G. Herbert v. UCBR ( 2019 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Geraldine Herbert,                 :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                            :                No. 1129 C.D. 2018
    :                SUBMITTED: April 11, 2019
    Unemployment Compensation Board of :
    Review,                            :
    Respondent          :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                   FILED: May 1, 2019
    Geraldine Herbert (Claimant) petitions for review of the July 17, 2018 Order
    of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming a Referee’s
    decision to deny Claimant unemployment compensation (UC) benefits under
    Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 The Board
    concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits because she voluntarily quit
    her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm the Board’s Order.
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
    802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law states that an employee shall be ineligible for UC benefits for
    any week “[i]n which [her] unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a
    necessitous and compelling nature.” 43 P.S. § 802(b). The Board also determined that Claimant
    was able and available to work and, thus, was not disqualified from receiving UC benefits under
    Section 401(d)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1). Claimant does not challenge the Board’s ruling
    under Section 401(d)(1) on appeal.
    Background
    Claimant worked as a housing counselor for Consumer Credit Counsel
    (Employer) from June 5, 2017 through November 30, 2017. Bd.’s Finding of Fact
    (F.F.) No. 1. In mid-September 2017, Employer notified Claimant that she was
    supposed to complete client billing packages as part of her work, but she had not
    done so. 
    Id. No. 2;
    Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/19/18, at 16. Employer instructed
    Claimant to complete the billing packages. Bd.’s F.F. No. 2. Claimant told one of
    her supervisors, Rosemary Lavelle, that completing the billing packages was
    stressful but that she would do her best to catch up. 
    Id. Claimant asked
    Ms. Lavelle
    to remove her from the calendar so that she could catch up on her work, but Ms.
    Lavelle denied the request. 
    Id. In August
    and September 2017, Claimant informed both of her supervisors,
    Ms. Lavelle and Marilou Protulipac,2 that her work was becoming overwhelming
    and exasperating. 
    Id. No. 4;
    N.T., 3/19/18, at 18, 21. Claimant told Ms. Lavelle that
    she was having issues with anxiety, that her psychiatrist had increased her
    medication, and that she believed the increased medication would help with her
    anxiety. Bd.’s F.F. No. 5; N.T., 3/19/18, at 14-15.
    In late September or early October 2017, Employer’s then-Vice President,
    Mary Loftus, verbally warned Claimant that she was behind in her work. Bd.’s F.F.
    No. 6; N.T., 3/19/18, at 27. Claimant did not mention any health issues to Ms. Loftus
    during that conversation. Bd.’s F.F. No. 6.
    Claimant was under the care of both a psychiatrist and a counselor. 
    Id. No. 7.
    While Claimant had discussed her work-related stress with her psychiatrist and her
    2
    The transcript of the Referee’s hearing identifies Claimant’s supervisor as “Mary Lou
    Patrillipack (phonetic),” N.T., 3/19/18, at 10, but the record shows that the supervisor’s name is
    “Marilou Protulipac,” see 
    id., Exs. R-28,
    R-29, & R-30.
    2
    counselor, neither provider gave Claimant any limitations or special instructions
    regarding her ability to work. Id.; N.T., 3/19/18, at 15. Claimant did not inform
    Employer that she needed any accommodations due to a medical condition. Bd.’s
    F.F. No. 9.
    Between August and October 2017, Employer gave Claimant significantly
    more time to complete her work than other housing counselors, but Claimant was
    still unable to complete her work. 
    Id. No. 3.
          On October 30, 2017, Claimant submitted a letter of resignation to Employer.
    
    Id. No. 8.
    In the letter, Claimant stated:
    I am writing to provide you a 30[-]day notice of my resignation
    from my position as Housing Counselor with [Employer]. My final day
    will be Friday, December 1, 2017. I have enjoyed working with the
    customers and the opportunity to assist them in their homeownership
    journey. However, the position in the Harrisburg/Carlisle office is very
    stressful for just one counselor and should have two active counselors[]
    persons [sic]. In addition, I believe that more adequate training from
    the beginning would be beneficial to future hires.
    N.T., 3/19/18, Ex. R-28; Bd.’s F.F. No. 8. Claimant did not cite any medical issues
    as the reason for her resignation in the letter. Bd.’s F.F. No. 8.
    Following her resignation, Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits. The local
    UC Service Center found that Claimant voluntarily left work for health reasons and
    needed to work in a stress-free environment, but she did not inform Employer of her
    work limitations. Not. of Determ., 12/3/17, at 1. Therefore, the Service Center
    determined that Claimant failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason for
    voluntarily quitting her employment under Section 402(b) of the Law. 
    Id. 3 Claimant
    appealed to the Referee, who held a telephone hearing on March 19,
    2018. Claimant testified on her own behalf, and Employer presented the testimony
    of Ms. Loftus, Employer’s President and Chief Executive Officer.3
    Claimant testified that she moved from West Virginia to Harrisburg to accept
    the position with Employer. N.T., 3/19/18, at 11. Claimant explained that her job
    duties were to meet with clients and manage their housing paperwork, including
    applications for Pennsylvania’s Homeowners Emergency Mortgage Assistance
    Program (HEMAP). 
    Id. at 10.
    Claimant testified that initially she spent two to three
    hours counseling each client and additional time after each client meeting to
    complete the necessary paperwork. 
    Id. at 11.
    However, Employer later informed
    Claimant that she was supposed to spend only two to three hours total per
    transaction. 
    Id. Claimant also
    testified that when she began working for Employer in June
    2017, she worked in the Harrisburg office, which was close to her home, but one
    month later, the office moved to Lemoyne, which was further from her home. 
    Id. at 11-12.
    Also in July 2017, Employer informed Claimant that she would need to travel
    to Carlisle once per week to meet with clients. 
    Id. at 12.4
    Claimant testified that her
    work began to pile up due to the increased travel time, so she began to work longer
    hours. 
    Id. at 13.
    Although she was working extra hours, she was paid for 37.5 hours
    per week and was not paid overtime. 
    Id. 3 Ms.
    Loftus was Employer’s Vice President at the time of Claimant’s employment but
    subsequently became the President and Chief Executive Officer. Heather Murray, Employer’s
    Manager of Community Relations, was also present at the hearing, but she did not testify.
    4
    In her Brief in Support of Appeal filed with the Board, Claimant stated that Lemoyne is
    about 15 miles from Harrisburg, and Carlisle is about 30 miles from Harrisburg. Record (R.) Item
    No. 10 at 1.
    4
    Claimant testified that in August 2017, she approached her supervisor, Ms.
    Lavelle, “and I actually was crying when I talked to her because I was upset feeling
    that I wasn’t keeping up with everything and that everything was kind of being given
    to me last minute.” 
    Id. at 12.
    Ms. Lavelle told Claimant “to hang in there [and] that
    it would all work out.” 
    Id. at 13.
    Claimant also testified that she told Employer’s
    then-Vice President, Ms. Loftus, that when she accepted the position, she did not
    expect to travel to Carlisle, but Ms. Loftus responded that it was “part of her job.”
    
    Id. at 20.
           Claimant testified that she was taking medication for anxiety at that time. 
    Id. at 14.
    She explained that “by August I was taking one [dose] a day to cope. And
    then by the time September came around I was taking two [doses] a day to get
    through the day and trying to stay calm and level so that I could work with my
    clients.” 
    Id. Claimant informed
    Ms. Lavelle that “I was having issues with my
    anxiety and stress levels and that I had increased my one pill and that . . . I was
    hoping that would help with everything.” 
    Id. Claimant also
    testified that she
    suffered a concussion in September 2017, which she reported to Ms. Loftus. 
    Id. at 14-15.
           Claimant further testified that she had been treating with a counselor and a
    psychiatrist since 2013 and that she was diagnosed with depression, generalized
    anxiety, and bipolar disorder. 
    Id. at 15.
    When asked if her medical providers had
    imposed any limitations on her ability to work, Claimant replied:
    No, they just gave me . . . the psychiatrist prescribed medication and
    you know, I never had any issues with work. So . . . we would discuss
    it at our counseling sessions. And [in October 2017] [the psychiatrist]
    suggested that I reconsider this position because it was increasing the
    symptoms I was having for the depression and the anxiety.
    5
    
    Id. Claimant testified
    that when Ms. Loftus approached her in late September or
    early October 2017 about being behind in her work, Claimant told her it was “all she
    could do.” 
    Id. at 16.
    According to Claimant:
    I had requested additional time off the calendar so that I could catch up
    especially once they had, the middle of September when they told me I
    needed to be doing billing packages and I had been there since June and
    that was the first time I had heard of that. That is why the piles of
    folders were placed outside the drawer. While I continued to counsel I
    was also trying to get these billing statements and the files reorganized
    for that purpose.
    
    Id. Finally, Claimant
    testified that she “absolutely” explained her specific
    medical conditions to her supervisors and that she “made them aware that things
    were slower for” her and that her “doctor suggested that [she] be more cautious with
    details.” 
    Id. at 21-22.
          Ms. Loftus testified on Employer’s behalf. Ms. Loftus testified that, at the
    time of Claimant’s hiring, she informed Claimant “that the [Harrisburg] office was
    closing and that we were moving to Lemoyne.” 
    Id. at 22.
    Ms. Loftus explained:
    We also made every applicant aware that if they accepted the position
    they would have to travel [to Carlisle] and [Employer] would reimburse
    [them] for mileage, which we did. We also let [our employees] leave
    at 4:00 when they traveled to Carlisle. So . . . the candidates as well as
    [Claimant] were fully aware of that requirement.
    
    Id. at 22-23.
    Ms. Loftus specifically recalled telling Claimant about the move to
    Lemoyne, as “there were only two candidates that we interviewed for that position,
    so . . . I had notes of what I wanted to make sure that I told people.” 
    Id. at 27.
    6
    Ms. Loftus offered into evidence a utilization report comparing the amount of
    work Claimant completed in the months of August, September, and October 2017 to
    that of two other housing counselors. 
    Id. at 23.
    Ms. Loftus testified that, based on
    the information in the report, the other counselors “had far less time per [client]”
    than Claimant and Claimant had “more than adequate time to complete the
    counseling and any associated follow[-]up.” 
    Id. & Ex.
    R-34.
    Ms. Loftus testified that the only health issues of Claimant’s of which she was
    personally aware were a broken tooth and a concussion, because Claimant had
    requested time off for each. 
    Id. According to
    Ms. Loftus, neither of Claimant’s
    supervisors ever informed her that Claimant was suffering from any other health
    conditions, and she had “no reason to think that [the supervisors] would not have
    brought that information to me.” 
    Id. at 25-26.
          Ms. Loftus also testified that in late September or early October 2017,
    I had a . . . conversation with [Claimant], which I told her was a verbal
    warning because she was so far behind with all of her work. And during
    that conversation[,] she never mentioned any issues. She just said that
    the HEMAP[] [applications] were taking her three hours and that the
    pre-closing pre-certifications were taking two hours. I went through
    that same [u]tilization [r]eport that I provided as evidence with her and
    she really had no reasons as to why she was behind. And she never told
    me that there were any kind of medical issues that were preventing her
    from keeping up with her work.
    
    Id. at 26-27
    (emphasis added). Ms. Loftus testified that she intended to have a
    follow-up meeting with Claimant a few weeks later, but Claimant resigned before
    that occurred. 
    Id. at 27.
          Following the hearing, the Referee affirmed the Service Center’s decision.
    The Referee resolved the conflicts in the testimony in Employer’s favor and credited
    Ms. Loftus’s testimony. Ref.’s Order, 3/20/18, at 2. The Referee found that
    7
    “Claimant was notified of the job conditions and work sites at hire.” 
    Id. The Referee
    also found that although Claimant had discussed her health issues with her
    supervisors, she “never raised a medical concern with [Ms. Loftus] as the reason for
    her work issues during the verbal warning in late September 2017.” 
    Id. Because Claimant
    failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason for voluntarily
    quitting, the Referee concluded that she was ineligible for UC benefits under Section
    402(b) of the Law. 
    Id. Claimant appealed
    to the Board, which affirmed the Referee’s decision. The
    Board likewise resolved the evidentiary conflicts in Employer’s favor and credited
    Ms. Loftus’s testimony. Bd.’s Order, 7/17/18, at 3. The Board concluded:
    [C]laimant did not inform [E]mployer of the extent of her medical
    condition or that it necessitated an accommodation. [C]laimant did
    inform her supervisors that she found the job stressful and that she has
    anxiety for which she was taking medication. She also informed
    [E]mployer that her medication was being increased and should help
    with her anxiety.
    [C]laimant did not provide any documentation from a treating medical
    provider to show she could not perform her work or needed an
    accommodation. Although she asked to be taken off the calendar, her
    reason for doing so was to catch up after she was informed she failed
    to complete billing packages and had to go back and complete them for
    each of her cases and not because of any medical issue.
    We do not find that [C]laimant acted in a reasonable manner in quitting
    her employment or that she made a reasonable effort to maintain her
    employment.
    8
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Therefore, the Board determined that Claimant was ineligible
    for UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. 
    Id. Claimant now
    appeals to this
    Court.5
    Issues
    (1)     Did Claimant have a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving her
    employment?
    (2)     Did Claimant provide sufficient notice to Employer of her health
    condition?
    (3)     Did the Board err in finding that Claimant did not act in a reasonable
    manner in quitting her employment?
    (4)     Did the Board err in finding that Claimant did not make a reasonable
    effort to maintain her employment?
    Analysis
    To qualify for UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, the claimant has
    the burden of proving that she had a necessitous and compelling reason for
    voluntarily leaving her employment. St. Clair Hosp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
    of Review, 
    154 A.3d 401
    , 404 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc). Specifically, the
    claimant must prove that:           (1) circumstances existed that produced real and
    substantial pressure to terminate her employment; (2) such circumstances would
    compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with
    ordinary common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve
    her employment. Solar Innovations, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    38 A.3d 1051
    , 1056 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). The claimant must demonstrate that she took
    5
    Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether
    an error of law was committed, or whether the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
    evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
    9
    “all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the employment relationship” before
    voluntarily quitting. St. 
    Clair, 154 A.3d at 404-05
    (quotation omitted).
    Claimant contends that her health conditions made it impossible for her to
    continue working for Employer without an accommodation. “[T]o establish that a
    medical condition is a necessitous and compelling reason for the voluntary
    termination of one’s employment, a claimant must: (1) establish, through competent
    evidence, the existence of a medical condition; (2) inform the employer of the
    condition; and (3) be able and available to work if a reasonable accommodation can
    be made.” 
    Id. at 405.
           “[A] claimant who desires to quit a job for health reasons must communicate
    her health problem[] to her employer so that the employer can attempt to
    accommodate the problem.” Blackwell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    555 A.2d 279
    , 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Before an employer’s duty to accommodate is
    triggered, the employer must have sufficient knowledge of the claimant’s health
    condition.   See 
    id. The claimant
    must communicate her “specific physical
    restrictions” to the employer and “explain [to the employer] her inability to perform
    her regularly assigned duties.” Fox v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    522 A.2d 713
    , 715 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
    “[O]nce an employee makes an employer aware of such health problems, the
    employer bears the burden [of] establish[ing] that it made a reasonable attempt to
    identify and propose possible accommodations for the employee’s health problems.”
    Watkins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    65 A.3d 999
    , 1005 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2013). “Only through communication can an employer be afforded an opportunity
    to accommodate a claimant’s problem by offering suitable work.” 
    Fox, 522 A.2d at 715
    .
    10
    Here, Claimant testified that she was treating with both a counselor and a
    psychiatrist for depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. N.T., 3/19/18, at 15.
    However, when asked whether either provider had given her “any special orders or
    limitations when it came to work,” Claimant replied “[n]o” and stated that her
    psychiatrist had only prescribed an increase in her medication. 
    Id. The record
    shows, and the Board found, that Claimant had discussed her stress
    and anxiety with her supervisors in August and September 2017. Bd.’s F.F. Nos. 4,
    5. However, the last time Claimant discussed those issues with her supervisors, she
    stated that she had increased her medication, which she believed would help alleviate
    her symptoms. 
    Id. No. 5;
    see N.T. 3/19/18, at 14-15, 21. According to Claimant, “I
    told [Ms.] Lavelle that I was having issues with my anxiety and stress levels and that
    I had increased my one pill and that . . . I was hoping that would help with
    everything.” N.T., 3/19/18, at 14. There is no evidence that Claimant subsequently
    informed either of her supervisors or Ms. Loftus that her efforts to reduce her anxiety
    with medication had been ineffective before she voluntarily quit her employment.
    Furthermore, Ms. Loftus testified that had Claimant presented Employer with
    specific medical restrictions, “we would have worked with her. We would [have]
    had to have an understanding from a medical provider as far as what limitations there
    were and then we would have . . . tried to work with her as far as if [sic] we could .
    . . what would be a reasonable accommodation.” 
    Id. at 25.
    Significantly, Ms. Loftus
    testified that when she confronted Claimant about being behind in her work in late
    September or early October 2017, Claimant “never mentioned any issues . . . [a]nd
    she never told me that there were any kind of medical issues that were preventing
    her from keeping up with her work.” 
    Id. at 26.
    While Claimant testified that her
    psychiatrist had advised her to reconsider the position with Employer in October
    11
    2017, 
    id. at 15,
    Claimant never communicated that information to Employer before
    quitting.
    The Board resolved the conflicts in the evidence in Employer’s favor and
    specifically credited Ms. Loftus’s testimony. Bd.’s Order, 7/17/18, at 3. It is well
    settled that the Board is the ultimate factfinder in UC cases and is empowered to
    resolve conflicts in the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Metro.
    Edison Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    606 A.2d 955
    , 957 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1992). Where the Board’s factual findings are supported by substantial, credible
    evidence, those findings are conclusive on appeal. Brandt v. Unemployment Comp.
    Bd. of Review, 
    643 A.2d 78
    , 79 (Pa. 1994).
    Claimant also argues that Employer denied her request for an accommodation
    when she asked to be taken off the calendar in September 2017. However, by
    Claimant’s own testimony, the reason Claimant made that request was to catch up
    on her work after she was instructed to complete the client billing packages. N.T.,
    3/19/18, at 16-17; Bd.’s Order, 7/17/18, at 3. She did not make that request for
    medical reasons.
    We conclude that Claimant did not provide Employer with sufficient
    information about her health conditions to trigger Employer’s duty to offer her a
    reasonable accommodation. The last time Claimant spoke to her supervisors about
    her anxiety, she told them she was going to increase her medication, which she hoped
    would alleviate the problem. There is no evidence that, after those discussions,
    Claimant informed Ms. Lavelle, Ms. Protulipac, or Ms. Loftus that her effort to treat
    her anxiety had been unsuccessful or that her psychiatrist had advised her to
    reconsider the position with Employer. In fact, Ms. Loftus credibly testified that,
    during her final conversation with Claimant shortly before her resignation, Claimant
    12
    did not mention any health issues at all. Bd.’s F.F. No. 6. Therefore, Employer
    could not have known that Claimant’s health conditions were of such a magnitude
    that she could no longer perform her job duties.
    Conclusion
    Based on the evidence credited by the Board, we conclude that Claimant failed
    to establish a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily quit her employment.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Geraldine Herbert,                 :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                            :    No. 1129 C.D. 2018
    :
    Unemployment Compensation Board of :
    Review,                            :
    Respondent          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 1st day of May, 2019, the Order of the Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, dated July 17, 2018, is hereby AFFIRMED.
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1129 C.D. 2018

Judges: Ceisler, J.

Filed Date: 5/1/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024