C.M. Boyd v. UCBR ( 2018 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Carla M. Boyd,                                  :
    Petitioner        :
    :
    v.                               :   No. 205 C.D. 2018
    :   Argued: October 15, 2018
    Unemployment Compensation                       :
    Board of Review,                                :
    Respondent                  :
    BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE BROBSON                                FILED: November 20, 2018
    Petitioner Carla M. Boyd (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of
    the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board). The Board reversed
    the Unemployment Compensation Referee’s decision, which awarded Claimant
    unemployment compensation benefits. For the reasons set forth below, we now
    affirm the Board’s decision.
    Claimant has been employed by the Community College of Allegheny
    County (Employer)1 as an Adjunct Professor since 1999. (Certified Record (C.R.),
    1
    Employer intervened in this matter by filing a notice of intervention on March 16, 2018.
    The Board subsequently notified this Court that it would not be filing a brief or participating in
    oral argument of this matter.
    Item No. 11 at 4.) Claimant filed for benefits on January 1, 2017, claiming benefits
    for the weeks ending on January 1, 2017, and May 20, 2017. (C.R., Item Nos. 1, 12.)
    The Indiana Unemployment Compensation Service Center (Service Center) found
    Claimant ineligible for both periods under Section 402.1 of the Unemployment
    Compensation Law (Law),2 because Claimant had reasonable assurances of
    employment during the next term. (C.R., Item No. 7.) Claimant then appealed from
    the Service Center’s decision as it related to the week ending on May 20, 2017, and
    a Referee conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 23, 2017. (C.R., Item
    Nos. 8, 11.)
    At the evidentiary hearing, Claimant testified that, as of the date of the
    hearing, she had last worked for Employer during the 2017 spring term, during
    which she taught four computer information technology courses. (Reproduced
    Record (R.R.) at 16a.) Those courses started on various dates in January, February,
    and March 2017. (Id.) Claimant received $800 per credit hour for those courses,
    for a total of $8,200 for the spring term. (Id. at 17a.) Claimant testified she has
    taught courses during the summer term. (Id.) Claimant could not recall the number
    of summer terms during which she taught, but she testified that it was more than one.
    (Id.) She stated that tenured faculty usually teach during the fall and spring terms,
    and the opportunity for adjunct instructors prevails in the summer. (Id. at 22a.)
    Claimant testified that on March 1, 2017, Employer offered her the
    opportunity to teach three courses during the summer of 2017, and she accepted the
    offer. (Id. at 17a.) Ultimately, she did not teach those classes because Employer
    2
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, added by the
    Act of July 6, 1977, P.L. 41, 43 P.S. § 802.1.
    2
    cancelled the courses due to low enrollment. (Id.) She testified that Employer has
    cancelled courses other times due to low enrollment. (Id. at 18a.)
    According to Claimant, Employer does not distinguish between the
    summer term and the fall and spring terms. (Id.) Claimant explained that there is
    no difference in terms of work when comparing the fall and spring terms to the
    summer term—i.e., the amount of time spent preparing for a course is the same. (Id.)
    There is no difference in content or pay, and there is no noticeable decrease in
    enrollment. (Id.) Fall courses are ten, fourteen, and sixteen weeks in length, and
    summer courses are six, eight, and ten weeks in length. (Id. at 21a-22a.)
    Claimant testified that she attempted to find alternative work for the
    summer of 2017 at a different college and searched Employer’s website for other
    jobs. (Id. at 19a.) She testified that she relies on full-year employment as opposed
    to simply two academic terms. (Id.) She further testified that Employer offered her
    the opportunity to teach one, three-credit course in the fall of 2017, for a total of
    $2,400. (Id.) Employer pays her on a monthly basis for each term during the term
    which she is teaching. (Id. at 21a.) Claimant received a letter (Letter of Reasonable
    Assurance) from Employer, dated April 6, 2017, providing her “notice of reasonable
    assurance of continued part-time employment for the fall semester.” (Id. at 31a.) It
    also noted that “[t]he final fall schedule is subject to enrollment and final course
    offerings.” (Id.) Claimant testified that she has received the same or a similar letter
    in past terms. (Id. at 24a.)
    Employer presented the testimony of Yvonne Powers, Employer’s
    Director of Employee and Labor Relations. (Id. at 14a.) Ms. Powers testified
    regarding the Letter of Reasonable Assurance, explaining that it is a standard letter
    sent to all of Employer’s faculty members every year. (Id. at 24a.) She also testified
    3
    that the Letter of Reasonable Assurance serves as a guarantee that faculty members
    will receive work from Employer in the future. (Id. at 25a.) Ms. Powers testified
    that there is a difference between the regular school schedule and the summer terms3
    in that graduation follows the end of the spring term. (Id.) Following graduation,
    there is a two- or three-week time period before the summer terms begin, which
    Employer refers to as summer recess. (Id. at 24a, 25a.) The summer terms have a
    lot of shortened classes. (Id. at 24a.) During the spring and fall semesters, Employer
    offers students the courses that the students will need to be on track for graduation.
    (Id.) During the summer terms, Employer offers some of the courses required for
    graduation but also offers extra classes during this time period. (Id.)
    Claimant’s counsel asked Ms. Powers a series of questions regarding
    the course catalog, duration and content of courses, and tuition paid by students
    during the various terms, but Ms. Powers did not know the answer to those questions.
    She noted that as Director of Employment and Labor Relations, she does not deal
    with those matters. (Id. at 27a-29a.) During that questioning, the Referee accepted
    Claimant’s counsel’s representation that even though the length of the summer terms
    is shorter than the length of the spring and fall terms, the number of hours that a
    student would be in a class offered in the summer term is equivalent to the number
    of hours a student would be in that same course if it was offered in the fall and spring
    terms. (Id. at 28a.) The difference is that a course offered during the fall and spring
    3
    Throughout her testimony, Ms. Powers referred to the periods of instruction following
    summer recess and preceding the fall term as summer sessions, but then she later agreed to the
    terminology summer term or summer terms. (R.R. at 26a.) She explained that there is a first and
    second summer term. (Id.) For purposes of consistency, we will use the phrase summer term(s)
    in place of summer session(s) when summarizing Ms. Powers’ testimony.
    4
    terms may meet for only fifty minutes at a time, whereas a summer course may meet
    for over two hours at a time.4 (Id.)
    Ms. Powers further testified that course offerings are based on
    enrollment, and Employer may cancel courses based on enrollment. (Id. at 29a.) In
    those instances, Employer usually opts to find other courses for an instructor because
    Employer has given a reasonable assurance of employment. (Id.)
    After the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Referee issued a
    decision reversing the Service Center’s determination, finding Claimant eligible for
    unemployment compensation benefits due to lack of reasonable assurance of
    continued employment. (C.R., Item No. 12.)
    Employer then appealed to the Board, which reversed the Referee’s
    decision and adopted its own findings of fact. (R.R. at 54a.) The Board concluded
    that Claimant was ineligible for benefits pursuant to Section 402.1 of the Law. (Id.)
    In so doing, the Board issued the following findings of fact:
    1. Since March of 1999, the claimant has been employed
    as an adjunct professor with Community College of
    Allegheny [County].
    2. The employer has regular spring and fall academic
    terms.
    4
    Claimant’s counsel also questioned Ms. Powers as to whether she knew how often
    Claimant taught during the summer terms in the past. (R.R. at 29a.) Employer’s representative
    raised an objection based on relevance. When pressed for an explanation regarding the reason for
    the question, Claimant’s counsel answered that he was “just curious whether or not [Ms. Powers]
    is familiar with what adjuncts typically do.” (Id.) The record reveals only a portion of the
    Referee’s response, as cross-talk prevented the court reporter from obtaining a transcription of the
    response. (Id.) The Referee’s partial response is as follows: “[Claimant] says she’s worked
    [s]ummer and she shows you that . . . .” (Id.) Following what the court reporter transcribes as
    “cross-talk,” Claimant’s counsel responds “[o]kay, all right, . . . fair enough,” and continues with
    a different line of questions. (Id.)
    5
    3. The claimant, on occasion, worked over the summer.
    4. The employer offers summer courses, which are
    shortened in length, which some are only six[-]week
    courses that are expedited.
    5. The spring and [fall][5]academic terms are different
    from the summer session.
    6. In her internet claim form, the claimant admitted she
    was unemployed due to being on a summer break.
    7. The summer program course that the claimant was
    selected to teach was cancelled due to low enrollment.
    8. The claimant received reasonable assurance to teach in
    the Fall of 2017.
    (Id.) The Board reasoned:
    In Community College of Allegheny County v.
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
    
    634 A.2d 845
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)[, appeal denied,
    
    653 A.2d 1234
    (Pa. 1994), . . . t]he Court held that:
    Although [the employer] regularly offers classes during
    the summer, that fact does not mean that the summer
    period is a regular academic term. In view of the
    significant decrease in enrollment during the summer, the
    definition of the academic calendar as consisting of a fall
    and spring term, and the varying lengths of course
    instruction in the summer, we conclude that the period in
    question—May 25, 1991 to June 22, 1991—is not a
    regular term, nor is it part of a regular term. Community
    
    College, 634 A.2d at 848
    . Here, following the Court’s
    rationale, the Board similarly concludes, based on the facts
    as found by the Board, that the period in question is not
    part of the regular term. As such, the claimant is ineligible
    for benefits during the summer session.
    (Id.) Claimant now petitions this Court for review.
    5
    It appears that the Board inadvertently omitted the word “fall” from finding of fact
    number 5.
    6
    On appeal,6 Claimant argues that substantial evidence does not exist to
    support findings of fact numbers 6 and 8. Claimant’s error of law claims are as
    follows: (1) the Board committed an error of law by failing to conclude that
    Employer’s summer term is a regular term within the meaning of Section 402.1 of
    the Law; (2) the Board committed an error of law by denying benefits because the
    period at issue is a regular term and courts have denied benefits only when claimants
    seek compensation for a period defined as a summer break—not where the period is
    a regular term; and (3) the Board committed an error of law by concluding that
    Claimant received reasonable assurance, in spite of the fact that the actual
    compensation for teaching in the fall was substantially less than the compensation
    earned in the spring. Alternatively, Claimant asserts that she is eligible for benefits
    because she was unemployed within the meaning of Section 4(u) of the Law.7
    We will first address Claimant’s substantial evidence arguments.
    Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind
    could base a conclusion.           Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
    
    502 A.2d 738
    , 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). In determining whether there is substantial
    evidence to support the Board’s findings, this Court must examine the testimony in
    6
    This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights
    were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are
    supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S.
    § 704.
    7
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
    § 753(4)(u). Section 4(u) of the Law, in pertinent part, defines “unemployed,” as:
    An individual shall be deemed unemployed (I) with respect to any week (i) during
    which he performs no services for which remuneration is paid or payable to him
    and (ii) with respect to which no remuneration is paid or payable to him, or (II) with
    respect to any week of less than his full-time work if the remuneration paid or
    payable to him with respect to such week is less than his weekly benefit rate plus
    his partial benefit credit.
    7
    the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of any
    inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
    Id. A determination
    as to whether substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact
    can only be made upon examination of the record as a whole.                 Taylor v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    378 A.2d 829
    , 831 (Pa. 1977). The Board’s
    findings of fact are conclusive on appeal only so long as the record, taken as a whole,
    contains substantial evidence to support them.            Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson,
    
    485 A.2d 359
    , 365 (Pa. 1984). “The fact that [a party] may have produced witnesses
    who gave a different version of the events, or that [the party] might view the
    testimony differently than the Board is not grounds for reversal if substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s findings.” Tapco Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
    of Review, 
    650 A.2d 1106
    , 1108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Similarly, even if evidence
    exists in the record that could support a contrary conclusion, it does not follow that
    the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.            Johnson v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    504 A.2d 989
    , 990 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
    Claimant argues that substantial evidence does not exist to support
    finding of fact number 6: “In her internet claim form, the claimant admitted she was
    unemployed due to being on a summer break.” (R.R. at 54a.) The Referee admitted
    Claimant’s internet claim form into the record during the hearing. (Id. at 15a.)
    Claimant indicated on the form that she was unemployed due to “summer recess.”
    (C.R., Item No. 2 at 4.) We see no distinction between the term “break” and “recess”
    for this finding. Thus, substantial evidence exists via Claimant’s internet claim form
    to support the Board’s finding that Claimant characterized her unemployment as
    being due to a summer break or recess. Claimant, in her brief, seems to challenge
    this finding because she believed that it characterized the summer “term” as a
    8
    “break.” To the contrary, the Board simply re-stated Claimant’s response on the
    internet claim form. The finding did not label the summer term as a type of break
    or recess.     Rather, it merely reflects Claimant’s characterization of her
    unemployment as being due to a summer break or recess.
    Claimant’s next argument also fails. Substantial evidence exists to
    support the Board’s finding that Claimant received reasonable assurance to teach in
    the fall term of 2017. Claimant received a letter from Employer in April of 2017 that
    provided “notice of reasonable assurance of continued part-time employment for the
    fall semester.” (R.R. at 31a.) Claimant testified that in past years she received the
    same or substantially similar letter. (Id. at 24a.) Further, Employer’s witness
    testified that the letter provided reasonable assurance of employment in the 2017 fall
    term and was a standard letter Employer sent every year. (Id. at 25a.) The record,
    therefore, supports a finding that Claimant received reasonable assurance of
    continued employment in the fall term. Claimant challenges no other findings in her
    brief, and therefore, the Board’s other findings are binding on appeal. Munski v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    29 A.3d 133
    , 136 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
    We will now address Claimant’s error of law claims. Whether an
    instructional, research, or principal administrative employee of an educational
    institution is eligible for unemployment compensation benefits is governed by
    Section 402.1 of the Law. Glassmire v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
    
    856 A.2d 269
    , 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Section 402.1 of the Law provides that such
    employees are not eligible in the following instance:
    With      respect    to    service   performed     after
    December 31, 1977, in an instructional, research, or
    principal administrative capacity for an educational
    institution, benefits shall not be paid based on such
    services for any week of unemployment commencing
    during the period between two successive academic years,
    9
    or during a similar period between two regular terms
    whether or not successive or during a period of paid
    sabbatical leave provided for in the individual’s contract,
    to any individual if such individual performs such services
    in the first of such academic years or terms and if there is
    a contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual
    will perform services in any such capacity for any
    educational institution in the second of such academic
    years or terms.
    (Emphasis added.) Stated another way, teachers who are not employed during a
    recess between two terms, who have been provided with a reasonable assurance of
    continued employment with the school for the term following the break, are
    ineligible for benefits.      See Archie v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    897 A.2d 1
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); Katz v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    540 A.2d 624
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988); DeLuca v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    459 A.2d 62
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). Section 402.1 of the Law recognizes that
    breaks are scheduled in the academic term, and, accordingly, “employees are not
    truly unemployed or suffering from economic insecurity during scheduled recesses.”
    Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    442 A.2d 1232
    , 1233 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1982).    Where reasonable assurance is concerned, the Board must
    determine whether reasonable assurance was given to the claimant “based on an
    examination of all the relevant facts.” 
    Glassmire, 856 A.2d at 273
    . The employer
    need not give an absolute guarantee of employment for the second academic term.
    
    Archie, 897 A.2d at 4
    . Rather, an employer provides reasonable assurance that the
    employee will perform services in the second academic term when:
    (1) The educational institution or educational service
    agency provides a bona fide offer of employment for the
    second academic period to the individual; [and]
    (2) The economic terms and conditions of the employment
    offered to the individual for the second academic period
    10
    are not substantially less than the terms and conditions of
    the individual’s employment in the first academic period.
    34 Pa. Code § 65.161(a).
    First, Claimant asserts that the Board erred by concluding that the
    summer term is not a regular term within the meaning of the Law. We disagree.
    The factual scenario at hand is similar to the one in Community College of Allegheny
    County, wherein this Court found that a part-time professor was not eligible for
    benefits during the summer term because the school’s summer term was not a regular
    term. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny 
    Cty., 643 A.2d at 847
    . The Court did not deem
    summer term to be a regular term because the courses offered in the summer had
    lower enrollment, were shorter in duration, and were limited in number. 
    Id. Here, the
    Board found that the summer courses offered at Employer’s campus were shorter
    in duration. (R.R. at 54a; Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 4.) The Board also found that
    the spring and fall terms are different from the summer session. (Id.; F.F. No. 5.)
    Further, it found that the summer program course Claimant was selected to teach
    was cancelled due to low enrollment. (Id. at 7.) Here, just as in Community College
    of Allegheny County, the Board found that: (1) the offered summer courses are
    shorter in duration; (2) there is some evidence that at least one class has been
    cancelled due to low enrollment; and (3) at least one class was unavailable over the
    summer term. It follows, then, that the summer term is sufficiently distinguishable
    from the spring or fall academic terms and does not constitute a regular term within
    the meaning of Section 402.1 of the Law.8
    Claimant’s next argument relies on a finding that Employer’s summer
    term is a regular term. More specifically, Claimant argues that Section 402.1 of the
    8
    The Court envisions that there could be a factual scenario where a summer term could be
    considered a regular term, but Claimant did not establish those circumstances in this case.
    11
    Law has only been applied to deny benefits to claimants who seek compensation
    during a summer break and not during a summer term. Thus, Claimant argues that,
    should we agree that the period at issue here is not a summer break, Claimant should
    be awarded benefits. As we discussed above, however, we conclude that the summer
    term is not a regular term, thereby disposing of this argument as well.
    Claimant further asserts that the Board erred in concluding that she
    received reasonable assurance of continued employment because the economic
    terms and conditions of the Letter of Reasonable Assurance were substantially less
    than what was offered previously. The basis of her argument is that she was actually
    scheduled to teach one class in the fall, whereas in the spring she taught three classes,
    leaving her with less actual compensation than she previously received. The crux of
    this Court’s inquiry, however, is “whether the terms and conditions offered were
    substantially less at the time the offer was made, ‘without the benefit of hindsight.’”
    
    Archie, 897 A.2d at 5
    (emphasis in original). In Archie, the claimant was an adjunct
    professor for an educational institution, where she taught two courses each fall and
    spring term. 
    Id. at 2.
    The employer notified the claimant that she was to return for
    the fall term to teach the same two courses, subject to sufficient enrollment. 
    Id. Based on
    the conditional language in the letter, the claimant applied for benefits at
    the end of the spring term but was denied. 
    Id. On appeal,
    this Court held that the
    letter that offered continued employment with the university constituted reasonable
    assurance. 
    Id. at 5.
    Due to the fact that the letter did not contain economic terms of
    employment, this Court inferred that the economic terms of employment as offered
    were unchanged. 
    Id. at 4.
    This Court also found the fact that the claimant actually
    received fewer courses for the fall term than she received for the spring term to be
    irrelevant to the question of whether the claimant was offered reasonable assurance.
    12
    
    Id. This situation
    is different from one in which the claimant is not offered the same
    employment arrangement as the previous term. See, e.g., Slippery Rock Area Sch.
    Dist. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    983 A.2d 1231
    (Pa. 2009).
    In Slippery Rock Area School District, the claimant worked as a
    long-term substitute teacher, where she earned over $23,000 per year, and was
    allowed ten sick days per year. 
    Id. at 1234.
    Before the fall term began, the school
    district informed the claimant that she would no longer be a long-term substitute but
    would be placed on a list of day-to-day substitutes. 
    Id. at 1235.
    The new position
    did not guarantee daily employment or any employment whatsoever. 
    Id. The claimant’s
    rate of compensation was also reduced from $126.34 per day to $80 per
    day worked. 
    Id. Further, the
    claimant had no paid sick days under the new position.
    
    Id. The Supreme
    Court, therefore, concluded that the claimant did not receive
    reasonable assurance of continued employment in the next term and was eligible for
    benefits. 
    Id. at 1244.
    In coming to its holding, the Supreme Court recognized the
    maxim from this Court, which considers scheduled recesses to be periods in which
    employees are not truly unemployed. 
    Id. The situation
    in Slippery Rock, however,
    caused the rationale behind this maxim to break down because the decrease in
    income was caused by the claimant’s employer’s decision to offer her a new position
    with fewer hours, compensation, and benefits. 
    Id. The claimant’s
    position under
    that set of facts effectively disappeared. 
    Id. Here, Employer
    offered Claimant reasonable assurance of part-time
    employment in the fall, subject to enrollment levels in the courses. Claimant
    testified that she received a similar Letter of Reasonable Assurance in prior terms.
    Employer’s witness also testified that the Letter of Reasonable Assurance was a form
    or standard letter sent each term. Just as in Archie, the letter did not offer wages, did
    13
    not specify which classes were to be taught, and did not even guarantee that a certain
    number of classes would be taught by Claimant. Pursuant to Archie, the terms
    offered are, therefore, inferred to be the same as the economic terms from previous
    terms. Further, this situation is not reminiscent of the facts in Slippery Rock. In the
    case now before this Court, Employer offered Claimant a position as an adjunct
    professor. There was, therefore, no change in her job description or duties. The
    terms offered are the same as those offered previously, and Employer offered
    Claimant the same job she has held since 1999. The Board, therefore, did not
    commit an error of law by concluding that Claimant received reasonable assurance
    of continued employment in the fall.
    Finally, relying on this Court’s decision in Zielinski v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    834 A.2d 1225
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), Claimant
    argues that even if she is not entitled to benefits under the above analysis, she is
    entitled to benefits because she was unemployed within the meaning of
    Section 4(u) of the Law when she received only one course to teach for the fall term.
    Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1551, “[n]o question shall be heard
    by the court which was not raised before the government unit.” This is the first time
    that Claimant has raised this argument, and, therefore, it is waived. The record is
    devoid of any mention of a claim for benefits based on unemployment during the
    fall term. In fact, counsel for Claimant clarified in the beginning of the hearing
    before the Referee that the only claim being made was for benefits for the week
    ending on May 20, 2017. (C.R., Item No. 11 at 3.) Claimant, therefore, has waived
    this issue, and this Court cannot determine the merits of the argument.
    For these reasons, the Board did not err in concluding that Claimant is
    ineligible for benefits for the period between two regular terms, where she has
    14
    received reasonable assurance of continued employment. Accordingly, we affirm
    the Board’s order denying Claimant benefits pursuant to Section 402.1 of the Law.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    15
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Carla M. Boyd,                      :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                       :   No. 205 C.D. 2018
    :
    Unemployment Compensation           :
    Board of Review,                    :
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 20th day of November, 2018, the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is hereby AFFIRMED.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge