T. Baxter v. PA BPP ( 2016 )


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  •         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Terance Baxter,                           :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                           :   No. 1736 C.D. 2015
    :   Submitted: February 19, 2016
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation           :
    and Parole,                               :
    Respondent        :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE SIMPSON                          FILED: May 16, 2016
    Terance Baxter (Inmate) petitions for review of an order of the
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying his administrative
    appeal of a Board order that recommitted him as a parole violator and recalculated
    his maximum sentence date. Inmate contends the Board incorrectly dismissed the
    portion of his administrative appeal in which he objected to the timeliness of his
    revocation hearing. He further asserts the Board erred in failing to give him credit
    for time served, and he questions the Board’s authority to correct a clerical error in
    his maximum sentence date. Upon review, we affirm.
    I. Background
    In December 1997, the Board paroled Inmate from a five to 20 year
    state sentence for burglary. At the time of this parole Inmate’s maximum sentence
    date was May 18, 2011.        Thereafter, the Board declared Inmate delinquent.
    Following arrest, Inmate was recommitted as a technical parole violator, and the
    Board recalculated his maximum sentence date as February 26, 2012. Certified
    Record (C.R.) at 23, 27-28.
    The Board reparoled Inmate in April 2000. While on this second
    parole, Inmate was arrested and convicted of new crimes.             He was then
    recommitted as a convicted parole violator and ordered to serve 12 months
    backtime. The Board recalculated Inmate’s maximum sentence date as March 1,
    2014. C.R. at 35-36, 38.
    Thereafter, the Board paroled Inmate for a third time in October 2003.
    In June 2006, however, Inmate was arrested on significant federal drug charges,
    and he was detained on the new federal criminal charges, without bail. Moreover,
    based on circumstances surrounding his new arrest, the Board issued a warrant to
    commit and detain Inmate for technical violations of his third parole. C.R. at 46-
    49.
    Ultimately, Inmate pled guilty and was sentenced on the federal
    charges to a term of five to 20 years in federal prison. C.R. at 66, 120-21. This
    conviction also subjected Inmate to sanctions as a convicted violator of his third
    parole. The disposition of the parole violations of Inmate’s third parole are at the
    center of this appeal.
    As to the parole violation charges, a revocation/recommitment hearing
    was held on June 14, 2007. The hearing took place at the Allegheny County
    prison, and Inmate was present and represented by counsel. C.R. at 97-118.
    2
    Counsel did not object to the timeliness of the hearing. By decision entered July
    10, 2007, and mailed July 16, 2007, the Board recommitted Inmate as a technical
    and convicted parole violator “when available.” C.R. at 120-21. The Board’s
    recommitment decision did not set forth a recalculated maximum sentence date
    because Inmate was considered unavailable. See 
    id. The hearing
    and Board
    recommitment decision are challenged by Inmate.
    After completion of his federal sentence, Inmate was returned to a
    Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (SCI) in March 2015. C.R. at 125.
    After Inmate’s return, the Board recalculated Inmate’s maximum sentence date for
    his state convictions from March 1, 2014 to July 6, 2025, based on the
    recommitment order. C.R. at 129-30. This recalculation decision was mailed May
    8, 2015. It is also challenged by Inmate.
    On May 18, 2015 Inmate filed an administrative appeal.              He
    challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting revocation/recommitment, he
    asserted unspecified errors of law, he challenged the timeliness of the revocation
    hearing, he asserted no revocation hearing was held or, if such a hearing was held,
    he and his lawyer were not present, and he objected to the calculation of his
    maximum sentence date. C.R. at 135.
    By decision mailed August 3, 2015, the Board reduced Inmate’s
    maximum sentence date for his state convictions from July 6, 2025 to July 3,
    3
    2025.1       In that same decision, the Board dismissed Inmate’s objection to the
    maximum sentence date of July 6, 2025, as moot based on the Board’s reduction in
    Inmate’s maximum sentence (from July 6, 2025 to July 3, 2025), and it dismissed
    Inmate’s objection to the parole revocation as an untimely challenge of the
    revocation decision mailed July 16, 2007. C.R. at 169-70.
    However, the Board erroneously stated in one place on the decision
    that Inmate’s maximum sentence date was “07/03/2015.” C.R. at 133 (emphasis
    added). Ten days later, the Board rescinded its decision mailed August 3, 2015
    based on the erroneous notation of Inmate’s maximum sentence date of
    “07/03/2015,” and it relisted the maximum sentence date as “07/03/2025.” C.R. at
    134. The Board stated that its decision mailed August 3, 2015 was “rescind[ed]…
    due to technician error ….” C.R. at 133, 177.
    Inmate filed another administrative appeal objecting to the Board’s
    authority to recalculate his maximum sentence date.               The Board denied this
    administrative appeal. C.R. at 171-78. Inmate now petitions for review.
    1
    The Board reduced Inmate’s maximum sentence date when it increased Inmate’s
    resentence credit applied toward his original sentence from zero days to four days. This
    resentence credit was given based on the period that Inmate was confined from June 15, 2006 to
    June 19, 2006. C.R. at 131.
    4
    II. Issues
    On appeal,2 the issues are whether the Board held a parole revocation
    hearing attended by Inmate and his counsel, and whether the Board properly
    dismissed objections to such a hearing as untimely; whether Inmate waived his
    right to review regarding the amount of credit he received by failing to timely raise
    this claim; and, whether the Board maintained authority to recalculate Inmate’s
    maximum sentence date based on a clerical error.
    III. Discussion
    A. Timeliness of Revocation Hearing
    Inmate first contends the Board incorrectly dismissed his challenges
    to the revocation hearing as untimely. Inmate argues his revocation hearing was
    purportedly held on June 14, 2007, but he does not recall this hearing. Inmate
    asserts that because he was “never at such a hearing, did not receive notice, and
    had no attorney there,” this Court should vacate the Board’s order that recommitted
    him. Am. Br. for Pet’r at 5. Inmate argues that under Lawson v. Pennsylvania
    Board of Probation and Parole, 
    977 A.2d 85
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), the Board has the
    burden of proving it held a timely revocation hearing.
    The Board counters that Inmate may contest the revocation of his
    parole by filing an administrative appeal with the Board within 30 days of the
    mailing date of the Board’s order. Here, the Board asserts Inmate’s administrative
    2
    This Court’s review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
    Board’s decision, and whether the Board erred as a matter of law or violated Inmate’s
    constitutional rights. 2 Pa. C.S. §704; McKenzie v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    963 A.2d 616
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2009).
    5
    appeal cannot be accepted because the Board received it in 2015, more than 30
    days after the July 17, 2007 mailing date of the Board’s recommitment decision.
    See Cadogan v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    541 A.2d 832
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988);
    Lewis v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    508 A.2d 644
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
    Here, after Inmate’s revocation/recommitment hearing in June 2007,
    the Board recommitted Inmate, with the remainder of his sentence to begin “when
    available.” C.R. at 120. Notice of Board’s decision was mailed on July 16, 2007.
    Consequently, Inmate had until August 15, 2007 to file an administrative appeal
    with the Board challenging his parole revocation. He did not do so. Thus, the
    Board properly dismissed that portion of Inmate’s administrative appeal in which
    he objected to his revocation hearing as untimely because Inmate’s administrative
    appeal was not timely received.
    Nevertheless,     even    Inmate’s    timely     challenges    to   the
    revocation/recommitment hearing lack merit. While Inmate asserts neither he nor
    his attorney was present at a hearing on June 14, 2007, our review of the transcript
    for the hearing clearly demonstrates that both Inmate and his lawyer were present.
    C.R. at 97-118.
    As to timeliness of the hearing, pursuant to Section 71.4(1) of the
    Board’s regulations: “A revocation hearing shall be held within 120 days from the
    date the Board received official verification of the [guilty plea or verdict] ….” 37
    Pa. Code §71.4(1).    For purposes of the regulation, “Official verification” is
    “[a]ctual receipt by a parolee’s supervising parole agent of a direct written
    6
    communication from a court in which a parolee was convicted of a new criminal
    charge attesting that the parolee was so convicted.” 37 Pa. Code §61.1.
    Here, Inmate pled guilty in federal court on the federal charges on
    January 18, 2007. C.R. at 71, 82. Pursuant to the hearing report for Inmate’s
    revocation hearing, the “Date of Official Verification of Convictions” on Inmate’s
    federal conviction was March 8, 2007. C.R. at 84. Inmate’s revocation hearing
    was held on June 14, 2007, which was within 120 days of when the Board received
    official verification of inmate’s federal conviction. Thus, the revocation hearing
    was timely. See 37 Pa. Code §71.4(1).
    B. Sentence Credit
    Before examining Inmate’s next argument regarding sentence credit,
    we consider the Board’s assertion that Inmate failed to properly preserve this issue.
    Specifically, the Board argues any issue not raised in the petition for review is
    waived. See, e.g., McKay v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Osmolinski), 
    688 A.2d 259
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). The Board also notes that, pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.
    2116(a), “[n]o question [in a brief] will be considered unless it is stated in the
    statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” 
    Id. The Board
    asserts that based on McKay, and Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a), Inmate waived his right to
    review of the sentence credit issue because he did not present it in his statement of
    questions involved or in his petition for review to this Court.
    Contrary to the Board’s assertions regarding waiver, paragraph 8 of
    Inmate’s petition for review, states: “[a]lso incorporated by reference are any other
    issues argued by [Inmate] in his administrative appeal.” Our review of Inmate’s
    7
    administrative appeal, which included an attached memorandum of law, reveals he
    raised the credit issue. C.R. at 136 (Issues “B” and “C” of Inmate’s statement of
    issues contained within memorandum submitted with administrative appeal).
    Thus, Inmate did, in fact, raise the credit issue. As such, we will address Inmate’s
    argument that the Board erred in failing to give him credit for the time served
    while he was in federal prison.
    Inmate contends the Board erred in failing to give him credit for time
    served while he was in federal prison. Specifically, Inmate asserts his state time
    served should be credited concurrently with his federal sentence. Inmate argues
    Section 9761(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9761(b), provides that
    Pennsylvania courts can count time spent under the authority of another
    jurisdiction against Pennsylvania time.3
    3
    Section 9761(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §9761(b) states:
    (b) Sentences imposed by other sovereigns.--If the defendant is at the
    time of sentencing subject to imprisonment under the authority of any
    other sovereign, the court may indicate that imprisonment under such
    other authority shall satisfy or be credited against both the minimum and
    maximum time imposed under the court's sentence. If the defendant is
    released by such other authority before the expiration of the minimum
    time imposed by the court, he shall be returned to a correctional institution
    of the Commonwealth to serve the time which remains of the sentence. If
    the defendant is released after the minimum time has elapsed, he shall be
    considered for parole on the same basis as a prisoner who has served his
    minimum time in a correctional institution of the Commonwealth. If the
    defendant is released after the maximum time imposed under the sentence
    of imprisonment he shall be deemed to have served his sentence.
    42 Pa. C.S. §9761(b).
    8
    Inmate asserts this Court’s holding in Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board
    of Probation and Parole, 
    937 A.2d 610
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) controls. In Santiago,
    an inmate sought review of a Board order that denied the inmate’s request for
    credit on his Pennsylvania sentence for time spent in custody in a Pennsylvania
    SCI on a Maryland sentence, which was ordered to be served concurrently with the
    inmate’s outstanding or unserved sentences. This Court held the Board lacked
    authority to convert the inmate’s concurrent time to consecutive time to be served
    first before his Pennsylvania sentence. Inmate argues the reasoning of Santiago
    applies here, and the Board should give him credit for time served.
    The Board counters that this Court’s holding in Santiago does not
    apply.      The Board notes that in Santiago, the offender was detained in a
    Pennsylvania SCI and recommitted as a parole violator prior to being transferred to
    the State of Maryland to resolve his new criminal charges. Santiago remained in a
    Pennsylvania SCI for approximately three years before his transfer to Maryland.
    Thereafter, a court in Maryland convicted Santiago of the new charges and
    sentenced him to a new term of imprisonment to run concurrently with any other
    sentence.
    Upon Santiago’s return to Pennsylvania, the Board recommitted him
    as a convicted parole violator and recalculated his maximum sentence date without
    giving him credit for time served on his Maryland sentence, including time spent in
    an SCI. Ultimately, this Court held Santiago was entitled to credit for all of the
    time he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania because the Board lacked authority to
    change the Maryland sentence from concurrent to consecutive.
    9
    Our decision in Santiago does not apply here. This is in part because
    a federal court lacks power to direct that a federal sentence served in a federal
    prison run concurrently with a state sentence. Griffin v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    862 A.2d 152
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d per curiam, 
    915 A.2d 639
    (Pa. 2007).
    Not surprisingly, in this case there is no indication that the federal
    court ordered Inmate’s new federal sentence to be served concurrently with his
    Pennsylvania state sentence. This material distinction renders Santiago inapposite.
