J. Silvers v. UCBR ( 2019 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Jamie Silvers,                                  :
    Petitioner                :
    :
    v.                               :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                       :
    Board of Review,                                :   No. 1436 C.D. 2018
    Respondent                     :   Submitted: March 15, 2019
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                             FILED: July 9, 2019
    Jamie Silvers (Claimant) petitions for review from the October 12, 2018
    order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that reversed
    the Referee’s decision finding that she was not ineligible for unemployment
    compensation benefits. The Board concluded that Claimant was ineligible for
    benefits because she did not meet her burden of showing that she terminated her
    employment for a necessitous and compelling reason pursuant to Section 402(b) of
    the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 Upon review, we affirm.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
    802(b). Section 402(b) provides that a claimant is ineligible for compensation if her unemployment
    is due to her voluntarily leaving employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.
    
    Id. Claimant was
    employed as a full-time primary therapist by UHS of
    Doylestown LLC (Employer) from September 12, 2016 until November 17, 2017.
    Board Findings of Fact (F.F.___) 1. After November 17, 2017, Claimant was out of
    work on an approved maternity leave and, prior to the expiration of her leave,
    notified Employer by email dated January 23, 2018 of her decision to terminate her
    employment. F.F. 2-3. In her January 23rd email, Claimant explained:
    So I have been going back and forth about this, and have
    really struggled with this difficult decision, but I have
    decided that I am not going to be returning to [Employer].
    . . . The main issue is the distance and daily commute from
    my home. While I know I could send [my child] to
    daycare close(r) to Doylestown; in reality, I just don’t
    want to be that far away from home (and would prefer [my
    child] be close as well where I would have backup help if
    needed.).
    Employer’s Exhibit (Ex.) 1 (emphasis in original).
    After terminating her employment, Claimant applied for benefits with
    the Duquesne Unemployment Compensation Service Center (Center). The Center
    issued a notice of determination denying benefits pursuant to Section 402(b) of the
    Law. Certified Record (C.R.) Item No. 5, Notice of Determination dated 2/15/18
    (Notice of Determination) at 1. Claimant appealed the Center’s decision to the
    Referee, and the Referee held a hearing on the matter. C.R. Item. No. 9, Transcript
    of Testimony (T.T.___) dated 4/4/18.
    At the hearing, Claimant testified that she worked an 8-hour shift for
    Employer, from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and she had a 30-mile one-way commute
    from her residence. F.F. 6 & 7; T.T. 5. Claimant is a single mother with no partner,
    and receives assistance from her mother with child care. F.F. 5; T.T. 5. Due to her
    commute, Claimant would not get to the daycare near her home by the closing time
    2
    of 6 p.m. to pick up her child. F.F. 7; T.T. 5. Claimant would have found a daycare
    facility closer to her work location, but if there was an emergency requiring backup
    help, her mother was not willing to pick up her child. F.F. 6; T.T. 5 & 11. Claimant
    indicated that she has several babysitters that she uses for child care and that she is
    able and available for work. F.F. 10; T.T. 10. Prior to quitting, Claimant spoke to
    her supervisor about her child care situation. F.F. 9; T.T. 5. At the hearing,
    Employer also presented a witness, her supervisor, who confirmed Claimant’s last
    day of work in the office as November 17, 2017 and provided a copy of Claimant’s
    January 23rd email for the record. T.T. 12-13.
    After the hearing on the matter, the Referee issued a decision reversing
    the Center’s determination and granting benefits. Referee’s Decision/Order dated
    4/25/18 (Referee’s Decision) at 2. The Referee concluded that Claimant voluntarily
    left her employment due to insurmountable child care issues and that Employer did
    not offer any evidence that it could resolve Claimant’s problem. 
    Id. Employer appealed
    the Referee’s decision to the Board, which reversed. The Board concluded
    that Claimant did not meet her burden of establishing a necessitous and compelling
    reason for terminating her employment. Board’s 10/12/2018 Opinion (Board’s
    Opinion) at 3. The Board explained:
    The [C]laimant’s fears about making it to the daycare
    located by her residence by 6 p.m. and not having a backup
    in the event of an emergency were speculative, as the
    [C]laimant resigned prior to the expiration of her leave of
    absence and never returned to work. The [C]laimant has
    not established that her childcare [sic] issues were
    insurmountable and she had no other choice but to quit her
    employment. The [C]laimant left her employment for
    personal reasons and has not met her burden.
    3
    Board’s Opinion at 3. Claimant petitions this Court for review.2
    Before this Court, Claimant contends that the Board erred when it
    concluded that she failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason for
    quitting her job because she produced evidence showing that she was not able to
    obtain suitable care for her child prior to terminating her employment. Claimant’s
    Brief at 10 & 12. Claimant testified that she had a lengthy commute and that she
    could not secure child care near her residence, as she would not be able to pick up
    her child before the daycare facility near her residence closed. 
    Id. Claimant further
    testified that had she obtained care near her place of employment, she would not
    have anyone available to pick up her child should an emergency arise. 
    Id. To establish
    cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, a claimant
    has the burden of showing that: (1) circumstances existed that produced real and
    substantial pressure to terminate employment, (2) like circumstances would compel
    a reasonable person to act in the same manner, (3) the claimant acted with ordinary
    common sense, and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her
    employment. Procito v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    945 A.2d 261
    , 264
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Whether one had a necessitous and compelling reason for
    quitting one’s job is a legal conclusion and is fully reviewable by this Court. Ganter
    v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    723 A.2d 272
    , 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
    In her January 23rd email to Employer in which she terminated her
    employment, Claimant explained, “[t]he main issue is the distance and daily
    commute from my home. While I know I could send [my child] to daycare close(r)
    to Doylestown; in reality, I just don’t want to be that far away from home . . . .”
    2
    This Court’s review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether errors of law were committed, and whether findings of fact are supported by substantial
    evidence. Procito v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    945 A.2d 261
    , 262, n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2008). In unemployment compensation proceedings, the Board is the ultimate finder of fact. 
    Id. 4 Employer’s
    Ex. 1 (emphasis added). Claimant similarly testified, “I voluntarily left
    the job for personal reasons” and cited the daily commute as the “main issue,” along
    with her child care needs and the logistics of having help with the child care given
    the distance of her home from her place of employment. T.T. 4 & 6.
    Even if we were to conclude that Claimant’s concerns regarding her
    child care options in light of her commute produced real and substantial pressure to
    terminate her employment, Claimant did not sustain her burden to establish cause of
    a necessitous and compelling nature because Claimant failed to produce legally
    sufficient evidence showing that she made a reasonable effort to preserve her
    employment. See 
    Procito, 945 A.2d at 264
    . “The failure of an employee to take all
    reasonable steps to preserve employment results in a voluntary termination.”
    Dopson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    983 A.2d 1282
    , 1284 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2009). Our Supreme Court, and this Court, have concluded that a claimant meets
    this burden when the claimant produces evidence showing that she made an earnest
    effort to find child care so she can meet her work responsibilities and that she
    provided the employer with notice of her problem to enable employer to offer an
    accommodation. Truitt v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    589 A.2d 208
    (Pa.
    1991); 
    Ganter, 723 A.2d at 272
    .
    For example, in Truitt, our Supreme Court found that the claimant made
    a reasonable effort to preserve her employment when the claimant made extensive
    efforts to find replacement child care and her employer refused to offer her any
    accommodation. 
    Truitt, 589 A.2d at 210
    . The claimant in Truitt was a single mother
    of two children and was employed as a waitress. 
    Id. at 209.
    The claimant’s
    babysitter was her mother, who regularly cared for her children, including during the
    claimant’s night shift from 4:30 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. 
    Id. Unexpectedly, and
    two days
    5
    prior to the claimant’s next scheduled night shift, her babysitter suffered an injury
    rendering her unable to care for the claimant’s children. 
    Id. The claimant
    made
    inquiries of her sisters, former babysitters, and a daycare center in an effort to find
    replacement care for her children, but no care was available after 6:00 p.m. when
    she was next scheduled to work. 
    Id. The claimant
    ’s mother also searched and made
    inquiries to find replacement child care and, because the claimant was new to her
    position, the claimant had not accrued any sick leave or vacation time to take a leave
    of absence for that shift. 
    Id. “Not willing
    to risk the safety and well-being of her
    children by leaving them home alone until 3:00 in the morning,” the claimant
    terminated her employment. 
    Id. In concluding
    that the claimant made reasonable
    efforts to preserve her employment, our Supreme Court noted the claimant’s efforts
    to find replacement child care, noting that “any reasonable person who had to find
    child care on this short notice” would have done what the claimant did and that “she
    sought to arrange a different schedule with her employer,” but the employer declined
    to accommodate her either temporarily or permanently. 
    Id. at 210.
                 Similarly, this Court in Ganter concluded that the claimant made a
    reasonable effort to preserve her employment when she quit after her employer
    requested the claimant to perform an assignment, without advance notice, that would
    have prevented her from picking up her child from daycare on time. 
    Ganter, 723 A.2d at 275
    . The claimant in Ganter was employed as a visiting nurse and was a
    single mother of two with a young son in daycare. 
    Id. at 273.
    On the occasions
    when asked to work overtime, the claimant picked her son up from daycare, took
    him home, and had her daughter watch him. 
    Id. The claimant
    ’s employer had
    recently relocated the office approximately 30 miles from the claimant’s residence
    and expanded its coverage area to encompass a five-county area, including
    6
    Philadelphia County. 
    Id. The claimant
    continued to work for her employer after
    this corporate reorganization and picked up her child from daycare by 6:00 p.m. 
    Id. One afternoon,
    at approximately 2:30 p.m., the employer called the claimant at the
    Conshohocken office and asked the claimant to travel from its office to Philadelphia
    to do a patient admission. 
    Id. The claimant
    refused the assignment, explaining that
    she would not have enough time to travel to Philadelphia, conduct the patient intake
    interview and admission, and return to pick up her child from daycare by 6:00 p.m.
    
    Id. The next
    day, the employer suspended the claimant for three days without pay
    and advised the claimant that she would be put on probation for a period of three
    months, during which time any further refusal of assignment would result in her
    discharge. 
    Id. Several days
    later, the claimant gave the employer two weeks’ notice
    that she would be resigning from her position because she felt that the disciplinary
    action taken against her was too harsh and felt that she would be unable to meet
    employer’s expectation that she be available to work anywhere in the five-county
    area on demand. 
    Id. In concluding
    that the claimant made reasonable efforts to preserve her
    employment, this Court in Ganter reasoned that at the time the employer requested
    the claimant to conduct the patient admission, the claimant immediately notified her
    employer of her child care problems. 
    Ganter, 723 A.2d at 275
    . This Court further
    explained:
    Without prior notice of the assignment, [c]laimant had no
    choice but to refuse it because she had a parental
    obligation to pick up her child and could not arrange for
    alternate child care on such short notice. In spite of this
    information, and aware of [c]laimant’s predicament,
    [e]mployer did nothing to cooperate with [c]laimant or
    attempt to resolve the situation; instead . . . [e]mployer
    suspended [c]laimant for three days without pay, put her
    7
    on probation for three months and informed her that she
    would be discharged if she refused another assignment.
    By taking this action, [e]mployer made it clear to
    [c]laimant that it would not tolerate [c]laimant’s child care
    situation and that [c]laimant’s parental obligations were
    secondary to [c]laimant’s employment obligations.
    Moreover, six days after [c]laimant’s suspension,
    [c]laimant gave [e]mployer two weeks’ notice of her intent
    to resign because her employment situation prohibited her
    from meeting the childcare needs of her single parenthood
    situation . . . . Employer, however, made no effort to
    address or accommodate [c]laimant’s needs during this
    two week period.
    
    Id. at 275
    (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). This Court explained that it would
    not deny the claimant benefits where “she demonstrated an earnest effort to
    overcome the employment obstacles placed upon her by her domestic
    responsibilities, but found it impossible to do so.” 
    Id. Though this
    Court granted
    benefits, it further noted in Ganter that had the claimant been given advance notice
    of the assignment, so that she had time to make alternative child care arrangements,
    the Court might have reached a different conclusion. 
    Ganter, 723 A.2d at 275
    , n.4.
    Here, however, Claimant did not establish that she made an earnest
    effort to overcome her employment obstacles resulting from her child care
    responsibilities. To this end, Claimant testified that with regard to her efforts to
    arrange child care:
    I started to arrange child care prior to leaving on
    maternity leave. Given the distance from my home, which
    is 30 miles each way, and I’m scheduled to work at the
    facility around 8:30 to 5:00 p.m. An eight-hour shift. I
    would not get home in time to pick up my daughter from
    daycare because most facilities close at 6:00 and my
    commute is about an hour, an hour and a half, especially
    on the way home. If I were [sic] to find something close
    8
    to the office in Doylestown [closer to work], which I did
    start to pursue, my mom would not be able to get her in
    the event of an emergency.
    T.T. 5 (emphasis added). Claimant testified that she brought her concerns to
    employer as follows:
    [Referee]: . . . so, did you speak with anyone at the
    Employer about, you know, issues about distance to see if
    there was anything they could do for you?
    [Claimant]: I spoke with my co-workers, but I also know
    given the nature of the position. . .
    [Referee]: Well, not co-workers. Anyone in authority, a
    manager, or human resources or anything like that?
    [Claimant]: I did not speak with human resources but I
    did talk to a supervisor. But given the nature of the
    position, it’s an in-patient hospital, it’s not like I can
    telecommute or . . .
    [Referee]: Yeah. But, you sometimes people can, you
    know, get different hours, or, you know, have some
    flexibility, but. . . All right. So, that you didn’t bring up to
    explore that?
    [Claimant]: Well, I did bring that up. It’s just a matter of
    I had certain meetings I have to attend to at certain hours.
    So, it’s not like I can be flexible with the time.
    T.T. 6-7. Claimant’s supervisor testified that Claimant “voluntarily left her job” for
    the reasons provided in her email, which included the logistics of child care. T.T.
    12.   Claimant’s supervisor also testified that Employer became aware of the
    9
    particular reason Claimant was leaving “when she put it in writing[,]” referring to
    Claimant’s resignation email. 
    Id. But, as
    Claimant stated, she “started” to arrange child care near her
    home and started to “pursue” child care near her office but decided not to complete
    this process, as she preferred to be closer to home. Employer’s Ex. 1. Though the
    Board found, and Claimant testified, that she mentioned her child care issue to her
    supervisor, Claimant provided no details regarding the conversation. Claimant
    stated that she brought up flexibility, but Claimant did not specify whether her
    supervisor told her that her position did not allow for an accommodation or whether
    Claimant reached that conclusion on her own.
    Further, Claimant acknowledged that she could have used the daycare
    near her office but had a concern that her mother would not be available to pick up
    her child in the event of an emergency. T.T. 5. Though Claimant expressed this
    concern, as noted by the Board, Claimant did not attempt to find any other individual
    who could retrieve her child from daycare in the event of an emergency, nor did she
    establish that she attempted to hire a babysitter to watch her child before terminating
    her employment. See Shaffer v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    928 A.2d 391
    ,
    394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (stating that claimant “must establish that she exhausted all”
    alternative child care arrangements and rejecting claimant’s request for benefits
    when claimant investigated only one daycare but did not offer evidence that she
    considered any other child care arrangements) (emphasis added). Further, Claimant
    did not establish that she considered any other options that may have been available
    to her in the unlikely event of an emergency, such as taking accrued vacation time
    or a leave of absence to pick up her child from daycare, before deciding to terminate
    her employment. See 
    Truitt, 589 A.2d at 209
    (noting that the claimant had not
    10
    accrued any sick leave or vacation time to allow her to take a leave of absence to
    deal with her child care problem).
    Based on the evidence presented by Claimant, we agree with the Board
    that Claimant did not meet her burden of showing a necessitous and compelling
    reason for terminating her employment. The evidence presented demonstrated that
    Claimant did not make a legally sufficient effort to preserve her employment. As a
    result, the Board’s denial of benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law was not in
    error.
    Accordingly, we affirm.3
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    3
    Nevertheless, Claimant argues that the Board erred by ignoring her second reason for
    terminating her employment, that is, because of the working conditions in the office prior to and
    throughout her pregnancy. Claimant’s Brief at 14-15. However, Claimant testified that the main
    reason for terminating her employment related to her commute and the logistics of child care in
    light of her commute. T.T. 6; C.R. Item No. 2, Claimant Questionnaire. The Board found that
    Claimant left her employment for personal reasons. Board’s Opinion at 3. Therefore, the Board
    did not err by failing to address the additional reason Claimant provided. See Baird v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    372 A.2d 1254
    , 1258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (explaining that
    the Board’s finding as to the reason claimant terminated his employment necessarily excludes a
    finding that he terminated for the reasons he provided). For this reason, Claimant’s additional
    argument that the Board’s Finding of Fact Number 10, relating to Claimant securing private
    babysitters, was inaccurate and misconstrues the testimony, and likewise lacks merit as Claimant
    quit for personal reasons.
    11
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Jamie Silvers,                        :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation             :
    Board of Review,                      :   No. 1436 C.D. 2018
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 9th day of July, 2019, the October 12, 2018 order of
    the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge