W.B. Kline, Jr. v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing ( 2019 )


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  •               IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William B. Kline, Jr.,                     :
    Appellant         :
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,              :
    Department of Transportation,              :      No. 1490 C.D. 2018
    Bureau of Driver Licensing                 :      Submitted: April 12, 2019
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                FILED: July 9, 2019
    William B. Kline, Jr. (Licensee) appeals from the Clearfield County
    Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) September 18, 2018 order dismissing Licensee’s
    operating privilege suspension appeal from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
    Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department). The sole
    issue before this Court is whether Licensee refused chemical testing. After review,
    we affirm.
    On March 11, 2018, Lawrence Township Police Officer Craig Allen
    Kanour (Officer Kanour) observed Licensee’s pick-up truck stopped at a stationary
    green light for several minutes with a broken passenger side headlight. Officer
    Kanour followed behind the vehicle and, thereafter, pulled Licensee over on the
    bypass. As Officer Kanour approached the vehicle, he detected the odor of an
    intoxicating beverage emitting from the truck and Licensee. He further observed that
    Licensee had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech. When Officer Kanour asked if
    Licensee had anything to drink, he responded that he had two beers and he was
    coming from the Toasted Monkey.
    Officer Kanour asked Licensee if he would perform standard field
    sobriety tests and Licensee agreed. However, during the tests, Licensee complained
    that the testing was ridiculous and he did not want to continue because he was pulled
    over for a broken headlight. Licensee failed the finger dexterity test; he showed signs
    of impairment when he performed the one-leg stand test; and he refused to perform
    the walk-and-turn test. Officer Kanour then asked Licensee if he would be willing to
    submit to a blood test, to which Licensee responded no. When Officer Kanour asked
    Licensee to place his hands behind his back, Licensee said no, he was not going.
    Thereafter, another officer assisted Officer Kanour in handcuffing
    Licensee and taking him to Penn Highlands Clearfield Hospital (Hospital). At the
    Hospital, Officer Kanour read Licensee the implied consent warnings (Form DL-26).1
    When Officer Kanour asked Licensee if he would be willing to consent to a blood
    draw, Licensee responded, inter alia, that he did not understand the warnings.
    Officer Kanour read the Form DL-26 a second time, after which Officer Kanour
    again asked Licensee if he would agree to submit to a blood test. Because Licensee
    began to argue, Officer Kanour stated that he would mark Licensee’s response as a
    refusal. At that point, Licensee stated he would do whatever Officer Kanour wanted
    him to do.
    Officer Kanour did not order the blood test because he did not receive a
    clear yes or no from Licensee. Officer Kanour believed the words “do whatever you
    want[,]” were insufficient to qualify as consent. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 74a.
    When Officer Kanour asked Licensee to exit the Hospital, Licensee became agitated.
    1
    “The [Form] DL-26 [] contains the chemical test warnings required by Section 1547 of the
    Vehicle Code, [75 Pa.C.S. § 1547,] which are also known as the implied consent warnings.” Vora
    v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    79 A.3d 743
    , 745 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
    2
    Officer Kanour grabbed Licensee’s arm and escorted him out of the Hospital and into
    the patrol car. Officer Kanour transported Licensee to the Clearfield County Jail and
    placed him on a 48-hour detainer until Licensee could become sober.
    On March 19, 2018, the Department notified Licensee that his driver’s
    license privileges would be suspended for a period of one year, effective April 26,
    2018, pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, due to his
    refusal to submit to chemical testing. On April 2, 2018, Licensee appealed from the
    suspension to the trial court. A hearing was held and, on September 18, 2018, the
    trial court dismissed Licensee’s appeal.             Licensee appealed to this Court. 2         On
    October 17, 2018, the trial court ordered Licensee to file a concise statement of the
    matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b) Statement).                Licensee filed his Rule 1925(b)
    Statement with the trial court on November 5, 2018. The trial court filed its opinion
    on December 7, 2018.
    Licensee argues that his statement: “I will do whatever he wants me to
    do[,]” “was an unqualified and unequivocal consent to a chemical test[.]” Licensee
    Br. at 4. This Court disagrees.
    Initially,
    [a]s finder of fact, the trial court is the sole arbiter of
    questions concerning the credibility and weight of the
    evidence, and the trial court’s determinations in these
    respects will not be disturbed unless the trial court abuses
    its discretion. However, whether a motorist’s conduct
    constitutes a refusal to submit to chemical testing is a
    question of law. In addressing this issue, we have
    consistently held that ‘anything substantially less than an
    2
    “Our review is to determine whether the factual findings of the trial court are supported by
    competent evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.”
    Renfroe v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    179 A.3d 644
    , 648 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2018).
    3
    unqualified, unequivocal assent’ to submit to testing
    constitutes a refusal to do so. Dep[’t] of Transp[.] v.
    Renwick,. . . 
    669 A.2d 934
    , 938 ([Pa.] 1996); Lanthier v.
    Dep[’t] of Transp[.], Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    22 A.3d 346
    , 348 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Miele v. Commonwealth, . . .
    
    461 A.2d 359
    , 360 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1983).
    McKenna v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    72 A.3d 294
    , 298 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2013) (emphasis added; citations omitted). “Further, a licensee’s refusal
    need not be expressed in words; a licensee’s conduct may constitute a refusal.” Park
    v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    178 A.3d 274
    , 281 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2018). Finally, “this Court has consistently held that once a licensee refuses chemical
    testing, the refusal cannot be vitiated by a later assent.” Vora v. Dep’t of Transp.,
    Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    79 A.3d 743
    , 747 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (citation omitted).
    Here, Officer Kanour read Licensee the Form DL-26 warnings twice.
    Officer Kanour testified that, after he read the Form DL-26 to Licensee the first time:
    I do not remember exactly what [Licensee] said. I know it
    was along the lines of -- because he went back and forth, he
    would state that he wanted his attorney, I believe, or that he
    didn’t understand the test. Or, what I read to him, I believe
    is what he said.
    R.R. at 72a. Officer Kanour described that, after he read the Form DL-26 to Licensee
    the second time:
    [Licensee] began to argue the fact that he was stopped for a
    headlight. Or, I’m sorry. Yes, he began to argue the fact
    that he was stopped for a headlight, becoming very agitated,
    saying that he’s a business owner.
    ....
    I advised him that he would be marked as a refusal. And
    that he was read the form multiple times. He then began to
    state that he will do whatever he wants me to do -- or, he
    will do whatever I want him to do.
    R.R. at 74a.
    4
    Licensee did not give an unqualified, unequivocal assent to submit to
    chemical testing at any time during his interaction with Officer Kanour. It is not an
    officer’s duty to tell a licensee what to do. “An officer’s sole duty is to inform
    motorists of the implied consent warnings; once they have done so, they have
    satisfied their obligation.”   Martinovic v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
    Licensing, 
    881 A.2d 30
    , 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Even if this Court was to conclude
    that Licensee’s statement that he would do whatever Officer Kanour wanted him to
    do was an assent to the blood test, it followed two refusals which were not vitiated by
    Licensee’s later assent.   Vora.    Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed
    Licensee’s appeal.
    For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    5
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William B. Kline, Jr.,                      :
    Appellant          :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,               :
    Department of Transportation,               :     No. 1490 C.D. 2018
    Bureau of Driver Licensing                  :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 9th day of July, 2019, the Clearfield County Common
    Pleas Court’s September 18, 2018 order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1490 C.D. 2018

Judges: Covey, J.

Filed Date: 7/9/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024