PSP v. ACLU of PA ( 2021 )


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  •          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Pennsylvania State Police,              :
    Petitioner           :
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    American Civil Liberties                :
    Union of Pennsylvania,                  :   No. 1066 C.D. 2017
    Respondent            :   Submitted: June 4, 2021
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                     FILED: November 17, 2021
    This case is before us on remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
    which directed that in reviewing the Final Determination of the Office of Open
    Records (OOR), we are to consider the entire record that was before the OOR,
    including conducting an in camera review of an unredacted document sought by
    Respondent, the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (Requester) from
    Petitioner, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). After an in camera review of the
    document at issue, we vacate the OOR’s Final Determination directing disclosure of
    the unredacted document and remand to the OOR for further proceedings.
    I. Background
    Our detailed statement of facts and legal analysis in this matter are set
    forth in full in our previous opinion. See Pa. State Police v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union
    of Pa. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1066 C.D. 2017, filed May 18, 2018), 
    2018 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 275
     (unreported) (ACLU-I), vacated, 
    232 A.3d 654
     (Pa. 2020)
    (ACLU-II). We repeat here only those portions necessary to our decision on remand.
    Requester submitted a record request to PSP pursuant to the Right-to-
    Know Law (RTKL)1 seeking “a copy, in digital format, of [PSP]’s complete,
    un[]redacted AR 6-9 regulation, which establishes policies and procedures for PSP
    personnel when using social media monitoring software.” Reproduced Record
    (R.R.) at 2a. PSP provided a heavily redacted copy of the requested document, titled
    “Real-Time Open-Source-Based Investigations and Research,” R.R. at 7a-15a,
    asserting that the redacted portions were exempt from disclosure under Section
    708(b)(2) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(2), because disclosure of the
    information would be reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.2
    R.R. at 3a-4a.
    Requester filed an appeal with OOR. Before OOR, PSP argued that
    release of the requested information would allow individuals with nefarious motives
    1
    Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
    2
    Section 708(b)(2) of the RTKL, known as the public safety exemption, protects
    [a] record maintained by an agency in connection with the military,
    homeland security, national defense, law enforcement or other
    public safety activity that, if disclosed, would be reasonably likely
    to jeopardize or threaten public safety or preparedness or public
    protection activity or a record that is designated classified by an
    appropriate Federal or State military authority.
    65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(2).
    2
    to more easily conceal their criminal activity and evade police scrutiny. See R.R. at
    29a-30a. PSP submitted an affidavit from its Director of the Bureau of Criminal
    Investigation (BCI), Major Douglas J. Burig. See R.R. at 31a-34a. In his affidavit,
    Major Burig addressed each redacted section of AR 6-9, explaining its nature and
    asserting that disclosure could jeopardize an investigation. See id.
    Requester challenged Major Burig’s affidavit, arguing that it failed to
    link each section’s redactions to reasonable public safety concerns. See R.R. at 36a-
    39a. After reviewing an unredacted copy of AR 6-9 in camera, the OOR Appeals
    Officer found that “the threats outlined in PSP’s affidavit simply do not match the
    text of the policy.” Br. of Pet’r, App. A (Final Determination) at 9. Ultimately,
    therefore, the OOR Appeals Officer concluded that the redacted information was not
    reasonably likely to jeopardize public safety and hence was not exempt from
    disclosure. Final Determination at 10. OOR ordered PSP to provide Requester with
    unredacted copies of all responsive records within 30 days. PSP then petitioned this
    Court for review.
    In ACLU-I, this Court reviewed Major Burig’s affidavit, but we did not
    conduct our own in camera review of the unredacted document. Id., slip op. at 7-
    13. We concluded that the affidavit was sufficiently detailed to sustain PSP’s burden
    of proof, in that it “(i) described the nature of the records sought; (ii) connected the
    nature of AR 6-9 to the reasonable likelihood that disclosure would threaten public
    safety and impair PSP’s public safety function; and (iii) noted that disclosure would
    allow certain individuals to more easily conceal their criminal activities and evade
    police scrutiny.” ACLU-I, slip op. at 12 (citing Carey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    61 A.3d 367
    , 376 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). We concluded that an in camera review was
    “unnecessary given the detailed nature of Major Burig’s [a]ffidavit . . . .” ACLU-I,
    3
    slip op. at 13. We also relied on the fact “that Requester conceded at oral argument
    that this Court could decide this matter without conducting an in camera review.”
    Id.; see generally ACLU-II. Further, we reasoned that the situation presented here
    was not analogous to those where courts typically view unredacted documents in
    camera. 
    Id.
    After granting allocatur, our Supreme Court vacated our decision in
    ACLU-II and remanded the matter to this Court for further proceedings. The Court
    specifically directed us to conduct an in camera review of the unredacted AR 6-9 on
    remand.
    II. Discussion
    In his affidavit, Major Burig attested that the regulation at issue
    “concerns investigative and intelligence gathering policies, procedures, and
    methods.” R.R. at 32a. He explained that the redactions were made “because public
    release of these sections would jeopardize PSP’s ability to conduct criminal
    investigations and other law enforcement activities it engages in to protect the
    public.” 
    Id.
     Major Burig then separately stated PSP’s reason for each redaction.
    We review the OOR’s determinations regarding each of Major Burig’s specific
    assertions in light of our in camera review.
    PSP redacted the entirety of Section 9.03 of AR 6-9 except for the
    heading, “Utilization of Real-Time Open Sources[3] as an Investigative Tool.” R.R.
    3
    Open-source intelligence “is an important tool law enforcement agencies can use to
    guide an investigation. [It] encompasses a wealth of publicly available information, from
    traditional print publications to today’s vast array of digital media outlets.”
    https://www.police1.com/investigations/articles/using-webint-and-osint-to-tackle-extremist-
    groups-Fvy2So5OzaAoNLTC/#:~:text=OSINT%2C%20or%20open-
    source%20intelligence%2C%20is%20an%20important%20tool,can%20gather%20a%20multitud
    e%20of%20leads%20through%20OSINT (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
    4
    at 8a-10a. Major Burig stated that this section describes how investigating PSP
    Troopers are to use open sources during an investigation, when they may and may
    not use open sources, and when they may want to use alternative methods. 
    Id.
     at
    32a. Major Burig posited that disclosure would allow individuals to undermine
    investigations and would disadvantage PSP because individuals would know when
    PSP can monitor their activities using open sources and could use that information
    to conceal their activities. 
    Id.
     The OOR Appeals Officer, on the other hand, found
    that “[t]he text of the prohibitions and authorizations within this section [] is broad,
    in contrast with the narrow scope of the prohibitions, and the prohibitions are based
    on known law.” Final Adjudication at 6-7.
    Our review of Section 9.03 reveals that it lists the categories of valid
    law enforcement purposes for which monitoring may be employed and includes
    limitations to assure compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements.
    However, the text of Section 9.03 and the description and statements in the affidavit
    concerning the risks arising from disclosure are insufficient to allow us to determine
    whether disclosure of the text of Section 9.03 could reasonably be expected to aid
    criminals in evading detection of illegal activities.        Accordingly, we cannot
    determine from the current record whether disclosure of this section would be
    reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.
    PSP redacted the entirety of Section 9.04 of AR 6-9 except for the
    heading, “Authorization to Access Real-Time Open Sources and/or Real-Time Open
    Source Networks.” R.R. at 10a-11a. Major Burig stated that this section describes
    when a Trooper must obtain a supervisor’s approval in an investigation and what
    steps may be taken to further that investigation, including the approval process to
    establish a specific investigative method. 
    Id.
     at 32a. Major Burig posited that
    5
    disclosure would expose the specific investigative method and allow those involved
    in criminal activity to impede investigations. 
    Id.
    Our review indicates that this section states when a supervisor’s
    authorization is needed for on-line investigations and the purposes for which an
    investigator may use an on-line alias. Like Section 9.03, however, the text of Section
    9.04 and the description and statements in the affidavit concerning the risks arising
    from disclosure are insufficient to allow us to determine whether disclosure of the
    text of Section 9.04 could reasonably be expected to aid criminals in evading
    detection of illegal activities. Accordingly, we cannot determine from the current
    record whether disclosure of this section would be reasonably likely to threaten
    public safety or preparedness.
    PSP redacted the entirety of Section 9.05 of AR 6-9, except for the
    heading, “Authorization Procedures for the Use of Online Aliases and Online
    Undercover Activity.” R.R. at 11a-13a. Major Burig explained this section concerns
    PSP’s ability to use open sources in an undercover capacity and provides policies,
    procedures, and operational details regarding undercover activity. 
    Id.
     at 33a. He
    stated that this information would provide criminals with tactics PSP uses when
    conducting undercover investigations, thereby jeopardizing PSP’s investigations
    and ability to catch individuals. 
    Id.
    Our review of Section 9.05 reveals that it states the forms required and
    the procedures to be followed in documenting approval for using and altering aliases
    and conducting on-line investigations. Like Section 9.03, Section 9.05 includes
    some limitations to assure compliance with statutory and constitutional
    requirements. However, the text of Section 9.05 and the description and statements
    in the affidavit concerning the risks arising from disclosure are insufficient to allow
    6
    us to determine whether disclosure of the text of Section 9.05 could reasonably be
    expected to aid criminals in evading detection of illegal activities. Accordingly, we
    cannot determine from the current record whether disclosure of this section would
    be reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.
    PSP redacted the entirety of Sections 9.06, 9.07 and 9.08, except for the
    headings “Deconfliction,” “Utilizing Real-Time Open Source Monitoring Tools,”
    and “Source Reliability and Content,” respectively, as well as Subsection C of
    Section 9.09, which appears under the heading “Documentation and Retention.”
    R.R. at 14a-15a. Major Burig explained that these sections contain information
    regarding when an investigation may be terminated, situations in which to use open
    source methods, and procedures used to verify the information obtained. 
    Id.
     at 33a.
    He stated that disclosure of this information would reveal how PSP conducts its
    investigations using open sources, thereby jeopardizing PSP’s ability to conduct
    such investigations in the future. 
    Id.
    Our review reveals that Section 9.06 provides for avoiding duplication in
    the use of aliases. Section 9.07 authorizes use of real-time open source monitoring
    when appropriate. Section 9.08 requires corroboration of information obtained by the
    use of such monitoring. Section 9.09, including Subsection 9.09C, governs retention
    of information obtained from such monitoring and is general in nature. However,
    the text of these sections and the descriptions and statements in the affidavit
    concerning the risks arising from their disclosure are insufficient to allow us to
    determine whether disclosure of the text of these sections could reasonably be expected
    to aid criminals in evading detection of illegal activities or to aid unacceptable
    candidates in hiding unfavorable background information. Accordingly, we cannot
    7
    determine from the current record whether disclosure of these sections would be
    reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.
    PSP redacted the entirety of Section 9.10 of AR 6-9, except for the
    heading, “Utilization of Real-Time Open Sources for Employment Background
    Investigations.” R.R. at 15a. Major Burig explained that PSP conducts background
    investigations on employees and may use open sources to determine whether a
    candidate for Trooper is suitable for employment. 
    Id.
     at 33a. He stated that the
    information was redacted because it would jeopardize PSP’s ability to hire qualified
    individuals and that disclosure would reveal the specific information that may be
    reviewed to determine whether a candidate is suitable for employment. 
    Id.
     He
    further explained that PSP takes steps to ensure candidates are suitable for
    employment in order to protect the public and the “Department.” 
    Id.
    Like most of the other sections of AR 6-9, Section 9.10 contains
    provisions allowing background investigations of candidates for employment and
    includes limitations to assure compliance with statutory and constitutional
    requirements. However, the text of Section 9.10 and the description and statements
    in the affidavit concerning the risks arising from disclosure are insufficient to allow
    us to determine whether disclosure of the text of Section 9.10 could reasonably be
    expected to aid criminals in evading detection of illegal activities or to aid
    unacceptable    candidates   in   hiding   unfavorable     background     information.
    Accordingly, we cannot determine from the current record whether disclosure of this
    section would be reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.
    Major Burig also addressed Section 9.02 of AR 6-9, entitled
    “Definitions,” under which some of the terms and their definitions were redacted.
    R.R. at 7a. Major Burig stated that disclosure of the redacted language would
    8
    provide insight into how PSP conducts an investigation and what sources and
    methods it would use. 
    Id.
     at 33a.
    However, our review of the text of Section 9.02 and the description and
    statements in the affidavit concerning the risks arising from disclosure are
    insufficient to allow us to determine whether disclosure of the redacted language in
    this section would be reasonably likely to threaten public safety or preparedness.
    In general, is it the burden of the party resisting disclosure to establish
    that an exemption from the RTKL applies. See Pa. State Police v. Muller, 
    124 A.3d 761
    , 766 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). However, where the subject matter of a request
    involves public safety or security, such as in police matters, careful consideration of
    a complete record is especially important, and supplementation of the record, if
    necessary, is appropriate. For example, in Carey, the requester sought information
    concerning inmate transfers. 
    61 A.3d at 370
    . The OOR denied the request pursuant
    to the public safety exception:
    As to whether the disclosure would threaten public safety,
    the OOR considered the affidavit submitted by [the
    Department of Corrections (DOC)]. That affidavit
    attested that the responsive records would reveal the
    names of DOC officials responsible for transfers, and
    reveal security and logistical procedures to transfer
    custody of inmates. These revelations would allow
    interference with DOC security measures and thus
    threaten DOC, inmate and general public safety.
    
    Id. at 371
    . DOC presented an affidavit from its Director of the Office of Population
    Management, who opined, inter alia, that “disclosing responsive records would
    foster retaliation against DOC and jeopardize the security of future transfers, and
    allow inmates to manipulate the eligibility assessment for transfer.” 
    Id. at 375
    . On
    review, this Court concluded DOC’s affidavit failed to explain which requested
    9
    records were protected from disclosure, failed to connect the responsive records with
    a threat to public safety, and failed to explain how disclosure of the requested
    information would be likely to impair transfers. 
    Id. at 377
    . Notwithstanding DOC’s
    failure to sustain its burden of proof, however, we declined to decide the case on that
    basis, determining that “the records relate to prison operations, heightening the risk
    associated with disclosure. Without more information, we would be remiss in
    deciding this case on the current record.” 
    Id.
     We observed that “[w]hen security-
    related exemptions are asserted in the police or prison context, and responsive
    records implicate valid security concerns, and an agency’s proof is insufficient to
    discern the contents of responsive records, seeking additional evidence may be
    appropriate.” Id.; see also Delaware Cnty. v. Schaefer, 
    45 A.3d 1149
    , 1158-59 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2012) (remanding for additional evidence where existing record did not
    permit determination of whether disclosure of requested information would pose risk
    to personal security); Commonwealth v. Rudberg, 
    32 A.3d 877
    , 882 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2011) (court’s broad scope of review authorizes remand to OOR where necessary to
    supplement the record); Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. A Second Chance,
    Inc., 
    13 A.3d 1025
    , 1040 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (remanding for additional evidence
    where, although parties were not prevented from presenting evidence initially,
    information request implicating physical safety and personal security issues was “a
    serious matter that deserve[d] thoughtful consideration on a complete record”); cf.
    Muller, 
    124 A.3d at 766
     (declining to allow supplementation of record where PSP
    had not “articulated any security related, public safety, or like considerations that
    favor supplementation”).
    Here, although PSP was afforded an opportunity to present an affidavit
    in support of nondisclosure, and despite Major Burig’s effort to be as explicit as
    10
    possible in explaining the risks of disclosing the full text of AR 6-9, the affidavit is
    insufficient to connect the text of AR 6-9 with the risks he articulates. However, we
    recognize that an affiant may walk a fine line in attempting to offer sufficient
    specificity to describe such risks without effectively divulging the contents of the
    documents at issue. Moreover, as in Carey, “[w]hen security-related [exemptions]
    are asserted in the police or prison context, and responsive records implicate valid
    security concerns, and an agency’s proof is insufficient to discern the contents of
    responsive records, seeking additional evidence may be appropriate.” 
    61 A.3d at 377
    . Accordingly, in this instance, because additional development of the record is
    necessary, we conclude that PSP should be given a further opportunity to explain the
    nature and degree of the risks it claims are inherent in potential disclosure of the
    contents of AR 6-9. See id.; Schaefer, 
    45 A.3d at 1158-59
    ; Rudberg, 
    32 A.3d at 882
    ;
    A Second Chance, 
    13 A.3d at 1040
    .
    III. Conclusion
    Our in camera review of AR 6-9 and Major Burig’s attestation were
    insufficient to allow us to determine whether disclosure of all provisions of AR 6-9
    would provide specific tactical information that could reasonably be expected to aid
    criminals in evading detection of illegal activities.   Accordingly, we conclude that
    further development of the record is required. Therefore, we vacate the OOR’s Final
    Determination and remand this matter to the OOR for further supplementation of the
    record, including an evidentiary hearing, and issuance of a new determination.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    11
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Pennsylvania State Police,                  :
    Petitioner               :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    American Civil Liberties                    :
    Union of Pennsylvania,                      :   No. 1066 C.D. 2017
    Respondent                      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2021 the Final Determination
    of the Office of Open Records (OOR) is VACATED, and this matter is
    REMANDED to the OOR for further supplementation of the record, including an
    evidentiary hearing, and a new determination.
    Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge