R. Carpenter v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA) ( 2015 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Raymond Carpenter,                               :
    :
    Petitioner               :
    :
    v.                              : No. 2357 C.D. 2014
    : Submitted: July 17, 2015
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal                     :
    Board (Commonwealth of                           :
    Pennsylvania),                                   :
    :
    Respondent               :
    BEFORE:          HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE COLINS                                               FILED: August 12, 2015
    Raymond Carpenter (Claimant) petitions for review of the November
    25, 2014 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed
    the November 26, 2013 decision and order of the Workers’ Compensation Judge
    (WCJ). The WCJ denied Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition under the Workers’
    Compensation Act (Act)1 because Claimant failed to demonstrate that his loss of
    earnings was due to his original work injury. Before this Court, Claimant argues
    1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708.
    that the Board erred by denying his Reinstatement Petition and that the WCJ failed
    to issue a reasoned decision. For the following reasons, we affirm.2
    On December 10, 2004, Claimant sustained a cervical strain during
    the course and scope of employment as a Parole Officer with the Commonwealth
    of Pennsylvania Department of Probation and Parole (Employer). (WCJ Decision,
    Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶1.) Claimant returned to a restricted duty position with
    Employer, but after three months he received a medical retirement. (Id. ¶6b-c.) A
    few months after his medical retirement, around June 2006, Claimant began
    working for Friendly Transportation Company (Friendly Taxi) as an operations
    manager and Claimant worked in that position for approximately one year. (Id.
    ¶6d.) Claimant resigned his position with Friendly Taxi and, two to three weeks
    later, Claimant obtained a position with Franklin and Marshall College (F&M) as a
    part-time patrol officer. (Id. ¶1e.) Within a month, Claimant was hired as a full-
    time investigator and he held that position until he resigned on August 16, 2012.
    (Id. ¶1h.) On September 6, 2012, Claimant filed a Reinstatement Petition alleging
    that, as of August 16, 2012, his past work injury had caused a present decrease in
    earning power.3 (Reinstatement Petition; WCJ Decision at 1.)
    2
    This Court’s review of an order of the Board is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s
    findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or
    whether constitutional rights were violated. Bufford v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (North American Telecom), 
    2 A.3d 548
    , 551 (Pa. 2010).
    3
    Claimant also filed a Review Petition, which was granted by the WCJ in the November 26,
    2013 decision and order. Accordingly, Claimant’s work injury was expanded to include “post
    fusion syndrome and myofascial pain syndrome.” (WCJ Decision and Order, Conclusion of Law
    (C.L.) ¶2.) In the same decision and order, the WCJ also denied Claimant’s Penalty Petition
    because Claimant failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the treatment
    provided to Claimant, to which Employer had denied payment, was causally related to his work
    injury. (Id., C.L. ¶4.) Neither party has sought review by this Court of the Board’s affirmance of
    the WCJ’s grant of the Review Petition or denial of the Penalty Petition.
    2
    Under Section 413(a) of the Act4, a claimant who has had benefits
    suspended may seek to have the suspension lifted where the claimant has
    experienced a recurred loss of earnings. 77 P.S. § 772. Where a claimant is
    petitioning to have benefits reinstated, the causal connection between the
    claimant’s disability and work-related injury is presumed.                   Pieper v. Ametek–
    Thermox Instruments Division, 
    584 A.2d 301
    , 305 (Pa. 1990). Under the Act, the
    word disability is synonymous with loss of earning power. Dillon v. Workmen’s
    Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Collieries), 
    640 A.2d 386
    , 391 (Pa.
    1994); Donahay v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Skills of Central PA,
    Inc.), 
    109 A.3d 787
    , 792 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). To lift a suspension of benefits,
    Section 413(a) of the Act requires that a claimant demonstrate: (1) that the
    claimant’s earning power is once again adversely affected by the disability; and (2)
    that the disability is a continuation of the disability that arose from the work-
    related injury. Bufford v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (North American
    Telecom), 
    2 A.3d 548
    , 558 (Pa. 2010); North Pittsburgh Drywall Co., Inc. v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Owen), 
    59 A.3d 30
    , 38 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2013). In seeking to demonstrate that a reinstatement of benefits is required under
    4
    Section 413(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
    A [WCJ]…may, at any time, modify, reinstate, suspend, or terminate a notice of
    compensation payable, an original or supplemental agreement or an award of the
    department or its [WCJ], upon petition filed by either party with the department,
    upon proof that the disability of an injured employe has increased, decreased,
    recurred, or has temporarily or finally ceased, or that the status of any dependent
    has changed….[W]here compensation has been suspended because the employe’s
    earnings are equal to or in excess of his wages prior to the injury[,]…payments
    under the agreement or award may be resumed at any time during the period for
    which compensation for partial disability is payable, unless it be shown that the
    loss in earnings does not result from the disability due to the injury.
    77 P.S. § 772.
    3
    the Act, it is not necessary that a claimant offer expert medical evidence to
    establish that the prior work-related injury continues; a claimant’s credible
    testimony is sufficient. Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe
    Die Casting Co.), 
    642 A.2d 1083
    , 1085 (Pa. 1994); Hinton v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 
    787 A.2d 453
    , 456 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2001). Once the claimant’s burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to
    the employer, who, in order to prevail, must demonstrate that the claimant’s loss in
    earnings is not caused by the disability arising from the work-related injury.
    Bufford, 2 A.3d at 558; Trevdan Building Supply v. Workers’ Compensation
    Appeal Board (Pope), 
    9 A.3d 1221
    , 1224 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). An employer may
    meet this burden by demonstrating that, for example, the claimant’s loss of
    earnings is due to the claimant’s bad faith rejection of available work within the
    claimant’s restrictions, rather than the claimant’s continuing disability. Id.; Verity
    v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Malvern School), 
    38 A.3d 936
    , 942 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2011).
    In the instant matter, the WCJ concluded that Claimant had not
    produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his earning power was once again
    adversely affected by his continued disability. (WCJ Decision, Conclusions of
    Law (C.L.) ¶3.) The Board affirmed, concluding that “there was no credited
    substantial, competent evidence to support Claimant’s allegation that his condition
    had changed to the point that he was again disabled.” (Board Decision at 5-6.)
    Claimant petitioned this Court for review. Before this Court, Claimant argues that
    the WCJ ignored uncontroverted evidence of record, which led the WCJ to err in
    concluding that Claimant had not met his burden under the Act, and that the WCJ
    failed to issue a reasoned decision.
    4
    In support of his Reinstatement Petition, Claimant testified before the
    WCJ on October 3, 2012, January 30, 2013, and August 5, 2013. (10/03/12
    Hearing Testimony (H.T.); 01/30/13 H.T; 08/05/13 H.T.; WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶¶6,
    7, 12.) Michael Rossano, the former Director of Public Safety and Chief of Police
    at F&M, who had been Claimant’s supervisor, testified for Claimant by way of
    deposition on August 14, 2013. (Michael Rossano Deposition (Rossano Dep.);
    WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶11a-b.) Claimant also offered the testimony of his treating
    physician, Randy A. Cohen, D.O., who is board certified in physical medicine and
    rehabilitation and who testified by way of deposition on March 15, 2013.5 (Randy
    A. Cohen, D.O., Deposition (Cohen Dep.); WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶8a.)
    In the November 26, 2013 decision and order denying Claimant’s
    Reinstatement Petition, the WCJ extensively reviewed Claimant’s testimony and
    made findings of fact concerning each day of testimony. (WCJ Decision, F.F.
    ¶¶6a-k, 7a-m, 12a-h.)      However, the WCJ ultimately did not find Claimant
    credible:
    15. This Judge has had the opportunity to view the demeanor and
    comportment of Claimant during his live testimony in conjunction
    with all of the other evidence of record. Based on same, Claimant’s
    testimony that his loss of earnings was due to his inability to continue
    to perform the physical duties of his investigative position at F&M
    from August 16, 2012 an[d] onward due to the work injury from 2004
    is found not to be credible for the following reasons:
    a. The “timing” of Claimant’s decision to stop working
    at F&M is suspect. Claimant decided to stop working on
    5
    Employer offered the testimony of Richard G. Schmidt, M.D., who is board certified in
    orthopedic surgery and who testified by way of deposition on May 31, 2013. (Richard G.
    Schmidt, M.D., Deposition (Schmidt Dep.); WCJ Decision, Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶10a.) The
    WCJ did not find Dr. Schmidt’s testimony credible. (WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶19.)
    5
    August 16, 2012, just the day after being reprimanded. It
    is not credible that the day after Claimant receives the
    reprimand, he is then all of a sudden unable to work any
    more due to the 2004 work injury, despite being able to
    do so for nearly five years at F&M.
    b. This Judge also notes that Claimant at first testified
    that he stopped working at the dispatcher operations
    manager position at Friendly Taxi, by all accounts a
    sedentary job, because of the ongoing effects of his work
    injury. A few weeks later, Claimant then obtained a
    police officer position with F&M College. It is not
    credible that Claimant would leave a sedentary office
    position at Friendly Taxi due to his work injury, and then
    accept a police officer position, which according to
    Claimant can be physically demanding. It seems clear to
    this Judge that Claimant chose to leave the office position
    at Friendly Taxi, for reasons other than his work injury.
    Claimant ultimately conceded on cross examination that
    he stopped working at Friendly Taxi, at least in part,
    because he could not stand the people he was working
    for. Claimant’s testimony that he left his positions at
    both Friendly Taxi and F&M primarily because of the
    ongoing effects of his work injury is not credible in light
    of the other issues he was having with these employers at
    the time he decided to stop working for these employers.
    c. Claimant’s investigative position does not appear to
    be physically demanding to the degree that Claimant
    could not perform the duties of this position due to his
    work injury. Mr. Rossano noted that Claimant’s job
    involved mostly investigative or administrative work.
    While Claimant testified that as an investigator he still
    had to meet the same physical requirements of a regular
    police officer, in having the ability to jump out of a car
    and run, and lift up to 50 pounds, Mr. Rossano noted that
    he never gave Claimant a task that he did not think
    Claimant could perform. Mr. Rossano also stated that he
    never thought he was placing Claimant in harms [] way
    having him perform the duties of his investigative
    6
    position on the street. In fact, Claimant was given a
    stellar employment evaluation by Mr. Rossano in April in
    2012, in which Claimant had “exceeded expectations.” It
    does not make sense that just a few months later that
    Claimant went from being an employee who was
    exceeding expectations to someone who could no longer
    work, without any intervening incident. The only
    intervening incidents in the record around this time
    appear to be the departure of Mr. Rossano as Claimant’s
    immediate supervisor in June of 2012 and the reprimand
    on August 15, 2012.
    d. Claimant testified that he could not work his
    investigator job in part because of really bad headaches.
    No medical evidence, however, has been presented
    relating Claimant’s headaches to the work injury from
    2004.
    e. Claimant’s subjective complaints that he cannot
    perform the physical duties of his investigative position
    are not credible. As stated earlier, the duties of the
    investigative position do not appear to be too strenuous.
    Claimant testified that despite the work injury, he is able
    to drive, walk for up to an hour and to watch his great
    grand-child. A medical note from February 2011,
    indicates Claimant was able to walk 5 to 10 miles per day
    on cruise excursions. Dr. Cohen testified Claimant’s
    pain levels had come down for a period of time to a three
    or four on a scale of one to ten, and Claimant himself
    noted that his pain had come down at times to a one or
    two on a scale of one to ten. All of these facts seem
    inconsistent with Claimant’s subjective statement that he
    stopped working because he physically is unable to
    perform the duties of his investigative position.
    (Id., F.F. ¶15a-c.) The WCJ also found that Dr. Cohen’s testimony was not
    credible in part. Specifically, the WCJ found:
    7
    Dr. Cohen’s opinion that Claimant is unable to perform any gainful
    employment as of August 16, 2012 because of Claimant’s reported
    pain levels are not credible. As noted above, Claimant’s subjective
    complaints that he is unable to work due to his pain levels is not
    credible. Dr. Cohen’s opinion which is based on Claimant’s
    subjective complaints, is likewise found to be incredible.
    (Id., F.F. ¶18.)
    In advancing his argument that he produced sufficient evidence to
    demonstrate that his current loss of earning is due to his work injury, Claimant
    relies upon his testimony concerning the changes in his job duties at F&M and his
    worsening symptoms, as well as Dr. Cohen’s testimony concerning Claimant’s
    condition. In the WCJ’s findings of fact the WCJ noted Claimant’s testimony
    concerning the professionalization of the F&M police department, Claimant’s
    concerns about passing a physical examination, and Claimant’s description of pain
    and of the effects of the medications he is prescribed. (Id., F.F. ¶¶6e-h, 7f, l-m,
    12c-d, f.)   The WCJ also thoroughly reviewed Dr. Cohen’s testimony in the
    findings of fact and noted that “Dr. Cohen opined that Claimant has been unable to
    engage in any employment since August of 2012 because his pain levels have
    prohibited him from doing so.” (Id., F.F. ¶8s.)
    As evident in the WCJ’s findings of fact, the record contains
    testimony to support Claimant’s argument that the changes in his job duties and his
    worsening condition demonstrate that his earning power is once again adversely
    affected by his continued disability.        What Claimant’s argument overlooks,
    however, is that the testimony offered was not accepted as credible and therefore is
    insufficient to meet Claimant’s burden. In workers’ compensation matters, the
    WCJ is the ultimate finder of fact and has exclusive province over questions of
    credibility. Furnai v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Temple Inland), 90
    
    8 A.3d 53
    , 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). As the ultimate finder of fact, the WCJ is free to
    accept or reject any testimony, in whole or in part, and to weigh and resolve
    conflicts in the evidence of record. Neff v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Pennsylvania Game Commission), 
    109 A.3d 291
    , 296 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). The
    WCJ’s credibility determinations are binding on this Court; at bottom, Claimant’s
    argument amounts to a request to exercise authority that this Court does not have.
    The WCJ concluded that Claimant had failed to sustain his burden by
    demonstrating that his earning power is once again adversely affected by his
    continued disability and our review has identified no credible, competent evidence
    of record that demonstrates otherwise. Therefore, we conclude that the Board did
    not err by affirming the WCJ.
    We also conclude that the WCJ’s decision was a reasoned one.
    Section 422(a) of the Act6 aids meaningful appellate review by requiring the WCJ
    to issue a reasoned decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law
    6
    The full text of Section 422(a) now reads as follows:
    Neither the board nor any of it members nor any [WCJ shall be bound by the
    common law or statutory rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or
    investigation, but all findings of fact shall be based upon sufficient competent
    evidence to justify same. All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a
    reasoned decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
    the evidence as a whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the
    rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why and how a particular
    result was reached. The [WCJ] shall specify the evidence upon which the workers'
    compensation judge relies and state the reasons for accepting it in conformity with
    this section. When faced with conflicting evidence, the workers' compensation
    judge must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent
    evidence. Uncontroverted evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an
    irrational reason; the workers' compensation judge must identify that evidence
    and explain adequately the reasons for its rejection. The adjudication shall provide
    the basis for meaningful appellate review.
    77 P.S. § 834.
    9
    based upon the evidence as a whole and clearly stating the rationale for the
    decision.    77 P.S. § 834; Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Tristate Transport), 
    828 A.2d 1043
    , 1052 (Pa. 2003) (“a decision is ‘reasoned’ for
    purposes of Section 422(a) if it allows for adequate review by the [Board] without
    further elucidation and if it allows for adequate review by appellate courts”).
    When the WCJ is faced with conflicting evidence, section 422(a) of the Act further
    requires that the WCJ explain the basis for rejecting or discrediting competent
    evidence. 77 P.S. § 834; Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1052.
    Claimant argues that the WCJ failed to make findings concerning the
    credibility of Mr. Rossano and that this failure precludes meaningful appellate
    review.     As with the testimony given by Claimant and Dr. Cohen, the WCJ
    thoroughly reviewed Mr. Rossano’s testimony in the findings of fact.         (WCJ
    Decision, F.F. ¶11a-k.) Unlike the testimony given by Claimant and Dr. Cohen,
    the WCJ did not make an explicit determination of Mr. Rossano’s credibility.
    However, the WCJ relied upon Mr. Rossano’s testimony in determining
    Claimant’s credibility. It is evident from the WCJ’s discussion of the basis for
    rejecting Claimant’s testimony that he accepted Mr. Rossano’s testimony as
    credible. (Id., F.F. ¶15b-c.)
    The WCJ’s findings of fact based on Mr. Rossano’s testimony
    included a description of Claimant’s position at F&M, explaining that all F&M
    officers are sworn police officers by the County of Lancaster.    (Id., F.F. ¶11c.)
    Based on Mr. Rossano’s testimony, the WCJ found that Claimant had the potential
    for physical confrontations when making an arrest, but that Claimant’s position
    involved a lot of investigative and administrative work. (Id. ¶11d.) Based on Mr.
    Rossano’s testimony, the WCJ also found that when Mr. Rossano left F&M,
    Claimant did not look well and that Claimant appeared to be getting progressively
    10
    worse. (Id. ¶11f&j.) Yet, despite the possible physicality of Claimant’s position
    and Mr. Rossano’s concerns about Claimant’s health, the WCJ, based on Mr.
    Rossano’s testimony, found that Claimant was one of Mr. Rossano’s best
    employees, that Claimant was very reliable and did his work well, that even when
    Claimant’s condition appeared to worsen his performance was still very good, and
    that Mr. Rossano had never expressed concerns about Claimant’s ability to
    perform his job and had consistently given him outstanding performance
    evaluations, stating that Claimant “exceeded expectations.”        (Id. ¶11e-f, h-i.)
    Overall, the WCJ determined that while Mr. Rossano’s testimony showed that the
    F&M police had become a more professionalized force during Claimant’s
    employment with F&M, Mr. Rossano’s testimony did not offer support for
    Claimant’s contention that his prior injury rendered him unable to continue at
    F&M because his duties at F&M had become akin to those of his preinjury
    position as a parole officer. As the finder of fact, the WCJ was required to
    consider and weigh the evidence offered by Mr. Rossano. The WCJ did so. The
    WCJ did not view Mr. Rossano’s testimony in the same light as Claimant; this is
    not a failure to issue a reasoned decision, but a failure to reason as Claimant would
    have liked. The WCJ’s decision as a whole is thorough, clear and leaves no
    question as to how the result was reached in this matter. 77 P.S. § 834.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board.
    __________ ___________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    11
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Raymond Carpenter,                   :
    :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                        : No. 2357 C.D. 2014
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal         :
    Board (Commonwealth of               :
    Pennsylvania),                       :
    :
    Respondent          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 12th day of August, 2015, the Order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
    __________ ___________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge