Laymen's Retreat League v. UCBR ( 2015 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Laymen’s Retreat League,                   :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation                  :
    Board of Review,                           :   No. 777 C.D. 2014
    Respondent             :   Submitted: March 27, 2015
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                    FILED: July 31, 2015
    Laymen’s Retreat League (Employer) petitions this Court for review of
    the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review’s (UCBR) April 8, 2014
    order reversing the Referee’s decision denying UC benefits under Section 402(e) of
    the UC Law (Law).1 Employer presents two issues for this Court’s review: (1)
    whether the UCBR’s credibility determinations were against the weight of the
    evidence; and (2) whether the UCBR’s finding of animosity between Sally J. Tygh
    (Claimant) and two of her co-workers was against the weight of the evidence. After
    review, we affirm.
    Claimant was employed full-time as a dining room supervisor with
    Employer from January 1, 1991 until September 15, 2012. On September 15, 2012,
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
    802(e) (relating to discharge for willful misconduct).
    Claimant’s co-workers, Monica and Alexis Luminella (Luminella sisters), claimed
    they saw Claimant in the break room with her hands in one of their purses. When the
    Luminella sisters walked into the break room, Claimant heard the door open, turned
    to look, and asked them if they had seen a busboy named Cole Fanelli (Cole).
    Neither of the Luminella sisters said anything to Claimant about the purse, nor did
    they respond to Claimant’s query as to Cole’s whereabouts. Nothing was taken from
    the purse. Alexis Luminella reported the alleged incident to the manager on duty,
    who reported it to her supervisor, and it went up the chain of command to Employer’s
    President James A. Fitzsimmons (Fitzsimmons). When confronted by Employer,
    Claimant denied having her hands in the purse. Claimant explained that she was in
    the break room looking for Cole because she was going to ask him to put the jellies
    out. The police were called, and an investigation was conducted, but Claimant was
    not charged with any criminal offense.       Notwithstanding, Fitzsimmons notified
    Claimant that she was suspended with pay pending a further investigation. On
    September 22, 2012, Fitzsimmons advised Claimant that her employment was
    terminated and Claimant expressed that Employer’s action was unfair. Employer
    notified Claimant by registered letter that her employment was ended because
    Employer believed that she was in another employee’s purse.
    Claimant applied for UC benefits.        On December 20, 2012, the
    Harrisburg Overflow UC Service Center determined that Claimant was eligible for
    UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Employer appealed and a Referee
    hearing was held on February 21, 2013. Claimant did not attend. On February 22,
    2013, the Referee reversed the UC Service Center’s determination.         Claimant
    appealed to the UCBR. The UCBR remanded the case to the Referee for another
    hearing to determine whether Claimant had good cause for her non-appearance at the
    first hearing, and to take evidence on the merits. On June 4, 2013, the UCBR
    2
    determined that Claimant did not have good cause for her absence from the first
    hearing and, based solely on the first hearing, affirmed the Referee’s decision.
    On June 19, 2013, Claimant made a request for reconsideration. On July
    15, 2013, the UCBR denied Claimant’s reconsideration request because she had filed
    an appeal in Commonwealth Court. On November 19, 2013, the UCBR applied to
    this Court for remission of the appeal. On November 22, 2013, this Court granted the
    UCBR’s request and remanded the matter to the UCBR to reconsider its June 4, 2013
    decision based on the entire record.2 On April 8, 2014, the UCBR reversed the
    Referee’s decision and determined that Claimant was eligible for UC benefits under
    Section 402(e) of the Law. Employer appealed to this Court.3
    Initially,
    Section 402(e) of the Law provides that an employee is
    ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits when
    his unemployment is due to discharge from work for willful
    misconduct connected to his work. The employer bears the
    burden of proving willful misconduct in an unemployment
    compensation case. Willful misconduct has been defined as
    (1) an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer’s
    interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules;
    (3) a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer
    has a right to expect of an employee; or (4) negligence
    indicating an intentional disregard of the employer’s
    2
    Upon further review, the [UCBR] determined that, although
    [C]laimant had not asked for a continuance in the proper manner due
    to her lack of legal training, she did not intentionally refuse to attend
    the Referee’s hearing, but rather was merely exercising her due
    process right to counsel at the hearing, albeit inartfully so, such that
    she did have proper cause for her nonappearance.
    UCBR Dec. at 3.
    3
    “Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether an error of law was committed, or whether the findings of fact were unsupported by
    substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.” Turgeon v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    64 A.3d 729
    , 731 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
    3
    interest or a disregard of the employee’s duties and
    obligations to the employer.
    Dep’t of Transp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    755 A.2d 744
    , 747-48 n.4
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (citation omitted).          “When an employee is discharged for
    violating a work rule, the employer must prove the existence of the rule and the fact
    of its violation.” Lewis v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    42 A.3d 375
    , 377
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “Once the employer has met its initial burden, the burden then
    shifts to the claimant to show either that the rule is unreasonable or that claimant had
    good cause for violating the rule.” Cnty. of Luzerne v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    611 A.2d 1335
    , 1338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
    Employer argues that “the [UCBR’s] credibility determination in favor
    of Claimant as to Claimant’s reasons for being in the break room was not supported
    by substantial evidence.” Claimant Br. at 14 (bold emphasis and uppercase omitted).
    The law is well established that:
    [T]he [UCBR] is the ultimate fact-finder in unemployment
    compensation matters and is empowered to resolve all
    conflicts in evidence, witness credibility, and weight
    accorded the evidence. It is irrelevant whether the record
    contains evidence to support findings other than those
    made by the fact-finder; the critical inquiry is whether
    there is evidence to support the findings actually made.
    Where substantial evidence supports the [UCBR’s]
    findings, they are conclusive on appeal.
    Ductmate Indus., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    949 A.2d 338
    , 342 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2008) (citations omitted; emphasis added). This Court has explained:
    Substantial evidence is relevant evidence upon which a
    reasonable mind could base a conclusion. In deciding
    whether there is substantial evidence to support the
    [UCBR’s] findings, this Court must examine the testimony
    in the light most favorable to the prevailing party . . . giving
    that party the benefit of any inferences which can logically
    and reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
    4
    Sanders v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    739 A.2d 616
    , 618 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1999).
    Here, the UCBR found as a fact: “[C]laimant explained that she was in
    the break room to look out the window at the area below where the young workers
    gathered to smoke because she was going to ask the busboy to put the jell[ies] out.”
    UCBR Dec. at 2, Finding of Fact (FOF) 10.
    When asked what she said to Fitzsimmons during Employer’s
    investigation into the handbag incident, Claimant testified at the remand hearing as
    follows:
    I told him that I was at work, I was out in the dining room.
    I had got to work early that morning, a little earlier than
    normal. The Luminella girls were out in the dining room
    with me. We were the only three people in the dining room
    at that time. A retreatant [sic] came up to me and asked me
    if there were jellies. The jellies that sit next to the toasters
    weren’t put out yet. I was working on one side of the
    dining [room] where the toasters are, the girls were working
    on the other side of the dining room. So I stepped into the
    kitchen, I was right by the kitchen door to see if I saw one
    of the boys that I had seen earlier tha[t] morning. His name
    is [Cole]. I didn’t see anyone in the kitchen at that time so I
    walked to where our break room is and I looked in the
    break room thinking somebody would be in there to put
    the jellies out. There was no one in there, so I walked
    over to the window because there’s a stairwell outside
    that sometimes the kids will go out and they’ll smoke out
    there. So I walked over to the window and I looked out
    the window and saw no one. And then I heard the girls --
    well I didn’t know it was the girls, but I heard the door open
    behind me. And I turned around and the two Luminella
    sisters were walking into the break room. And I turned to
    them and I said have you seen Cole, and both girls said no.
    And so I walked out of the break room, the girls said
    nothing else to me, and I went back through the hallway
    back into the kitchen, and I did see Cole at the dish
    machine. And I said to him at that time, I said we need to
    put the jellies out. And he said that [the other supervisor]
    Ashley Hope [(Hope)] had just put them out.
    5
    Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 91a (emphasis added).             On cross-examination,
    Employer’s counsel questioned Claimant as follows:
    E[mployer’s] L[awyer] And why would you go in the
    break room to look for Cole?
    C[laimant] Because when, a lot of times when the kids had
    finished – I call them kids -- but when they had, the young
    people had finished with their jobs they would go into the
    break room before breakfast or a meal would start and they
    would kind of congregate and like talk in there. So that was
    the first idea I had, maybe he had walked back to the break
    room.
    EL And when you opened the door and saw that he wasn’t
    there why didn’t you just leave at that point?
    C Because I know that if they’re not in the break room
    sometimes they sit out at the stairwell. There’s like a low
    stairwell, steps come down, goes across, then it comes back
    up into the kitchen area, and they’ll go out there and smoke
    and hang out and talk, so I thought perhaps he would be out
    there.
    EL Why wouldn’t you just go out to the stairwell to see if
    he was there?
    C Because I was already in the break room so I just walked
    over to look out the window that was right close to where
    the stairwell was[].
    R.R. at 99a-100a. The above testimony is relevant evidence upon which a reasonable
    mind could conclude that Claimant went into the break room to look for Cole.
    Accordingly, the UCBR’s finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence.
    Employer next argues that “the [UCBR’s] finding of animosity between
    Claimant and the Luminella sisters, and that the Luminella sisters had motive to place
    Claimant in a bad light was not supported by substantial evidence.” Claimant Br. at
    17 (bold emphasis and uppercase omitted). The UCBR opined: “[C]laimant testified
    that there was animosity between her and the [Luminella] sisters for several incidents
    6
    that had previously occurred, and the [UCBR] credits this testimony.” UCBR Dec. at
    4. The UCBR concluded:
    Given that [C]laimant has consistently denied the
    allegations, and provided the more reasonable explanation
    for her presence in the break room on the day in question,
    and given that the only eye-witnesses to the alleged
    misconduct were sisters who had a motive to place
    [C]laimant in a bad light, the [UCBR] is constrained to
    find and conclude that [E]mployer did not bear its burden of
    proving willful misconduct as [a] matter of law in this case.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    At the remand hearing, Claimant’s counsel presented a letter Claimant
    wrote to Fitzsimmons regarding why she believed the Luminella sisters had animosity
    towards her. In the letter Claimant described an incident that occurred on June 12,
    2012, wherein, Hope had complained to their supervisor about Claimant leaving work
    early. The supervisor called Claimant who voluntarily returned to work.          When
    Claimant left work Hope and the Luminella sisters were outside smoking, and when
    she returned, they were still outside smoking. Claimant and Hope went back and forth
    about why Hope made the supervisor call Claimant when the work was already
    completed, and eventually Hope and the Luminella sisters got in Hope’s car and drove
    away. See Ex. CB-1. The letter continued regarding Claimant’s correction of the three
    girls’ prior use of foul language. The letter expressly stated: “I think Ashley [Hope],
    Monica [Luminella] and Alexis [Luminella] have animosity towards me because
    of my constant correction of [their] bad language around retreatants [sic] and co-
    workers.” Ex. CB-1 at 2 (emphasis added). The letter was accepted into evidence.
    In reference to the letter, Claimant’s counsel questioned Claimant as
    follows:
    C[laimant’s] L[awyer] Now the June, 2012 incident when
    you wrote this letter that wasn’t the first time you had
    7
    mentioned to [] Fitzsimmons or anybody at [Employer]
    about the issue that occurred on June 12th, correct?
    C[laimant] Correct.
    CL And was there also an issue as you stated in the letter
    where there was an accusation that you had left and not
    done your work, that you had gone home early?
    C    That’s correct.
    CL And were the Luminella sisters part of the accusation?
    C    They were.
    R.R. at 105a. During recross-examination, Employer’s counsel questioned Claimant
    about the fact that Hope was the one who complained about her during the June 12 th
    incident, not the Luminella sisters and Claimant testified as follows:
    E[mployer’s] L[awyer] So if I understand your testimony
    correctly, [Hope] is the one who complained?
    C[laimant] [Hope] called [Employer’s supervisor] Jim
    Hall. But when I got, when I saw the two glasses I went
    back out on the loading dock and I said to the girls, I said
    there is nothing to be done here, I don’t know what all this
    is about, I don’t really understand this. So the girls at that
    point were getting ready to leave, they were - walking
    toward [Hope’s] car. [Hope] said, [sic] I said [Hope], what
    is going on here? [Hope] used some profanities and said
    I’m tired of doing your job. And the girls [the Luminella
    sisters] just kind of snickered and laughed about it and
    didn’t say anything. And they all got in [Hope’s] car and
    they left.
    EL So [Claimant], you don’t know that the Luminella
    sisters complained?
    C Well I don’t, I don’t know that they complained but they
    sure didn’t say anything to defend the situation. They just
    stood there and snickered about it.
    EL All right. So they were there when you were having a
    conversation with [Hope] . . .
    8
    C Right, and . . .
    EL . . . who was the one that complained?
    C . . . and the girls are this little tight group of girls.
    They’re very good friends. And so I would assume that,
    you know, [Hope] and them got together and decided this
    [is] what they were -- I assumed they got together . . .
    EL All right. So you’re assuming that somehow they were
    involved because . . .
    C Yes.
    EL . . . they’re friends with [Hope]?
    C Right.
    EL You don’t know that they were involved?
    C I -- well let’s put it this way, I would say that I do
    know that they were involved in it because [of] the way
    they conducted themselves when I went back over there.
    EL So you know they were involved because they got into
    [Hope’s] car and they’re friends with [Hope]?
    C No. I know they’re involved by their mannerisms
    when I went back over there, how you have just a
    knowledge of knowing when people are back-stabbing
    you.
    EL Now do you think that you have some issues with the
    Luminella sisters that you think that maybe they don’t
    like you?
    C Do I think that now?
    EL Yes.
    C Of course I think that now.
    EL Well, no, back at that time.
    C Back at that time, yeah, I think there was a lot going
    on behind my back at that time.
    R.R. at 106a-108a (emphasis added).
    9
    Reviewing the letter and the above testimony in the light most favorable
    to Claimant as the prevailing party, and giving Claimant the benefit of any inferences
    which can logically and reasonably be drawn from the evidence as we must, the letter
    and the testimony is relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind could conclude
    that there was animosity between Claimant and the Luminella sisters. Accordingly,
    because there was substantial evidence to support the UCBR’s conclusion of
    animosity, we will not disturb the UCBR’s credibility determination.
    For all of the above reasons, the UCBR’s order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    10
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Laymen’s Retreat League,               :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    Unemployment Compensation              :
    Board of Review,                       :   No. 777 C.D. 2014
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 31st day of July, 2015, the Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review’s April 8, 2014 order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge