Borough of Coraopolis v. A. Papa ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Borough of Coraopolis, :
Officer Robert Litterini :
and Officer Nicholas DeRusso, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 233 C.D. 2022
:
Amanda Papa : Submitted: November 4, 2022
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: March 3, 2023
The Borough of Coraopolis, Officer Robert Litterini, and Officer Nicholas
DeRusso (collectively, the Borough) appeal from a December 30, 2021 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) denying the Borough’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon review, we reverse and remand to the Trial
Court for the entry of judgment in favor of the Borough.
I. Background
On the evening of May 30, 2018, Coraopolis Police Officers Litterini and
DeRusso responded to a domestic violence call at the residence of Amanda Papa and
her husband, Garrett Wasserman. See Commonwealth v. Amanda Lynn Wasserman,
a.k.a. Papa (C.C.P. Allegheny Cnty., No. CP-02-CR-0008418-2018, filed July 20,
2020) (Criminal Trial Opinion), at 9. The call had been placed by Ms. Papa’s father,
who was concerned after finding his daughter intoxicated and agitated following a
fight with her husband. Id. After the officers arrived, Mr. Wasserman, visibly
injured, granted the officers access to the home. Id. at 9-10. Inside, the officers
observed a broken television, broken computers, upturned houseplants and lamps,
and shattered glass strewn across the floors. Id. at 10. Ms. Papa emerged from an
upstairs bedroom door, announced that she did not wish to see her husband, and
returned to the bedroom to lock herself inside it. Id. Due to the information received
from Ms. Papa’s father and the condition of her home and her husband, the officers
forced the bedroom door open. Id. They informed Ms. Papa that she was under
arrest for the assault of her husband. Id. When the officers attempted to handcuff
her, Ms. Papa attempted to fight them off. Id.
Upon her arrest, Ms. Papa was taken to a holding cell at the police station. Id.
Immediately after the officers left her alone, Ms. Papa attempted to flood the cell by
stuffing a blanket into a toilet and repeatedly flushing it. Id. at 10-11. The officers
moved Ms. Papa to an interview room, where they handcuffed each of her hands to
the arms of a chair. Id. at 11. Immediately after they left the room, Ms. Papa began
kicking a nearby table, which the officers (who had been watching via surveillance
camera) returned to remove. Id. Minutes after they left, Ms. Papa proceeded to kick
the chair across the room, jump up and down, kick the wall repeatedly, bite her wrists
causing blood and bite marks, remove her clothing, urinate on the floor and chair,
and hit her head repeatedly on the chair. Id. The officers called a team of medics to
evaluate and treat Ms. Papa’s self-inflicted injuries. Id.
Following the events of May 30, 2018, Ms. Papa was charged with resisting
arrest and institutional vandalism.1 Id. at 2. Following a bench trial, the court
1
At the time, Ms. Papa was already facing several criminal charges as the result of an
incident on April 22, 2018. The charges were consolidated with those in the instant matter for
trial, conviction, and sentencing. Criminal Trial Op. at 1. The May 30, 2018 events, and the
convictions that followed, form the factual basis of a separate civil action and appeal to this Court.
See Moon Twp. v. Papa (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 234 C.D. 2022, filed March 3, 2023).
2
convicted Ms. Papa of both counts and, on March 27, 2019, sentenced her to
concurrent one-year terms of probation.2 Id. at 3.
On September 23, 2020, Ms. Papa filed a pro se3 Complaint alleging that
Officers Litterini and DeRusso were liable for false arrest, negligence, defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. Original
Record (O.R.), Item No. 10. Ms. Papa further alleged that the Borough was liable
for the officers’ conduct as their employer, and was liable in its own right for an
additional count of negligence. See generally id. ¶¶ 56-70. As a proposed remedy,
Ms. Papa requested an award of money damages in an unspecified amount, plus legal
costs. Id. ¶ 70.
The Borough filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 29, 2021.4
O.R., Item No. 17. Therein, the Borough argues that Coraopolis was governmentally
immune from Ms. Papa’s claims under what is commonly known as the Political
2
Ms. Papa appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the convictions. See
Commonwealth v. Amanda Lynn Wasserman (Pa. Super., No. 1407 WDA 2019, filed Nov. 12,
2021), appeal denied, 275 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2022).
3
While examining Ms. Papa’s claims, we are mindful of the rule that “allegations of a pro
se complainant are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by
attorneys.” Rosario v. Beard, 920 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Danysh v. Dep’t of
Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2005)). Where a pro
se complainant’s allegations are adequately set forth, they will not be dismissed just because they
are not artfully drafted. Hill v. Thorne, 635 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 1993).
4
Previously, the Borough removed the case to the United States Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania on October 21, 2020. O.R., Item No. 11. In a January 8, 2021 order, the
district court remanded the case to state court. Id., Item No. 12.
3
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542.5 Id.
¶¶ 24-25. The Borough further asserts that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are
protected by official immunity pursuant to Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act.6 Id.
¶¶ 26-28. Finally, the Borough claims that each of Ms. Papa’s claims fail on their
merits because Ms. Papa has not, and cannot, allege facts necessary to establish the
elements of each claim. See generally id. ¶¶ 35-64.
On December 30, 2021, the Trial Court issued an order denying the Borough’s
summary judgment motion. O.R., Item No. 22. The order consisted simply of a
printout of the Borough’s proposed order granting summary judgment, with the text
crossed out and the single word “denied” written in the margin. Id.
The Borough subsequently petitioned this Court for permission to appeal. In
a May 19, 2022 per curiam order, this Court granted its petition. Our order directed
the parties to submit briefs on whether the Borough and its employees are immune
from suit, and on whether Ms. Papa’s suit constituted a collateral attack on her
convictions.7
5
Section 8541 provides that, except as otherwise specified in the Tort Claims Act, “no
local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property
caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8541. Section 8542 provides certain exceptions, all of which involve negligence claims and
which are not applicable to the instant matter. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542.
6
Section 8545 provides that an “employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages on
account of any injury to a person or property caused by acts of the employee which are within the
scope of his office or duties only to the same extent as his employing local agency and subject to
the limitations imposed by [the Tort Claims Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545.
7
The order also directed the parties to submit briefs on the question of whether “the
Pennsylvania Constitution provides a private right of action to” Ms. Papa. This is a reference to
one of Ms. Papa’s claims in her related suit against Moon Township.
4
II. Issues
The Borough argues that summary judgment was improperly denied because
the Borough and its employees are immune from suit as a matter of law, and because
Ms. Papa’s claims constitute an improper collateral attack on her criminal
conviction.8
III. Discussion
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides:
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to
unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment
in whole or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a
necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be
established by additional discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion,
including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts
essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would
require the issues to be submitted to a jury.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2. A party seeking to avoid summary judgment must show by
specific facts in the depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Moon v. Dauphin Cnty., 129 A.3d 16, 28 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015).
Here, the Borough moved for summary judgment on the basis that Ms. Papa’s
claims suffer from legal defects that “could not be cured through any further
discovery in this case.” O.R., Item No. 17, Motion ¶ 7. Ms. Papa countered that
summary judgment would be inappropriate because she did not have an opportunity
8
Our standard of review on appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Clean Air Council v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 185 A.3d
478, 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court
committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Id.5
to substantiate her allegations of abusive treatment at the hands of the Borough and
its employees. O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶¶ 11-12.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a),9 the Trial Court submitted a single sentence
statement explaining its denial of summary judgment, which reads as follows:
“When [the Borough] filed [its] [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment, discovery was
not closed and it was therefore not free and clear from all doubt that [the Township
or its employees] were entitled to summary judgment.” The memorandum cites a
single case, Brown v. Tunkhannock Township, 665 A.2d 1318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995),
which is inapposite to the issues at hand.10
It is important to note that the Trial Court did not address any of the issues set
forth in this Court’s order granting the interlocutory appeal such as immunity and
collateral attack defenses. Furthermore, the Trial Court offers an incomplete
statement of when summary judgment is appropriate. The close of discovery is not
the only condition allowing summary judgment to be considered. Pursuant to Rule
of Civil Procedure 1035.2(1), summary judgment is equally appropriate when “there
is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of
action or defense which could be established by additional discovery.” Pa.R.Civ.P.
9
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) provides that, upon the receipt of a notice of appeal, “the judge who
entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already
appear of record, shall . . . file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order.”
10
The Trial Court’s reliance on Brown in this matter is perplexing as Brown does not
discuss the status of discovery or its impact on summary judgment. Brown involved a plaintiff
who sustained injuries at a softball game on township-owned land and brought an action in
negligence against the township. 665 A.2d at 1319. After the close of pleadings and a single
deposition, the township moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity pursuant to the
Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (RULWA), Act of February 2, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1860,
as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 477-1–477-8. 665 A.2d at 1319. The trial court granted the township’s
motion. Id. at 1319-20. This Court reversed, holding that the ballpark was “improved land” and
therefore outside the scope of the RULWA. Id. at 1322.
6
1035.2(1). The Trial Court’s statement fails to provide any insight or explanation as
to why Rule 1035.2(1) is inapplicable in this instance. For the reasons set forth
below, we have determined that the Borough and officers are immune from suit, that
Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter of law, and that further discovery would serve no
purpose.
A. Governmental Immunity
Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides the general rule of government
liability: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be
liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by
any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 8541. The following section provides eight exceptions, all of which involve acts
of negligence.11 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542. The clear legislative intent to insulate local
agencies and their employees from tort claims mandates that courts construe those
exceptions narrowly. Cornelius v. Roberts, 71 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that the Borough is liable for the torts committed
by Officers Litterini and DeRusso in its capacity as their employer. Ms. Papa also
alleges that the Borough is liable in its own right for negligence due to its failure to
heed her calls to investigate the officers’ alleged wrongdoing. Not one of the
11
The exceptions include: (i) the operation of motor vehicles; (ii) the care, custody, or
control of personal property; (iii) the care, custody or control of real property; (iv) a dangerous
condition of trees, traffic controls and street lighting; (v) a dangerous condition of steam, sewer,
water, gas or electric systems; (vi) a dangerous condition of streets; (vii) a dangerous condition of
sidewalks; and (viii) the care, custody or control of animals. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b).
7
allegations falls under Section 8542’s exceptions to governmental immunity.12 The
Borough is therefore immune from all of Ms. Papa’s claims.13
B. Official Immunity
The general rule of official immunity is stated in Section 8545 of the Tort
Claims Act: “An employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages on account
12
Ms. Papa’s negligence claim against the Borough itself would be unavailing even if
immunity did not apply. Specifically, Ms. Papa alleges that the Borough is in breach of a duty “to
oversee its employees including investigating complaints of misconduct by its employees and take
appropriate action.” O.R., Item No. 10, Complaint ¶ 67. In support, Ms. Papa cites Section 1123.1
of the Borough Code, which provides that “[t]he mayor shall have full charge and control of the
chief of police and the police force,” and that the mayor “may delegate to the chief of police or
other officer supervision over and instruction to subordinate officers in the manner of performing
their duties.” 8 Pa.C.S. § 1123.1(a)-(c). There is nothing in that provision, or elsewhere in the
Borough Code, that imposes an affirmative duty on municipal authorities to take disciplinary
action anytime that someone alleges misconduct. A borough’s power to investigate or discipline
a police officer is governed by Section 1124(a) of the Borough Code, which provides that a
borough mayor “may, for cause and without pay, suspend any police officers until the succeeding
regular meeting of the council at which time or later the council may . . . suspend, discharge, reduce
in rank or reinstate with pay the police officers.” 8 Pa.C.S. § 1124(a) (emphases added). As made
clear by the operative verb “may,” the Borough Code authorizes, but does not require, a borough
government to take such action.
13
In opposition to the Borough’s assertion of immunity, Ms. Papa also argues that under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governments “may be sued
in certain limited circumstances.” O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶ 13. While that is true, Monell
concerned civil actions for loss of federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms.
Papa is not pursuing federal claims, which is why this case was remanded to state court.
Ms. Papa also opposes immunity on the basis of two new allegations against the Borough:
that it had failed to place her under a female police officer’s supervision, and that one of the police
officers at the station on the evening of Ms. Papa’s arrest was the subject of a sexual misconduct
complaint. O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶¶ 15, 16. It is unclear how these allegations relate to the
question of whether the Borough is immune from her suit. If Ms. Papa wished to argue that the
alleged conduct constituted additional torts, then the allegations should be included in an amended
complaint. Even if the Trial Court were to grant Ms. Papa leave to amend, however, the averments
would fail to support the argument; Ms. Papa does not allege that she was harmed by the absence
of a female officer, or that she had any interactions with the officer accused of sexual misconduct.
The new allegations are therefore irrelevant to the question of whether the Borough is immune.
8
of any injury to a person or property caused by acts of the employee which are within
the scope of his office or duties only to the same extent as his employing local
agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545. That limitation is waived if an injury was caused by
an act that is judicially determined to have “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. For purposes of Section 8550,
“willful misconduct” is synonymous with “intentional tort”; that is, the actor
“desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least that he was aware that it
was substantially certain to ensue.” Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 196 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2012). If the claim does not rise to the level of willful misconduct, but,
instead, is based on negligence, then the employee enjoys governmental immunity
to the same extent as a local agency, and the negligence claim must meet one of the
eight enumerated exceptions in Section 8542(b). Orange Stones Co. v. City of
Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1023 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are personally
liable for false arrest, negligence, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and malicious prosecution. The negligence count against the officers, like
the one against the Borough itself, does not fall under any of the Section 8542(b)
exceptions. Officers Litterini and DeRusso are therefore immune from that claim.14
14
Like the negligence claim against the Borough itself, the claim against the officers would
be unavailing even if immunity did not apply. In her Complaint, Ms. Papa alleges that the officers
are liable for negligence through a variety of bad acts. First, the Complaint states that the officers
violated Section 302(a)(2) of the Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended, which provides that
a peace officer who personally observes someone in apparent need of immediate mental health
treatment “may take such person to an approved facility for an emergency examination.” 50 P.S.
§ 7302(a)(2). As made clear by the operative verb “may,” Section 302(a)(2) grants officers the
discretion to take a person to an approved facility for an emergency examination; it does not
require them to do so.
(Footnote continued on next page…)
9
As the remaining counts all involve allegations of intentional acts, they may
only survive if it is judicially determined that the officers’ actions constituted willful
misconduct; that is, intentional torts. For the following reasons, we conclude that
the averments in Ms. Papa’s Complaint fail as a matter of law to support any such
determination.
1. False Arrest
The necessary elements of a cause of action for false arrest are: (1) the
detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention. Renk v. City
of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). An arrest that is based upon probable
cause is legally justified, regardless of whether the individual arrested was
eventually found guilty. Id.Ms. Papa also alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso “left [a] urine-soaked towel
around the head of [Ms. Papa],” and that they later pushed the towel into her face. O.R., Item No.
10, Complaint ¶¶ 35-36. Ms. Papa later alleged that their actions constitute attempted
“strangulation.” O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶ 12. In support, Ms. Papa refers to images from
the surveillance footage of the interview room during her detention. That footage does not support
Ms. Papa’s version of events. At 8:18 p.m. on the evening of her arrest, one of the emergency
medical technicians who were called to evaluate Ms. Papa is seen placing a towel on the floor,
presumably to clean up the puddle of urine. O.R., Item No. 21, Reply Brief, Exhibit B. At 8:51
p.m., Ms. Papa is seen placing the towel around her own neck and shoulders. Id. At 9:33 p.m.,
Ms. Papa is seen kicking Officer DeRusso while he appears to be attempting to remove Ms. Papa’s
right handcuff; seconds later, he is seen lifting one end of the towel and holding it in front of Ms.
Papa’s face, but not pushing it into her face. Id.While we and the Trial Court are required to view the record in the light most favorable to
Ms. Papa, we are under no obligation to adopt a version of events that is blatantly contradicted by
video evidence. See Sellers v. Twp. of Abington, 106 A.3d 679, 690 (Pa. 2014) (finding no genuine
issue of material fact where an in-car camera recording “blatantly contradicts” the nonmoving
party’s version of events) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Consequently, the
evidence referred to by Ms. Papa does not establish any element of a negligence claim.
10
Ms. Papa argues that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are liable for false arrest
because, inter alia, her assault charge was eventually withdrawn.15 O.R., Item No.
10, Complaint ¶ 20. As stated, however, a charge need not result in a conviction for
probable cause to have existed. When the officers arrived at Ms. Papa’s home, they
observed scratches on Mr. Wasserman’s skin, which Mr. Wasserman attributed to
Ms. Papa’s assault. Those signs of injury and the coinciding evidence of the broken
objects strewn across Ms. Papa’s and Mr. Wasserman’s home were more than
enough to establish a probable cause to arrest for domestic violence. For this reason,
Ms. Papa’s allegations cannot support an inference that the officers are liable for
false arrest.
2. Defamation
In a defamation action, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that an
allegedly defamatory statement was false. Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus.
Bureau of Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 396 n.8 (Pa. 2007) (citing Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986)). Ms. Papa alleges that a Coraopolis police officer
informed her employer that Ms. Papa was facing criminal charges, which is a true
statement.16 The allegations therefore cannot support an inference that the officers
are liable for defamation.
15
Ms. Papa’s husband did not pursue the domestic violence charge. As for Ms. Papa’s
charges for resisting arrest and institutional vandalism, a cause of action for false arrest obviously
cannot be made because she was convicted of those charges. See McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d
797, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (explaining that “[p]robable cause to arrest is conclusively
established to have existed at time that arrest was made, which thus precludes action for false
arrest, if there is guilty plea or conviction”).
16
Specifically, the Complaint avers that Ms. Papa’s husband was told that a Coraopolis
police officer, “possibly” Sergeant DeRusso, “had informed [Ms. Papa’s] employer of the pending
criminal action.” O.R., Item No. 10 ¶ 41.
11
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A person is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if, by extreme
and outrageous conduct, that person intentionally or recklessly causes severe or
emotional distress to another. Carson v. City of Phila., 574 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1990). Conduct or statements are “outrageous” if they “go beyond all
bounds of decency and are regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Id. Before the question reaches a jury, it is for the court to determine whether the
defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery. Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Ms. Papa alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso engaged in “outrageous
conduct” when they arrested and detained her. O.R., Item No. 10, Complaint ¶ 46.
Because the officers had probable cause to arrest her, the conduct was entirely
consistent with their duties as law enforcement officers. No reasonable inference
can be made that the performance of official duties constitutes extreme or outrageous
conduct.
4. Malicious Prosecution
To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant instituted proceedings against the plaintiff (1) without probable cause,
(2) with malice, and that (3) the proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff.
Kelley v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d
940, 941 (Pa. 1988).
Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that Officers Litterini and DeRusso are liable for
malicious prosecution because they “initiated criminal proceedings” against her, and
that she “expects” a ruling by the Superior Court in her favor on the appeal from
those charges. O.R., Item No. 10, Complaint ¶¶ 51, 54. The Superior Court affirmed
12
the convictions; thus, the proceedings did not terminate in her favor, and no
reasonable inference can be made that the officers are liable for malicious
prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, all of Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter of law;
consequently, there is nothing in the record to justify a judicial determination that
Officers Litterini or DeRusso engaged in a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or
willful misconduct. Pursuant to Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act, they are
officially immune from Ms. Papa’s claims.
C. Collateral Estoppel
Finally, the Borough argues that Ms. Papa’s claims constitute an improper
collateral attack on her criminal conviction. As authority for this assertion, the
Borough cites Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194, 196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
In that case, a prison inmate sued a county government for conspiracy, negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel following his conviction and
imprisonment for sexual assault. In rejecting his claims, this Court concluded that
the plaintiff’s “inability to aver that the underlying conviction was invalidated” was
an absolute bar to recovery. Id. at 203. The principle underlying that conclusion,
commonly referred to as collateral estoppel, is that a party may not relitigate an issue
that has already been resolved in another proceeding. See Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d
872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (noting “that a criminal conviction collaterally estops a
defendant from denying his acts in a subsequent civil trial”).
Since it has already been demonstrated that Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter
of law, it is not necessary to engage in a separate collateral estoppel analysis of those
claims. However, for the sake of thoroughness, we note that underlying every one
of Ms. Papa’s claims is an effort to negate the legality and propriety of her arrest and
13
conviction, and the later determination that she violated the terms of her probation.
This Court is powerless to undo the outcome of valid criminal proceedings. The
purpose of civil actions such as the one brought by Ms. Papa is not to provide second
or third opportunities to relitigate criminal convictions after the proper avenues of
appeal have been exhausted.
IV. Conclusion
The Borough and its employees are governmentally and officially immune
from suit pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. Ms. Papa’s claims also fail as they
constitute a collateral attack on the outcome of valid criminal proceedings. Finally,
as the allegations fail as a matter of law, any further discovery would only delay the
inevitable dismissal of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the Trial Court’s order
and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Borough.
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Borough of Coraopolis, :
Officer Robert Litterini :
and Officer Nicholas DeRusso, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 233 C.D. 2022
:
Amanda Papa :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of March, 2023, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) in the above-captioned matter, dated
December 30, 2021, is hereby REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Trial Court
for the entry of judgment in favor of Appellants.
Jurisdiction relinquished.