W. Gillespie v. WCAB (Aker Philadelphia Shipyard) ( 2017 )


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  •              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Gillespie,                        :
    Petitioner           :
    :
    v.                           : No. 1633 C.D. 2016
    : Submitted: February 17, 2017
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal              :
    Board (Aker Philadelphia Shipyard),       :
    Respondent              :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT                                    FILED: May 17, 2017
    William Gillespie (Claimant) petitions for review of an adjudication
    of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) denying his petition to revise
    his disability status from partial to full disability. In doing so, the Board reversed
    the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), who upheld Claimant’s
    constitutional challenge to his impairment rating evaluation (IRE), for the stated
    reason that Claimant’s challenge to his IRE was untimely filed. Claimant filed his
    challenge eight years after his employer notified him of a change in his workers’
    compensation disability status. Concluding that Claimant’s petition was untimely,
    we affirm the Board.
    The facts are not disputed.        Claimant was employed by Aker
    Philadelphia Shipyard (Employer). On January 8, 2004, Claimant slipped and fell
    on ice on the deck of a ship, which caused pain to his low back, right hip, right leg
    and right shoulder. WCJ Decision, 9/20/2007, at 1; Reproduced Record at 17
    (R.R. __). Claimant was diagnosed as suffering “from cauda equine syndrome
    (multiple radiculopathies) as a result of a fall secondary to canal stenosis with
    some pre-existing degenerative changes and herniated discs.”             WCJ Decision,
    9/20/2007, at 2; R.R. at 18. He sustained “nerve damage at all levels from L2 to
    S1,” the worst of which “was at L4-5, L5-S1 and the ruptured disc at L3-4 on the
    right.” 
    Id. After a
    hearing, a WCJ granted Claimant’s claim petition.
    On November 20, 2007, Dr. Richard J. Morris evaluated Claimant as
    having a whole body impairment of 25 percent. In doing this evaluation, Dr.
    Morris used the Fifth Edition of the American Medical Association “Guides to the
    Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” (Fifth Edition AMA Guides). Based on Dr.
    Morris’ IRE, Employer issued a “Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation
    Disability Status” to Claimant.        Notably, Claimant continued to collect full
    disability compensation, but the change in his status limited his compensation
    period to 500 weeks. See Section 306(a.2)(3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act
    (Act), 77 P.S. §511.2(3).1
    Eight years later, in September 2015, Claimant filed a reinstatement
    petition asserting that his IRE was a nullity because Dr. Morris used the Fifth
    Edition AMA Guides to do his evaluation of Claimant. In support, Claimant relied
    upon this Court’s decision in Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Derry Area School District), 
    124 A.3d 406
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), petition for
    1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4, 2501-2708. Section
    306(a.2)(3), added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, states:
    Unless otherwise adjudicated or agreed to based upon a determination of earning
    power under clause (b)(2), the amount of compensation shall not be affected as a
    result of the change in disability status and shall remain the same. An insurer or
    employe may, at any time prior to or during the five hundred-week period of
    partial disability, show that the employe’s earning power has changed.
    77 P.S. §511.2(3) (emphasis added).
    2
    allowance of appeal granted, 
    133 A.3d 733
    (Pa. 2016). In Protz, we determined
    that only the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides had been authorized by the
    legislature for guidance in an IRE. The legislature’s attempt to approve future
    editions of the AMA Guides was unconstitutional because its legislative authority
    may not be delegated to a private body, even one as august as the American
    Medical Association. Employer opposed Claimant’s reinstatement petition.
    Claimant’s petition was assigned to a WCJ.          In support of his
    reinstatement petition, Claimant submitted: (1) the WCJ’s September 20, 2007,
    decision granting his claim petition; (2) the impairment rating determination face
    sheet; (3) the IRE report; (4) a notice of change of workers’ compensation
    disability status; (5) the contingent fee agreement between Claimant and his
    attorney; and (6) his litigation expenses. Employer did not submit any evidence.
    On February 23, 2016, the WCJ granted Claimant’s reinstatement
    petition. Because Claimant’s impairment rating was made on the basis of the Fifth
    Edition of the AMA Guides, the WCJ concluded that Claimant sustained his
    burden of proving that the IRE was a nullity as was the change in his disability
    status.
    Employer appealed to the Board. Employer contended that the WCJ
    did not issue a reasoned decision because the WCJ did not consider any of its
    arguments, namely, that Protz did not apply to this case.
    The Board concluded that the WCJ erred. The Board explained that a
    claimant has 60 days within which to file a petition challenging the validity of a
    change in his disability status as a result of an IRE. See Section 306(a.2)(2) of the
    Act, 77 P.S. §511.2(2).     After 60 days, a claimant may challenge his partial
    disability status by presenting a new impairment rating evaluation that shows a full
    3
    body impairment of 50 percent or more. Johnson v. Workers’ Compensation
    Appeal Board (Sealy Components Group), 
    982 A.2d 1253
    , 1258 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2009); Barrett v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Sunoco, Inc.), 
    987 A.2d 1280
    , 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Claimant did not file an appeal within 60 days of
    the notice of change in his disability status, and he did not obtain a new
    impairment rating. Accordingly, Claimant did not meet his burden under Section
    302(a.2)(2) of the Act.        The Board reversed the WCJ’s determination, and
    Claimant petitioned for our review.
    On appeal,2 Claimant raises two issues. First, Claimant contends that
    the Board erred in dismissing his reinstatement petition as untimely. He contends
    that the 60-day appeal period in Section 306(a.2) of the Act is not applicable in a
    constitutional challenge to an IRE. Second, Claimant argues that the Board erred
    in disregarding this Court’s decision in Protz.
    The Act sets forth the procedures for impairment rating evaluations.
    Section 306(a.2) states, in relevant part, as follows:
    (1) When an employe has received total disability
    compensation pursuant to clause (a) [77 P.S. §511] for a period
    of one hundred four weeks, unless otherwise agreed to, the
    employe shall be required to submit to a medical examination
    which shall be requested by the insurer within sixty days upon
    the expiration of the one hundred four weeks to determine the
    degree of impairment due to the compensable injury, if any.
    The degree of impairment shall be determined based upon an
    evaluation by a physician who is licensed in this
    Commonwealth, who is certified by an American Board of
    Medical Specialties approved board or its osteopathic
    2
    We review Board adjudications to determine whether errors of law were made, whether
    constitutional rights were violated, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by
    substantial evidence. Ward v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 
    966 A.2d 1159
    , 1162 n. 4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
    4
    equivalent and who is active in clinical practice for at least
    twenty hours per week, chosen by agreement of the parties, or
    as designated by the department, pursuant to the most recent
    edition of the American Medical Association “Guides to the
    Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.”
    (2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that
    meets a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater
    than fifty per centum impairment under the most recent edition
    of the American Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation
    of Permanent Impairment,” the employe shall be presumed to
    be totally disabled and shall continue to receive total disability
    compensation benefits under clause (a). If such determination
    results in an impairment rating less than fifty per centum
    impairment under the most recent edition of the American
    Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
    Impairment,” the employe shall then receive partial disability
    benefits under clause (b) [77 P.S. §512]: Provided, however,
    That no reduction shall be made until sixty days’ notice of
    modification is given.
    ***
    (4) An employe may appeal the change to partial disability at
    any time during the five hundred-week period of partial
    disability; Provided, That there is a determination that the
    employe meets the threshold impairment rating that is equal to
    or greater than fifty per centum impairment under the most
    recent edition of the American Medical Association “Guides to
    the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.”
    77 P.S. §511.2(1), (2), (4) (emphasis added). In Protz, this Court held that the
    language, “pursuant to the most recent edition of the American Medical
    Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment[,]” represented
    an “unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority” to a private entity because
    it “proactively approved versions of the AMA Guides beyond the Fourth Edition
    without review.” 
    Protz, 124 A.3d at 416
    (emphasis added). The Fourth Edition of
    5
    the AMA Guides was the only edition of the AMA Guides adopted expressly by
    the legislature and, thus, the only edition that could be used.
    In Johnson, 
    982 A.2d 1253
    , this Court explained the process for
    challenging an IRE. Where an employer sends the claimant a notice that it intends
    to change the claimant’s disability status as a result of an IRE, the claimant has 60
    days to challenge the IRE. If the claimant does not challenge the change in status
    within the 60 days, then Section 306(a.2)(4) of the Act becomes operative; it states
    that the claimant may appeal the “change to partial disability at any time during the
    five hundred-week period of partial disability; Provided, [t]hat there is a
    determination that the employe meets the threshold impairment rating that is equal
    to or greater than fifty percentum ....” 77 P.S. §511.2(4). See also 
    Johnson, 982 A.2d at 1258
    .
    The Board followed the statutory scheme. Claimant did not challenge
    Dr. Morris’ IRE determination within 60 days.           Although Claimant filed his
    petition within 500 weeks, he did not offer evidence that he met the “threshold
    impairment rating” of 50 percent. The Board did not err in reversing the WCJ.
    Claimant contends that he is not challenging the accuracy of the IRE
    or petitioning to change his disability status. Accordingly, he argues that the time
    limitations in Section 306(a.2) of the Act are not applicable. Specifically, he
    argues that, under this Court’s decision in Protz, his IRE is void ab initio. Indeed,
    all IREs performed under the Fifth Edition are legal nullities. Accordingly, his
    disability status never changed.
    This Court considered and rejected Claimant’s argument in Riley v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), 
    154 A.3d 396
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). In Riley, the claimant was evaluated using the Fifth
    6
    Edition of the AMA Guides, instead of the Fourth Edition, and she did not appeal
    the IRE within 60 days of the notice of change in her disability status. Rather, the
    claimant waited nearly ten years to challenge the IRE determination. We held that
    her challenge was untimely and that Protz did not invalidate the claimant’s 2003
    IRE rating.
    Likewise, here, Claimant’s petition did not satisfy the deadlines set
    forth in Section 306(a.2) of the Act for challenging his IRE, on any ground. It is
    too late to do so now. As we stated in Riley, “Protz does not give [a claimant] a
    second chance to appeal [the] IRE.” 
    Riley, 154 A.3d at 401
    . Riley is controlling.
    Claimant points to Mazuruk v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Gillin and Sons Contracting, Inc.), (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1216 C.D. 2015, filed
    October 14, 2016) (unreported).3 In Mazuruk, the employer filed a petition to
    modify compensation benefits based upon an IRE showing that the claimant had an
    impairment rating of 24 percent, using the Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides. The
    WCJ granted the employer’s petition, and the Board affirmed the decision of the
    WCJ. On appeal, the claimant argued that the IRE was not performed under the
    most recent edition of the AMA Guides. We agreed and remanded the matter with
    instructions that the WCJ permit the employer to have the claimant submit to a
    new IRE to be performed in accordance with the Fourth Edition of the AMA
    Guides. Mazuruk, slip op. at 12.
    Mazuruk is distinguishable. First, the claimant in Mazuruk lodged a
    timely challenge to his IRE determination; Claimant did not. Second, the claimant
    3
    Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedures §414(a), 210 Pa. Code
    §69.414(a), an unreported opinion of this Court may be cited for its persuasive value and not as
    binding precedent.
    7
    in Mazuruk had an appeal pending at the time this Court issued its decision in
    Protz; Claimant did not.
    In his second issue, Claimant contends that the Board capriciously
    disregarded this Court’s decision in Protz. We reject this contention. As set forth
    above, it does not matter what grounds are invoked to challenge an IRE. If not
    raised within 60 days, it is too late. Accordingly, the Board had no duty to
    consider Claimant’s constitutional challenge based on Protz.4
    For the reasons discussed above, the order of the Board is affirmed.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    4
    Generally, a declaration that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional does not void every
    decision ever made in accordance therewith; only parties still engaged in active litigation may
    take advantage of a change. East Penn Township v. Troxell, (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 2490 C.D. 2009,
    2491 C.D. 2009, 2492 C.D. 2009, 2493 C.D. 2009, filed January 5, 2011), slip op. at 4-5
    (unreported) (citing Luke v. Cataldi, 
    883 A.2d 1114
    , 1119 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), reversed
    and remanded on other grounds, 
    932 A.2d 45
    (Pa. 2007)).
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Gillespie,                    :
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                        : No. 1633 C.D. 2016
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal          :
    Board (Aker Philadelphia Shipyard),   :
    Respondent          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2017, the order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board, dated September 16, 2016, is hereby AFFIRMED.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: W. Gillespie v. WCAB (Aker Philadelphia Shipyard) - 1633 C.D. 2016

Judges: Leavitt, President Judge

Filed Date: 5/17/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024