J. Taylor v. DOC ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Jeffrey Taylor, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :
Department of Corrections, : No. 77 M.D. 2022
Respondent : Submitted: September 30, 2022
BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: March 1, 2023
Before the Court in our original jurisdiction is the preliminary objection
of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) to the “Petition for
Writ of Mandamus” (Petition) filed by Jeffrey Taylor (Taylor), pro se. After
submission of this case for disposition of the preliminary objection, Taylor also filed
a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleading” (Motion). For the following reasons, we
sustain the Department’s objection, dismiss Taylor’s Motion as moot, and dismiss
the Petition.
I. Background
Taylor is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-
Fayette). Petition at 2, ¶ 2. In November 1996, Taylor was convicted of third-degree
murder in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (sentencing court) and
sentenced to 10 to 40 years’ imprisonment. See id., Exhibit D, Sentence Status
Summary at 1. In March 1998, Taylor was convicted in the same court of the crimes
of robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, and
kidnapping and received sentences totaling 25 to 80 years’ incarceration. See
Preliminary Objection (P.O.), Exhibit A, Sentencing Orders at 1-2.1 The sentencing
orders stated that Taylor was to serve the sentences consecutively to each other and
to the sentence imposed in 1996, further specifying the order in which the sentences
were to be served.2 See id. On March 30, 1998, sentencing forms bearing the seal
of the minute clerk were issued. See Petition, Exhibit A, Minute Clerk Forms at 1-
6. Each form contained a notation in the bottom-left corner confirming that the
sentences were to run consecutively to each other and to Taylor’s prior sentence, and
also the order in which the sentences were to be served. Id.
In February 2022, Taylor filed his Petition, asserting that the
“[Department] refuse[d] to acknowledge the commencement of [his] concurrent
1
The Department included Taylor’s sentencing orders as Exhibit A to its preliminary
objection, as Taylor failed to attach them to his Petition. See Preliminary Objection (P.O.) at 2, ¶
8 (citing Barndt v. Dep’t of Corr., 902 A.2d 589, 591 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (noting that “a limited
exception to the rule against speaking demurrers exists for documents filed in support of a
demurrer where a [petitioner] has averred the existence of certain written documents and premised
his cause of action upon those documents”)).
2
We note that although portions of the sentencing orders are indecipherable, the legible
portions plainly indicate that the sentencing court imposed the sentences to run consecutively. See
P.O., Exhibit A, Sentencing Orders at 1-2. Pursuant to the sentencing orders, the sentence imposed
at count 1 shall take effect at the expiration of the sentence imposed at count 3, the sentence
imposed at count 2 shall take effect at the expiration of the sentence imposed at count 4, the
sentence imposed at count 3 shall take effect at the expiration of “any other sentence now serving”
and the sentence imposed at count 4 shall take effect at the expiration of the sentence imposed at
count 1. Id.2
sentence from the effective date of March 30,1998[.]” Petition at 2, ¶ 4.3 Taylor
contends that the Department erred in “accept[ing] the ambiguous ‘notations’ on
each sentencing order that [his] charges [were to run] consecutive to each other.” Id.According to Taylor, the sentencing orders create “ambiguity” because they bear an
effective date of March 30, 1998, and “[i]t is only at the bottom of each sentencing
order . . . [that] notations [indicate] that each sentence is [to run] consecutive[ly].”
Id. at 3, ¶ 5.4 Taylor maintains that “[t]hese notations are incorrect and do not
accurately depict [his] sentence,” reasoning that “[i]f these sentences were to be
consecutive, the effective date of each sentence would have been left blank[.]” Id.
Taylor contacted the sentencing court to attempt to rectify the alleged
discrepancy in the sentencing orders. Petition at 3, ¶ 7. In response, the sentencing
court sent Taylor a copy of his DC-300B commitment form, which Taylor then
forwarded to SCI-Fayette.5 Id. at 3, ¶¶ 8-9; see also Petition, Exhibit B, DC-300B
Form at 1-4. Taylor asserts that the DC-300B form bolsters his claim, as it indicates
a start date of March 30, 1998 for each sentence. Petition at 3, ¶ 8. Taylor
complained to the Department that SCI-Fayette ignored his DC-300B form. Id. at
3, ¶ 10 (citing Exhibit C, Letter, 11/2/21). A records specialist with the Department
3
Taylor indicated that he included the sentencing orders as Exhibit A to his Petition. See
Petition at 2, ¶ 4 (citing Petition, Exhibit A, Minute Clerk Forms). However, Exhibit A in fact
contains the minute clerk forms.
4
Unlike the minute clerk forms, the sentencing orders attached to the Department’s
preliminary objection do not bear any notation in the bottom left-hand corner. See P.O., Exhibit
A, Sentencing Orders at 1-2.
5
“Upon commitment of an inmate to the custody of the Department . . . , the sheriff or
transporting official shall provide to the institution’s records officer or duty officer, in addition to”
the inmate’s sentencing order and other pertinent information, “a copy of the court commitment
form DC-300B generated from the Common Pleas Criminal Court Case Management System of
the unified judicial system[.]” Section 9764(a) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a); see
also Section 96.4 of the Department’s Regulations, 37 Pa. Code § 96.4.
3
responded, explaining that SCI-Fayette could only accept DC-300B forms received
directly from the sentencing court. Id. at 4, ¶ 12 (citing Exhibit C, “MEMO,”
1/27/22). The records specialist further explained that written orders are “always
used” to calculate sentences, and that any concerns regarding a possible discrepancy
between these orders and the DC-300B form should be directed to the sentencing
judge. Id. (quoting Exhibit C, “MEMO,” 1/27/22).
Nevertheless, Taylor asserts that the Department should have contacted
the sentencing judge regarding whether his sentences were to be served concurrently
or consecutively. Id. at 4, ¶ 15. Taylor insists that the Department “alter[ed]” his
sentencing orders and the DC-300B form. Id. at 5, ¶ 16. Further, Taylor maintains
that the Department may not modify or disregard the DC-300B form, as it is
generated by the sentencing court. Id. Moreover, Taylor asserts that the Department
is obligated to faithfully implement sentencing orders and may not add or delete
sentencing conditions. Id. at 5, ¶ 17 (McCray v. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127,
1133 (Pa. 2002)).
Accordingly, Taylor requests that this Court issue a writ of mandamus
ordering acceptance of his sentences as commencing on March 30, 1998 and
“forward a copy direct to the records specialist at SCI-Fayette . . . , so that his
sentence can be changed to reflect the appropriate effective date.” See Petition at 5.
On April 5, 2022, the Department demurred to the Petition on the basis
that Taylor lacks a clear right to the requested relief. See P.O. at 6, ¶ 23.6 On January
6
In April 2022, Taylor submitted a praecipe for default judgment, asserting that the
Department failed to file a responsive pleading to his Petition within the required time. See
Praecipe for Default Judgment, 4/13/22 This Court dismissed Taylor’s praecipe on the basis that
the Department timely filed its preliminary objection. See Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 4/21/22.
4
18, 2023, Taylor filed his Motion, requesting that this Court dismiss the
Department’s preliminary objection and grant the relief sought in the Petition. See
Motion at 1-5 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034; Pa.R.A.P. 1532). The Department
responded that the Motion was premature, as the Department had yet to file an
answer to Taylor’s Petition. See Answer to Motion, 1/30/23 at 3 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P.
1034).
II. Issues
The Department argues that this Court should dismiss the Petition
because Taylor fails to plead facts sufficient to establish a clear right to the requested
relief. Department’s Br. at 11. The Department contends that it “is charged with
faithfully implementing sentences imposed by the courts. As part of the executive
branch, the Department lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to
add or delete sentencing conditions.” Id. (quoting McCray, 872 A.2d at 1133).
Further, the Department asserts that sentencing orders control when any ambiguity
exists. See Department’s Br. at 12 (citing Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287,
1293 (Pa. 1983)). The Department maintains that both the sentencing orders and the
minute clerk forms indicate that the sentencing court imposed Taylor’s sentences to
run consecutively. Id. at 13. Thus, the Department contends that it properly
calculated Taylor’s sentence. Id. at 14.
Also in April 2022, Taylor filed an answer with new matter to the Department’s
preliminary objection. See Answer with New Matter, 4/20/22. The Department filed a motion to
strike Taylor’s answer with new matter on the basis that an answer to preliminary objections may
not include new matter. See Motion to Strike, 4/27/22 at 2-3, ¶¶ 10-12 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b);
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017(a)(4)). By order dated April 29, 2022, this Court granted the Department’s
motion to strike without prejudice to Taylor to file a responsive pleading to the Department’s
preliminary objection. Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 4/29/22.
5
Taylor likewise acknowledges that the Department is charged with
faithfully implementing court-imposed sentences. See Taylor’s Br. at 9 (citing
McCray, 872 A.2d at 1133). Nevertheless, Taylor counters that neither the
sentencing orders nor the minute clerk forms support the Department’s position, as
“a consecutive sentence does not show the date the sentence is to begin.” Id.7 Taylor
contends that the provision of March 30, 1998 as the effective date for each of the
disputed sentencing orders establishes that his sentences are to be served
concurrently. See id. at 10. Further, Taylor maintains that a writ of mandamus is an
appropriate remedy because his right to the requested relief constitutes a question of
law that does not involve the Department’s exercise of discretion. See id. at 10.
III. Discussion
A. Preliminary Objections
In ruling on preliminary objections,
our review is limited to the pleadings. . . . We are required
to accept as true the well-[pleaded] averments set forth
in the . . . [petition for review], and all inferences
reasonably deducible therefrom. . . . Moreover, the court
need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted
inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or
expressions of opinion. . . .
Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res.,
909 A.2d 413, 415-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (citations omitted). A preliminary
objection to the legal sufficiency of a pleading, commonly known as a demurrer,
raises questions of law, and we “must decide whether it is clear from the well-
7
As noted above, Taylor mistakenly relied on the minute clerk forms instead of the
sentencing orders. See supra note 3.
6
pleaded facts and reasonable inferences from those facts that the [petitioner] has not
established a right to relief.” Yocum v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 233-
34 (Pa. 2017). “Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be
sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which
relief may be granted.” Id. at 274. “[T]he question presented by [a] demurrer is
whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.
Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should
be resolved in favor of overruling it.” Bilt–Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The
Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 2005). “In addition, courts reviewing
preliminary objections may not only consider the facts [pleaded] in the [petition for
review], but also documents or exhibits attached to it.” Lawrence v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 941 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). However, in the context of a demurrer,
the Court need not accept as true any averments in the petition that conflict with the
exhibits attached thereto. Id. (citing Philmar Mid-Atl., Inc. v. York St. Assocs. II,
566 A.2d 1253, 1254 (Pa. Super. 1989)).
To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner possesses a “threshold
burden . . . to establish a clear legal right to relief.” Tindell v. Dep’t of Corr., 87
A.3d 1029, 1034 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citations omitted). As this Court has
explained,
[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy available only to
compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory
duty on the part of a governmental body. The Department
is an administrative agency charged with faithfully
carrying[]out sentences imposed by the courts, and is
without authority “to adjudicate the legality of a sentence
or to add or delete sentencing conditions.” McCray[], . . .
872 A.2d [at] 1133 . . . . Because the sentence imposed by
a trial court is a question of law that involves no discretion
on the part of the Department, mandamus will lie to
7
compel the Department to properly compute a prisoner’s
sentence.
Commonwealth, ex rel. Powell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 14 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2011) (citations omitted). “The purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights,
but to enforce those rights already established beyond peradventure.” LeGrande v.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 894 A.2d 219, 223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (citing Africa v. Horn,
701 A.2d 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)).
We agree with the Department that Taylor’s pleading fails to establish
a clear legal right to mandamus relief compelling acceptance of his sentences as
running concurrently. See Tindell, 87 A.3d at 1034. Taylor asserts that the March
30, 1998 effective date for the sentencing orders gives rise to “ambiguity,” as “[i]t
is only at the bottom of each sentencing order . . . [that] notations [indicate] that each
sentence is [to run] consecutive[ly].” Petition at 3, ¶ 5.8 Nevertheless, Taylor
maintains that these notations are incorrect, reasoning that the sentencing court
would have omitted the effective date in imposing the sentences to run
consecutively. See id. Taylor, therefore, insists that the Department should have
construed the inclusion of the effective date as evidencing the sentencing court’s
intent to provide for concurrent service of the sentences. See id.; see also Taylor’s
Br. at 10.
As noted by both parties, the Department “is charged with faithfully
implementing sentences imposed by the courts” and “lacks the power to adjudicate
the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.” McCray, 872
A.2d at 1133. “A sentence . . . is to be construed so as to give effect to the intention
of the sentencing judge.” Powell, 14 A.3d at 915. “The text of the sentencing order
8
We reiterate that Taylor apparently reviewed the minute clerk forms instead of the
sentencing orders. See supra note 3.
8
is determinative of the court’s intentions and the sentence imposed. We are limited
to the language of the sentencing order itself, despite any oral statements the
sentencing court may have made to the contrary.” Comrie v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 142
A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citations omitted).
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 705(B),
[w]hen more than one sentence is imposed at the same
time on a defendant, or when a sentence is imposed on a
defendant who is sentenced for another offense, the judge
shall state whether the sentences shall run concurrently or
consecutively. If the sentence is to run concurrently, the
sentence shall commence from the date of imposition
unless otherwise ordered by the judge.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 705(B) (emphasis added). Fatal to Taylor’s claim, the sentencing
orders clearly provide for consecutive service, further specifying when each
“sentence [is] to begin and take effect[.]”9 P.O., Exhibit A, Sentencing Orders at 1-
2. Thus, the sentences do not collectively “commence” from the March 30, 1998
“date of imposition.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 705(B).10 Moreover, Taylor provides no
authority in support of his “preferred reading” of the sentencing orders as providing
for concurrent service of the sentences imposed therein. Cf. Montgomery v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 525 M.D. 2015, filed Aug. 22, 2018), slip op. at 4-
5 (rejecting the Department’s “attempts to buttress its interpretation” of the disputed
sentencing orders by asserting that they should be “read together,” where the
9
See supra note 2.
10
The minute clerk forms attached to the Petition corroborate the substance of the
sentencing orders attached to the preliminary objection. In considering the Department’s
demurrer, the Court need not accept as true any averments in the Petition that conflict with the
attached exhibits. See Lawrence v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 941 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)
9
Department “cite[d] to no authority to support this proposition,” instead “choos[ing]
to disregard the plain text” in favor of “its preferred reading”).11
We, therefore, conclude that Taylor fails to establish a clear legal right
to an order directing the Department to disregard the plain terms of the sentencing
orders. See Forbes v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 931 A.2d 88, 90-92 & 95 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2007), aff’d, 596 Pa. 492, 946 A.2d 103 (Pa. 2008) (denying inmate’s application
for summary relief, sustaining the Department’s preliminary objections and
dismissing inmate’s mandamus petition, where inmate did not possess a clear legal
right to an order directing the Department to deaggregate his consecutive sentences);
see also Yocum, 161 A.3d at 233-34; Casner v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun.
Emps., 658 A.2d 865, 869 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
“At any time after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or
original jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right
of the applicant thereto is clear.” Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034
(relating to judgment on the pleadings). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings
may summarily dispose of a case only when there exists no genuine issue of fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Casner, 658 A.2d at
869. “When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must
consider the pleadings and relevant documents, including preliminary objections[.]”
Pa. Off. of Attorney Gen. ex rel. Corbett v. Richmond Twp., 975 A.2d 607, 612 n.5
11
We observe that the sentencing court imposed the sentencing orders roughly in 1998.
“[T]he presumption that the written sentencing order is what the sentencing judge intended
increases with the length of time that the written sentencing order goes unchallenged.”
Commonwealth, ex rel. Powell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 14 A.3d 912, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citing
Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1240 (Pa. Super. 1994) (brackets omitted)).
10
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (first citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017(a); and then citing Pa.R.Civ.P.
1034(a)). Here, no answer has been filed to the Petition, as the Department instead
filed a preliminary objection, and the Petition does not demonstrate a clear right to
relief. The preliminary objection must be disposed of first, in order to determine
whether an answer to the Petition is required. Because we sustain the Department’s
preliminary objection, no answer is required, and we do not reach the Motion.
Accordingly, it will be dismissed as moot.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Department’s preliminary
objection, dismiss Taylor’s Motion as moot, and dismiss the Petition.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Jeffrey Taylor, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :
Department of Corrections, : No. 77 M.D. 2022
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of March, 2023, the preliminary objection of
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is SUSTAINED, the “Motion for
Judgment on the Pleading” filed by Jeffrey Taylor (Taylor) is DISMISSED AS
MOOT, and the “Petition for Writ of Mandamus” filed by Taylor is DISMISSED.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge