that [Claims Adjuster]
    testified that it was her intent to actually accept this claim
    for a closed period, however, she did not actually issue a
    Bureau Document to this effect. Rather, the . . . Denial
    was issued acknowledging a left knee sprain with a
    closed period payable from November 10, 2015, through
    February 2, 2016, and stating that any ongoing disability
    and/or injury is denied. This is not the proper use of a
    Denial and does not demonstrate a legal acceptance of
    the claim. Rather, it appears that she was again taking
    unilateral action without actually accepting any legal
    liability.
    F.F. No. 21.
    Based on the credited evidence, the WCJ found that Claimant
    sustained a left knee injury on November 5, 2015, in the nature of a patella
    subluxation with disruption of the medial patellofemoral ligament with surgery
    resulting in deep vein thrombosis, which caused a loss of earning power. F.F. No.
    23. The WCJ also found that Employer never properly filed an NTCP and did not
    issue an FROI in a timely manner. F.F. No. 23.
    11
    The WCJ concluded that Claimant met his burden on all petitions.
    The Receipt is not a Bureau form that actually accepts the injury as compensable
    on a temporary basis. An actual NTCP must be filed with the Bureau, either
    electronically or by mail. Because the NTCP was not properly filed, Employer
    could not modify or stop payment of benefits. The WCJ further concluded that
    Claimant was entitled to all partial and total disability benefits due until he
    returned to full-duty work on September 19, 2016, at which point benefits were
    suspended. WCJ Op., Conclusion of Law (C.L.) No. 5.
    With regard to the Penalty Petition, the WCJ determined that
    Employer violated the Act by not timely submitting an FROI, failing to file an
    NTCP, unilaterally changing the payment of benefits from total to partial under the
    NTCP, unilaterally stopping the payment of benefits, and by intending to accept
    liability for a closed period of disability, but not officially recognizing the claim.
    The WCJ awarded a 50 percent penalty on all benefits payable from February 6,
    2016, to September 19, 2016, in the amount of $8,211.06. C.L. No. 6. The WCJ
    also determined that Employer engaged in an unreasonable contest because its own
    errors and omissions in filing the proper documentation fueled the litigation, and
    she awarded counsel fees of $8,880, with no deduction from Claimant’s benefits.
    C.L. No. 7. Thus, the WCJ granted Claimant’s Claim, Reinstatement and Penalty
    Petitions and awarded counsel fees.           Employer appealed to the Board, which
    affirmed. Employer now petitions this Court for review.3
    3
    Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported
    by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights
    were violated. Department of Transportation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Clippinger), 
    38 A.3d 1037
    , 1042 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
    12
    II. Issues
    Employer contends that the WCJ abused her discretion by granting
    Claimant’s Penalty Petition and awarding counsel fees. In addition, Employer
    argues that the WCJ erred by awarding indemnity benefits and medical expenses
    beyond February 3, 2016, where competent evidence shows that Claimant
    sustained only a sprain/strain and fully recovered from this injury as of that date.
    III. Discussion
    A. Penalty Petition & Counsel Fees
    First, Employer claims that the WCJ abused her discretion by granting
    Claimant’s Penalty Petition and awarding counsel fees. According to Employer,
    the record evidence shows that Employer’s carrier timely created, signed and
    mailed the NTCP to the Bureau and paid benefits to Claimant.               Therefore,
    Employer did not violate the Act. Alternatively, even if Employer violated the Act
    by failing to timely file an NTCP, such violation was unintentional, and Claimant
    was not prejudiced because he received his full salary through February 2, 2016.
    Consequently, the imposition of penalties and counsel fees is completely
    unwarranted here and should be reversed.
    Preliminarily, we note that the WCJ, as the ultimate fact-finder in
    workers’ compensation cases, “has exclusive province over questions of credibility
    and evidentiary weight . . . .” Anderson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Penn Center for Rehabilitation), 
    15 A.3d 944
    , 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “The
    WCJ’s authority over questions of credibility, conflicting evidence and evidentiary
    weight is unquestioned.”     Minicozzi v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Industrial Metal Plating, Inc.), 
    873 A.2d 25
    , 28 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). The WCJ
    may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including a medical witness, in
    13
    whole or in part. 
