S. Fisher v. UCBR ( 2017 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Sean Fisher,                                  :
    Petitioner       :
    :   No. 1834 C.D. 2016
    v.                            :   Submitted: April 28, 2017
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                     :
    Board of Review,                              :
    Respondent                :
    BEFORE:         HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE SIMPSON                              FILED: July 17, 2017
    Sean Fisher (Claimant), representing himself, petitions for review
    from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that
    denied him unemployment compensation (UC) benefits under Section 402(e) of
    the Law1 (relating to willful misconduct). Essentially, Claimant challenges the
    Board’s determination that he committed willful misconduct. Upon review, we
    affirm.
    Claimant worked for Fabri-Kal Corporation (Employer) as an operator
    from 2010 until his last day of work in June 2016. After his separation from
    employment, Claimant applied for UC benefits, which were initially granted.
    Employer appealed. A hearing ensued before a referee.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
    §802(e).
    At the hearing, Claimant and Employer’s Human Resources Manager
    (Human Resources Manager) testified. After the hearing, the referee issued a
    decision in which he made the following relevant findings:
    2. [Claimant] had a long history of attendance
    occurrences, for which he had been warned multiple
    times, including final warnings and a last chance
    agreement.
    3. [Claimant] was even allowed to continue work and
    given additional chances after the final warning and last
    chance agreement but yet continued to be repeatedly
    absent.
    4. [Claimant] was then absent on 5/16 and 5/17/16.
    5. [Claimant] was discharged due to his attendance.
    Referee’s Dec. 8/11/16, Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 2-5.
    The referee further explained (with emphasis added):
    In the instant case, the Referee finds the testimony of
    [Employer’s] witness to be credible and does not find the
    testimony of [Claimant] to be credible.
    In the instant case, the Referee cannot conclude that there
    is any credible evidence that [Claimant] had good cause
    for his continued absence or any credible evidence that
    he had good cause for the final incident of absence which
    precipitated his discharge. The Referee must conclude
    that [Claimant] was discharged for willful misconduct in
    connection with his work, so that [Claimant] is ineligible
    under Section 402(e) of the Law.
    Referee’s Dec. at 2.
    2
    Claimant, then through counsel, appealed to the Board.                 He also
    requested a remand to allow him to present additional evidence.
    Ultimately, the Board affirmed the referee. In so doing, it adopted
    and incorporated the referee’s findings as its own. It also denied Claimant’s
    remand request. Claimant now petitions for review to this Court.
    In the Argument section of his brief,2 Claimant asserts: “[Employer]
    had no necessitous, compelling reason to terminate [C]laimant’s employment.
    Employer also did not give proper disciplinary actions prior to termination, such as
    suspension. The [UC] Referee had no credible evidence or compelling reason to
    deny benefits.” Br. of Pet’r at 19. Claimant also attaches a letter brief his former
    counsel submitted to the Board. Through that brief, Claimant argued he called off
    of work on May 16 and May 17, 2016, the dates preceding his termination from
    employment, because of an inability to obtain childcare. He further asserted he
    requested a shift change on those dates that would have alleviated his childcare
    issue, but Employer denied his request. Thus, Claimant asserted he had good
    cause for the final two absences before his discharge. See Mt. Airy # 1, L.L.C. v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 791 C.D. 2009, filed
    December 23, 2009), 
    2009 WL 9103007
    (unreported).
    2
    Our review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact were supported
    by substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed or whether constitutional rights
    were violated. Oliver v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    5 A.3d 432
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)
    (en banc).
    3
    The Board counters that Claimant had a history of absenteeism for
    which Employer issued Claimant multiple warnings. It asserts Employer gave
    Claimant several chances over the years to improve his attendance, but Claimant
    continued to call off from work. For his final absences, the Board contends,
    Claimant asserted he had no one to watch his child. However, the Board did not
    credit Claimant’s testimony as to the reason for his absences. Thus, the Board
    argues, Claimant did not prove good cause for his absences, and the Board
    properly denied Claimant UC benefits.
    In UC cases, the Board is the ultimate fact-finder.         Oliver v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    5 A.3d 432
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc).
    As such, issues of credibility and the evidentiary weight given to conflicting
    testimony are within the Board’s exclusive province. 
    Id. The Board
    may reject the
    testimony of the claimant if it concludes his testimony is not worthy of belief.
    Adams v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    373 A.2d 1383
    (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1977). Further, this Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
    party prevailing before the Board.      Sanders v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    739 A.2d 616
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). We must give that party the benefit of
    all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. 
    Id. In addition,
    “[t]he fact that [a party] may have produced witnesses
    who gave a different version of the events, or that [the party] might view the
    testimony differently than the Board is not grounds for reversal if substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s findings.” Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
    of Review, 
    650 A.2d 1106
    , 1108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Thus, it is irrelevant
    4
    whether the record contains substantial evidence to support findings other than
    those made by the Board; the critical inquiry is whether there is substantial
    evidence to support the findings actually made. Wise v. Unemployment Comp.
    Bd. of Review, 
    111 A.3d 1256
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); Ductmate Indus., Inc. v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    949 A.2d 338
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
    Section 402(e) of the Law states that an employee shall be ineligible
    for compensation for any week in which his unemployment is a result of willful
    misconduct connected to his work. 43 P.S. §802(e). Willful misconduct is defined
    as: (1) a wanton and willful disregard of an employer’s interests; (2) deliberate
    violation of rules; (3) disregard of the standards of behavior which an employer
    can rightfully expect from an employee; or, (4) negligence showing an intentional
    disregard of the employer’s interests or the employee’s duties and obligations.
    Grieb v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    827 A.2d 422
    (Pa. 2002). The
    employer bears the initial burden of establishing a claimant engaged in willful
    misconduct. Navickas v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    787 A.2d 284
    (Pa.
    2001). Whether a claimant’s actions constitute willful misconduct is a question of
    law fully reviewable on appeal. 
    Id. Employers have
    the right to expect employees will be at work and on
    time. Grand Sport Auto Body v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    55 A.3d 186
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc). Nevertheless, while absenteeism standing
    alone is grounds for discharge, it is not willful misconduct.           Lyons v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    533 A.2d 1144
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
    Absenteeism can constitute willful misconduct if any of the following additional
    5
    elements are present: (1) excessive absenteeism; (2) failure to notify the employer
    of the absence in advance; (3) lack of good or adequate cause for the absence; (4)
    disobedience of existing employer rules, regulations, or policy regarding
    absenteeism; and, (5) disregard of warnings regarding absenteeism.       Pettey v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    325 A.2d 642
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974).
    Although an advance warning is not a prerequisite to support a
    discharge for willful misconduct, a prior warning is relevant as it “reflects the
    employee’s attitude toward his employment and thus adds to the willfulness of the
    misconduct.”     Am. Process Lettering, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    412 A.2d 1123
    , 1125-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).
    Here, the Board found Claimant had a lengthy history of attendance
    issues. F.F. No. 2. Employer warned Claimant about those issues on multiple
    occasions, including a final warning and a last chance agreement. 
    Id. Further, Employer
    allowed Claimant to continue working and gave him additional chances
    after the final warning and last chance agreement. F.F. No. 3. Nevertheless,
    Claimant was repeatedly absent. 
    Id. Thereafter, Claimant
    was absent from work
    on May 16 and May 17, 2016. F.F. No. 4. Employer discharged Claimant based
    on attendance issues. F.F. No. 5. The credible testimony of Human Resources
    Manager supports the Board’s findings.      Referee’s Hr’g, Notes of Testimony
    (N.T.), 8/9/16, at 3-6.
    More particularly, Human Resources Manager testified that beginning
    in 2011, Employer warned Claimant regarding his absences and attendance issues.
    6
    N.T. at 3. Thereafter, in June 2012, Employer provided Claimant a two-year last
    chance warning.    N.T. at 4.   Employer subsequently suspended Claimant for
    missing the start of a safety meeting.       
    Id. Employer then
    conducted a full
    employment review regarding Claimant’s attendance issues in January 2013. 
    Id. Nevertheless, Claimant
    had a subsequent attendance issue in October 2013. 
    Id. Further, Employer
    issued Claimant another warning regarding attendance in
    November 2014. 
    Id. Claimant again
    violated Employer’s attendance policy in
    August 2015. 
    Id. Employer opted
    to give Claimant another chance at that time.
    N.T. at 4-5. Employer issued Claimant another warning for an attendance issue in
    March 2016. N.T. at 5. Thereafter, Claimant called off work three times in April
    and May 2016. 
    Id. Finally, Claimant
    called off of work on May 16 and 17, 2016,
    which led to Employer’s decision to terminate his employment. 
    Id. In making
    its findings, the Board credited the testimony of Human
    Resources Manager over that of Claimant. Referee’s Dec. at 2; Bd. Op. at 5. The
    Board also determined the record lacked any credible evidence that Claimant had
    good cause for his continued absences or the final absences that precipitated his
    discharge. Referee’s Dec. at 2; Bd. Op. at 5. As such, the Board determined
    Claimant committed willful misconduct. Referee’s Dec. at 2; Bd. Op. at 5. No
    error is apparent in the Board’s ultimate determination that Claimant committed
    disqualifying willful misconduct. Indeed, the Board expressly rejected Claimant’s
    testimony regarding the purported good cause for his final absences.
    Further, Mt. Airy, cited by Claimant, is distinguishable. There, the
    Board determined the claimant had good cause for his absences and tardiness
    7
    based on its acceptance of the claimant’s testimony. Unlike in Mt. Airy, the Board
    here expressly rejected Claimant’s testimony concerning the purported good cause
    for his absences. Clearly, we cannot disturb the Board’s credibility determination.
    As a final point, Claimant argues Employer did not follow proper
    disciplinary procedures before terminating his employment, such as a suspension.
    However, at the hearing here, Claimant offered no evidence to support this
    assertion. Moreover, in light of the Board’s supported finding as to Employer’s
    repeated warnings to Claimant concerning his attendance issues, F.F. No. 2, it
    appears clear that Claimant was aware his job was in jeopardy if he continued to be
    absent from work.3
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    3
    In his Summary of Argument, Claimant also asserts the Board should have only
    considered his final absences in deciding whether he committed willful misconduct. However,
    the Board here found Employer discharged Claimant based on attendance issues generally,
    Referee’s Dec. 8/11/16, Finding of Fact No. 5, and Human Resources Manager’s testimony
    supports this finding. N.T. at 3-6.
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Sean Fisher,                           :
    Petitioner     :
    :   No. 1834 C.D. 2016
    v.                      :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation              :
    Board of Review,                       :
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2017, the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S. Fisher v. UCBR - 1834 C.D. 2016

Judges: Simpson, J.

Filed Date: 7/17/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024