In Re: Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P. ~Appeal of: Homes for America, Inc. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    In Re: Condemnation by                       :
    Sunoco Pipeline L.P. of                      :
    Permanent and Temporary                      :
    Rights of Way for the                        :
    Transportation of Ethane,                    :
    Propane, Liquid Petroleum                    :
    Gas, and other Petroleum                     :
    Products in the Township of                  :
    Heidelberg, Lebanon County,                  :
    Pennsylvania, over the Lands                 :
    of Homes for America, Inc.                   :
    :   No. 565 C.D. 2016
    Appeal of: Homes for America, Inc.           :   Submitted: September 30, 2016
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                      FILED: May 24, 2017
    Homes for America, Inc. (Condemnee) appeals from the Lebanon
    County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) March 24, 2016 order overruling its
    Preliminary Objections to Sunoco Pipeline L.P.’s (Sunoco) Declaration of Taking
    (Declaration).1 Condemnee contends that the trial court erred because Sunoco’s
    Mariner East 2 Project is not an intrastate and interstate pipeline dually regulated by
    the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and the Federal Energy
    1
    Appeals filed by Gerald V. and Katherine M. Thomas (collectively, Thomas) (Pa. Cmwlth.
    No. 563 C.D. 2016) and Heath K. and Brenda H. Nell (collectively, Nell) (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 564
    C.D. 2016) were consolidated with Condemnee’s appeal on April 26, 2016. However, because
    Thomas and Nell have since resolved their disputes with Sunoco, this Court discontinued their
    appeals by October 16, 2016 order. Only Condemnee’s appeal remains active.
    Regulation Commission (FERC), Sunoco is not a public utility, Sunoco does not have
    eminent domain power, and Sunoco’s Declaration is barred by the collateral estoppel
    doctrine.2
    This Court en banc decided a majority of Condemnee’s issues in In re
    Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., 
    143 A.3d 1000
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), petition
    for allowance of appeal denied, (Pa. Nos. 571, 572, 573 MAL 2016, filed December
    29, 2016) (Sunoco I).         After careful review of the record in this case, and in
    accordance with Sunoco I, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    I. Background
    On August 5, 2015, Sunoco filed the Declaration to condemn permanent
    and temporary easements across Condemnee’s property located on South Canaan
    Grove Road, Newmanstown, Heidelberg Township, Lebanon County (Property) for
    the construction, operation and maintenance of Sunoco’s Mariner East 2’s pipelines.
    See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 749a-767a, 880a-885a.
    Condemnee filed Preliminary Objections to the Declaration in
    accordance with Section 306 of the Eminent Domain Code,3 26 Pa.C.S. § 306,
    alleging: Sunoco does not have condemnation authority (Objection 1); Sunoco’s
    corporate resolution does not authorize Sunoco to use eminent domain for the
    intrastate pipeline (Objection 2); Sunoco is collaterally estopped from asserting
    eminent domain power for Mariner East 2 after it was denied in Loper v. Sunoco
    Pipeline, L.P. (C.P. York No. 2013-SU-004518-05, filed February 24, 2014)
    2
    In its Statement of Questions Involved set forth in Condemnee’s brief filed with this Court,
    Condemnee’s first issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mariner East 2 is both an
    interstate and intrastate service. Condemnee’s second issue is whether Mariner East 2 may be
    dually regulated by the PUC and FERC. Because both issues involve the same analysis, we
    combined those issues as Issue 1 herein.
    3
    26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106.
    2
    (Objection 3); the Declaration falsely represents Mariner East 2 as an intrastate
    pipeline (Objection 4); Sunoco seeks approval for two pipelines despite that FERC
    only approved one (Objection 5); and, Pennsylvania law prohibits Sunoco’s attempt
    to obtain eminent domain power under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law
    of 1988 (BCL)4 without a FERC Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) (Objection
    6).5 See R.R. at 920a-973a. Sunoco opposed Condemnee’s Preliminary Objections.
    See R.R. at 974a-993a.
    The trial court conducted a hearing on November 30, 2015. See R.R. at
    1269a-1453a. On March 24, 2016, the trial court ordered Condemnee’s Preliminary
    Objections overruled, as follows:
    1. The Mariner East 2 Pipeline will provide both interstate
    and intrastate service for ethane, propane, and other
    petroleum products in the Commonwealth.
    2. Such pipeline service is dually-regulated, with [FERC]
    having the authority to regulate interstate service and the
    [PUC] having the authority to regulate intrastate service.
    3. Since [Sunoco] is regulated by the [PUC] for the Mariner
    East 2 Project, it meets the definition of a public utility
    providing public utility service under the Pennsylvania
    [BCL].
    4. As a public utility providing public utility service under
    the [BCL], [Sunoco] has the power of eminent domain.
    4
    15 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101-9507. Section 1511(a)(2) of the BCL, 15 Pa.C.S. § 1511(a)(2),
    provides that “public utility corporations” may exercise the power of eminent domain to condemn
    property for the transportation of, inter alia, natural gas and petroleum products. Section 1103 of
    the BCL, 15 Pa.C.S. § 1103, defines public utility corporation as “[a]ny domestic or foreign
    corporation for profit that . . . is subject to regulation as a public utility by the [PUC] or an officer or
    agency of the United States . . . .” FERC is an agency of the United States that may regulate an
    entity as a public utility under this section.
    5
    Condemnee also objected to the sufficiency of Sunoco’s bond; however, on December 9,
    2015, Sunoco posted a bond agreeable to Condemnee. See R.R. at 1469a-1474a. Accordingly,
    Condemnee’s seventh objection was rendered moot. See Trial Court Op. at 12.
    3
    5. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to
    compel a different result.
    6. The bonds posted by [Sunoco] in response to our Order
    of December 15, 2015 are adequate to cover the damages
    anticipated by Condemnee[].
    7. In light of the above, the Preliminary Objections . . . are
    [OVERRULED] in their entirety.
    Condemnee Br. App. A, Trial Ct. Order. Also on March 24, 2016, the trial court filed
    an opinion in support of its order. See Condemnee Br. App. A, Trial Ct. Op. On
    April 8, 2016, Condemnee appealed to this Court.6
    II. Analysis
    A. Dual Regulation
    Condemnee first argues that the trial court erred by finding that Mariner
    East 2 is both an intrastate and interstate pipeline subject to the PUC’s regulation.
    Condemnee also contends that the trial court erred by finding that Mariner East 2
    service is dually regulated by the PUC and FERC, because no law supports dual
    regulation, and Section 104 of the Public Utility Code (Code),7 66 Pa.C.S. § 104,
    prohibits the PUC’s regulation of interstate commerce. We disagree.
    The record made before the trial court in this matter is nearly identical to
    the one made in Sunoco I. Both contain the same Sunoco witness testimony, Mariner
    East Project exhibits and PUC orders.                 Therefore, this Court’s thorough and
    exhaustive analysis and summary of Sunoco’s background in Sunoco I is relevant to
    the Declaration filed in this case.
    6
    “In an eminent domain case disposed of on preliminary objections this Court is limited to
    determining if [the trial court’s] necessary findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and
    if an error of law or an abuse of discretion was committed.” Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1014
    n.17.
    7
    66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316.
    4
    1. Regulation of Sunoco as a Public Utility
    Sunoco has operated as a Pennsylvania public utility since 2002, when it
    received the PUC’s approval for the transfer, merger, possession, and use of all assets
    of the Sun Pipe Line Company (Sun) and of the Atlantic Pipeline Corporation
    (Atlantic), both of which were public utilities subject to the PUC’s jurisdiction. See
    R.R. at 769a-772a. Accordingly, the PUC issued a CPC (2002 CPC) authorizing
    Sunoco “to transport petroleum products in the former service territory of Sun and
    Atlantic[,]” between Delmont, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania and Twin Oaks,
    Delaware County, Pennsylvania, which includes Lebanon County. R.R. at 773a; see
    also R.R. at 773a-776a. In granting the 2002 CPC, the PUC declared that the transfer
    of assets to Sunoco “provides an affirmative public benefit” (R.R. at 774a) and that
    “the granting of [Sunoco’s] application is necessary or proper for the service,
    accommodation, convenience and safety of the public.” R.R. at 769a.
    2. The Mariner East Project
    Sunoco planned the Mariner East Project to transport natural gas liquids
    (NGLs),8 such as propane, ethane, and butane within the service territory authorized
    8
    According to the United States Energy Information Administration:
    [NGLs] are hydrocarbons—in the same family of molecules as natural
    gas and crude oil, composed exclusively of carbon and hydrogen.
    Ethane, propane, butane, isobutane, and pentane are all NGLs . . .
    NGLs are used as inputs for petrochemical plants, burned for space
    heat and cooking, and blended into vehicle fuel . . . .
    The chemical composition of these hydrocarbons is similar, yet their
    applications vary widely. Ethane occupies the largest share of NGL
    field production. It is used almost exclusively to produce ethylene,
    which is then turned into plastics. Much of the propane, by contrast,
    is burned for heating, although a substantial amount is used as
    petrochemical feedstock . . . .
    5
    by the 2002 CPC. See R.R. at 755a; see also In re Condemnation of Sunoco Pipeline,
    L.P. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 220 C.D. 2016, filed September 2, 2016);9 Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1007-11
    . The Mariner East Project consists of multiple phases, and the overall
    goal is to relieve the oversupply of NGLs in the Marcellus and Utica Shale basins and
    to remedy propane shortages in Pennsylvania and the Northeast. See R.R. at 755a.
    Sunoco initially intended the Mariner East Project to prioritize interstate
    service. The first phase, known as Mariner East 1, was designed to transport NGLs
    from the Marcellus and Utica basins east to the Marcus Hook Industrial Complex
    (MHIC) located in both Delaware County and Claymont, Delaware. See R.R. at
    755a. However, the record indicates that Sunoco also contemplated the intrastate
    transportation of propane for delivery to Pennsylvania customers. See R.R. at 755a.
    During the completion of Mariner East 1, Sunoco experienced a significant increase
    in demand for intrastate shipments of propane, driven by local consumer demand.
    See R.R. at 755a. The record further reflects that harsh winter conditions experienced
    during the 2013-14 winter season, combined with a pipeline infrastructure deficit, led
    to propane shortages and changing market conditions. See R.R. at 755a. Because of
    the circumstances, Sunoco accelerated its plans to provide intrastate shipments of
    propane, in addition to interstate shipments of propane and ethane, through the
    Mariner East Project. See R.R. at 755a.
    This increased focus on intrastate shipments was the impetus for the
    second phase of Sunoco’s Mariner East Project (Mariner East 2). See R.R. at 761a-
    United States Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy, April 20, 2012, available at
    http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5930&src=email (last visited May 20, 2016).
    9
    We acknowledge that this Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for
    [their] persuasive value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
    Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). We reference this Court’s In re
    Condemnation of Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 220 C.D. 2016, filed September 2, 2016)
    decision herein for its persuasive value.
    6
    762a. Mariner East 2 will consist of pipelines with access points in Ohio, West
    Virginia, and Pennsylvania. See R.R. at 762a. Product will be placed into a pipeline
    (on-ramps), and there will be multiple exit points within Pennsylvania where product
    will be removed from the pipeline (off-ramps). See R.R. at 762a. Mariner East 2
    generally will run parallel to the Mariner East 1 line. See R.R. at 763a. The Mariner
    East Project (through Mariner East 1 and Mariner East 2) will transport petroleum
    products in Sunoco’s certificated areas as an integrated service.10
    3. PUC Orders and Tariffs
    The record contains references to Sunoco initiating several PUC
    proceedings when its focus for the Mariner East Project moved from interstate to
    intrastate transportation of NGLs after the winter of 2013-14. See R.R. at 754a-767a.
    These proceedings, and the resulting PUC orders, include the following relevant
    actions:
        July 24, 2014 order – the PUC reaffirmed Sunoco’s
    authority to transport petroleum products between
    Delmont, Westmoreland County, and Twin Oaks,
    Delaware County (see R.R. at 786a-796a);
    10
    The PUC’s August 21, 2014 Order states:
    Subject to continued shipper interest, Sunoco intends to undertake a
    second phase of the Mariner East [P]roject, which will expand the
    capacity of the project by constructing: (1) a 16[-]inch or larger
    pipeline, paralleling its existing pipeline from Houston, PA to the
    Marcus Hook Industrial Complex and along much of the same route,
    and (2) a new 15 miles of pipeline from Houston, PA to a point near
    the Pennsylvania-Ohio boundary line. This second phase, sometimes
    referred to as ‘Mariner East 2’, will increase the take-away capacity
    of natural gas liquids from the Marcellus Shale and will enable
    Sunoco to provide additional on-loading and off-loading points within
    Pennsylvania for both intrastate and interstate propane shipments.
    R.R. at 806a-807a.
    7
       August 21, 2014 order – the PUC approved a tariff for
    Sunoco’s west-to-east intrastate movement of propane
    from Mechanicsburg to Twin Oaks (see R.R. at 798a-
    802a);
       August 21, 2014 order – the PUC granted Sunoco a
    CPC authorizing it to provide intrastate transportation
    service of petroleum products in Washington County,
    which expanded the service territory in which Sunoco is
    authorized to provide its Mariner East service (see R.R.
    at 805a-809a);
       October 29, 2014 order – the PUC reaffirmed that
    “Sunoco has been certificated as a public utility in
    Pennsylvania . . . , and the existence of [PUC o]rders
    granting the [CPCs] to Sunoco is prima facie evidence
    of the facts therein, including that Sunoco is a public
    utility under the Code.” (R.R. at 861a; see also R.R. at
    822a-878a).
       January 15, 2015 order – the PUC approved a tariff for
    Sunoco’s west-to-east intrastate movement of propane,
    reflecting a new origin point of Houston, Washington
    County (see R.R. at 811a-815a); and,
       March 26, 2015 order – the PUC approved a
    supplemental tariff for intrastate shipments from
    Delmont, Westmoreland County to Twin Oaks,
    Delaware County (see R.R. at 817a-820a).
    See Sunoco I; see also In re Condemnation of Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. (Pa. Cmwlth.
    No. 220 C.D. 2016, filed September 2, 2016).
    The Sunoco I Court also “provide[d] some . . . background information
    on the nature of the interrelationships between [sic] Sunoco, [the] PUC and [FERC,]”
    as follows:
    Both FERC and [the] PUC regulate the shipments of natural
    gas and petroleum products or service through those
    pipelines, and not the actual physical pipelines conveying
    those liquids. FERC’s jurisdiction is derived from the
    8
    Interstate Commerce Act (ICA)[11] and applies to
    interstate movements, while the Code and [the] PUC’s
    jurisdiction apply to intrastate movements.     This
    jurisdiction is not mutually exclusive. . . .
    Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1004
    (original bold text emphasis, footnotes and original
    record citations omitted; bold text emphasis added).
    [I]t is [the] PUC, and not FERC, that has authority to
    regulate intrastate shipments. Similarly, . . . pipeline
    service operators in Pennsylvania, such as Sunoco, can be,
    and frequently are, simultaneously regulated by both FERC
    and [the] PUC through a regulatory rubric where FERC
    jurisdiction is limited only to interstate shipments, and [the]
    PUC’s jurisdiction extends only to intrastate shipments. . . .
    ....
    The record substantiates that the pipeline system previously
    provided and currently provides interstate and intrastate
    service on the same pipelines. . . . [The] PUC has
    regulated Sunoco’s intrastate pipeline transportation of
    petroleum products and refined petroleum products
    since 2002, and FERC has regulated Sunoco’s interstate
    service of the same products on the same pipelines. . . .
    Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1005-06
    (emphasis added).
    Therefore, when the condemnees in Sunoco I made the identical dual
    regulation arguments,12 this Court determined, based on the PUC orders related to the
    Mariner East Project, FERC’s decision in Amoco Pipeline, Co., 62 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61119,
    at 61803-61804, 
    1993 WL 25751
    , at *4 (Feb. 8, 1993) (finding that “the
    commingling of oil streams is not a factor in fixing jurisdiction under the ICA”), and
    other related authority, “that Sunoco’s CPCs apply to both Mariner East 1 service
    and to Mariner East 2 service, as it is an authorized expansion of the same service.”
    11
    42 U.S.C. § 60502.
    12
    Condemnee’s counsel in the instant appeal, Michael F. Faherty, Esquire, also represented
    the condemnees in Sunoco I.
    9
    Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1017
    (original bold emphasis omitted; bold emphasis added).
    Thus, the Sunoco I Court held that the trial court
    did not err when it concluded that ‘PUC regulated intrastate
    shipments of NGL[s,]’ including service provided by
    Mariner East 2, and that ‘[a]s a result, [Sunoco] has the
    power of eminent domain to condemn property for the
    construction of [Mariner East 2].’ ([Sunoco I Trial Ct.]
    Op. at 4.)
    
    Id. at 1017
    (original bold emphasis omitted; bold emphasis added). The Sunoco I
    Court further held “that the record establishes that the expanded service to be
    provided by the Mariner East 2 pipeline will involve both interstate service
    (subject to FERC regulation) and intrastate service (subject to [the] PUC[’s]
    regulation) . . . . ” 
    Id. at 1015
    (original bold emphasis omitted; bold emphasis
    added).
    Because this Court’s Sunoco I decision controls our analysis of this
    issue, we hold that the trial court here properly held that Mariner East 2 is both an
    intrastate and interstate pipeline dually regulated by the PUC and FERC.
    B. Public Utility
    Condemnee further argues that the trial court erred by finding that
    Sunoco is a public utility, since Mariner East 2 “is in interstate commerce and not for
    the public.” Condemnee Br. at 8, 29. Because Condemnee failed to raise this issue in
    its Preliminary Objections, it is waived. See In re Condemnation of Land for the S. E.
    Cent. Bus. Dist. Redevelopment Area #1, 
    946 A.2d 1143
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
    Notwithstanding, the Sunoco I condemnees likewise argued before the
    Cumberland County Common Pleas Court that Sunoco failed to demonstrate a public
    need for the Mariner East 2 pipeline. Therein, the condemnees contended that the
    PUC’s approval of a service is only a preliminary step, and it was the responsibility
    10
    of the trial court in an eminent domain proceeding to review the public need and to
    make a determination of the scope and validity of the condemnation for the Mariner
    East 2 pipeline. 
    Id. at 1017
    .
    As to the PUC’s jurisdiction, this Court in Sunoco I stated:
    [T[he Code charges [the] PUC with responsibility to
    determine which entities are public utilities and to regulate
    how public utilities provide public utility service. This has
    long been the statutory mandate. See, e.g., Pottsville Union
    Traction Co. v. P[a.] Pub[.] Serv[.] Comm’n, 
    67 Pa. Super. 301
    (1917). It is beyond purview that the General
    Assembly intended [the] PUC to have statewide jurisdiction
    over public utilities and to foreclose local public utility
    regulation. Duquesne Light Co. v. Monroeville Borough,
    
    298 A.2d 252
    (Pa. 1972).
    Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1017
    . The Sunoco I Court further explained:
    The Eminent Domain Code does not permit common pleas
    to review the public need for a proposed service by a public
    utility that has been authorized by PUC through the
    issuance of a CPC. In Fairview Water Co. v. Public Utility
    Comm[ission], . . . 
    502 A.2d 162
    ([Pa.] 1985), our Supreme
    Court discussed the proper forum for a condemnee’s
    challenge to the legality of a taking when a public utility
    attempts to condemn an easement and [the] PUC has
    determined that condemnee’s property is necessary for the
    utility service. The case stemmed from a dispute between
    Fairview and a power company over the power company’s
    continuing use of an easement previously agreed to by the
    parties. 
    Id. at 163.
    The power company filed an application
    with [the] PUC requesting a finding and determination that
    its transmission line was necessary and proper for the
    service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the
    public. A PUC Administrative Law Judge determined that
    the service was necessary and proper and also determined
    the scope and validity of the easement. This court affirmed.
    On appeal, Fairview argued that [the] PUC lacked
    jurisdiction to determine the scope and validity of the
    easement. 
    Id. at 163-64.
    The Supreme Court agreed and
    stated: ‘[o]nce there has been a determination by the PUC
    that the proposed service is necessary and proper, the issues
    11
    of scope and validity and damages must be determined by a
    Court of Common Pleas exercising equity jurisdiction.’ 
    Id. at 167.
    As Sunoco here holds CPCs issued by [the] PUC
    and [the] PUC in its [o]rders issuing the CPCs found the
    authorized service to be necessary and proper, it is left to
    common pleas to evaluate scope and validity of the
    easement, but not the public need.
    As illustrated by Fairview, determinations of public need
    for a proposed utility service are made by [the] PUC, not
    the courts. Section 1103 of the Code requires an applicant
    for a CPC to establish that the proposed service is
    ‘necessary or proper for the service, accommodation,
    convenience, or safety of the public.’ 66 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a).
    Under this section, the applicant must ‘demonstrate a public
    need or demand for the proposed service . . . .’ Chester
    Water Auth. v. Pub[.] Util[.] Comm’n, 
    868 A.2d 384
    , 386
    ([Pa.] 2005) (emphasis added).[]
    Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1018-19
    (footnote and emphasis omitted).
    Accordingly, based upon this Court’s ruling on this precise issue in
    Sunoco I, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion in this case that
    even if this objection were not waived, . . . the
    determination as to whether a particular service by a public
    utility will be in the public’s interest is a determination to
    be made by the . . . PUC. In determining whether to grant
    CPCs, the PUC investigates and determines whether a
    company will be acting in the interest of the public. As to
    the public benefit of the Mariner East [P]roject, the PUC
    has ruled on multiple occasions that the project is in the
    public interest. See, e.g. Condemnor’s Ex[.] 4 at 10;
    Condemnor’s Ex[.] 6[] at 4.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 13. Accordingly, the trial court’s reasoning is consistent with Sunoco
    I, and it properly concluded that Sunoco is a public utility.
    C. Eminent Domain
    Condemnee next argues that the trial court erred by finding that Sunoco
    has eminent domain powers for Mariner East 2 because its corporate resolution
    12
    authorized an interstate pipeline, and Sunoco seeks to condemn for two pipelines
    when it only asserts the need for one.13 We disagree.
    As previously described, in the public utility context, an
    entity must meet separate but related requirements set forth
    in both the BCL and the Code to be a public utility
    corporation clothed with the power of eminent domain.
    Section 1511(a)(2) of the BCL provides that ‘public utility
    corporations’ may exercise the power of eminent domain to
    condemn property for the transportation of, inter alia,
    natural gas and petroleum products. Section 1103 of the
    BCL defines public utility corporation as ‘[a]ny domestic or
    foreign corporation for profit that . . . is subject to
    regulation as a public utility by the [PUC] . . . .’ 15 Pa. C.S.
    § 1103. Section 1104 of the Code requires that a public
    utility must possess a CPC issued by [the] PUC pursuant to
    Section 1101 of the Code before exercising eminent
    domain. While courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to
    review whether an entity attempting to exercise eminent
    domain power meets the BCL criteria, that jurisdiction does
    not include the authority to revisit PUC adjudications. A
    CPC issued by [the] PUC is prima facie evidence that
    [the] PUC has determined that there is a public need for
    the proposed service and that the holder is clothed with
    the eminent domain power.
    Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1017
    -18 (emphasis added).
    Specific to the PUC orders issued regarding the Mariner East Project, the
    Sunoco I Court noted that the PUC’s July 24, 2014 order found that intrastate pipeline
    service proposed by Sunoco would result in “numerous potential public benefits” by
    allowing Sunoco “to immediately address the need for uninterrupted deliveries of
    propane in Pennsylvania and to ensure that there is adequate pipeline capacity to meet
    peak demand for propane during the winter heating season.” 
    Id. at 1019.
    The Court
    further noted that in its August 21, 2014 order authorizing the provision of intrastate
    13
    The Sunoco I condemnee made the same arguments to the trial court, but did not develop
    the corporate resolution argument on appeal to this Court. See Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1011
    ; see also
    
    id. at 1014
    n.16.
    13
    petroleum and refined petroleum products pipeline transportation service in
    Washington County, the PUC stated that:
    [W]e believe that approval of this Application is necessary
    and proper for the service, accommodation, and
    convenience of the public. We believe granting Sunoco
    authority to commence intrastate transportation of
    propane in Washington County will enhance delivery
    options for the transport of natural gas and natural gas
    liquids in Pennsylvania. In the wake of the propane
    shortage experienced in 2014, Sunoco’s proposed service
    will increase the supply of propane in markets with a
    demand for these resources, including in Pennsylvania,
    ensuring that Pennsylvania’s citizens enjoy access to
    propane heating fuel. Additionally, the proposed service
    will offer a safer and more economic transportation
    alternative for shippers to existing rail and trucking
    services.
    
    Id. The Court
    held that “there is no basis for a common pleas court to
    review a PUC determination of public need,” and that “to allow such review would
    permit collateral attacks on PUC decisions and be contrary to Section 763 of the
    Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 763, which places review of PUC decisions within the
    jurisdiction of this Court.” 
    Id. Accordingly, this
    Court concluded in Sunoco I that
    Sunoco holds a CPC issued by the PUC for Mariner East 2, it “is clothed with the
    eminent domain power.” 
    Id. at 1018.
                Relative to Sunoco’s corporate resolution, the trial court ruled:
    [Section 1511(g)(2) of the BCL,] 15 Pa.C.S. [§]
    1511(g)(2)[,] provides, in relevant part, that a petition for
    approval and order filing bond ‘shall be accompanied by the
    bond and a certified copy of the resolution of
    condemnation. The resolution shall describe the nature and
    extent of the taking.’ 
    Id. We find
    that the Resolution[] to
    Condemn submitted by Sunoco satisfy the requirements of
    [Section] 1511 [of the BCL]. Contrary to Condemnee[’s]
    Preliminary Objection, the Resolution[] do[es] not specify
    14
    that [it is] for an interstate pipeline, [r]ather, [it] state[s] that
    [it is] for the Mariner East 2 Project, which as noted above,
    we have found to be both an interstate and intrastate
    pipeline. The Resolution[] further specif[ies] that [it]
    cover[s] Lebanon County and specifically identif[ies] the
    subject [Property] and the extent of the easements sought on
    [the Property]. We therefore find that [the Resolution is]
    sufficiently specific to authorize the condemnation[] . . . .
    Trial Ct. Op. at 8. Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the trial court
    properly determined that Sunoco’s corporate resolution authorized the Property’s
    condemnation. See R.R. at 887a-892a. Further, since “determinations of public need
    for a proposed utility service are made by [the] PUC, not the courts[,]” neither the
    trial court nor this Court may assess whether Sunoco, in fact, needs one or two
    pipelines for Mariner East 2.14 Sunoco 
    I, 143 A.3d at 1019
    . Accordingly, the trial
    court’s reasoning, consistent with Sunoco I, properly concluded that Sunoco has
    eminent domain powers for Mariner East 2.
    D. Collateral Estoppel
    Lastly, Condemnee argues that the trial court erred by finding that the
    Loper decision denying Sunoco eminent domain power does not compel the same
    result in this case. We disagree.
    The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an
    issue where a question of law or fact essential to a judgment
    was actually litigated and determined by a court of
    competent jurisdiction. Collateral estoppel applies only
    when the issue decided in the prior case and the issue
    presented in the current case are identical; there was a final
    judgment on the merits; the issue was essential to the
    judgment; the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a
    full and fair chance to litigate the merits; and the party
    14
    Since Condemnee expressly objected to Sunoco’s need for two pipelines in Objection 5
    (see R.R. at 925a), there is no merit to Sunoco’s argument (see Sunoco Br. at 4) that the issue was
    waived.
    15
    against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity
    with a party in the prior case.
    Foster v. Colonial Assur. Co., 
    668 A.2d 174
    , 180-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (citation
    omitted), aff’d, 
    673 A.2d 922
    (Pa. 1996).
    The condemnees in Sunoco I similarly argued that Sunoco’s declarations
    of taking were barred by collateral estoppel based on Loper. At issue in Loper was
    whether Sunoco satisfied the definition of “public utility corporation” in the BCL, as
    a result of the regulation of its interstate service by FERC. However, at the time
    Loper was decided, Sunoco had not yet sought or obtained PUC approval to provide
    intrastate service. Thus, the Loper court addressed only whether Sunoco was a public
    utility corporation because it was subject to regulation as a public utility by an officer
    or agency of the United States, i.e., FERC, and did not decide whether Sunoco was a
    public utility corporation because it was subject to regulation as a public utility by the
    PUC.
    However, the Sunoco I Court found that, subsequent to the Loper
    decision and after the polar vortex in 2013-14, Sunoco repurposed Mariner East 2 to
    be both an interstate pipeline, as well as an intrastate pipeline subject to PUC
    regulation. Sunoco filed its declarations of taking in Cumberland County as a public
    utility corporation subject to regulation as a public utility by the PUC. As the
    question before the trial court and on appeal to this Court was whether Sunoco was
    subject to regulation as a public utility by the PUC because the Mariner East 2
    pipeline was also an intrastate service, we concluded that the issue decided in Loper
    was not the same as in Sunoco I, and hence that collateral estoppel did not bar
    Sunoco’s declarations of taking.
    Here, as it did in Sunoco I, Sunoco presented evidence that, after Loper
    was decided, an intrastate component was added to the Mariner East Project in the
    form of on-ramps and off-ramps within Pennsylvania, thus, providing for the PUC’s
    16
    regulation. In finding that the Loper decision does not bar the instant case, the trial
    court reasoned:
    Relying upon Loper as the basis for the application of
    collateral estoppel in the instant case, Condemnee[] cannot
    meet [its] burden, as there have been subsequent, significant
    changes to the character of the Mariner East 2 Project in the
    two years since Judge Linebaugh’s ruling. At the time
    Loper was decided, the Mariner East 2 [P]roject was
    intended to be only an interstate pipeline, one which crossed
    Pennsylvania state lines but contained no stations for the
    on-loading and off-loading of transported materials within
    state lines. Thus, Loper only addressed whether Sunoco
    had condemnation authority under federal law for what
    was then a purely interstate pipeline. Since that time, in
    response to market conditions, Sunoco has designated,
    with [the] PUC[’s] approval, Mariner East 2 as both an
    intrastate as well as an interstate pipeline. N.T. at 69-70,
    79, 104-105, 143. Therefore, the facts of Loper are
    inapposite to those of the instant case[], and the decision
    cannot be the basis of Condemnee[’s] assertion of collateral
    estoppel.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).15 Based upon the PUC’s
    approvals of Mariner East 2 as both an intrastate and interstate pipeline since Loper
    15
    The Sunoco I Court similarly held:
    [The trial court] did not err in finding that collateral estoppel does not
    bar this action. The issue decided in Loper is not the same issue
    raised in this case, and so it does not meet the first condition. At issue
    in Loper was whether Sunoco satisfied the definition of public utility
    corporation as a result of the regulation of its interstate service by
    FERC and not as a result of PUC’s regulation of its intrastate service.
    At the time Loper was decided, Sunoco had not yet sought or
    obtained [the] PUC[’s] approval to provide intrastate service. . . .
    The Loper court addressed only whether Sunoco was a public utility
    corporation because it was subject to regulation as a public utility by
    an officer or agency of the United States, i.e., FERC, and did not
    decide whether Sunoco was a public utility corporation because it was
    subject to regulation as a public utility by [the] PUC, the issue raised
    here. Although [the c]ondemnees disagree that Sunoco can prevail on
    17
    was decided, we agree that the issues in the two cases are not identical and, thus,
    consistent with Sunoco I, the trial court properly concluded that collateral estoppel
    does not compel a different result.
    III. Conclusion
    Because we discern no error in the trial court’s determinations pertaining
    to the dual regulation of Sunoco’s Mariner East 2 project by the PUC and FERC,
    Sunoco’s status as a public utility, Sunoco’s eminent domain powers and collateral
    estoppel, and these issues are directly controlled by this Court’s Sunoco I decision
    with which the trial court’s decision is in accord, we affirm the trial court’s order
    overruling Condemnee’s Preliminary Objections to Sunoco’s Declaration.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    this issue that is a separate inquiry from whether the issue was
    previously decided. For these reasons, we agree that collateral
    estoppel is not a bar to this case.
    
    Id. at 1015
    (emphasis added).
    18
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    In Re: Condemnation by                  :
    Sunoco Pipeline L.P. of                 :
    Permanent and Temporary                 :
    Rights of Way for the                   :
    Transportation of Ethane,               :
    Propane, Liquid Petroleum               :
    Gas, and other Petroleum                :
    Products in the Township of             :
    Heidelberg, Lebanon County,             :
    Pennsylvania, over the Lands            :
    of Homes for America, Inc.              :
    :
    :   No. 565 C.D. 2016
    Appeal of: Homes for America, Inc.      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2017, the Lebanon County Common
    Pleas Court’s March 24, 2016 order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    In Re: Condemnation by Sunoco              :
    Pipeline L.P. of Permanent and             :
    Temporary Rights of Way for the            :
    Transportation of Ethane, Propane,         :
    Liquid Petroleum Gas, and Other            :
    Petroleum Products in the Township         :
    of Heidelberg, Lebanon County,             :
    Pennsylvania, over the Lands of            :
    Homes for America, Inc.                    :
    :   No. 565 C.D. 2016
    Appeal of: Homes for America, Inc.         :   Submitted: September 30, 2016
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    DISSENTING OPINION
    BY JUDGE COSGROVE                              FILED: May 24, 2017
    For the reasons set forth in my dissent in In Re: Condemnation by
    Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. (Gerhart Appeal), (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 220 C.D. 2016, filed
    May 15, 2017), I dissent here as well.
    ___________________________
    JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: In Re: Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P. ~Appeal of: Homes for America, Inc. - 565 C.D. 2016

Judges: Covey, J. ~ Dissenting Opinion by Cosgrove, J.

Filed Date: 5/24/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/24/2017