    Id. We are
    bound by the WCJ’s credibility determinations. 
    Id. at 29.
                   “[I]t is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support
    findings other than those made by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is whether there is
    evidence to support the findings actually made.”               
    Minicozzi, 873 A.2d at 29
    (citation omitted). We examine the entire record to see if it contains substantial
    evidence, which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might find
    sufficient to support the WCJ’s findings. 
    Id. If the
    record contains such evidence,
    the findings must be upheld, even though the record may contain conflicting
    evidence. 
    Id. Additionally, we
    must view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party and give it the benefit of all inferences reasonably deduced
    from the evidence. Wagner v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Anthony
    Wagner Auto Repairs & Sales, Inc.), 
    45 A.3d 461
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    With respect to the imposition of penalties, Section 435(d) of the Act 4
    permits a WCJ to award a penalty when it is apparent that an employer and/or
    insurer has violated the Act. Farance v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Marino Brothers, Inc.), 
    774 A.2d 785
    , 789 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    788 A.2d 380
    (Pa. 2001). The Act permits a maximum penalty of 10 percent of the
    amount of the award and interest except in cases of unreasonable or excessive
    delay, in which the penalty may be increased to 50 percent. 77 P.S. §991(d)(i).
    The decision to impose penalties as well as the amount of penalties is within the
    discretion of the WCJ. City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
    Board (Andrews), 
    948 A.2d 221
    , 228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
    4
    Added by Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as amended, 77 P.S. §991(d).
    14
    We review the award of penalties, as well as the amount of penalties
    imposed, for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. A claimant
    who files a penalty petition
    must meet his initial burden of proof that a violation of the Act has occurred; the
    burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the violation has not occurred. 
    Id. The question
    of whether an employer violated the Act is a question of law. Mercer
    Lime and Stone Co. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (McGallis), 
    923 A.2d 1251
    , 1255 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
    As to the relevant requirements of the Act at issue here, Section
    406.1(a) of the Act5 requires an employer to promptly investigate each reported
    injury and commence the payment of benefits pursuant to either an NCP or NTCP
    within 21 days.        Where the employer is uncertain as to whether a claim is
    compensable under the Act or the extent of its liability, the employer may initiate
    compensation payments without prejudice and without liability pursuant to an
    NTCP. 77 P.S. §717.1(d)(1).
    Here, the WCJ found that Employer failed to issue and properly file
    documentation accepting Claimant’s injury and unilaterally ceased payments on
    February 3, 2016, in violation of the Act. F.F. No. 23. The WCJ’s findings are
    supported by the credible testimony of Bureau Representative and Claimant as well
    as the documentary evidence. Bureau Representative credibly testified that the
    Bureau never received an NTCP from Employer. R.R. at 209a-10a. Claimant also
    testified that he did not receive a copy of the NTCP, but he acknowledged
    receiving a copy of the Bureau’s Receipt. R.R. at 58a-59a. According to the
    Bureau’s records, Employer only filed a Statement of Wages, a Notice Stopping
    and Denial of workers’ compensation benefits as of February 3, 2016. R.R. at
    5
    Added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as amended, 77 P.S. §717.1(a).
    15
    307a-13a. Bureau Representative also testified that Employer did not issue the
    FROI in a timely manner, which delayed the issuance of a JCN. R.R. at 202a.
    According to the Bureau’s records, the Bureau did not receive an EDI of the FROI
    of Claimant’s November 5, 2015 injury until December 1, 2015. R.R. at 177a.
    Employer argues that its carrier issued and mailed an NTCP on
    November 30, 2015, or December 1, 2015, as evidenced by the Receipt and Claims
    Adjuster’s testimony. However, the WCJ found otherwise based on conflicting
    evidence. F.F. No. 23. Bureau Representative credibly testified that the “so-called
    receipt of” the NTCP was triggered by an EDI transaction, when the Bureau
    received the FROI for Claimant’s claim, which updated the claim to temporary
    status. R.R. at 199a. The EDI transaction “triggered [the] generation of [the
    Receipt] in anticipation of submission of the LIBC 501, the expected form . . . .”
    R.R. at 199a.
    Although Employer’s Claims Adjuster testified that she timely
    created, signed and mailed a copy of the NTCP to the Bureau, the WCJ rejected
    her testimony noting recollection issues and a lack of follow through, and found
    Bureau Representative’s conflicting testimony to be more credible. F.F. Nos. 14,
    21, 23. The WCJ explained:
    Based upon the credible testimony of record, it is found
    as fact that the [NTCP] was not properly filed. Had the
    Claims Adjuster issued the FROI in a timely manner, the
    [NTCP] could easily have been filed in WCAIS. The
    [NTCP] was never mailed to . . . Claimant or the Bureau
    or at least one of them would have noted receipt of the
    document. This is evident by the [Claims Adjuster]’s
    failure to perform any of the other tasks listed on the note
    upon which she was relying in saying she would have
    mailed the [NTCP]. [Employer], therefore, paid wage
    loss and medical benefits without filing a document
    acknowledging the injury. Since [Employer] did not file
    16
    the [NTCP], they [sic] cannot take advantage of the
    provisions of the . . . Act allowing them [sic] to stop
    payment of benefits with a Notice Stopping and Denial.
    F.F. No. 23.
    Employer’s challenge that Claims Adjuster’s testimony was more
    credible and that Bureau Representative’s testimony was “not credible and should
    not have been accepted” constitutes an impermissible attack on the WCJ’s
    credibility determinations, which we will not entertain. Petitioner’s Brief at 20.
    See 
    Minicozzi, 873 A.2d at 28-29
    .
    Upon review, we conclude that the WCJ did not err in determining
    that Employer violated the Act. As the WCJ noted, Employer’s violations caused
    Claimant to lose income for months and forced him to litigate numerous petitions
    to their conclusion, while bearing the burden of proof. F.F. No. 23. The WCJ
    acted within her discretion by imposing a 50 percent penalty for Employer’s
    unreasonable delay. Therefore, we will not overturn the penalty. See City of
    Philadelphia.
    As for the award of counsel fees, Section 440 of the Act6 authorizes
    the WCJ to award reasonable counsel fees to a claimant where there has been an
    6
    Added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as amended, 77 P.S. §996. Section 440
    provides:
    (a) In any contested case where the insurer has contested liability
    in whole or in part, including contested cases involving petitions to
    terminate, reinstate, increase, reduce or otherwise modify
    compensation awards, agreements or other payment arrangements
    or to set aside final receipts, the employe or his dependent, as the
    case may be, in whose favor the matter at issue has been finally
    determined in whole or in part shall be awarded, in addition to the
    award for compensation, a reasonable sum for costs incurred for
    attorney’s fee, witnesses, necessary medical examination, and the
    value of unreimbursed lost time to attend the proceedings:
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    17
    unreasonable contest as to a claimant’s entitlement to his workers’ compensation
    benefits.   The WCJ determined that Employer’s contest was not reasonable
    because the litigation was necessitated by the fact that Employer failed to file
    appropriate documents in a timely manner. We discern no abuse of the WCJ’s
    discretion in this regard.
    B. Claim and Reinstatement Petitions
    Next, Employer claims that the WCJ erred by granting Claimant’s
    Claim and Reinstatement Petitions and awarding indemnity benefits and medical
    expenses beyond February 3, 2016. Employer maintains that the WCJ capriciously
    disregarded competent evidence and improperly relied on Claimant’s incredible
    testimony in rendering her findings. According to Employer, the overwhelming
    weight of the evidence supports termination of benefits as of February 3, 2016.
    (continued…)
    Provided, That cost for attorney fees may be excluded when a
    reasonable basis for the contest has been established by the
    employer or the insurer.
    (b) If counsel fees are awarded and assessed against the insurer or
    employer, then the [WCJ] must make a finding as to the amount
    and the length of time for which such counsel fee is payable based
    upon the complexity of the factual and legal issues involved, the
    skill required, the duration of the proceedings and the time and
    effort required and actually expended. If the insurer has paid or
    tendered payment of compensation and the controversy relates to
    the amount of compensation due, costs for attorney’s fee shall be
    based only on the difference between the final award of
    compensation and the compensation paid or tendered by the
    insurer.
    77 P.S. §996.
    18
    R.R. at 347a. Employer’s Physician conducted an IME on February 2, 2016, in
    which he determined that Claimant only suffered a sprain/strain and had fully
    recovered from the injury as of that date. R.R. at 314a-319a, 397a. In addition,
    surveillance evidence showed that Claimant did not have any significant problems
    with his left knee. R.R. at 398a; Supplemental Certified Record, Employer’s
    Exhibit D-E (DVDs). Even Claimant’s Physician released Claimant to light-duty
    work, which was temporarily available. When not available, Claimant received his
    full salary under Employer’s Program between November 10, 2015, when his
    disability first began, through February 2, 2016.           Claimant’s failure to
    acknowledge or deny that he was paid his full salary impugns his credibility.
    A review for capricious disregard of material, competent evidence is
    an appropriate component of appellate review in any case in which the question is
    properly raised before a court.        Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 
    812 A.2d 478
    , 487 (Pa. 2002).              A
    capricious disregard of evidence occurs where “the WCJ’s findings reflect a
    deliberate disregard of competent evidence that logically could not have been
    avoided in reaching the decision . . . .” Pryor v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
    Board (Colin Service Systems), 
    923 A.2d 1197
    , 1205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Where
    substantial evidence supports the findings, and those findings in turn support the
    conclusions, it should remain a rare instance where an appellate court disturbs an
    adjudication based on capricious disregard. 
    Wintermyer, 812 A.2d at 491-92
    .
    In a claim proceeding, a claimant bears the burden of proving he
    suffered a work-related injury in the course and scope of his employment causing a
    loss of earning power. Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
    (Reedy), 
    634 A.2d 592
    , 595 (Pa. 1993); Morrison v. Workers’ Compensation
    19
    Appeal Board (Rothman Institute), 
    15 A.3d 93
    , 97-98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Where
    the causal connection between the work incident and alleged disability is not
    obvious, unequivocal medical evidence is necessary to establish it.         Fotta v.
    Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (U.S. Steel), 
    626 A.2d 1144
    , 1146 (Pa.
    1993); Justus v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bay Valley Foods), 
    147 A.3d 1237
    , 1241 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). A WCJ may reinstate a claimant’s workers’
    compensation benefits upon proof that the claimant’s disability has increased or
    recurred.   Section 413(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. §771; Sloane v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia), 
    124 A.3d 778
    ,
    783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
    Here, the WCJ reviewed the evidence presented by both parties and
    issued an 18-page opinion, wherein she summarized the evidence and made
    credibility findings. Contrary to Employer’s assertions, the WCJ did not overlook
    or capriciously disregard medical evidence in determining that Claimant met his
    burden on his Claim and Reinstatement Petitions.         The WCJ considered the
    conflicting medical testimony and made appropriate findings.
    Claimant’s Physician diagnosed Claimant with a work-related injury
    in the nature of a “patellar subluxation with disruption of the medial patellofemoral
    ligament.” R.R. at 243a. Claimant’s Physician performed surgery on Claimant on
    February 26, 2016. R.R. at 237a. When Claimant developed deep vein thrombosis
    as a complication of surgery, Claimant’s Physician performed a second procedure.
    R.R. at 240a. Thereafter, Claimant’s Physician opined that Claimant’s condition
    had improved significantly, and he released Claimant to full-duty work, without
    restrictions, as of September 19, 2016. R.R. at 240a-41a. Claimant’s Physician
    testified that Claimant has not fully recovered because he has ongoing residuals
    20
    from the work injury, although he was nearing maximum medical improvement.
    R.R. at 248a-49a.
    Although Employer presented conflicting medical evidence, the WCJ
    credited Claimant’s medical evidence over Employer’s, explaining:
    The testimony of [Claimant’s Physician] is found to be
    more credible than that of [Employer’s Physician].
    [Claimant’s Physician] saw . . . Claimant over an
    extended period of time and noted findings that were
    consistent during serial examinations as well as
    consistent with findings from other providers. He
    provided conservative treatment before proceeding with
    surgery and subsequent to surgery, . . . Claimant was
    able to return to work without restrictions. During
    surgery, [Claimant’s Physician] was able to visualize the
    inside of . . . Claimant’s knee so he is in a better position
    to describe the findings. [Claimant’s Physician] did not
    “coddle . . . Claimant,” but provided treatment and
    support. [Employer’s Physician] saw . . . Claimant on
    only one occasion, documented findings that were
    inconsistent with other providers, however, he
    acknowledged that with the type of injury diagnosed by
    [Claimant’s Physician], [and that] findings can be
    different on different days. In addition, [Employer’s
    Physician] based his opinion of full recovery, in part, on
    his review of “a” surveillance [DVD]. Since there are 3
    surveillance [DVDs] in evidence, it is unclear whether he
    saw one (1) of these or if there is a completely different
    [DVD] that was viewed by [Employer’s Physician].
    [Employer’s Physician] noted that . . . Claimant walked
    without a limp and could get into and out of his car
    without difficulty. My personal review of the three (3)
    surveillance [DVDs] noted times when . . . Claimant did
    appear to have some difficulties and often the quality of
    the pictures was so poor, it was not possible to tell if
    . . . Claimant was having any problems or not. Finally,
    [Employer’s Physician] acknowledged that his diagnosis
    of knee “sprain” also allows for a more specific
    subluxation diagnosis (even though he does not
    necessarily agree with the diagnosis). Even though he
    21
    would not have done the surgery without a complete
    rupture of ligament, other orthopedic surgeons do not
    necessarily agree.
    F.F. No. 22.
    The WCJ also credited Claimant’s testimony as “straightforward,
    consistent over several hearings and consistent with medical evidence.” F.F. No.
    20. Claimant testified regarding his injury, the two surgeries, his recovery, his
    return to full-duty employment, and ongoing pain. R.R. at 46a-47a, 52a-55a, 122a.
    Insofar as Employer attempts to impugn the credibility of Claimant on the basis
    that he should have made certain statements, Employer had multiple opportunities
    to cross-examine Claimant and failed to elicit the testimony it is now complaining
    that he failed to render.
    Upon review, the WCJ carefully considered and weighed the evidence
    before her, made all necessary findings and conclusions, and clearly articulated her
    reasons for accepting and rejecting the testimony.      Simply because the WCJ
    rejected Employer’s evidence in favor of Claimant’s evidence does not constitute a
    capricious disregard of the evidence. See Grimm on Behalf of Grimm v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Federal Express Corp.), 
    176 A.3d 1045
    , 1054 (Pa.
    Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    189 A.3d 385
    (Pa. 2018) (a WCJ’s express consideration
    and rejection of evidence does not constitute a capricious disregard of that
    evidence). This Court may not reconsider the WCJ’s determinations on matters of
    credibility and evidentiary weight. 
    Minicozzi, 873 A.2d at 29
    .
    The WCJ’s finding that Claimant sustained a work-related injury in
    the nature of a patella subluxation with disruption of the medial patellofemoral
    ligament, which required surgery and resulted in various periods of disability from
    November 5, 2015, until September 19, 2016, is amply supported by the testimony
    of Claimant and his Physician. As this evidence constitutes substantial, competent
    22
    evidence sufficient to support the WCJ’s findings, we discern no error in the
    WCJ’s award of indemnity benefits and medical expenses beyond February 3,
    2016. For these reasons, we conclude that the WCJ properly granted Claimant’s
    petitions and awarded counsel fees.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order.
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    Judge Cohn Jubelirer did not participate in the decision of this case.
    23
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    The Pennsylvania State University,      :
    :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                    : No. 1662 C.D. 2018
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal            :
    Board (Underhill),                      :
    :
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2019, the order of the
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, dated November 27, 2018, is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge