P.T. v. DHS ( 2016 )


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  •              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    P.T.,                                            :    SEALED CASE
    Petitioner        :
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    Department of Human Services,                    :    No. 851 C.D. 2015
    Respondent                 :    Argued: April 12, 2016
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                           FILED: May 4, 2016
    P.T. petitions this Court for review of the Department of Human
    Services (DHS) Secretary’s (Secretary) May 5, 2015 Final Order setting aside the
    Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ (BHA) decision expunging P.T.’s indicated report1
    of child abuse from the ChildLine & Abuse Registry (ChildLine Registry).2 The
    1
    Section 6303(a) of the Child Protective Services Law (Law) defines an “indicated report”
    as a report issued by DHS or a county agency if it “determines that substantial evidence of the
    alleged abuse by a perpetrator exists based on any of the following: (i) [a]vailable medical
    evidence[;] (ii) [t]he child protective service investigation[; or,] (iii) [a]n admission of the acts of
    abuse by the perpetrator.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a); see also Section 3490.4 of DHS’ Regulations, 55
    Pa. Code § 3490.4.
    2
    Section 3490.4 of the DHS Regulations defines “ChildLine” as
    [a]n organizational unit of [DHS] which operates a Statewide toll-free
    system for receiving reports of suspected child abuse established
    under [S]ection 6332 of the [Child Protective Services Law (Law)]
    (relating to establishment of Statewide toll-free telephone number),
    refers the reports for investigation and maintains the reports in the
    appropriate file. . . .
    55 Pa. Code § 3490.4. “The ChildLine Registry is maintained in accordance with the [Law.]” In
    re: S.H., 
    96 A.3d 448
    , 450 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
    issue before this Court is whether there was substantial evidence to support the
    Secretary’s Final Order maintaining P.T.’s indicated report on the ChildLine
    Registry.
    On December 18, 2013, Washington County Children and Youth
    Services (CYS) received an oral report alleging that P.T. mentally abused his son,
    Pa.T. (born on October 31, 2000), from January 1, 2007 to December 18, 2013. CYS
    conducted an investigation and, on January 29, 2014, filed an indicated report against
    P.T. as a perpetrator of abuse against Pa.T. P.T. appealed. Hearings were held on
    October 9 and 14, 2014 before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).3
    On February 13, 2015, the ALJ issued an adjudication and
    recommendation sustaining P.T.’s appeal and expunging his indicated report from the
    ChildLine Registry.         On February 24, 2015, the BHA adopted the ALJ’s
    recommendation in its entirety.         CYS requested the Secretary to reconsider the
    BHA’s decision, which was granted on March 17, 2015. On May 5, 2015, the
    Secretary set aside the BHA’s decision. P.T. appealed to this Court. 4
    Initially, Section 6341(a)(2) of the Law authorizes “the [S]ecretary to . . .
    expunge an indicated report on the grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being
    maintained in a manner inconsistent with [the Child Protective Services Law
    [(Law)5].” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a)(2). “[CYS] has the burden of establishing by
    substantial evidence that an indicated report of child abuse is accurate. If CYS fails
    to sustain that burden, a request for expungement will be granted.” Bucks Cnty.
    3
    The ALJ’s adjudication misstates that the hearings took place on August 7 and October 9,
    2014. See P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 1.
    4
    CYS intervened.
    “Our ‘scope of review in expunction proceedings is limited to a determination of whether
    constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed, or whether necessary
    findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.’” K.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    950 A.2d 1069
    , 1073 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting E.D. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    719 A.2d 384
    , 387 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1998)).
    5
    23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6386.
    2
    Children & Youth Soc. Servs. Agency v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    808 A.2d 990
    , 993
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Section 6303(a) of the Law defines “substantial evidence” as
    “[e]vidence which outweighs inconsistent evidence and which a reasonable person
    would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”6 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) (emphasis
    omitted); see also G.V. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    91 A.3d 667
    (Pa. 2014); In re: S.H.,
    
    96 A.3d 448
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). “[W]hether [CYS’] evidence satisfied the standard
    set forth in the statute is a question of law.” 
    S.H., 96 A.3d at 455
    .
    P.T. argues that the Secretary erred as a matter of law by setting aside
    the BHA’s order expunging his indicated report from the ChildLine Registry where
    CYS failed to prove by substantial evidence that P.T. caused Pa.T. serious mental
    injury as the Law defines that term. We agree.
    Section 6303(b.1) of the Law provides in pertinent part: “The term ‘child
    abuse’ shall mean intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following: .
    . . (3) [c]ausing or substantially contributing to serious mental injury to a child
    through any act or failure to act or a series of such acts or failures to act.” 23 Pa.C.S.
    § 6303(b.1) (emphasis added).           “Serious mental injury” is defined in Section
    6303(a) of the Law as:
    A psychological condition, as diagnosed by a physician or
    licensed psychologist, including the refusal of appropriate
    treatment, that:
    (1) renders a child chronically and severely anxious,
    agitated, depressed, socially withdrawn, psychotic or in
    reasonable fear that the child’s life or safety is threatened;
    or
    6
    This Court has stated that “‘substantial evidence’ in child abuse expungement cases is
    synonymous with the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.” S.T. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
    Lackawanna Cnty. Office, Children, Youth & Family Servs., 
    681 A.2d 853
    , 857 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1996). In S.H, this Court explained: “[T]he standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, and
    the statutory standard of evidence in an expunction hearing is [substantial evidence]. This is the
    standard that governs our appellate review of the Secretary’s adjudication.” 
    Id. at 455.
    3
    (2) seriously interferes with a child’s ability to accomplish
    age-appropriate developmental and social tasks.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) (text emphasis added); see also 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.
    At the hearing, Pa.T.’s mother A.W. testified for CYS that she and P.T.
    shared custody of Pa.T. from January 1, 2007 through approximately November
    2013, when Pa.T. refused to see his father, and neither she nor P.T. forced visitation.
    A.W. described that during their shared custody arrangement from January 2007 until
    December 2013, Pa.T. suffered from asthma and gastrointestinal (GI) upset related to
    anxiety, for which he treated with Pediatric Alliance, P.C. (Pediatric Alliance). She
    declared that, for periodic asthma flare-ups, Pa.T. has a rescue inhaler, and he uses a
    nebulizer for more serious episodes. A.W. explained that Pa.T. would get upset and
    experience stomach issues with resultant diarrhea. A.W. further reported that Pa.T.
    takes probiotics for his stomach, which helps.
    A.W. said that since November 2013, Pa.T. has had minimal contact
    with P.T. and, with the exception of a stomach condition at the end of the prior school
    year,7 Pa.T. did not have any stomach issues until the week before the hearing. A.W.
    also described that when Pa.T. gets anxious,
    [h]is personality completely changes. He doesn’t sleep
    well. He gets dark circles under his eyes. [He b]ecomes
    more wanting to just stay home and not be involved with
    his friends. Just his whole personality changes, and he used
    to pick at his hands when he’d get nervous and his lips.
    You just see changes in him.
    Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a. She related Pa.T.’s anxiety to P.T.’s behavior.
    A.W. recounted P.T. pulling on Pa.T.’s football helmet and calling him
    names in front of her and other parents; referring to A.W. as a “f***ing c**t” and a
    7
    A.W. related that Pa.T.’s doctors thought the stomach pains may have been due to an
    appendicitis; however, despite several tests, the cause was never established, and the pains
    eventually subsided.
    4
    “wh**re” in front of Pa.T.; making derogatory comments about A.W.’s family;
    referring to Pa.T.’s half-brother T.W. as a love child; getting Pa.T. a dog to break him
    of his allergies;8 giving Pa.T. long lists of chores, including mowing (without a self-
    propelled mower) and picking up dog waste, while his friends were visiting; calling
    Pa.T. weak, a “p*ssy” or a “Sally”; and, referring to Pa.T. as a “f*g” because he likes
    to draw. R.R. at 14a-15a. A.W. also asserted that Pa.T. was forced to make his own
    breakfast and lunch, do his own laundry, clean the boat and the pool, and his friends
    no longer wanted to go to P.T.’s house. She claimed that P.T. refused to help Pa.T.
    with his homework, would not accept that Pa.T. suffered from asthma, and would not
    allow Pa.T. to have a moment’s rest.
    A.W. asserted that, in December 2012, P.T. struck Pa.T. for peeking at
    his Christmas presents and, as a result, the court issued an order prohibiting P.T. from
    using corporal punishment with Pa.T. A.W. also recalled that, early in November
    2013, Pa.T. called from P.T.’s house and told her he was sick, but P.T. refused to help
    him. She stated that she took Pa.T. to the doctor, where he was diagnosed with
    pneumonia.      Pa.T. missed school and spent two to three weeks with her as he
    recovered. A.W. claimed that thereafter Pa.T. no longer wanted to see P.T.
    A.W. described that Pa.T. attempted to retrieve his ski equipment from
    P.T. on December 12, 2013 so he could go on a ski club trip, but P.T. refused to give
    it to him and the police were called. She testified further that P.T. cancelled Pa.T.’s
    ski pass, forcing A.W. to re-purchase equipment and a ski pass for Pa.T.’s trip. She
    recounted that Pa.T. had stress-related diarrhea for several days thereafter, although
    he still attended the ski trip. A.W. acknowledged that P.T. sent Pa.T. texts after
    December 13, 2013 – some of which were nice and others that were not. She related
    that P.T. texted a photo of Pa.T.’s dog Roxy with the message: “Some of us miss you.
    8
    A.W. admitted that she too has a dog, but explained that the dog is “a non-shedding, no[-
    ]dander hair dog.” R.R. at 23a.
    5
    Still looking for you. Love you. Miss you,” and a photo of Pa.T.’s cousins in front
    of the Christmas tree. R.R. at 25a. At some point, A.W. responded to P.T.: “You
    need serious help. You are so abusive to Pa.[T.]” R.R. at 24a. On December 16,
    2013, A.W. took Pa.T. to see his pediatrician, Edwin B. King, M.D. (Dr. King),
    regarding his diarrhea.
    A.W. acknowledged that she lived at approximately five different
    addresses between 2007 and 2013. During this time period she lived with her fiancé
    J.V. and his sons for three years, and her younger son T.W.’s father K.D. for a time.
    A.W. testified that Pa.T. never expressed anxiety due to their living arrangements.
    CYS presented clinical psychologist Jennifer Eldridge, Ph.D. (Dr.
    Eldridge),9 who testified that she provided individual and family counseling in 2007
    for Pa.T. pursuant to a court order because his parents’ co-parenting difficulties
    “plac[ed] him under distress.” R.R. at 41a. Dr. Eldridge recalled treating Pa.T. twice
    9
    Section 5986(b) of the Judicial Code provides, in pertinent part:
    In order to make a finding . . . that the child is unavailable as a
    witness, the court must determine, based on evidence presented to it,
    that testimony by the child as a witness will result in the child
    suffering serious emotional distress that would substantially impair
    the child’s ability to reasonably communicate. In making this
    determination, the court may do all of the following:
    (1) Observe and question the child, either inside or outside the
    courtroom.
    (2) Hear testimony of a parent or custodian or any other person, such
    as a person who has dealt with the child in a medical or therapeutic
    setting.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 5986(b).
    As the hearing commenced, Dr. Eldridge represented that, based upon her observations,
    Pa.T. was unavailable to testify because of the extreme emotional reaction he would have to the
    proceeding. Upon witnessing Pa.T.’s breakdown (i.e., consisting of crying and inability to speak) at
    the mention of seeing his father, the ALJ agreed with Dr. Eldridge, and ruled that Pa.T. was
    unavailable. See R.R. at 5a-12a; see also P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 10-11.
    6
    a month from 2007, but after her 2009 maternity leave, she provided services on an
    as-needed basis, “pretty much based on Pa.[T.]’s level of distress.” R.R. at 41a. Dr.
    Eldridge explained that she primarily saw Pa.T. alone, but met with the parents for a
    brief time at each session, and also occasionally held family counseling sessions.
    Dr. Eldridge described becoming particularly concerned for Pa.T.’s well-
    being in 2013 when Pa.T. was distressed after a physical altercation with P.T. during
    Christmas 2012 that led to a court order prohibiting P.T. from using corporal
    punishment. She further articulated that Pa.T. suffered bouts of diarrhea and stomach
    problems related to P.T.’s behavior in 2013. Dr. Eldridge stated that she met with
    P.T. and Pa.T. on several occasions, and advised P.T. not to speak negatively about
    A.W., or discuss custody or support issues with Pa.T. She also recommended that
    P.T. seek individual counseling because he was obviously very stressed. As far as
    she was aware, P.T. did not use corporal punishment after issuance of the court order,
    and Pa.T. wished to maintain a relationship with P.T.
    Dr. Eldridge reported that things appeared better for Pa.T. and she did
    not see him until fall 2013, when “[Pa.T.’s] GI issues were horrible.                    He had
    pneumonia. He seemed physically exhausted[.]” R.R. at 42a. She explained:
    [P.T.] no longer agreed to come to family sessions after
    some time in the spring, and he had written an e-mail
    accusing me of not calling [CYS] on [A.W.,] . . . saying that
    [A.W.] had Munchausen’s[10] and was making all kinds of
    allegations against [A.W.], but I never had any concern that
    [A.W.] was abusing Pa.[T.], so I never called [CYS], but
    [P.T.] took it like we didn’t have an allegiance then
    somehow . . . and so I didn’t see him again.
    10
    “Munchausen syndrome by proxy is a mental illness and a form of child abuse. The
    caretaker of a child, usually a mother, either makes up fake symptoms or causes real symptoms to
    make it look like the child is sick.” https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001555.htm.
    7
    R.R. at 42a. However, during that time Dr. Eldridge noted Pa.T. struggled with
    algebra and a strict teacher, for which she wrote a recommendation for Pa.T. to be
    transferred to a less challenging class.
    Dr. Eldridge described Pa.T.’s concern about P.T’s complaints that he
    could no longer use corporal punishment, and being fearful of P.T.’s unpredictable
    daily mood changes, specifically whether P.T.
    was going to be really hard on him and belligerent toward
    him and make him do all kinds of chores and redo the
    chores or criticize him about homework or predict that he
    was going to be a failure because of something he wasn’t
    doing or should have done better.
    R.R. at 42a. She also noted Pa.T.’s concerns regarding: P.T’s warnings that A.W.
    may poison him, having to do chores (i.e., mowing and re-mowing the lawn) while
    his friends were visiting, being negatively compared to A.W., nearly being hit by a
    wine rack, being taken along to make child support payments, having snot blown on
    him in the car, a scene being made over retrieving his ski equipment for a school trip,
    and being criticized for his school and sports performances.                    Dr. Eldridge
    acknowledged that in 2013, Pa.T. did not have physical symptoms when she saw him
    in March, and although he did when she next treated him on September 24, 2013, his
    physical condition was better at the follow-up visit on December 19, 2013. Dr.
    Eldridge recounted that Pa.T.’s pneumonia gave him time away from P.T.                      Dr.
    Eldridge ultimately diagnosed Pa.T. with anxiety disorder.
    Dr. King testified that he was one of several pediatricians at Pediatric
    Alliance who treated Pa.T. since at least 2002, when Pa.T. was diagnosed with
    chronic allergies and asthma. During the relevant time period, Dr. King personally
    treated Pa.T. in 2007 and not again until December 16, 2013.11 Dr. King specifically
    11
    Pa.T. was not a patient at Pediatric Alliance from 2007 to 2011, during which time his
    care was by another provider.
    8
    recalled treating Pa.T. on December 16, 2013 for watery diarrhea and rectal irritation
    which Pa.T. had for four days. Dr. King recalled the impression that A.W. “was
    accustomed to the diarrhea[,] but was coming . . . to see if [he] could do something
    about it.” R.R. at 33a. He disclosed that because his examination did not reveal an
    organic or physical cause, he explored the possibility of an emotional cause.
    Dr. King recorded that A.W. told him the diarrhea was related to anxiety
    Pa.T. experienced related to contact with P.T. Dr. King noted in his report that a
    “significant outlier” during that visit was that Pa.T. did not receive a birthday present
    from P.T. because “he did not deserve it.” R.R. at 29a. Dr. King acknowledged
    notations in his report based upon information A.W. provided, including that: P.T.
    has fought Pa.T.’s asthma diagnosis, P.T. bought a dog to break Pa.T. of his asthma,
    P.T. is known to various community members to make loud and inappropriate
    comments at football events, P.T. calls kids names, P.T. discontinued Pa.T.’s ski
    pass, Pa.T.’s grades are poor, court ordered time with P.T., P.T knows not to leave
    marks, P.T. texted Pa.T. pictures of spanking, and P.T. threatened to call radio station
    KDKA about Dr. Eldridge.
    When asked whether Pa.T. was the victim of abuse, Dr. King declared:
    My opinion would be that [Pa.T.] was [at] high risk,
    meaning the information that I gathered significantly had
    merit statistically, that there was a very, in my mind, yes,
    very high risk that [Pa.T.’s] diarrhea was because of anxiety
    and his anxiety was because of [P.T.’s] statements that I
    was hearing.
    ....
    I documented, ‘[Pa.T.] is fairly terrified,’ meaning, in my
    opinion, he was showing . . . physical signs of agitation.
    And, then I put, quote, ‘When I go to see dad, he won’t let
    me out[.]’
    9
    R.R. at 30a. Dr. King expressed his concern that Pa.T. had a “predictable illness
    [diarrhea] secondary to emotional abuse.”              R.R. at 37a.       Therefore, Dr. King
    concluded “that [Pa.T.] shouldn’t be exposed to [P.T.] until we find out if [Pa.T.’s]
    diarrhea is related.” R.R. at 30a. Dr. King testified that, due to the serious nature of
    what he observed on December 16, 2013, and in an effort to be thorough and not rely
    solely on one party’s story, he obtained a release from A.W. and contacted Dr.
    Eldridge.
    Dr. King opined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
    since Pa.T. did not see P.T. or treat for ongoing diarrhea thereafter, Pa.T.’s anxiety-
    based diarrhea was related to contact with P.T. See R.R. at 31a. When asked
    whether “a mother moving in with different men who are not married and having a
    child with one of those men” could be a cause of anxiety-induced diarrhea in a child,
    Dr. King responded:
    Pretty much anything a child would have to adjust to, any
    major changes. Your question pertains to textbook anxiety
    and adjustment and irritable bowel, so anytime that the
    patient has to adjust to anything, any change, if they have
    any underlying anxiety, it’s exacerbated by major changes.
    So that would be a more detailed question . . . for the patient
    because what children are anxious to is very specific.
    One child could be anxious to one thing that totally does not
    bother another child. So your question is could it be related
    to that? Yeah, it could be related to just about anything.
    R.R. at 39a. Dr. King further admitted that Pa.T.’s anxiety-induced diarrhea was
    not chronic, and was not recorded in Pa.T.’s records after his December 16, 2013
    visit.12 See R.R. at 39a.
    12
    Dr. King acknowledged that although Pa.T. was treated at Pediatric Alliance in March
    2014 for a sinus infection and gastroenteritis accompanied by diarrhea, that episode was related to
    an infection rather than anxiety.
    10
    CYS caseworker A. Beck (Beck)13 testified that she investigated the
    report that P.T. was abusing Pa.T. She described interviewing Pa.T., A.W., Dr. King,
    Dr. Eldridge and P.T.14 She specifically recalled A.W. reporting P.T.’s verbal abuse
    of Pa.T. that made Pa.T. ill,15 Dr. King telling her that Pa.T. presented to him with
    complaints of severe diarrhea, Dr. Eldridge describing that Pa.T. suffered from
    anxiety for about four years due to P.T.’s behavior, and P.T. denying any abuse. She
    explained that she always assumes the child is telling the truth and, since the
    information she received from Dr. King, Dr. Eldridge and A.W. correlated with
    Pa.T.’s statement, she completed a DHS Form CY-48 (Child Protective Service
    Investigation Report), see R.R. at 77a-78a, in which she represented that there was
    substantial evidence that P.T. emotionally abused Pa.T. Beck acknowledged that she
    was not aware of any claim of a serious interference with Pa.T.’s ability to
    accomplish age-appropriate developmental and social tasks. See R.R. at 59a.
    In defense, P.T. produced records and testified16 that he texted and/or
    sent Pa.T. photos daily from summer 2013 through December 2013. He recalled that
    after sending a photo of Pa.T.’s cousins with the Christmas tree, Pa.T. responded with
    an uncharacteristically-worded message and then concluded: “That’s messed up.
    You’re being abusive.” R.R. at 97a.
    P.T. admitted that in December 2012 he discovered Pa.T. sneaking into
    P.T.’s closet and opening his Christmas presents after he had been told several times
    to stay out of the closet, and he “made a mistake,” R.R. at 104a, and “[he] grabbed
    13
    The ALJ’s adjudication misstates that CYS caseworker Maria Garcia testified for CYS.
    See P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 5.
    14
    Beck also interviewed Pa.T.’s Godmother and cousin, C.H., who was present when Beck
    spoke with P.T.
    15
    Beck could not recall the specifics of what A.W. told her.
    16
    P.T. also provided testimony from P.M. (Pa.T.’s former wrestling coach), C.H. (Pa.T.’s
    Godmother/cousin), K.V. (P.T.’s friend), and neighbors Li.D. and K.B. The ALJ did not make
    specific findings regarding their testimony.
    11
    him and [he] sen[t] him to his room and, as [Pa.T.] was walking through the room,
    [he] gave him a kick in the butt with [his] foot.” R.R. at 105a. He admitted that “[he]
    could have handled that better.” R.R. at 105a.      P.T. related that there was a CYS
    complaint filed against him for that incident and, despite that it was deemed
    unfounded, a court order was issued prohibiting corporal punishment against Pa.T.
    He pronounced that Pa.T. did not seem to be disturbed by the incident, even going so
    far as to switch visitation dates so he could go skiing with P.T., and they took a ski
    trip to Colorado together in March 2013. P.T. declared that, shortly after that, in May
    or April 2013, Pa.T. was distressed because Pa.T. had been listed as a witness to
    testify in support of a CYS report against T.W.’s father.
    In regards to the summer 2013 wine rack incident, P.T. stated that the
    rack fell over when he bumped it with the door, but that Pa.T. was in an adjoining
    room and was in no danger of being hurt. Relative to math, P.T. stated that Pa.T. was
    in honors math beginning September 2013, but began earning Cs and complaining
    that the teacher was too hard. P.T. asserted that Pa.T. needed to put in more effort,
    and worked with him to improve, but then P.T. received notice that Pa.T. had been
    transferred to a lower level math class. He admitted that he emailed Dr. Eldridge
    regarding his objection to her recommendation to transfer Pa.T. He also notified Dr.
    Eldridge that A.W. moved her and Pa.T.’s home 11 times in 12 years, and that Pa.T.
    was going to have to testify at CYS proceedings related to his half-brother. P.T.
    explained that he did not refuse to see Dr. Eldridge with Pa.T., but that since only
    A.W. was authorized by court order to handle Pa.T.’s medical affairs, he would have
    been held in contempt.
    With respect to the December 2013 ski equipment incident, P.T. testified
    that since Pa.T. had missed approximately three weeks of school in November due to
    his pneumonia, and had a significant amount of homework and 13 tests to make up
    before the Christmas break, he did not think it was appropriate for Pa.T. to take an
    12
    entire weekend away for a ski trip. He related that the police were called to his home
    when A.W. attempted to get the equipment, but it was because she was sitting in her
    car incessantly honking the horn and a neighbor complained. He said he saw Pa.T.
    skiing that weekend, and he looked fine, but yet Pa.T. reported to the doctor just days
    later that he had watery diarrhea for those four days.
    P.T. averred that Pa.T. never expressed to P.T. that he was stressed or
    nervous, or had stomach issues or diarrhea. He claimed that during the ski equipment
    incident, Pa.T. expressed to P.T. his stress about his mother moving in with her
    boyfriend. P.T. asserted that he never degraded Pa.T., either during sports or any
    other time. Rather, they had spent significant time boating, water skiing, swimming,
    riding motor cross, playing ball, skiing and wrestling. He stated that Pa.T. was an
    amazing athlete. P.T. admitted that he and A.W. disagreed about sports, and that
    Pa.T. has quit all of his activities and sits alone at lunchtime in school. He was aware
    that A.W. blocked him, Pa.T.’s relatives and friends from his phone, thereby
    alienating him from everyone. He further expressed that he liked when Pa.T. was
    busy outside, rather than playing video games inside, so he limited screen time. P.T.
    reported that he has always given Pa.T. what he wanted and has never failed to give
    him birthday presents.
    P.T. denied that he ever spoke about A.W. in the manner she claimed,
    and specified that a February 2013 court order, that P.T. sought, prohibited both
    parents from saying anything disparaging about the other, and from involving Pa.T.
    in support, custody or financial discussions. He acknowledged that Pa.T. had chores
    to do at his house, including mowing the lawn with a riding mower. He related that,
    on one occasion, when Pa.T. failed to put the grass collector on the lawn mower as he
    mowed, which left clippings in the yard, he made Pa.T. go back and pick up the
    grass. P.T. also recalled making Pa.T. clean out the boat after a trip, and requiring
    that Pa.T. and his friends clean up after themselves when they finished in the pool.
    13
    He stated that Pa.T. did not have to clean the pool, since they have a machine that
    does it, but he had instructed Pa.T. to put the machine in the pool. He maintained that
    Pa.T. did not make his own breakfast, nor did his own laundry, except for putting his
    clean clothes away; however, he may have made his own lunch on occasion. P.T.
    recalled Pa.T. complaining about having to do chores at P.T’s house, that he does not
    have to do at A.W.’s house. He explained that, with the exception of one of Pa.T.’s
    friends who was asked to leave when he was disrespectful to P.T., Pa.T.’s friends
    were welcome at P.T.’s home and still use the pool.
    Psychologist Foster Hutchinson, Ph.D. (Dr. Hutchinson) testified that he
    treated P.T. from September to December 2002, also from May to September 2007,
    and then again in January 2014.17 Dr. Hutchinson described that the general theme of
    their 2007 sessions was “trying to assist [P.T.] with the emotional distress he was
    experiencing with ongoing divorce and child custody proceedings,” R.R. at 64a, and
    P.T.’s paternity. See R.R. at 69a. Dr. Hutchinson described that P.T.’s relationship
    with Pa.T. in 2007 was positive, that they engaged in a number of activities together,
    especially Pa.T.’s sports.
    Dr. Hutchinson reported P.T. being concerned in 2007 that Pa.T. was not
    exerting enough effort in sports or at school, and that P.T.’s frustration led them to
    argue. He also recounted that P.T. believed A.W. was undermining P.T.’s credibility
    and allowing Pa.T. “to get out of things and to essentially, in his opinion,
    underperform relative to his potential.” R.R. at 67a. Dr. Hutchinson declared that, in
    2007, he diagnosed P.T. with dysthymic mood disorder, “which is a . . . long-term,
    chronic mood disorder[.]” R.R. at 67a. Dr. Hutchinson opined that P.T.
    17
    According to Dr. Hutchinson’s testimony, P.T. also treated with him several times in
    2008, but those sessions pertained to P.T.’s relationship with his then-girlfriend, rather than A.W. or
    Pa.T. See R.R. at 66a, 68a.
    14
    would be capable, as a result of his intensity and his
    motivation for his son to excel, to say things to his son in an
    attempt to motivate him to perform up to his potential that
    could have the undesired effect of putting additional
    pressure and stress on a son.
    In my professional opinion, I would not define that as []
    imposing psychological or mental abuse, but I do believe
    that some of the episodes that had been related to me had a
    level of intensity in attempting to have an influence on his
    son that could certainly have created moderate, at least,
    levels of stress for Pa.[T.].
    R.R. at 67a; see also R.R. at 69a. Dr. Hutchinson related that his two January 2014
    sessions with P.T. had a great deal to do with stress P.T. experienced over the
    December 2012 incident with Pa.T., A.W.’s relationships and whether P.T. should
    walk away or fight to maintain his relationship with Pa.T.
    The BHA adopted, in their entirety, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions,
    wherein the testimony of Dr. King, Dr. Eldridge and Dr. Hutchinson was deemed
    credible. The ALJ also found during her observations of P.T. at the hearing, that
    “[h]e was intense and at times he could hardly contain himself,” particularly during
    A.W.’s testimony. P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 13. The ALJ further declared that
    “[t]here is no question regarding causation.”      P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 13.
    However, the ALJ acknowledged that P.T.’s “behavior toward [Pa.T.] was not
    sufficient to show [P.T.] actually caused [Pa.T.] a serious mental injury.” P.T. Br.
    App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 14.
    Moreover, the ALJ and, the BHA by adopting the same, determined that
    CYS failed to meet its burden of proving any of the three conditions which constitute
    “serious mental injury” under the Law.         Relative to the first part of Section
    6303(a)(1) of the Law which mandates that there be a physician or psychologist (i.e.,
    medically)-diagnosed psychological condition rendering the child “chronically and
    severely anxious, agitated, depressed, socially withdrawn, [and/or] psychotic,” the
    15
    ALJ declared that “[a] chronic condition is one that is marked by long duration, by
    frequent recurrence over a long time, and often by slowly progressing seriousness.
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 402 (2002),” and held that since
    neither Dr. King nor Dr. Eldridge diagnosed Pa.T.’s condition as chronic, and
    Pa.T. quickly recovered once he stopped seeing P.T., “[Pa.T.]’s condition is not
    chronic[.]” P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 14.
    With respect to the second part of Section 6303(a)(1) of the Law, which
    requires the presence of a medically-diagnosed psychological condition rendering the
    child in “reasonable fear that [his] life or safety is threatened”, the ALJ held: “There
    was no evidence to suggest [P.T.]’s conduct caused [Pa.T.] reasonable fear that
    his life or safety was threatened.” P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 14 (emphasis
    added).
    Relative to the requirement in Section 6303(a)(2) of the Law that there
    exist a medically-diagnosed psychological condition that “seriously interferes with a
    child’s ability to accomplish age-appropriate developmental and social tasks[,]” the
    ALJ held:
    CYS did not demonstrate sufficient facts under
    subsection (2) that [Pa.T.]’s condition caused a serious
    interference with his           ability   to    accomplish
    developmental and social tasks appropriate for his age.
    In December 2013, [Pa.T.] chose to no longer see [P.T.]
    Since that time, [Pa.T.] has been living with [A.W.] and
    according to Dr. King and Dr. Eldridge[,] he is better
    physically and mentally. There was some testimony offered
    demonstrating that during the time period in question[,
    Pa.T.] had to plan activities around his ability to access a
    bathroom due to the GI issues that were manifesting from
    his anxiety disorder. However, [Pa.T.] did continue to
    participate in those activities and there is no evidence to
    show [Pa.T.] at this point is anything but a normal 14-
    year-old boy. Although [Pa.T.]’s grades did suffer a bit,
    and he had to change math classes in the fall of 2013, he
    still regularly attends school and he continues to ski.
    16
    Hence, the evidence fails to demonstrate that his condition
    severely interfered with his developmental and social tasks
    appropriate for his age.
    P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
    Accordingly, the BHA also adopted the ALJ’s conclusion:
    CYS did not present substantial evidence that [P.T.]’s
    abusive behavior caused [Pa.T.] a serious mental injury.
    Therefore, [CYS] has not been able to present substantial
    evidence to support its decision to file an indicated report of
    child abuse against [P.T].        Accordingly, for all the
    foregoing reasons, the [ALJ] recommends the appeal of
    [P.T.] be sustained.
    P.T. Br. App. 1, ALJ Adj. at 14 (emphasis added).
    “In expungement proceedings, [the BHA] is the ultimate fact finder with
    authority to make determinations of credibility.” F.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    4 A.3d 779
    , 781 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); see also J.M. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    52 A.3d 552
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “If the Secretary does not reverse any facts found by
    the hearing officer, these findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are binding
    on this Court.” 1st Steps Int’l Adoptions, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    880 A.2d 24
    ,
    28 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). “It goes without saying that an appellate court may not
    find facts or reweigh the evidence.”           
    S.H., 96 A.3d at 455
    .      Accordingly,
    “[d]eterminations as to credibility and evidentiary weight will not be disturbed on
    appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” F.V.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    987 A.2d 223
    , 228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citation omitted).
    Here, the Secretary did not make new findings of fact or credibility
    determinations, but rather adopted the BHA’s adopted findings. Notwithstanding, the
    Secretary set aside the BHA’s decision and reinstated P.T.’s indicated report, stating
    only:
    Based upon the relatively detailed findings of fact within
    the [A]djudication and a review of the hearing
    17
    transcript, I find that [CYS] has met its burden of proof
    by substantial evidence that [DHS] is maintaining an
    indicated report of child abuse against [P.T.] in a manner
    which is consistent with [DHS’ R]egulations.
    P.T. Br. App. 2, Final Order (emphasis added).            Because the Secretary arrived at a
    different conclusion based on the same findings of fact, the issue is whether, based
    upon the ALJ’s findings, the Secretary erred as a matter of law by reinstating P.T.’s
    indicated report on the ChildLine Registry.
    Based upon our review of the record, we agree that P.T.’s parenting may
    have caused Pa.T. distress, as well as A.W. moving numerous times with Pa.T. and
    living with different men. However, we disagree that, as a matter of law, CYS has
    proven that Pa.T. has a “serious mental injury” under the Law. Specifically, CYS
    failed to offer any evidence to prove that Pa.T. has a medically-diagnosed
    psychological condition rendering Pa.T. in “reasonable fear that [his] life or
    safety is threatened,” as required by the second portion of Section 6303(a)(1) of
    the Law.       CYS also failed to prove that Pa.T. has a medically-diagnosed
    psychological condition that “seriously interferes with [his] ability to accomplish age-
    appropriate developmental and social tasks” as required by Section 6303(a)(2) of the
    Law. Accordingly, the Secretary erred in setting aside BHA’s decision when CYS, as
    a matter of law, did not meet its burden of proof.18
    We also find no record evidence that establishes that Pa.T. has “[a]
    psychological condition . . . that . . . renders [Pa.T.] chronically and severely
    anxious,” as is legally required to establish that P.T. has inflicted “serious mental
    injury.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1); see also 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4. Although the Law
    does not define the term “chronic,” this Court has held that “[w]here a court needs to
    define an undefined term, it may consult definitions in statutes, regulations or the
    18
    We are not convinced based upon the evidence proffered that Pa.T.’s difficulties in math
    and/or his math class transfer are related in any way to P.T.’s conduct.
    18
    dictionary for guidance, although such definitions are not controlling.”     Adams
    Outdoor Adver., LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Smithfield Twp., 
    909 A.2d 469
    , 483
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (emphasis added). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
    (11th ed 2004) defines “chronic” as “marked by long duration or frequent recurrence:
    not acute[.]” 
    Id. at 221.
                 By all accounts, the stomach condition and diarrhea that accompanied
    Pa.T.’s anxiety was not an ongoing condition, but rather was a condition he
    experienced only sometimes while in P.T.’s presence. Neither Dr. King (based upon
    his single treatment of Pa.T. in 2013) nor Dr. Eldridge (based upon Pa.T.’s March,
    September and December 2013 treatments) diagnosed that Pa.T. had a chronic
    condition as required under the Law. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1); see also 55 Pa.
    Code § 3490.4.
    In Luzerne County Children and Youth Services v. Department of Public
    Welfare, 
    550 A.2d 604
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), this Court held:
    CYS presented the testimony of T.H.’s treating psychiatrist,
    Dr. Anthony Denaro. Dr. Denaro testified that T.H. did not
    want to return home because he felt a strong aversion to
    C.H. Notes of Testimony at 60. Dr. Denaro also testified
    that this aversion arose out of C.H.’s attempts to impose
    greater discipline and supervision over T.H. than he was
    accustomed to before Mr. H.’s remarriage to C.H. . . .
    Although Dr. Denaro testified that, of the two, C.H. was
    more responsible for the breakdown in their relations, the
    witness did not state that C.H. caused serious mental
    injury to T.H. nor that C.H. caused the child to attempt
    suicide. N.T. at 63. Finally, the psychiatrist testified that
    returning T.H. to the home of Mr. H. and C.H. would place
    T.H. at a risk of serious mental injury.
    CYS also presented the testimony of Linda Goldner, T.H.’s
    individual and family therapist at the hospital. Ms. Goldner
    testified that the relationship between C.H. and T.H. was
    dysfunctional, that C.H. did not want to visit T.H. in the
    hospital, and that Mr. H. and C.H. refused a pass to allow
    19
    T.H. to visit at home prior to his discharge. N.T. at 49, 51-
    52. K.A.F., T.H.’s natural mother, testified that she has not
    experienced any behavioral problems with T.H. since he
    has come to live with her. N.T. at 113.
    After careful review of the record in this case, we conclude
    that the hearing officer properly determined that CYS had
    not met its burden of proving that C.H. had engaged in any
    acts or omissions which caused serious mental injury to
    T.H. The evidence presented demonstrates only that
    T.H. had a strong aversion to C.H. based upon C.H.’s
    mere presence in the home and her attempts to impose more
    discipline and supervision upon T.H. Section 2 of the
    Law[19] specifically states that the Law’s provisions shall
    not be construed to restrict the generally[-]recognized
    existing rights of parents to use reasonable supervision and
    control when raising their children. 11 P.S. § 2202. While
    we are aware that returning T.H. to the home of Mr. H. and
    C.H. may have placed T.H. at a risk of serious mental
    injury and further deterioration, this alone is not
    substantial evidence that C.H. was the perpetrator of
    child abuse against T.H.
    
    Id. at 606-07
    (footnote omitted; bold emphasis added).
    In V.M., Sr. v. Department of Public Welfare (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1837
    C.D. 2007, filed April 15, 2008),20 this Court, citing Luzerne County, similarly held:
    More specifically, in assessing V.M., Jr.’s condition, Dr.
    Kelly noted in his May 26, 2005 report that V.M., Jr.’s
    ‘[p]ast history of fecal impaction, fecal incontinence, and
    rectal pain have all normalized.’ Exhibit A–2 at 3. Dr.
    Kelly noted that V.M., Jr. ‘does have soiling of his
    underclothing in association with emotional distress.’ 
    Id. However he
    also noted that ‘[t]his is actually compatible
    with irritable bowel syndrome . . . ’ and that ‘[h]e is
    otherwise without symptoms and he is gaining and growing
    at the 90th percentile for his weight and the 25th for his
    19
    Section 2 of the former Child Protective Services Law, Act of November 26, 1975, P.L.
    438, as amended, repealed by Section 6 of the Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240.
    20
    This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may not be cited as binding precedent;
    however, they may be cited “for [their] persuasive value[.]” Section 414 of the Commonwealth
    Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. V.M. is cited herein for its persuasive value.
    20
    height.’ 
    Id. In addition,
    in his September 13, 2005 report,
    Dr. Kelly noted that V.M., Jr. ‘admits that the soiling occurs
    in association with his visits with his father . . .’, that ‘[t]his
    is consistent with irritable bowel syndrome . . . ’, and that
    ‘[d]espite his symptoms his growth parameters continue to
    advance well.’ 
    Id. at 5.
                  It is true that Dr. Kelly initially recommended that V.M., Jr.
    seek counseling, and that he subsequently recommended
    that V.M., Jr. continue his ‘counseling for his feelings of
    anxiety and depression.’ 
    Id. However, nowhere
    in either
    of these reports does Dr. Kelly diagnose V.M., Jr. as
    suffering from any psychological condition that renders
    him ‘chronically and severely anxious, agitated,
    depressed, socially withdrawn, psychotic or in reasonable
    fear that the child’s life or safety is threatened . . . ’ as
    required under the Law. Likewise, nowhere in either of
    these reports, does Dr. Kelly diagnose V.M., Jr. as
    suffering from a psychological condition that ‘seriously
    interfere[d] with [his] ability to accomplish age-
    appropriate developmental and social tasks . . . ’ as
    required under the Law.
    V.M., slip op. at 3-4 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
    More recently, in B.B. v. Department of Public Welfare (Pa. Cmwlth.
    No. 1214 C.D. 2009, filed March 22, 2010),21 citing Luzerne County, this Court held:
    We do not condone B.B.’s use of abusive language to C.B.
    even during heated arguments. Indeed, we have no quarrel
    with CYS’s removal of C.B. from B.B.’s custody in light of
    her abusive behavior, which undoubtedly could lead to
    chronic psychological problems. However, her abusive
    verbal behavior alone is insufficient to establish that she
    actually did cause a serious mental injury to C.B. As
    Cochran conceded, C.B.’s psychological condition was
    transient, not chronic as required by Section 6303(a) of
    the Law. C.B. did not receive treatment for his condition
    and quickly recovered from it once he started living with his
    paternal grandmother and father. The evidence also fails to
    demonstrate that his condition severely interfered with his
    developmental and social tasks appropriate for his age.
    21
    B.B. is cited herein for its persuasive value, pursuant to Section 414 of the Commonwealth
    Court’s Internal Operating Procedures.
    21
    Although B.B. told Dr. Cochran that his grades suffered ‘a
    little bit,’ he testified that his schoolwork was ‘not really’
    affected while he was in B.B.’s custody; he continued to
    participate in many sport and music activities and ‘regularly
    attend[ed] the youth group’ events. R.R. at 10a, 13a and
    107a. CYS did not allege, and nothing in the record
    suggests, that B.B.’s conduct placed him in reasonable fear
    that his life or safety was threatened.
    B.B., slip op. at 6 (bold emphasis added).
    “[N]owhere . . . [is there any evidence that Pa.T. is] suffering from any
    psychological condition that renders him ‘chronically and severely anxious, agitated,
    depressed, socially withdrawn, psychotic or in reasonable fear that [his] life or safety
    is threatened . . . ’ as required under the Law.” V.M., slip op. at 4. Thus, here,
    [a]s in in Luzerne County, the evidence presented by CYS is
    insufficient to establish that [P.T.]’s conduct, however
    hurtful and inappropriate, caused a serious mental injury to
    [Pa.T.], as defined by the Law. Because the record
    establishes that CYS failed to meet its burden of proving
    that [P.T.] was the perpetrator of child abuse, []he is entitled
    to have the indicated report expunged pursuant to Section
    6341 of the Law. . . .
    B.B., slip op. at 7.
    Therefore, the Secretary’s Final Order is contrary to the Law.
    Accordingly, the Secretary’s Final Order is reversed and the case is remanded for
    DHS to expunge from the ChildLine Registry the indicated report of child abuse
    naming P.T. as a perpetrator.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    22
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    P.T.,                                        :   SEALED CASE
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    Department of Human Services,                :   No. 851 C.D. 2015
    Respondent             :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 4th day of May, 2016, the Department of Human
    Services (DHS) Secretary’s May 5, 2015 Final Order is reversed, and the case is
    remanded for DHS to expunge from the ChildLine & Abuse Registry the indicated
    report of child abuse naming P.T. as a perpetrator.
    Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge