W.M. Barlow v. Liberty Twp. ( 2018 )


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  •         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Walter M. Barlow,                      :
    Appellant   :
    :
    v.                        :   No. 1229 C.D. 2017
    :   Submitted: September 12, 2018
    Liberty Township, Adams County,        :
    Pennsylvania; Board of Supervisors     :
    of Liberty Township, Adams County,     :
    Pennsylvania; John Bostek; Robert      :
    Jackson                                :
    BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE BROBSON                       FILED: September 28, 2018
    Appellant Walter M. Barlow (Barlow) appeals from an order of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Adams County (trial court), dated August 23, 2017. The
    trial court sustained the preliminary objections filed by Liberty Township
    (Township), the Board of Supervisors of Liberty Township (Board), John Bostek
    (Bostek), and Robert Jackson (Jackson) (collectively, Appellees) and dismissed
    Barlow’s Amended Complaint with prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, we
    reverse the trial court’s order.
    Barlow’s Amended Complaint sets forth the following factual
    averments.    Barlow began working for the Township as its only year-round,
    part-time road maintenance employee in July 2014. (Reproduced Record (R.R.)
    at 8a, 16a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 38.) Thereafter, in November 2015, Barlow was
    elected to serve as a Township supervisor for a period of 2 years, commencing on
    January 5, 2016. (R.R. at 9a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 7.) As of January 5, 2016, the
    members of the Board were Bostek, Jackson, and Barlow. (R.R. at 16a; Am. Compl.
    at ¶ 36.) Shortly after assuming his position as Township supervisor, Barlow
    conducted a comprehensive review of the Township’s financial statements and
    discovered that the Township’s treasurer “had been allocating to herself and
    receiving payments in excess of that to which she was entitled under the terms of
    her employment.” (R.R. at 16a-17a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 40-42.) Barlow averred that
    the misallocations occurred over the course of several years, at a time when both
    Bostek and Jackson served on the Board and reviewed and approved all of the
    Township’s personnel payments. (R.R. at 17a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 42.)
    Barlow averred further that, in September 2016, he informed Bostek
    and Jackson of the apparent misallocations by the Township’s treasurer and
    recommended that the Board hold a meeting to consider immediate action with
    respect to the employment of the Township’s treasurer, referral of the matter to law
    enforcement, and a formal audit of the Township’s current and past financial
    statements. (R.R. at 17a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 43.) Barlow averred that Bostek and
    Jackson rejected his recommendations and informed him that if he “notif[ied] law
    enforcement or raise[d] the matter publicly, he would face opposition to his
    candidacy for reelection as [s]upervisor and other negative consequences.” (R.R.
    at 17a-18a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 44.)        Notwithstanding Bostek’s and Jackson’s
    objections, Barlow ensured that: (1) law enforcement was notified about the
    apparent misallocations; (2) a motion was made and adopted by the Board to
    2
    terminate the employment of the Township’s treasurer; and (3) after additional
    discrepancies were uncovered during an audit of Township personnel records in
    October 2016, a motion was made and adopted by the Board to perform an outside
    forensic audit of the Township’s financial records. (R.R. at 18a-19a; Am. Compl.
    at ¶¶ 46-47.)
    Barlow also averred that, with the intent of harming Barlow for his
    actions, Bostek and Jackson sought to undermine Barlow’s position as Township
    supervisor and to terminate Barlow from his employment with the Township as a
    part-time road maintenance employee. (R.R. at 19a-20a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 49-50.)
    Barlow averred that, on March 6, 2017, Bostek and Jackson met with Barlow at what
    Bostek and Jackson deemed to be an “executive session” of the Board, and informed
    Barlow that, after a review of the Township’s budget, “they had decided to suspend
    budget appropriations relating to part-time road maintenance, and that as a result
    [Barlow] would no longer be employed as a part-time road maintenance employee
    of the Township.” (R.R. at 20a-21a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 52-53, 57.) Despite Barlow’s
    objections and without further discussion, Bostek and Jackson “voted to adopt the
    proposal to suspend budget appropriations relating to part-time road maintenance.”
    (R.R. at 21a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 55, 58.) Barlow also believed that, prior to
    March 6, 2017, Bostek and Jackson, without notifying Barlow, met on at least one
    occasion, during which time they “deliberated and/or decided to suspend budget
    appropriations relating to part-time road maintenance.” (R.R. at 21a; Am. Compl.
    at ¶ 54.)
    Barlow averred further that, after the Township’s solicitor advised
    Bostek and Jackson that the Board’s “executive session” likely violated
    open-meeting laws, Bostek and Jackson directed the Township’s secretary to revise
    3
    the written agenda for the Board’s March 7, 2017 regular meeting to add “Road
    Department Staffing Budget” under the subheading “New Business.” (R.R. at 23a;
    Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 61-63.)          Following the commencement of the Board’s
    March 7, 2017 meeting, Bostek opened the meeting for a period of comments by the
    public followed by a period of comments by the supervisors; no one made any
    comments regarding the proposal to suspend budget appropriations related to
    part-time road maintenance during either the public comment period or the
    supervisor comment period. (R.R. at 24a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 66-69.) Barlow averred
    that, during the discussion of new business, Jackson discussed the Board’s
    determination that “as of February 2017[,] the Township’s projected budget was
    ‘falling short’ of expectations and that ‘from a budget point of view’ the Township
    should ‘cut back on our road crew expenses’” and thereafter made a motion for the
    temporary suspension of the Township’s part-time road crew. (R.R. at 25a; Am.
    Compl. at ¶¶ 72-73.) Barlow averred further that, even though the Board “had, in
    prior monthly meetings, consistently followed the practice and policy of allowing
    comments by the public, outside the formal public comment period, on any items of
    ‘New Business,’” Bostek refused to allow public comment on Jackson’s motion.
    (R.R. at 25a-26a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 74-77.) Bostek and Jackson voted in favor of
    the motion, and the motion was adopted; Barlow noted that he did not agree with the
    motion, but he abstained from the vote. (R.R. at 27a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 78-79.)
    Barlow also averred that Bostek then made a motion to reclassify
    Barlow as a temporary part-time employee of the Township, even though the Board
    did not list the motion on its written agenda or identify the motion in a notice to the
    public. (R.R. at 27a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 82-83.) Barlow averred that Bostek again
    refused to permit public comment on the motion. (R.R. at 27a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 84.)
    4
    Bostek and Jackson voted to approve the motion, and the motion was adopted;
    Barlow noted that he did not agree with the motion, but he abstained from the vote.
    (R.R. at 27a; Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 85-86.)
    Barlow averred further that, on April 28, 2017, Bostek and/or Jackson
    directed a revision to the written agenda for the Board’s May 2, 2017 meeting,
    adding “Resolution Establishing a Public Comment Policy” and “Proposed Motion”
    under the subheading “New Business.” (R.R. at 28a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 90.) The
    written agenda provided a description of the “Proposed Motion,”1 but it did not
    provide any explanation or description of the “Resolution Establishing a Public
    Comment Policy.” (R.R. at 28a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 90.) At the meeting, Bostek
    indicated that the Board would consider a motion to adopt the “Resolution
    Establishing a Public Comment Policy.” (R.R. at 29a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 93.) Barlow
    averred that, despite his and the public’s request to table the motion until the Board’s
    next regular meeting so that the text of the resolution could be made available to the
    public, Bostek called for a vote on the motion.              (R.R. at 29a; Am. Compl.
    at ¶¶ 94-96.) Bostek and Jackson voted in favor of the motion, while Barlow
    abstained from the vote. (R.R. at 30a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 97.) Bostek then indicated
    that the Board would consider a motion to adopt the “Proposed Motion” and read
    the written description set forth in the Board’s written agenda to the public.
    1
    Barlow avers that the revised written agenda for the Board’s May 2, 2017 meeting set
    forth the following description of the “Proposed Motion”:
    I move that the Township approve, affirm and ratify: a) the recognition that any
    references in any correspondence of March 6, 2017, to an alleged decision being
    made by the [Board] on March 6, 2017, be withdrawn and nullified; and b) the
    reclassification of [Barlow] from part-time to temporary status, with work hours
    and schedule to be determined by the Roadmaster based on need.
    (R.R. at 28a-29a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 90.)
    5
    (R.R. at 30a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 98.) Bostek and Jackson voted in favor of the motion,
    while Barlow abstained from the vote. (R.R. at 30a; Am. Compl. at ¶ 99.)
    On July 7, 2017, Barlow filed his Amended Complaint, seeking
    injunctive, declaratory, and other relief against Appellees for violations of the
    Sunshine Act (Act)2 and The Second Class Township Code (Code).3 Barlow alleged
    that the Board’s meeting(s) held prior to March 6, 2017, as well as the Board’s
    March 6, 2017, March 7, 2017, and May 2, 2017 meetings violated both the Act and
    the Code because, inter alia: (1) such meetings were not open to the public;
    (2) neither Barlow nor the public were provided reasonable notice of such meetings
    or of the Board’s proposals to adopt certain actions at such meetings; (3) the public
    was not given a reasonable opportunity to comment on the Board’s proposals to
    adopt certain actions at such meetings; (4) the actions taken at such meetings had
    been deliberated and adopted at a prior illegal meeting; and/or (5) the actions taken
    at such meetings had been adopted without complying with required procedures, for
    an improper purpose, or without reasonable deliberation.
    Appellees filed preliminary objections to Barlow’s Amended
    Complaint, seeking dismissal of Barlow’s Amended Complaint. Appellees argued
    that Barlow’s Amended Complaint was legally insufficient because, even if the
    Board held a private meeting on March 6, 2017 in violation of the Act or the Code,
    any action taken at such private meeting was subsequently ratified and cured by the
    Board’s action taken at its March 7, 2017, and May 2, 2017 meetings, both of which
    were open to the public and did not violate the Act or the Code. In support thereof,
    Appellees attached copies of the minutes from the Board’s March 7, 2017, and
    2
    65 Pa. C.S. §§ 701-716.
    3
    Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 65101-68701.
    6
    May 2, 2017 meetings to their preliminary objections and directed the trial court’s
    attention to internet links containing video recordings of such meetings. By order
    dated August 23, 2017, the trial court sustained Appellees’ preliminary objections
    and dismissed Barlow’s Amended Complaint with prejudice. In so doing, the trial
    court reasoned:
    [T]his is a case that is clear and free from doubt. The
    March 7, 2017 subsequent open meeting was the very next
    day after the alleged illegal closed meeting on
    March 6, 2017. Importantly, at the March 7, 2017
    meeting, the official action in question was approved by
    a 2/3 majority of the Board. The official action in question
    was again approved by a 2/3 majority at the May 2, 2017
    open meeting. All [3] members of the Board, including
    [Barlow] who is the aggrieved party, were present at the
    alleged illegal closed meeting and both subsequent open
    meetings. Both subsequent open meetings were open to
    the public and had opportunities for public comment.
    Consequently, no harm or damage was caused. As any
    alleged [Act] or [Code] violation was properly and
    promptly cured, [Barlow] cannot make out a claim upon
    which relief can be granted. All of the curative measures
    are clearly reflected on the minutes of the March 7, 2017
    and May 2, 2017 meetings. [Barlow] argues that this [trial
    court] should not consider those minutes now because
    [Barlow] chose not to include them in the Amended
    Complaint. Thereby, [Barlow] argues that this [trial court]
    should allow this litigation to continue despite the fact that
    the minutes and video recordings of the meetings will
    ultimately show any violations were cured. Therefore,
    there is no reason to continue this time consuming and
    costly litigation which places unnecessary strain on [the
    Township’s] limited financial resources.
    (Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.)
    On appeal, Barlow argues that the trial court committed an error of law
    by sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissing his Amended
    Complaint because: (1) the allegations of his Amended Complaint, when accepted
    7
    as true, establish that the Board’s meeting(s) held prior to March 6, 2017, as well as
    the Board’s March 6, 2017, March 7, 2017, and May 2, 2017 meetings violated both
    the Act and the Code and that relief is available for such violations; and (2) the
    alleged ratification measures taken at the March 7, 2017, and May 2, 2017 meetings
    do not preclude relief for the violations of the Act and the Code.
    This Court’s standard of review of a trial court’s order sustaining
    preliminary objections to a complaint is limited to considering whether the trial court
    erred as a matter of law or committed an abuse of discretion. Muncy Creek Twp.
    Citizens Comm. v. Shipman, 
    573 A.2d 662
    , 663 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). In considering
    whether a trial court properly sustained preliminary objections, this Court accepts as
    true all well-pled facts and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Cowell v.
    Dep’t of Transp., 
    883 A.2d 705
    , 707 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). “It is well-settled that
    in Pennsylvania civil practice, preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
    require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings. Thus, no
    testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose
    of the legal issues presented by a demurrer.” Cardella v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd.,
    
    827 A.2d 1277
    , 1282 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    In this case, the trial court concluded that Barlow could not make out a
    claim for which relief could be granted because the Board cured any violations of
    the Act and/or Code at its March 7, 2017, and May 2, 2017 meetings. In reaching
    this conclusion, the trial court acknowledged that it went beyond Barlow’s Amended
    Complaint and considered minutes and video recordings from the Board’s
    March 7, 2017, and May 2, 2017 meetings. While we acknowledge the trial court’s
    concerns about the Township’s limited financial resources, the law must take
    precedence. The law is clear that the trial court must accept as true all of Barlow’s
    8
    well-pled facts and simply cannot go outside Barlow’s Amended Complaint to
    determine whether Barlow’s claims are legally sufficient. Our review of Barlow’s
    Amended Complaint reveals that Barlow adequately pled causes of action for
    violations of the Act4 and the Code.5 For these reasons, we are constrained to
    conclude that the trial court committed an error of law by sustaining Appellees’
    preliminary objections and dismissing Barlow’s Amended Complaint.
    Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    4
    Pursuant to the Act, “[o]fficial action and deliberations by a quorum of the members of
    an agency shall take place at a meeting open to the public.” 65 Pa. C.S. § 704 (emphasis added).
    An agency is permitted to hold an executive session that is not open to the public to discuss matters
    involving employment provided that: (1) “[t]he reason for holding the executive session [is]
    announced at the open meeting occurring immediately prior or subsequent to the executive
    session”; and (2) “official action on discussions held [at the executive session are] taken at an open
    meeting.” 65 Pa. C.S. §§ 707(a), 708(a)(1), (b) and (c). “[T]he board . . . shall provide a reasonable
    opportunity . . . for residents . . . or for taxpayers . . . to comment on matters of concern, official
    action or deliberation which are or may be before the board . . . prior to taking official action.”
    65 Pa. C.S. § 710.1(a).
    5
    Pursuant to the Code, “[a]n affirmative vote of a majority of the entire board of
    supervisors at a public meeting is necessary in order to transact any business.” Section 603 of the
    Code, 53 P.S. § 65603 (emphasis added). A board of supervisors may conduct a special meeting
    after notice to the public stating the nature of the business to be conducted at the meeting.
    Section 604 of the Code, 53 P.S. § 65604.
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Walter M. Barlow,                     :
    Appellant      :
    :
    v.                         :   No. 1229 C.D. 2017
    :
    Liberty Township, Adams County,       :
    Pennsylvania; Board of Supervisors    :
    of Liberty Township, Adams County,    :
    Pennsylvania; John Bostek; Robert     :
    Jackson                               :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2018, the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Adams County is hereby REVERSED.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1229 C.D. 2017

Judges: Brobson, J.

Filed Date: 9/28/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024