F. Hughes v. Wawa, Inc. (WCAB) ( 2021 )


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  •                IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Frank Hughes,                            :
    Petitioner           :
    :   No. 333 C.D. 2021
    v.                         :
    :   Submitted: November 4, 2021
    Wawa, Inc. (Workers’ Compensation        :
    Appeal Board),                           :
    Respondent              :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                  FILED: December 13, 2021
    Frank Hughes (Claimant) petitions for review of the March 8, 2021 and
    March 30, 2021 orders of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB),
    affirming the decision of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) that denied his
    petition for review of two utilization review (UR) determinations and penalty
    petition, and denying his petition for rehearing. We affirm.
    Factual and Procedural History
    On April 1, 2000, Claimant sustained a work-related injury while in the
    course and scope of his employment as a truck driver with Wawa, Inc. (Employer).
    A notice of compensation payable described Claimant’s work injury as a low back
    herniation.   (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 341a.)        The parties entered into a
    compromise and release (C&R) agreement, which was approved by the WCJ on
    August 24, 2011. The C&R agreement described the compensable injury as herniated
    discs at L4-5 and L5-S1, adjustment reaction with mixed anxiety and depressed
    mood, and pain disorder. The medical portion of Claimant’s workers’ compensation
    claim remained open with Employer continuing to be responsible for payment of
    medical benefits determined to be reasonable, necessary, and related to Claimant’s
    work injury. Id. at 341a.
    UR Request - Treatment by Dr. Davis
    On April 13, 2018, Employer, through its third-party administrator, AIG
    Claims, Inc., filed a request for a UR determination1 regarding the treatment rendered
    to Claimant by Dr. Christopher Davis, who is board certified in pain management and
    family medicine, for treatment after April 12, 2018. Specifically, the request for a
    UR determination sought the reasonableness of the number and frequency of
    Claimant’s office visits to Dr. Davis, and prescriptions for Oxycontin 60 mg,
    Oxycontin 80 mg, Valium 10 mg, Sonata 10 mg, MiraLAX powder, and
    amitriptyline.
    On May 15, 2018, the reviewer, Sarah Reinhardt, D.O., who is board
    certified in family medicine, circulated a UR determination regarding the
    reasonableness and necessity of the treatment of Dr. Davis. Dr. Reinhardt found the
    challenged treatment reasonable and necessary, in part. She found that office visits
    more than once per month were unreasonable and unnecessary, and that although
    Oxycontin may be justified for Claimant’s diagnoses and complaints, the combined
    1
    Section 306(f.1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736,
    as amended, 77 P.S. §531, requires that disputes regarding the reasonableness and necessity of
    medical treatment be submitted for utilization review by a utilization review organization (URO)
    authorized by the Department of Labor and Industry to perform such reviews. According to Section
    306(f.1)(6)(ii) and (iv) of the Act, 77 P.S. §531(6)(ii) and (iv), the URO is to issue a report and the
    report is to be made part of the record before the WCJ, who shall consider it as evidence but is not
    bound by it.
    2
    dose for Claimant’s two prescriptions exceeded recognized medication guidelines and
    the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines, and as such, the
    Oxycontin prescriptions were not justified during the period under review. Id. at
    341a.
    UR Request - Treatment by Dr. Sing
    On October 23, 2018, Employer requested UR review of treatment by
    Dr. Davis’ partner, Robert Sing, D.O., from August 27, 2018, and ongoing, including
    office visits, Oxycontin 80 mg, Oxycontin 60 mg, Valium, amitriptyline, MiraLAX,
    Elavil, blood/urine testing, and any/all other treatment.
    On December 12, 2018, the reviewer, Sean P. Hampton, D.O., issued a
    UR determination, finding Dr. Sing’s treatment necessary, in part. Dr. Hampton
    found that Claimant’s Oxycontin dosage of 330 morphine milligram equivalents
    (MME) far exceeded the CDC guidelines, which recommend limiting the dose to less
    than 50 MME per day and avoiding dosing higher than 90 MME per day. Dr.
    Hampton further noted that abrupt discontinuation of narcotic medications can result
    in health and withdrawal issues, and that a period of six months for weaning would be
    reasonable and necessary. He therefore found Oxycontin prescriptions reasonable
    and necessary until June 7, 2019, with reduced dosages and frequencies to completion
    of weaning, and unreasonable and unnecessary beyond June 7, 2019. Dr. Hampton
    also found office visits with Dr. Sing more than one time per month between August
    27, 2018, and June 7, 2019, and for more than once every three months after June 7,
    2018, to be unreasonable and unnecessary medical treatment. Id. at 341a.
    Claimant’s Petitions for Review of UR Determinations
    Claimant filed petitions for review of Dr. Reinhardt’s May 15, 2018 UR
    determination and Dr. Hampton’s December 12, 2018 UR determination. Id. at 341a-
    3
    42a. The petitions were consolidated and assigned to a WCJ. The WCJ appointed
    William Ingram, D.O., as an impartial physician to examine Claimant and submit a
    report.
    Claimant’s Penalty Petition
    On July 9, 2018, Claimant filed a petition for penalties, alleging that
    Employer failed to pay for reasonable and necessary treatment, specifically, $175.00
    for treatment by Dr. Davis on May 10, 2017; $175.00 and $25.00 for two visits to Dr.
    Sing on October 25, 2017; and $92.00 for treatment by Dr. Davis on March 14, 2018.
    (R.R. at 4a.)
    Proceedings before the WCJ
    Employer presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Reinhardt, who
    testified that she reviewed records of Dr. Davis from February 20, 2007, through
    April 11, 2018. She also reviewed records of other providers included with Dr.
    Davis’s records, as listed in her report.2 (Deposition of Sarah Reinhardt, D.O.,
    2
    Dr. Reinhardt’s report, dated May 10, 2018, indicated that Dr. Davis’s records included
    records of other providers: Treatment, Lab, and Medication Records from 02/20/07 through
    04/11/18 (250 pages); Treatment Records from Crozer Keystone Health System, 09/14/00 through
    11/27/00 (35 dates); Operative Report, Lumbar Microdiscectomy, Vidyadhar S. Chitale, M.D.,
    08/07/00; Treatment Records, Neurosurgery, Vidyadhar S. Chitale, M.D., 06/01/01; Treatment
    Records, Sleep Disorders Center, Annmarie Gaskin, M.D., 09/17/10; Treatment Records,
    Orthopedics, Philip M. Maurer, M.D., 04/19/02, 04/30/02, and 05/21/02; Treatment Records,
    Urology, Pierre Ghyad, M.D., 04/21/02; Treatment Records, Orthopedics, M. Darryl Antonacci,
    M.D., 10/01/01, 10/29/01, and 12/27/01; Treatment Records, Psychiatry, Timothy J. Michals, M.D,
    04/03/07; Treatment Records, Psychology, Jacques Lipetz, Ph.D., 08/30/05 and one not dated;
    Treatment Records, Pain Management, John Park, M.D., 10/10/12; Home Medical Services,
    Durable Medical Equipment Dispensed (Stimulation Device), 05/22/02; Emergency Room Records,
    Fitzgerald Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 06/03/01; Discharge Records, Springfield Hospital,
    04/06/17; Discharge Records, Bryn Mawr Hospital, Antonis Pratsos, M.D., 12/11/12; EMG/NCV
    (Electromyography/Nerve Conduction Velocity) Report, 09/27/01; X-ray Report, Left Hip, Left
    Foot, and Ankle, 04/24/02; and MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) Report, Lumbar Spine,
    10/13/08. (R.R. at 268a.)
    4
    1/12/19, at 17-18; R.R. at 303a-04a.) Dr. Reinhardt stated that Claimant underwent
    back surgery approximately four months after the initial injury in April 2000 and saw
    multiple physicians until Dr. Davis took over his care. She described the surgery as a
    lumbar hemilaminectomy and microdiscectomy at the left L4-5 and a foraminotomy
    of L5-S1. Id. at 19-20; R.R. at 305a-06a.
    Dr. Reinhardt explained that Dr. Davis treated Claimant for degenerative
    disc disease, lumbar radiculopathy, insomnia, and constipation. Id. Dr. Reinhardt
    found routine office visits reasonable and necessary at a frequency of once per month.
    Id. at 20-21; R.R. at 306a-07a.      She found the use of Valium reasonable and
    necessary as it can be used for the relief of muscle spasm and found Sonata
    reasonable for treatment of insomnia and MiraLAX powder reasonable for chronic
    constipation, which is a common side effect of opioid medications. Id. at 20-23; R.R.
    at 306a-09a.    She found Elavil reasonable and necessary as it is a common
    antidepressant and is helpful in the case of neuropathic pain. Id.
    Regarding Claimant’s prescription for Oxycontin, Dr. Reinhardt noted
    that Claimant’s regimen included taking Oxycontin 80 mg once every 12 hours in the
    morning and evening, and Oxycontin 60 mg at noon.              Dr. Reinhardt testified,
    however, that Oxycontin, 60 mg at noon and 80 mg every two hours was not
    reasonable and necessary. Id. at 23; R.R. at 309a. She stated that Oxycontin is a
    reasonable analgesic choice for Claimant, but his total combined narcotic dose was
    330 MME, which far exceeded the CDC guidelines’ upper limit of 120 MME. Id. at
    24; R.R. at 310a. She stated that the potential consequences of Claimant’s dosage
    level were increased risk of accidental overdose and respiratory depression and other
    side effects from opioids. Id. at 24-25; R.R. at 310a-11a.
    5
    On cross-examination, Dr. Reinhardt acknowledged that she had patients
    who required treatment outside of CDC guidelines, but rarely. Id. at 27; R.R. at 313a.
    She also acknowledged that she had never met or treated Claimant, and that Dr. Davis
    had been treating Claimant for 12 years. Id. at 28; R.R. at 314a.
    Employer also submitted the report of Dr. Hampton.         Dr. Hampton
    reviewed all treatment by Dr. Sing from August 27, 2018, forward.           (Sean P.
    Hampton, D.O. Report at 1; R.R. at 277a.) He also reviewed the same medical
    records from other treatment providers that were reviewed by Dr. Reinhardt. Dr.
    Hampton observed that before surgery, Claimant participated in physical and aquatic
    therapy with no sustained pain relief. Id. at 3-4; R.R. at 279a-80a. He continued to
    have significant radiating low back pain after surgery despite physical therapy,
    epidural steroid injections, and medications. Id. Claimant’s last visit with Dr. Sing
    prior to the period under review was October 25, 2017. Id. He returned to Dr. Sing
    August 27, 2018, and was seen September 24, 2018, and October 22, 2018, with
    diagnoses of chronic low back pain, lumbar radiculopathy, insomnia, anxiety, and
    opioid-induced constipation. Id.
    Dr. Hampton opined that while Claimant’s diagnoses supported a
    prescription for a narcotic pain reliever, the combined total of Oxycontin prescribed
    by Dr. Sing “far exceeded typical standards of practice and recognized medication
    and CDC guidelines.”       Id. at 7; R.R. at 283a.       He also noted that abrupt
    discontinuation of narcotic medications can result in health and withdrawal issues,
    such that a six-month period for weaning would be reasonable and necessary. Id. Dr.
    Hampton thus found Oxycontin reasonable and necessary only through June 7, 2019,
    with reduced dosages and frequencies to completion of weaning, and Valium, Elavil,
    6
    MiraLAX, and blood/urine testing reasonable and necessary. Id. at 7-8; R.R. at 283a-
    84a.
    In opposition to Claimant’s penalty petition, Employer submitted,
    among other things, an affidavit of Lorie Myers, a claims representative for AIG
    Claims Services, Inc. (R.R. at 322a-33a.) Ms. Myers stated that the denial of the
    March 14, 2018 charge for $92.00 was inadvertent, and that the charge had been
    repriced and paid. Id. She stated that she was not aware of any additional unpaid
    bills related to Claimant’s treatment. Id. She stated that the out-of-pocket payments
    by Claimant were for Oxycontin, which had been found unreasonable and
    unnecessary from April 12, 2018, forward; the prescription for Oxycontin was denied
    because Oxycontin had been found unreasonable and unnecessary, and the
    prescription for Narcan was denied because Narcan was not a covered medication.
    Ms. Myers’ affidavit appeared to be signed but was not dated or notarized. Id.
    Claimant preserved a hearsay objection to the affidavit, noting that the
    parties had agreed to depositions and medical records but not to an unsworn affidavit
    of the claims representative. Id. at 259a.
    The independent medical examination (IME) report of Dr. Ingram, dated
    February 25, 2019, was admitted as the WCJ’s exhibit. Claimant’s then-current
    medications were Oxycontin 60 mg, 80 mg, and 40 mg, Valium, amitriptyline,
    Lipitor, aspirin, and isophiril. (IME Report of William T. Ingram, D.O. at 2; R.R. at
    21a.) Dr. Ingram found the non-opioid medications appropriate. Id. at 4; R.R. at 23a.
    Regarding Claimant’s Oxycontin dosage, Dr. Ingram commented that the treating
    physicians had indicated a desire to increase other types of therapies and decrease the
    Oxycontin dose, and Claimant was in favor of it. Id. at 4-5; R.R. at 23a-24a. Dr.
    Ingram further stated that the current dosage was not dangerous per se as Claimant
    7
    was compliant and was carefully monitored, and there were no indications of
    inappropriate behavior. Id. Dr. Ingram stated that neuropathic pain modulating
    medications such as gabapentin or Lyrica would be a good choice to decrease
    narcotic use and that it may take a year to achieve a 33% decrease in Claimant’s
    Oxycontin dosage. Id. He described the current narcotic use as “a bit on the high
    side, but certainly not dangerous, especially as prescribed and monitored for this
    patient.” Id.
    Claimant presented the deposition testimony of his treating physician,
    Dr. Davis, who is board certified in family practice with a subspecialty board
    certification in pain management and hospice and palliative care. Dr. Davis testified
    that Claimant had exhausted all conservative treatments, injections, and surgery.
    (Deposition of Christopher Davis, D.O. at 16; R.R. at 180a.) He stated that he had
    been treating Claimant for about 12 or 13 years and saw Claimant monthly. Id. at 12-
    13; R.R. at 176a-77a. Dr. Davis stated that when a patient is prescribed opioids, that
    patient is required to sign a contract and undergo random urine screens and pill
    counts as necessary. Id. at 13-14; R.R. at 177a-78a. Dr. Davis testified that Claimant
    was compliant with all requirements and there had been no diversion or abuse of
    medications. Id. at 14; R.R. at 178a.
    Dr. Davis testified that the CDC guidelines are recommendations, and
    that he strives to have his patients take the lowest effective dose of an opioid
    medicine when possible. Id. at 15; R.R. at 179a. He stated that Claimant is a failed
    surgery patient who has been stable for several years and compliant with the
    recommended safeguards. Id. at 16; R.R. at 180a. He further stated that he has
    conversations with Claimant monthly about other non-opioid treatments. Id. at 16-
    17; R.R. at 180a-81a. Attempts to decrease the dose caused increased pain and
    8
    increased symptoms with activity.       Id.       Dr. Davis did not feel that a different
    medication would give Claimant the same pain relief he was getting with the current
    medication.    Id. at 19; R.R. at 183a.       He would entertain changing to a new
    medication if and when there was a need for a change. Id.
    Regarding Claimant’s penalty petition, Dr. Davis testified that bills for
    three dates of treatment had not been paid: May 10, 2017, October 25, 2017, and
    March 14, 2018. He stated that any remaining bills that were not paid were incurred
    during the period under review. Id. at 9-12; R.R. at 173a-76a. Dr. Davis further
    testified that his office customarily submits bills to carriers on HCFA 1500 forms,
    with LIBC-9 forms and office notes for the date of service. To the best of his
    knowledge, that procedure had been followed. Id. An itemization of charges of
    Springfield Sports Medical Center for dates of service beginning April 17, 2007, and
    ending November 5, 2018, was made an exhibit to Dr. Davis’s deposition. The
    itemization lists the charges as $92.00 for May 10, 2017, $175.00 and $25.00 for
    October 25, 2017, and $92.00 for March 14, 2018. (Davis Deposition Ex. C-Davis-
    2.)
    On cross-examination, Dr. Davis testified that Claimant was first
    prescribed Oxycontin on May 14, 2001, by Dr. Sing, who is Dr. Davis’s partner. Id.
    at 23-24; R.R. at 187a-88a. Claimant had been on 60 mg at noon and 80 mg every 12
    hours for approximately 10 years.       Id. Dr. Davis further testified that he tried
    decreasing the dose every six months, however, Claimant’s blood pressure increased,
    and his symptoms were not managed. Id. at 25; R.R. at 189a.
    Dr. Davis agreed that there are potential side effects of long-term use of
    opioid medication, including addiction and overdose, and he agreed that opioids are
    discouraged for chronic non-malignant back pain. Id. at 26-27; R.R. at 190a-91a. He
    9
    stated that the recommendations for treatment have changed since Claimant was first
    prescribed Oxycontin in 2000 and that a new patient with new back pain would not
    necessarily be treated the same way. Id. at 26-28; R.R. at 190a-92a.
    Claimant testified that he was still treating with Dr. Davis and Dr. Sing
    and saw them once a month. (Deposition of Frank Hughes, 1/21/19, at 6; R.R. at
    234a.) He stated that there had been efforts to decrease the dosage of his medication
    over the past six or eight months and that he was dealing with it. Id. at 6-7; R.R. at
    234a-35a. On cross-examination, Claimant clarified that Dr. Davis and Dr. Sing fill
    in for each other and only one prescribes Oxycontin at a time. Id. at 14; R.R. at 242a.
    He stated that his Oxycontin regimen had decreased from 80-60-80 to 80-60-60 and
    he planned to continue to try to decrease the dosage. Id. at 14-15; R.R. at 242a-43a.
    WCJ’s Decision Affirmed by the Board
    On August 1, 2019, the WCJ issued a determination crediting Dr.
    Hampton’s opinions, Dr. Reinhardt’s opinions, and the opinion of Dr. Ingram, in part.
    He also credited Claimant’s testimony as to the benefit derived from the prescription
    medications but found that the medical evidence supported the recommended
    attempts to wean Claimant off the medications and reduce unnecessary medical visits.
    The WCJ found Dr. Reinhardt’s opinion that Oxycontin as prescribed by
    Dr. Davis was unreasonable and unnecessary medical treatment to be credible and
    convincing based upon her review of the medical records, as outlined in her UR
    determination. (WCJ Decision, 8/1/19, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 19.) He found that
    Dr. Reinhardt was credible and convincing that the Oxycontin as prescribed by Dr.
    Davis was unreasonable and unnecessary medical treatment for Claimant’s April 1,
    2000 employment injury. Id. The WCJ credited Dr. Reinhardt’s opinion regarding
    the risks from opioid medication including accidental overdose and respiratory
    10
    depression along with her opinion that other treatments could be utilized to prevent
    the use of high dosages of Oxycontin to be credible and convincing and supported by
    the records she reviewed. Id.
    The WCJ credited Dr. Hampton’s opinion that the daily dosage of
    Oxycontin prescribed by Dr. Sing exceeded the CDC guidelines and was three times
    over the recommended amount and Dr. Hampton’s recommendation of weaning
    Claimant from opioid use into the future. (F.F. No. 25.)
    The WCJ noted that Dr. Davis acknowledged that Claimant was using a
    high level of prescribed medications. He found that there was insufficient evidence
    to show attempts to wean Claimant off of Oxycontin. (F.F. No. 20.)
    Regarding Dr. Ingram’s opinion, the WCJ found that he was credible, in
    part. (F.F. No. 22.) The WCJ found that Dr. Ingram’s finding that the dose of
    Oxycontin prescribed to Claimant was reasonable was inconsistent with the
    acknowledgement as to the high doses of these opioids in this case. Id. The WCJ
    found that Dr. Ingram’s opinion was credible that a reduction of the amount of
    Oxycontin prescribed to Claimant was necessary. Id.
    Regarding Claimant’s penalty petition, the WCJ found that Claimant
    failed to establish a violation of the Act. The WCJ summarized the affidavit of Ms.
    Myers in which she indicated that she was unaware of bills that were outstanding.
    (F.F. No. 18.) The WCJ noted that although Dr. Davis testified regarding outstanding
    bills, this testimony was not supported by documentation. (F.F. No. 20.) The WCJ
    determined that Claimant did not submit an itemization and proof of submission of
    the unpaid medical expenses to the correct carrier. As a result, the WCJ found that
    the documents submitted by Claimant were insufficient to support a violation of the
    terms of the Act. (F.F. No. 23.)
    11
    On August 8, 2019, Claimant appealed the WCJ’s decision to the
    WCAB. On October 29, 2019, Claimant submitted a supplemental brief advising that
    new CDC guidelines issued on October 10, 2019, were directly relevant to the issues
    involved, identifying the dangers posed to all patients “forced” to abruptly stop taking
    opioids, and requesting that the matter be remanded to the WCJ to consider the
    current guidelines.3 On March 8, 2021, the WCAB circulated an opinion affirming
    the WCJ’s decision in its entirety.           R.R. at 355a-76a.         Regarding Claimant’s
    contention that the WCJ’s decision should be vacated and remanded for consideration
    of the revised CDC guidelines, the WCAB disagreed, explaining that
    the risks of abrupt discontinuation of opioid medications
    were taken into account by both Dr. Ingram and Dr.
    Hampton. Dr. Davis also acknowledged that Claimant's
    treatment regimen was not in conformance with present-day
    standards, and Claimant testified that his regimen had been
    adjusted with a goal of decreasing his medication use. We
    do not agree that a remand is necessary for consideration of
    the detrimental effects of an abrupt withdrawal of opioid
    medications.
    Id. at 374a-75a.
    3
    Our review is limited to the certified record. Neither the petition for rehearing nor the
    WCAB order denying the same appear in the certified record but they are provided in Claimant’s
    reproduced record. Absent any objection from Employer, we will address the same herein.
    12
    On March 23, 2021, Claimant filed a request for rehearing. Id. at 377a-
    80a. That request was denied by the WCAB on March 30, 2021. Id. at 398a. Before
    this Court,4 Claimant raises the following seven issues:5
    1. Whether the WCAB failed to address all issues raised
    by Claimant?
    2. Whether the UR determinations were invalid because
    the insurer failed to list “other medical providers” on
    the UR Requests?
    3. Whether Dr. Reinhardt’s UR determination was
    invalid for the reason that she was not board certified
    in pain management?
    4. Whether the UR reviews performed by Dr. Reinhardt
    and Dr. Hampton were unequivocal and definitive?
    5. Whether the decision of the WCJ was a “reasoned
    decision”?
    6. Whether the WCAB abused its discretion in denying
    Claimant’s request for a rehearing?
    7. Whether Claimant’s constitutional due process rights
    were violated in the litigation before the WCJ?
    4
    This Court reviews the WCJ’s adjudication to determine whether the necessary findings of
    fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether WCAB procedures were violated, whether
    constitutional rights were violated, or whether an error of law was committed. MV Transportation
    v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Harrington), 
    990 A.2d 118
    , 120 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    5
    Claimant actually raises nine issues in his Issues Presented section of his brief. See
    Claimant’s Br. at 4. For clarity, we have rephrased and combined our discussion of some of
    Claimant’s issues.
    13
    1.
    In his first issue, Claimant argues that the WCAB failed to address all
    issues he raised in his appeal from the WCJ’s decision. We have reviewed the record
    and the decision of the WCAB and are satisfied, as explained below, that the WCAB
    addressed all of the issues raised by Claimant in his appeal to the WCAB.
    2.
    Next, Claimant contends that the UR requests were defective because
    they did not list all of his other treatment providers.6 (R.R. at 97a, 12a.) Because of
    this alleged defect, Claimant argues that the reviewers, Dr. Reinhardt and Dr.
    Hampton, were not provided with the opportunity to review all his medical records
    and this rendered their UR determinations void ab initio.
    In Seamon v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Sarno & Son
    Formals), 
    761 A.2d 1258
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (en banc), the claimant argued the
    failure to obtain medical records from his earlier treating doctors rendered the UR
    determinations inadmissible or, at least, incompetent to support the finding that the
    treatment was not reasonable or necessary. 
    Id. at 1261
    . This Court disagreed and
    determined that the URO’s failure to obtain all records did not invalidate the review.
    We concluded that a lack of the complete documentary medical history does not
    automatically preclude a UR reviewer from deciding the reasonableness or necessity
    of a particular treatment, nor does it preclude a WCJ from crediting and relying on
    the UR determination.7
    6
    Before the WCAB, Claimant argued that UR was waived because the UR requests were
    not properly completed. The WCAB addressed this argument on pages 4-6 of its opinion.
    7
    See also Solomon v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 
    821 A.2d 215
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), where this Court, relying on Seamon, observed that, in the absence of
    a statement by a reviewer that she was unable to render an opinion because medical records were
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    14
    Claimant acknowledges that pursuant to Seamon, failure of a reviewer to
    obtain the entire medical file does not automatically preclude a reviewer from
    assessing the reasonableness or necessity of a particular treatment. He contends,
    however, that his argument is different than the one we considered in Seamon. He
    argues that when, as here, the reviewer’s “inability to even seek the records” is due to
    the insurer/employer’s failure to identify and list them on the UR request form, then
    the UR determination is defective and should be invalidated. (Claimant’s Br. at 18.)
    Stated differently, he contends that listing “other treatment provider(s)” on the UR
    request form is mandatory8 and suggests that the failure to do so should automatically
    render a UR determination defective. There are several problems with Claimant’s
    argument.
    First, we decline to assume, as Claimant does, that the failure to list a
    claimant’s “other treatment provider(s)” on the UR request form will necessarily
    make it impossible for the reviewer to obtain and review other providers’ records.
    That simply is not the case as demonstrated by this record. Both Drs. Reinhardt and
    Hampton reviewed copious records from Claimant’s other treatment providers, and
    (continued…)
    missing, there was no need for her to review all records of everyone who provided medical
    treatment to the claimant in order to opine solely concerning the reasonableness and necessity of the
    treatment at issue.
    8
    In support, Claimant points to the medical cost containment regulations at 34 Pa. Code
    §127.407(a), which provides that “[i]n order to determine the reasonableness or necessity of the
    treatment under review, UROs shall obtain for review all available records of all treatment rendered
    by all providers to the employee for the work related injury,” and 34 Pa. Code §127.462, which
    provides that “UROs shall attempt to obtain records from all providers for the entire course of
    treatment rendered to the employee for the work related injury which is the subject of the UR
    request, regardless of the period of treatment under review.”
    15
    they were able to conduct their reviews of the challenged treatment in the context of
    Claimant’s entire course of care for his work-related injury. As noted, both Drs.
    Reinhardt and Hampton demonstrated their knowledge of Claimant’s current
    condition and recounted his lengthy medical history and treatments, from the date of
    his accident nearly 20 years ago, to the present. That history was based on their
    review of other treatment providers’ medical records that were, not surprisingly,
    amongst Dr. Sing’s and Dr. Davis’s records.
    We also fail to discern how the question posed by Claimant (failure to
    list other treatment providers on UR request form) is fundamentally different than the
    one we considered in Seamon. The Court in Seamon held that a UR determination
    that did not include a review of the medical treatment by other providers did not
    automatically render the reviewers’ opinions invalid. Here, even if the reviewers did
    not conduct a review of the medical records of other providers due to the insurer’s
    failure to identify them on the UR request form, it would not automatically mean the
    reviewers would be unable to render a determination of reasonableness or necessity
    under Seamon. Focusing on the fact that the other providers were not listed on the
    UR request form seems to us to be beside the point. In any event, as discussed, the
    reviewers did review medical records from Claimant’s other treatment providers,
    including his records from his psychologist and surgeon.9 Claimant does not identify
    any other provider’s records that were not reviewed that would have in any way
    changed the determination of the reviewers.
    9
    Claimant argues that his surgeon and psychologist were not identified on the UR request
    form. However, as noted, both reviewers did review his surgeon’s records and records of his
    psychologist.
    16
    Finally, the absence of other providers’ medical records, if any, goes to
    the WCJ’s weighing of the evidence, which is beyond our scope of review. See
    Solomon (the breadth of information reviewed by the UR reviewer is a factor which
    the WCJ may consider, but it is no more conclusive than any other single factor
    considered in evaluating the credibility of conflicting expert opinions).
    In Patton v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Delaware River
    Port Authority), (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1095 C.D. 2017, filed February 9, 2018O, 
    2018 WL 792104
    ,10 the claimant argued, as Claimant does here, that the reviewer’s UR
    determination was defective because the UR request failed to list all of the claimant’s
    other treatment providers. This Court rejected the argument, explaining that
    the regulatory scheme developed under the Act
    contemplates assessment of reasonableness and necessity of
    a specific provider’s treatment in the context of the overall
    course of care provided to the claimant. However, we
    expressly found an incomplete documentary medical
    history “does not automatically preclude a UR doctor from
    making a determination of reasonableness or necessity;
    nor does it preclude a WCJ from crediting and relying on
    the UR report.” [Seamon, 
    761 A.2d at 1262
    ].
    Moreover, this Court pointed out in Seamon that in
    weighing the evidence and determining credibility, the WCJ
    can consider any irregularities in the review process. Once
    the employer satisfies its burden of proof by relying on a
    UR determination, the claimant then has the burden to rebut
    that evidence, which he may do by submitting other medical
    evidence. 
    Id.
    Patton, slip op. at *8, 
    2018 WL 792104
     at *4 (emphasis added).
    10
    Pursuant to section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, we may cite an
    unreported opinion of this Court for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
    17
    Here, neither Dr. Reinhardt nor Dr. Hampton indicated that they were
    unable to render an opinion due to the absence of information regarding any other
    providers. They never indicated that they were unable to assess Claimant’s current
    medical condition and complaints, which were essential to their determination if the
    Oxycontin dosages prescribed were necessary or reasonable. As such, the failure to
    indicate other treatment providers on the UR request forms was neither fatal to the
    reviewers’ UR determinations, nor did it preclude Dr. Reinhardt or Dr. Hampton
    from determining the reasonableness or necessity of the treatments under review.
    Citing Seamon, the WCAB accurately confirmed that the failure to list additional
    providers on the UR request forms did not preclude UR or preclude the WCJ from
    crediting and relying upon the reports. We determine no error.
    3.
    In his third issue, Claimant argues that Dr. Reinhardt’s review was
    invalid because she was not licensed in the same profession and with the same or
    similar specialty as the provider under review, as required by section 306(f.1)(6)(i) of
    the Act, 77 P.S. §531(6)(i). Claimant’s argument is unavailing.
    The Act requires that the reviewer be licensed by the Commonwealth in
    the same profession and with the same or similar specialty as the provider under
    review. Section 306(f.1)(6)(i) of the Act, 77 P.S. §531(6)(i). The implementing
    regulation, 34 Pa. Code §127.466, requires the URO to forward the records, the
    request for UR, the notice of assignment and a Bureau-prescribed instruction sheet to
    a reviewer licensed by the Commonwealth in the same profession and having the
    same specialty as the provider under review. 34 Pa. Code §127.467. As the WCAB
    observed, neither the Act nor the regulations address licensing at a subspecialty level.
    18
    Both Dr. Davis and Dr. Reinhardt were board certified in family
    practice. (R.R. at 363a.) Thus, both the reviewer and the reviewee were certified in
    the same specialty, family medicine. The appointment of Dr. Reinhardt, therefore,
    did conform to the requirements of the Act and implementing regulations.
    To the extent that Dr. Reinhardt is alleged to have lacked adequate
    qualifications to review the treatment of Dr. Davis, this was an issue of credibility to
    be determined by the WCJ.        Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Tristate Transport), 
    828 A.2d 1043
     (Pa. 2003); Sherrod v. Workmen’s Compensation
    Appeal Board (Thoroughgood, Inc.), 
    666 A.2d 383
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Credibility
    determinations will not be disturbed unless their basis is arbitrary and capricious, or
    so fundamentally dependent on a misapprehension of materials facts, or so otherwise
    flawed, as to render the basis irrational. Casne v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
    Board (STAT Couriers, Inc.), 
    962 A.2d 14
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). That standard was
    not met here. Claimant has not established that the WCJ made arbitrary, capricious,
    or otherwise flawed findings regarding the qualifications of Dr. Reinhardt.
    4.
    Next, Clamant contends that the reviewers, Dr. Reinhardt and Dr.
    Hampton, offered improper advisory opinions, and not definitive determinations
    because they were unable to state with certainty what dosage of opioids would be
    proper, how to achieve a lower dosage, or what course of treatment would be
    appropriate if continuing efforts to reduce the dosage remain unsuccessful. Claimant
    argues that they only spoke in terms of what Claimant’s treating providers “should
    try” to do. (Claimant’s Br. at 23.) Again, we must disagree.
    The single issue in a UR petition is the reasonableness and necessity of
    the treatment under review.      Warminster Fiberglass v. Workers’ Compensation
    19
    Appeal Board (Jorge), 
    708 A.2d 517
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). The employer has the
    never-shifting burden throughout the UR process of proving that the challenged
    medical treatment is not reasonable or necessary, no matter which party prevailed at
    the UR level.    Topps Chewing Gum v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Wickizer), 
    710 A.2d 1256
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    Treatment may be reasonable and necessary even if it is designed to
    manage the claimant’s symptoms rather than to cure or permanently improve the
    underlying condition. Trafalgar House v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Green), 
    784 A.2d 232
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Accordingly, the WCJ should consider
    evidence of the palliative effect of treatments under review and weigh that evidence
    in deciding a UR petition. Ryndycz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (White
    Engineering), 
    936 A.2d 146
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). A reviewer may consider any risk
    to the patient in determining the reasonableness and necessity of a prescribed
    medication, Sweigart v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Burnham Corp.),
    
    920 A.2d 962
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), and a WCJ may rely on the detrimental effects of
    a medication that may be palliative in finding the use of the medication not
    reasonable and necessary. Bedford Somerset MH/MR v. Workers’ Compensation
    Appeal Board (Turner), 
    51 A.3d 267
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). A lack of progress in pain
    improvement is also a factor for the WCJ’s consideration. Womack v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (School District of Philadelphia), 
    83 A.3d 1139
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2014).
    Here, both reviewers unequivocally provided definitive determinations
    that the Oxycontin being prescribed was unreasonable and unnecessary.           Dr.
    Reinhardt testified that Claimant’s total combined narcotic dose was 330 MME and
    that the CDC guidelines’ upper limit is 120 MME. Dr. Hampton agreed that the
    20
    combined total dosage of Oxycontin prescribed by Dr. Sing exceeded typical
    standards of practice and recognized medication and CDC guidelines, and was,
    therefore, not reasonable and necessary.
    To the extent that Claimant argues that it was the reviewers’ function to
    devise a treatment plan for him, we cannot agree. Their opinions appropriately
    considered the palliative nature of the treatment, the risks to Claimant of continuing
    at very high doses of opioid medication, and the risks to Claimant of an abrupt
    cessation of the medication. We determine no error.
    5.
    Next, Claimant argues that the WCJ’s decision was not a “reasoned”
    decision. He argues that the WCJ relied on incompetent conclusions that were
    contrary to the evidence as a whole, and he capriciously disregarded the identical
    explanations offered by six experts. Further, he contends that the WCJ provided no
    actual reason for the evidence found credible. We disagree.
    Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. §834, provides that a WCJ must
    render a reasoned decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based
    upon the evidence as a whole, and must clearly and concisely explain the rationale for
    the decision so that parties to a workers’ compensation action can understand the
    reasoning underlying a particular result. Daniels. The WCJ must articulate an actual
    objective reason for his credibility determinations of witnesses other than those
    testifying in person at the hearing. Id. An appellate tribunal may not imagine the
    reasons for a WCJ’s credibility determinations. Id.
    An adequate explanation for a determination is provided when the WCJ
    outlines the evidence considered, states credible evidence relied upon, and establishes
    the reasons underlying the ultimate decision rendered. Id.
    21
    Further, as the ultimate finder of fact and the sole authority for
    determining the weight and credibility of evidence, the WCJ may accept or reject the
    testimony of any witness in whole or in part, including medical witnesses. Lombardo
    v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Topps Co., Inc.), 
    698 A.2d 1378
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1997). The WCJ’s findings will not be disturbed if they are supported by
    substantial, competent evidence. Greenwich Collieries v. Workmen’s Compensation
    Appeal Board (Buck), 
    664 A.2d 703
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
    Here, the WCJ clearly outlined the evidence considered and the
    credibility determinations made, as well as the reasons underlying his ultimate
    determination that Claimant’s treatment under review was not reasonable and
    necessary, as required for rendering a reasoned decision. Daniels. Under these
    circumstances, his decision provided a meaningful basis for appellate review.
    6.
    In his sixth issue, Claimant submits that the WCAB erred by denying his
    petition for rehearing based on after-discovered evidence, i.e., the updated CDC
    guidelines. He argues that Dr. Reinhardt and Dr. Hampton based their opinions on
    then-current CDC guidelines, which were changed while Claimant’s appeal to the
    WCAB was pending. Claimant contends that he brought the new guidelines to the
    WCAB’s attention by supplemental brief and petition for rehearing, but they were
    erroneously denied.
    The grant or denial of a rehearing is generally within the discretion of
    the WCAB and the WCAB will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Cudo v.
    Hallstead Foundry, Inc., 
    539 A.2d 792
     (Pa. 1989); City of Philadelphia v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Harvey), 
    994 A.2d 1
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Payne v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Elwyn, Inc.), 
    928 A.2d 377
     (Pa. Cmwlth.
    22
    2007). A rehearing is not allowable (1) for the purpose of strengthening weak proofs
    that have already been presented, (2) to permit a party to introduce previously
    available evidence to attempt to cure a failure to satisfy a party’s burden of proof, or
    (3) for the purpose of hearing additional testimony that is merely cumulative.
    Washington v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (National Freight Industries,
    Inc.), 
    111 A.3d 214
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); Paxos v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal
    Board (Frankford-Quaker Grocery), 
    631 A.2d 826
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).
    The    WCAB      directly   addressed   the   arguments    in   Claimant’s
    supplemental brief and, specifically, the reference to the new CDC guidelines in its
    opinion. As the WCAB noted, the adverse effects of the abrupt discontinuation of
    opioid medications were considered by both Dr. Ingram and Dr. Hampton, and no
    witness had recommended the abrupt discontinuation of Claimant’s Oxycontin. To
    the contrary, Dr. Hampton specifically found that a six-month weaning period was
    reasonable and necessary. Dr. Ingram observed that it could take a year to effectuate
    a 33% reduction in Claimant’s opioid dosage. Thus, we do not agree that a remand
    was necessary for consideration of the detrimental effects of an abrupt withdrawal of
    opioid medications. The WCAB did not abuse its discretion in denying Claimant’s
    request for a rehearing.
    7.
    In his final issue, Claimant argues that his constitutional right to due
    process was violated. He claims the WCJ erroneously admitted the claim adjuster’s
    affidavit over his hearsay objection and capriciously disregarded undisputed
    competent evidence that he properly submitted medical bills for treatment and that
    that they remain unpaid.
    23
    Penalties are provided in section 435 of the Act,11 and are appropriate
    where a violation of the Act or the WCAB’s rules and regulations occurs. The
    assessment of penalties and the amount of penalties imposed, if any, are matters
    within the WCJ’s discretion.           Gumm v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Steel), 
    942 A.2d 222
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “[A] violation of the Act or its regulations
    must appear in the record for a penalty to be appropriate.” Shuster v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission), 
    745 A.2d 1282
    , 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Further, a claimant who files a penalty petition
    bears the burden of proving a violation of the Act occurred. 
    Id.
              If the claimant
    meets his initial burden of proving a violation, the burden then shifts to the employer
    to prove it did not violate the Act. 
    Id.
    The regulations require medical providers to submit medical bills for
    payment on HCFA 1500, UB92, or any successor forms. 34 Pa. Code §127.201.
    Monthly medical reports are required to be submitted in any month during which
    treatment was provided to a claimant, and the insurer is not obligated to pay for the
    treatment covered by the report until it receives the report. 34 Pa. Code §127.203.
    Under section 306(f.1)(5) of the Act, 77 P.S. §531(5), medical bills must be paid
    within 30 days of receipt unless the employer disputes the causal connection or the
    reasonableness and necessity of the treatment. An employer may deny payment of
    medical expenses if the medical bills are not submitted on one of the forms specified
    in section 127.201 of the regulations, 34 Pa. Code §127.201, relating to bills and
    forms. Insurers are not responsible to pay for treatment until such form is submitted
    as specified. Further, if a medical provider does not submit the required medical
    report on the prescribed form, the insurer is not obligated to pay for the treatment
    11
    Added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, 77 P.S. §991.
    24
    until the required report is received. 34 Pa. Code §127.203(d). If LIBC forms are not
    timely submitted to the employer or its insurer, the employer should not be held liable
    for payment until the LIBC forms are submitted. Section 306(f.1)(2) of the Act 77
    P.S. §531(2); 34 Pa. Code §127.203.
    Here, the WCJ concluded that Claimant failed to establish a violation on
    the record. We discern no error. Claimant had the burden of establishing a violation.
    Shuster. The WCJ found Dr. Davis’s testimony was insufficient to establish that the
    specific bills in question were properly submitted with the accompanying HCFA
    forms and medical reports, to the correct carrier. Finally, contrary to Claimant’s
    contention that the WCJ improperly made a finding of fact based on hearsay, the
    WCJ did not rely on Ms. Myers’ affidavit in concluding that Claimant failed to
    establish that properly submitted invoices for reasonable, necessary, and causally
    connectedi medical treatment, were not paid.
    Accordingly, we conclude that Claimant’s constitutional right to due
    process was not violated in the litigation before the WCJ.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, the March 8, 2021 and March 30, 2021 orders of
    the WCAB are affirmed.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    25
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Frank Hughes,                         :
    Petitioner           :
    :    No. 333 C.D. 2021
    v.                         :
    :
    Wawa, Inc. (Workers’ Compensation     :
    Appeal Board),                        :
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 13th day of December, 2021, the March 8, 2021 and
    March 30, 2021 orders of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board are hereby
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 333 C.D. 2021

Judges: McCullough, J.

Filed Date: 12/13/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2021

Authorities (20)

Daniels v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 574 Pa. 61 ( 2003 )

Topps Chewing Gum v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 1998 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 266 ( 1998 )

Sherrod v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board , 1995 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 457 ( 1995 )

Washington v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2015 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 87 ( 2015 )

Lombardo v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 1997 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 350 ( 1997 )

Womack v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2014 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 55 ( 2014 )

Greenwich Collieries v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board , 1995 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 419 ( 1995 )

Casne v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2008 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 591 ( 2008 )

Paxos v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board , 158 Pa. Commw. 355 ( 1993 )

MV Transportation v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2010 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 82 ( 2010 )

City of Philadelphia v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2010 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 137 ( 2010 )

Bedford Somerset MHMR v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board ... , 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 261 ( 2012 )

Warminster Fiberglass v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board ... , 1998 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 163 ( 1998 )

Shuster v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 51 ( 2000 )

Seamon v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 601 ( 2000 )

Trafalgar House & St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. ... , 2001 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 709 ( 2001 )

Sweigart v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 136 ( 2007 )

Payne v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 303 ( 2007 )

Ryndycz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 587 ( 2007 )

Gumm v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board , 2008 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 36 ( 2008 )

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