    Further, Inmate here was not incarcerated on both his federal and state sentences
    simultaneously. Rather, Inmate was held in federal custody while serving his
    federal sentence, and he was not returned to an SCI until after he completed his
    federal sentence. In contrast, in Santiago, the inmate was held in an SCI for
    several years on both the Maryland sentence and the Board’s detainer. As such,
    unlike in Santiago, here there is no basis on which to grant Inmate additional credit
    on his sentence.
    C. Clerical Error
    In his final argument, Inmate asserts that the Board overstepped its
    authority in revising his maximum sentence date after it made a technical error on
    his May 8, 2015 “greensheet.” Inmate argues that “the Board should not be able to
    change his maximum [sentence] date in this way.” Am. Br. for Pet’r at 6-7.
    The Board responds that, when Inmate was recommitted as a
    convicted parole violator in 2007, the former Parole Act4 governed sentence
    4
    Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, as amended, formerly 61 P.S. §§331.1–331.34a
    (repealed by the Act of August 11, 2009, P.L. 147).
    10
    recalculations. In particular, Section 21.1 of the Parole Act, 61 P.S. §331.21a(a),
    stated in pertinent part:
    Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the [Board] released from
    any penal institution of the Commonwealth who, during the
    period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits any
    crime punishable by imprisonment, for which … he pleads
    guilty … in a court of record, may, at the discretion of the
    [B]oard, be recommitted as a parole violator. If his
    recommitment is so ordered, he shall be reentered to serve the
    remainder of the term which said parolee would have been
    compelled to serve had he not been paroled, and he shall be
    given no credit for the time at liberty while on parole. …
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The Board asserts the Parole Act did not limit the Board’s authority to
    correct an erroneous calculation or typographical error. To the contrary, the Board
    argues, the Parole Act granted the Board statutory authority to recalculate a
    parolee’s maximum sentence date as necessary to reflect the denial of credit for
    time at liberty on parole, without mention of any limitations.
    The Board contends it may correct clerical errors in its actions. Lord
    v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    580 A.2d 463
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (Board properly
    rescinded a previously executed parole that resulted from a clerical error, where
    due process was afforded the inmate); Murgerson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    579 A.2d 1335
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (calculation of total backtime was clerical error and
    would not be interpreted as allowing prisoner to serve time for two parole
    violations concurrently, rather than consecutively).
    11
    Here, Inmate filed an administrative appeal and objected to his
    recalculated maximum sentence date of July 6, 2025. As a result, the Board issued
    a revised recommitment order, and it reduced Inmate’s maximum sentence date
    from July 6, 2025 to “07/03/2025.”         C.R. at 131-32.      That revised order to
    recommit also clearly enunciated Inmate’s maximum sentence date, in bold, and in
    two separate locations on the parole violation date calculation.5
    The Board subsequently followed up the revised order to commit with
    a Notice of Board decision dated August 3, 2015. In that decision, the Board
    stated it was “changing the parole violation maximum date to read: 07/03/2015.”
    C.R. at 133.
    This Court recognizes the August 3, 2015 Notice of Board decision
    stated that Inmate’s “parole violation maximum date” was changed “to read:
    07/03/15.” However, 10 days later, the Board issued a revised notice of Board
    decision in which it clearly stated that it “[r]escind[ed] Board action of 07/29/2015,
    due to technician error; and now: chang[ed] the parole violation maximum date to
    read: 07/03/25,” and “[t]he rest of the Board action remains the same.” C.R. at 134
    (emphasis added). Further, in no fewer than four places collectively on the April
    30, 2015 and July 29, 2015 orders to recommit does it identify, in bold, that
    Inmate’s maximum sentence date is “07/03/2025.” C.R. 127, 131 (emphasis in
    original). Upon review, we agree with the Board that it had authority to correct its
    technical error in this instance. Lord; Murgerson.
    5
    Inmate’s “Maximum [sentence] Date” on the July 29, 2015 revised order to recommit
    was “07/03/25”. C.R. at 131 (emphasis in original).
    12
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Terance Baxter,                        :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                         :   No. 1736 C.D. 2015
    :
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation        :
    and Parole,                            :
    Respondent     :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 16th day of May, 2016, the order of the Pennsylvania
    Board of Probation and Parole is AFFIRMED.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge