T.W. Wojnarowski v. J.E. Wetzel, Sec'y. of the DOC ( 2021 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Thomas W. Wojnarowski,                       :
    :
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                          : No. 440 M.D. 2020
    : Submitted: February 12, 2021
    John E. Wetzel, Secretary of the             :
    Department of Corrections, SCI-              :
    Somerset, Business Manager,                  :
    Records Supervisor, Warden                   :
    Chief Counsel DOC, Westmoreland              :
    County Clerk of Courts,                      :
    Westmoreland Common Pleas                    :
    Court,                                       :
    :
    Respondents      :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                           FILED: December 6, 2021
    Before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, are Respondents’1
    Preliminary Objections (POs) to the Petition for Review (PFR) filed by Thomas W.
    Wojnarowski (Wojnarowski) seeking to enjoin Respondents from withdrawing
    funds from his inmate account pursuant to Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing
    1
    The named Respondents are John E. Wetzel, Secretary of the Department of Corrections
    (Department); State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Somerset Business Manager, SCI-Somerset
    Records Supervisor, SCI-Somerset Warden, and Chief Counsel of the Department (collectively,
    Department); Westmoreland County Clerk of Courts (County Clerk), and the Westmoreland
    County Court of Common Pleas (Sentencing Court).
    Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(5), commonly referred to as Act 84.2 For the reasons
    that follow, we sustain Respondents’ POs in the nature of demurrer and dismiss the
    PFR.
    I. Facts Averred
    Wojnarowski, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional
    Institution (SCI) at Laurel Highlands,3 initiated this action by filing a pro se PFR
    against Respondents challenging the collection of court-ordered fines, costs, and
    restitution from his inmate account.
    According to the facts averred in the PFR and the exhibits attached
    thereto,4 by order dated December 12, 2007, the Sentencing Court sentenced
    2
    Section 9728 was added to the Sentencing Code by the Act of June 18, 1988, P.L. 640,
    No. 84. “[Act 84] provides a procedure for [the Department] to collect fines and court costs for
    which a defendant is liable pursuant to a previous court order.” Freemore v. Pennsylvania
    Department of Corrections, 
    231 A.3d 33
    , 35 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quoting Russell v. Donnelly,
    
    827 A.2d 535
    , 537 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)).
    3
    When Wojnarowski instituted this action, he was an inmate at SCI-Somerset. By letter
    dated June 21, 2021, Wojnarowski notified the Court that he was transferred to SCI-Laurel
    Highlands.
    4
    Wojnarowski attached the following Exhibits to his PFR: (1) Collection of Inmate Debts
    (1/18/08); (2) Inmate Request to Staff Member (8/1/19); (3) Inmate Request to Staff Member
    (8/5/19); (4) Sentencing Order (12/12/07); (5)-(6) Court Commitment Form (12/20/07); (7)
    Sentence & Order for Taxing Costs (12/12/07); (8) Inmate Account (1/18/08); (9) Westmoreland
    County Court of Common Pleas Docket No. CP-65-CR-0004187-2006; (10) Letter to County
    Clerk (3/27/12); (11)-(12) Itemized Account of Fines, Costs, Fees, and Restitution (2/3/09); (13)
    Somerset County Prothonotary Civil Case Print (7/14/20); (14) Wojnarowski v. Wetzel (C.P.
    Somerset, No. 349 Civil 2020, filed July 14, 2020) (memorandum and order transferring the case
    to this Court); and (15) Complaint Cover Sheet for Wojnarowski v. Wetzel (C.P. Somerset, No.
    349 Civil 2020, filed July 2, 2020).
    Additionally, Wojnarowski attached the following exhibits to his brief, some of which were
    already attached as exhibits to the PFR: (1)-(5) Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    2
    Wojnarowski to a term of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration at Westmoreland County
    Court of Common Pleas Docket No. (Docket No.) CP-65-CR-0004187-2006. PFR,
    at 5 and Exhibit Nos. 4, 9. As part of the sentence, the Sentencing Court ordered
    Wojnarowski to pay the costs and fines as well as Crime Victims Compensation
    Fund restitution. Prior to his incarceration, Wojnarowski was sentenced to fines and
    costs at Docket Nos. CP-65-CR-0002207-2003, CP-65-SA-0000331-2005 and CP-
    65-CR-00004187-2006. PFR, ¶1, at 5; see Petitioner’s Brief, Exhibit No. 10; see
    also Docket Nos. CP-65-CR-0002207-2003, CP-65-SA-0000331-2005 and CP-65-
    CR-00004187-2006.         Upon his commitment, the County Clerk notified the
    Department that Wojnarowski owed a total of $8,971.42 for unpaid costs, fines, and
    restitution at Docket No. CP-65-CR-0004187-2006. PFR, ¶3 and Exhibit Nos. 5, 8,
    9. Soon thereafter, the Department began making deductions from Wojnarowski’s
    inmate account. PFR, Exhibit No. 2.
    On March 27, 2012, Wojnarowski sent a letter to the County Clerk
    stating that he “was unable to pay fines . . . .” PFR, ¶4. Notwithstanding, the
    Department inmate accounting office continued deducting 20% from his account
    and forwarding it to the County Clerk without Wojnarowski’s authorization or
    consent. PFR, ¶6. As of June 26, 2020, a total of $2,532.90 had been withdrawn
    from his inmate account. PFR, ¶6.
    In January 2008, Wojnarowski sent a request to the Department
    accounting office regarding the deductions. PFR, ¶7. In response, the Department
    sent him a Collection of Inmate Debts letter dated January 18, 2008. PFR, Exhibit
    Docket No. CP-65-SA-0000331-2005; (6)-(9), (11)-(13) Westmoreland County Court of Common
    Pleas Appeal Docket No. CP-65-CR-0004187-2006; (10) Participant Payment Summary (9/3/19);
    (14) Sentencing Order (12/12/07); (15)-(16) Court Commitment Form (12/20/07); (17) Collection
    of Inmate Debts (1/18/08); (18) Inmate Request to Staff Member (8/15/20); (19) Inmate Request
    to Staff Member (8/1/19); and (20) Inmate Request to Staff Member (8/5/19).
    3
    No. 1. The letter advised that the Department would continue to deduct payments
    of 20% from his inmate account in accordance with Department policy. 
    Id.
    In August 2019, Wojnarowski sent two informal requests to the
    Department to discover why the Department was deducting money from his inmate
    account without his authorization. PFR, ¶7 and Exhibit Nos. 2-3. He asked the
    Department to stop making deductions and to provide him with a copy of any and
    all documents from the Sentencing Court authorizing such deductions. PFR, ¶7 and
    Exhibit Nos. 2-3. The Department responded that the money is owed in connection
    with the Sentencing Court orders, and it provided him with a breakdown of charges.
    PFR, ¶8 and Exhibit Nos. 2-3.        On August 19, 2019, Wojnarowski filed an
    administrative grievance, which was denied. PFR, ¶10.
    Wojnarowski now seeks relief in this Court. Wojnarowski’s claims are
    threefold. First, Wojnarowski raises a due process claim on the basis that he was
    never afforded a hearing regarding his financial ability to pay fines, costs, and
    restitution as required by Section 9730(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S.
    §9730(b). PFR, ¶4. Wojnarowski takes issue with the Department’s application of
    funds to satisfy court-ordered costs on his prior convictions without a Section
    9730(b) delinquency hearing. PFR, ¶¶1, 18. Second, Wojnarowski asserts that he
    was not advised that he would be required to pay fines, costs and restitution while
    incarcerated when he entered his plea bargain at Docket No. CP-65-CR-0004187-
    2006. PFR, ¶5. The Sentencing Court’s order does not state that Wojnarowski must
    pay these obligations “while incarcerated.” PFR, ¶4; see PFR, Exhibit No. 4. Third,
    Wojnarowski contends that a deduction in the amount of 20% creates a financial
    burden upon him, which he is unable to afford. PFR, ¶17. Wojnarowski’s only
    source of income is his prison wages in the amount of .17 cents to .32 cents per hour,
    4
    for an average of 30 hours per week, and personal gifts from family and friends.
    PFR, ¶¶5, 17. For relief, Wojnarowski asks this Court to enjoin Respondents from
    taking any further unlawful deductions from his inmate account, order them to
    reimburse all monies illegally deducted, and provide him with a hearing to determine
    his financial ability to make the court-ordered payments from his account.
    In response, the Department, the County Clerk, and the Sentencing
    Court filed separate POs. The Department and the County Clerk Respondents
    similarly demur on the ground that Wojnarowski failed to state a claim upon which
    relief may be granted. They maintain that the Department is authorized to take
    monetary deductions, without a pre-deduction hearing, from Wojnarowski’s inmate
    account to pay the court-ordered costs and restitution because the Sentencing Court’s
    order does not defer the payment of these financial obligations until his release from
    incarceration. The County Clerk additionally objects on the basis that he did not
    receive service of process of the PFR from Wojnarowski.5 The Sentencing Court
    demurs on the ground that the PFR fails to state any claims specifically against it.
    In addition, the Sentencing Court preliminarily objects on the grounds that this Court
    lacks jurisdiction over the actions of the Sentencing Court because there is no
    pending appeal and any potential claims against it are barred by sovereign
    immunity.6 For these reasons, Respondents ask this Court to sustain their POs and
    dismiss Wojnarowski’s PFR.                Wojnarowski filed an answer to the POs.
    Respondents’ POs are now before us for review.
    5
    The County Clerk states that he obtained a copy of the PFR from this Court.
    6
    We note that “[s]overeign immunity is an affirmative defense which ordinarily should be
    raised as new matter[] but may be raised in [POs] when to delay a ruling thereon would serve no
    purpose.” Stackhouse v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
    892 A.2d 54
    , 60 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)
    (citing Faust v. Department of Revenue, 
    592 A.2d 835
    , 838 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991)).
    5
    II. Discussion
    A. Legal Standards
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(4) provides that a PO
    may be filed for legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer) as well as lack of
    jurisdiction or improper service. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1), (4). In ruling on POs in
    the nature of a demurrer, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
    of material fact, as well as inferences deducible therefrom. Aviles v. Pennsylvania
    Department of Corrections, 
    875 A.2d 1209
    , 1211 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). In
    addition, courts reviewing POs may also consider any documents or exhibits
    attached to the PFR. Lawrence v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 
    941 A.2d 70
    , 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). It is not necessary to accept as true any averments
    in the PFR that conflict with exhibits attached to it. 
    Id.
     Conclusions of law,
    unwarranted inferences from the facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of
    opinion are not admitted. Portalatin v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,
    
    979 A.2d 944
    , 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). A demurrer may be sustained only where it
    appears with certainty that the law will not permit recovery under the allegations
    pleaded. County of Dauphin v. City of Harrisburg, 
    24 A.3d 1083
    , 1089 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2011). Any doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling a demurrer. 
    Id.
    B. Respondents’ Demurrers
    We begin our review with the Department’s and the County Clerk’s
    demurrers on the basis that Wojnarowski has failed to state a claim upon which relief
    may be granted. The Department and the County Clerk assert that Wojnarowski
    cannot maintain a cause of action against them on the basis that they lack authority
    to deduct funds from his inmate account for the payment of court-ordered costs and
    restitution. Under Act 84, no hearing is required prior to making the deductions.
    The Department is authorized to deduct the funds pursuant to Act 84 based on the
    6
    sentencing order, which imposed these financial obligations without any delay
    language. The County Clerk is authorized to calculate costs due. They maintain
    that all money in the inmate account, including personal gifts and prison income, are
    subject to deductions.
    First, Section 9728(b)(3) of the Sentencing Code directs the county
    clerk of courts to send orders for payment of costs to the Department upon
    sentencing. 42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(3). The calculation of costs imposed by the
    sentencing court is a ministerial act, which is appropriate for the clerk of courts to
    perform following sentencing. Richardson v. Department of Corrections, 
    991 A.2d 394
    , 397 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Therefore, it was proper for the County Clerk to
    calculate the court-ordered costs and provide this information to the Department.
    Act 84 authorizes the Department to make monetary deductions from
    an inmate’s account to pay court-ordered restitution, costs, and fines. 42 Pa. C.S.
    §9728(b)(5); Boyd v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 
    831 A.2d 779
    , 782-
    84 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). As for whether a pre-deduction hearing is required, our
    Supreme Court recently explained:
    [P]risoners are entitled, under the Due Process Clause of
    the Fourteenth Amendment, [U.S. Const. amend. XIV,] to
    notice of certain items and a reasonable opportunity to
    object before the first Act 84 deduction is made. These
    items include the Department’s Act 84 deduction policy,
    the prisoner’s total monetary obligation to the
    Commonwealth, the rate at which funds will be deducted
    from his account, and the funds which will be subject to
    withdrawals.
    Johnson v. Wetzel, 
    238 A.3d 1172
    , 1182 (Pa. 2020) (citing Bundy v. Wetzel, 
    184 A.3d 551
    , 558-59 (Pa. 2018); Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of
    Corrections, 
    773 F.3d 472
    , 486 (3d Cir. 2014)). “These measures will help protect
    7
    against errors in the Department’s application of its Act 84 deduction policy without
    significantly impeding its ability to carry out essential functions.” Bundy, 184 A.3d
    at 559. However, where the Act 84 deductions occurred prior to this judicial
    precedent entitling prisoners to pre-deprivation process, “the availability of a
    meaningful post-deprivation remedy satisfies due process.” Johnson, 238 A.3d at
    1182 (quoting Bundy, 184 A.3d at 557).
    The Department’s Act 84 deductions began in 2009, prior to the judicial
    precedent entitling prisoners to pre-deprivation process. See PFR, Exhibit No. 2.
    However, as Wojnarowski avers, he filed informal queries with the County Clerk
    and Department regarding the deductions. PFR, ¶¶3-4, 7 and Exhibit Nos. 2-3. The
    Department responded to each inquiry and provided him with a Collection of Inmate
    Debts letter, which notified him of the Department’s policy, the rate of deduction,
    and a breakdown of all charges. PFR, ¶¶7, 9 and Exhibit Nos. 1-3. Wojnarowski
    also filed an administrative grievance challenging the deductions from his account,
    which the Department denied. PFR, ¶10. This post-deprivation process satisfies
    due process. Johnson, 238 A.3d at 1182; Bundy, 184 A.3d at 557.
    Notably, Wojnarowski does not claim that the costs are in error. Rather,
    he asserts that he cannot afford them. Because incarcerated individuals are provided
    with all of life’s necessities free of charge, regardless of the amount of funds in their
    account, it may not reasonably be determined that deductions pursuant to Act 84
    impose a substantial financial hardship. Buck v. Beard, 
    879 A.2d 157
    , 161 (Pa.
    2005); Sweeney v. Lotz, 
    787 A.2d 449
    , 451-52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
    As for Wojnarowski’s claim that he is entitled to an ability-to-pay
    hearing pursuant to Section 9730(b) of the Sentencing Code, with regard to costs
    owed on his other sentences, his reliance on this provision is misplaced. Although
    8
    Section 9730(b) permits a court to examine a defendant’s financial ability to pay,
    this provision “applies only when the defendant’s sentence prescribes financial
    obligations without confinement.” Department of Corrections v. Tate, 
    133 A.3d 350
    ,
    356 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added). Although some of Wojnarowski’s prior
    sentences imposed costs without confinement, the fact remains that Wojnarowski is
    incarcerated. Consequently, he is not entitled to a Section 9730(b) hearing. See 
    id.
    Second, a sentencing court’s order governs the Department’s
    collections from inmate accounts.             Freemore v. Pennsylvania Department of
    Corrections, 
    231 A.3d 33
    , 39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). In accordance with Act 84, the
    Department developed collection guidelines set forth in Section 3 of DC-ADM 005.
    Of particular relevance here, Section 3.A.2.a, provides:
    2. The Business Manager/designee shall:
    a. If the Department is in possession of a court order
    or sentencing transcript, then the Business
    Manager/designee shall determine if the order that
    imposes financial obligations on the inmate defers the
    payment of those obligations to a later date or event
    (“delay language”). If so, collection of costs as a result of
    that court order must not begin until the date or event
    indicated in the court order. In all such cases, the specific
    terms of the court order will control the collection.
    Questions concerning the terms of a court order shall be
    referred to the Act 84 Coordinator
    Section 3.A.2.a of DC-ADM 005 (original emphasis omitted).7
    7
    The Department’s Collection of Inmate Debts policy is available at
    https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/005%20Collection%20of%
    20Inmate%20Debts.pdf (last visited December 3, 2021). This policy applies to court-ordered
    costs, such as the costs of prosecution, constable fees, supervision fees, etc. It does not apply to
    statutorily mandated costs imposed by the sentencing court, such as costs payable to the Crime
    Victims Compensation Fund. Regarding the latter statutorily mandated costs, the Department may
    deduct funds towards payment of the sentencing order’s imposition of said costs during
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    9
    As this Court has explained:
    Once in possession of the sentencing order, the SCI’s
    business manager must determine if it expressly “defers
    the payment of those obligations to a later date or event”
    and, only if it does, may the Department delay making
    deductions from an inmate account therefor. DC-ADM
    005 Section 3.A.2.a (emphasis omitted). Otherwise,
    Section 9728(b)(5)(i) of Act 84 mandates that “[t]he
    [Department] shall make [the] monetary deductions . . . .”
    42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(5)(i).
    Freemore, 231 A.3d at 41 (footnote omitted).
    Recently, in Lambing v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
    488 M.D. 2017, filed July 23, 2020),8 we examined when the Department may collect
    court-ordered costs. Recognizing that the express terms of a sentencing order
    govern, where the sentencing order expressly defers the payment of such costs until
    after incarceration, the Department is not authorized to make deductions from an
    inmate’s prison account. In Lambing, the sentencing order clearly directed that
    “defendant shall pay the total due in monthly installments during the period of
    parole.” Lambing, slip op. at 6. Based on this language, we enjoined the Department
    from making deductions for court-ordered costs while the defendant was
    incarcerated.
    incarceration. See, e.g., Section 1101(e) of the Crime Victims Act, Act of November 24, 1998,
    P.L. 882, as amended, 18 P.S. §11.1101(e) (addressing Crime Victims Compensation Fund and
    Victim Witness Service Fund and providing that “[n]o court order shall be necessary in order for
    the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. Costs under this section must be paid
    in order for the defendant to be eligible for probation, parole or accelerated rehabilitative
    disposition”); see also Spotz v. Commonwealth, 
    972 A.2d 125
    , 134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (noting
    that “non-waivable, statutorily mandated costs are deductible absent any express court order”).
    8
    Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation of
    unreported panel decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value, but not as
    binding precedent. 
    210 Pa. Code §69.414
    (a).
    10
    Here, the Sentencing Court’s order at Docket No. CP-65-CR-0004187-
    2006 breaks down the costs payable by Wojnarowski into court-ordered costs, such
    as the costs of prosecution, constable fees, supervision fees and treatment costs, and
    statutorily mandated costs, such as costs payable to the Crime Victims
    Compensation Fund, by checking boxes on a standard order of court/sentence form.
    Specifically, the sentencing order directs Wojnarowski to:
     PAY COSTS OF PROSECUTION, PERTINENT
    CONSTABLE FEES, EMSA FEE, MCARE FUND
    SURCHARGE, A MONTHLY SUPERVISION FEE
    DURING TERM OF COURT SUPERVISION, AND
    COSTS OF TREATMENT OR OTHER ORDER[ED]
    PROGRAMS.     ADULT PROBATION TO
    DETERMINE PAYMENT SCHEDULE FOR
    COSTS/FINES.
     PAY RESTITUTION OF $5315.00 – Crime Victims
    Comp. AS DOCUMENTED ON THE VICTIM
    RESTITUTION CLAIM FORM MADE PART OF
    THE RECORD . . . .
    PFR, Exhibit No. 4 (bold emphasis added; italics emphasis reflects handwritten
    portion of the order).
    Wojnarowski appears to rely on the language that “ADULT
    PROBATION TO DETERMINE PAYMENT SCHEDULE FOR COSTS/FINES”
    as support for his position that he was not required to make any payments during his
    incarceration, only after. See PFR, Exhibit No. 4. However, this language relates
    only to court-ordered costs and not to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund
    restitution. Moreover, unlike in Lambing, the sentencing order here does not
    expressly order Wojnarowski to pay court-imposed costs “during the period of
    parole” or otherwise defer payment to a later date or event. Rather, the sentencing
    order merely refers to the payment schedule that will be set up following
    11
    Wojnarowski’s release from incarceration to pay any balance still owed. This
    provision is consistent with Act 84, which provides that upon release from
    incarceration, any costs remaining shall be collected by the county probation
    department or appropriate county agency, with the approval of the court. 42 Pa. C.S.
    §9728(a)(1).
    Upon review, the sentencing order does not support Wojnarowski’s
    contention that he is not required to make any payments until his release from
    incarceration. Absent express delay language in the sentencing order itself, the
    Department was under no duty to defer collection of court-imposed costs.
    42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(5)(i).
    Third, regarding the alleged impropriety of making deductions from
    gifts or wages in Wojnarowski’s inmate account, Act 84 provides that the
    Department “shall make monetary deductions of at least 25% of deposits made to
    inmate wages and personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution, costs
    imposed under [S]ection 9721(c.1), filing fees to be collected under [S]ection
    6602(c) (relating to prisoner filing fees) and any other court-ordered obligation.”
    42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(5) (emphasis added). Monetary gifts placed into an inmate’s
    account are subject to Act 84 deductions. Bundy, 184 A.3d at 555; Danysh v.
    Department of Corrections, 
    845 A.2d 260
    , 262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 
    881 A.2d 1263
     (Pa. 2005).      Likewise, an inmate’s prison wages are subject to Act 84
    deductions as well. 42 Pa. C.S. §8127(a)(5); Danysh, 
    845 A.2d at 262
    . The source
    of funds in an inmate account, whether derived from wages, gifts, or government
    benefits, is of no moment. Bundy, 184 A.3d at 555; Danysh, 
    845 A.2d at 262
    . Act
    84 authorizes the Department to make deductions from any funds deposited into an
    inmate’s account. Bundy, 184 A.3d at 555; Danysh, 
    845 A.2d at 262
    . Thus, there is
    12
    no legal basis upon which to exempt these monies from any future Act 84 deductions
    or to seek reimbursement for deductions taken from his inmate account.
    Upon review, the Department is authorized to make deductions
    pursuant to Act 84 and the Sentencing Court’s order, which did not contain express
    deferment language. Wojnarowski was afforded adequate post-deprivation process
    regarding the Act 84 deductions. Personal gifts and wages are not immune from
    deduction. Therefore, he is not entitled to the injunctive relief requested. For these
    reasons, we sustain the Department’s and the County Clerk’s demurrers for failure
    to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
    Turning to the Sentencing Court’s demurrer, the Sentencing Court
    demurs on the basis that Wojnarowski failed to state a claim against it. Specifically,
    the Sentencing Court asserts that the PFR contains no specific allegations of
    wrongdoing against it nor seeks relief from it.
    Our review of the PFR confirms that Wojnarowski did not allege any
    facts to support a claim against the Sentencing Court. Although there are mentions
    of orders by the Sentencing Court and rules pertaining to court proceedings, such is
    not enough. A petition for review must apprise a defendant of both notice of the
    claim and the facts upon which it rests. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019; Unified Sportsmen of
    Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Game Commission (PGC), 
    950 A.2d 1120
    , 1134 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2008). Wojnarowski does not attempt to reverse the Sentencing Court’s
    order. The injunctive relief Wojnarowski seeks is directed towards the Department
    and the County Clerk, not the Sentencing Court.               As discussed above,
    Wojnarowski’s PFR generally fails to state a claim upon which injunctive relief may
    be granted. We, therefore, sustain the Sentencing Court’s demurrer.
    13
    III. Conclusion
    For these reasons, we conclude that Wojnarowski has not established a
    clear right to the requested relief against any Respondents. We, therefore, sustain
    Respondents’ POs in the nature of demurrers, and we dismiss Wojnarowski’s PFR.9
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    9
    In light of this disposition, we decline to address any remaining POs and dismiss them as
    moot.
    14
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Thomas W. Wojnarowski,                :
    :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                      : No. 440 M.D. 2020
    :
    John E. Wetzel, Secretary of the      :
    Department of Corrections, SCI-       :
    Somerset, Business Manager,           :
    Records Supervisor, Warden            :
    Chief Counsel DOC, Westmoreland       :
    County Clerk of Courts,               :
    Westmoreland Common Pleas             :
    Court,                                :
    :
    Respondents     :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 6th day of December, 2021, Respondents’ preliminary
    objections in the nature of DEMURRER are SUSTAINED; Respondents’ remaining
    POs are DISMISSED AS MOOT; and Petitioner’s Petition for Review is
    DISMISSED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge