B.K. Williams, Jr. v. PSP ( 2018 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Bryan K. Williams, Jr.,                     :
    Petitioner                :
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    Pennsylvania State Police,                  :   No. 20 M.D. 2017
    Respondent         :   Submitted: February 9, 2018
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                         FILED: March 21, 2018
    Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary
    objections of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to Bryan K. Williams’ pro se
    petition for a writ of mandamus. Williams’ petition asks this Court to direct PSP to
    modify the registry of convicted sex offenders maintained pursuant to the Sexual
    Offender Registration and Notification Act1 (SORNA), so that Williams’
    registration requirement is reduced from the term of his life to ten years.
    1
    42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
    Williams is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution-
    Waymart, where he is serving a sentence of six to twelve years2 for the following
    Crimes Code3 offenses:
    (1) Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, a
    first-degree felony in violation of section 3123(b), 18
    Pa. C.S § 3123(b);
    (2) Incest of a minor (under the age of 13), a second-
    degree felony in violation of section 4302(b)(1), 18
    Pa. C.S § 4302(b)(1);
    (3) Corruption of minors, a third-degree felony in
    violation of section 6301, 18 Pa. C.S § 6301; and
    (4) Indecent assault, a first-degree misdemeanor in
    violation of section 3126(a)(7), 18 Pa. C.S §
    3126(a)(7).
    Three of Williams’ offenses are classified as Tier III offenses under SORNA. 42
    Pa. C.S. § 9799.14(d). Individuals convicted of Tier III offenses are required to
    register as sex offenders with PSP for life. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3).
    Consequently, Williams is subject to a lifetime registration
    requirement. In his petition, however, he contends that his term of mandated
    registration should be reduced pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling
    in A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
    143 A.3d 896
     (Pa. 2016).
    In A.S., the court considered “the proper construction of the lifetime
    registration triggering language ‘two or more convictions’ in Pennsylvania’s former
    2
    Williams’ minimum sentence expires June 29, 2020; his maximum sentence expires June
    29, 2026. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, 1/29/2017, 2.
    3
    18 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-9546.
    2
    sex offender registration statute, Megan’s Law II (formerly codified at 42 Pa. C.S. §
    9795.1(b)(1) (superseded)).” 143 A.3d at 897. The sex offender in A.S. was
    simultaneously convicted of sexual abuse of children, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312, and
    unlawful contact with a minor, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6318. Id. at 899. Though each of these
    offenses individually triggered only a ten-year period of registration, PSP classified
    him as a lifetime registrant pursuant to statutory language subjecting individuals
    convicted of two or more enumerated offenses to a lifetime registration requirement.
    Id. at 900. The A.S. court concluded that the recidivist philosophy underlying the
    second iteration of Megan’s Law required “an act, a conviction, and a subsequent
    act to trigger lifetime registration for multiple offenses otherwise triggering a ten-
    year period of registration.” Id. at 898. For that reason, the A.S. court reduced the
    registration requirement of the sex offender in that case to ten years because his
    convictions occurred simultaneously.      Id. at 908. The court expressly noted,
    however, that its ruling in A.S. pertained to “a Megan’s Law II question, not a
    SORNA question.” Id. at 897 n.1.
    In his petition, Williams argues that pursuant to A.S. his lifetime
    registration requirement should be reduced to ten years. PSP raises two preliminary
    objections in response to Williams’ petition: (1) the petition is time-barred; and (2)
    the petition should be dismissed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(4) because it
    fails to state a legal claim.
    PSP argues that Williams’ claim is subject to the six-month statute of
    limitations set forth in section 5522(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, which provides that
    an “action against any officer of any government unit for anything done in the
    execution of his office” must be commenced within six months. 42 Pa. C.S. §
    5522(b)(1). PSP cites Curley v. Smeal, 
    41 A.3d 916
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), in support
    of this argument. However, this Court expressly overruled Curley in Morgalo v.
    Gorniak, 
    134 A.3d 1139
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), where we acknowledged the Supreme
    3
    Court’s criticism of subjecting mandamus claims to a six-month statute of
    limitations. Curley “offers dubious authority for establishing a six-month limitations
    period for mandamus claims.” Bahret v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth.,
    No. 500 M.D. 2015, filed May 16, 2016).4 Where doubt exists as to whether a
    preliminary objection should be sustained, that doubt should be resolved by
    overruling the objection. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Dep’t of
    Conservation & Natural Res., 
    909 A.2d 413
    , 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Applying
    this standard, we overrule PSP’s preliminary objection based on the statute of
    limitations.
    With respect to PSP’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer,
    we note that when ruling on challenges to the legal sufficiency of a complaint—
    we must accept as true all well-pled material facts and all
    inferences reasonably deducible from those facts. [Christ
    the King Manor v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    911 A.2d 624
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)]. However, we are not required to
    accept as true any unwarranted factual inferences,
    conclusions of law or expressions of opinion. 
    Id.
     For this
    Court to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear
    with certainty that the law will not permit recovery. 
    Id.
    Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving
    party. 
    Id.
    Barge v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
    39 A.3d 530
    , 538-39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    PSP argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in A.S. is inapplicable to
    Williams’ case. We agree. Unlike the sex offender in A.S., Williams’ lifetime
    registration requirement is not based on the recidivist-oriented multiple conviction
    provisions of Megan’s Law II. Williams was convicted in June 2014 after the
    4
    Section 414 of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation to
    unreported panel decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value.
    4
    enactment of SORNA. His lifetime registration requirement is not based on multiple
    convictions of offenses subject to individual ten-year suspensions as in A.S.
    Williams’ lifetime registration requirement is based on his conviction for crimes
    designated as Tier III offenses under SORNA, each of which triggers a mandate for
    lifetime registration. 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.14(d) and 9799.15(a)(3). The Supreme
    Court explicitly stated that A.S. did not pertain to SORNA, the source of Williams’
    lifetime registration requirement. Williams has failed to state a claim upon which
    relief can be granted. Consequently, we sustain PSP’s preliminary objection in the
    nature of a demurrer to Williams’ petition.5
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    5
    We note that in response to PSP’s preliminary objections, Williams filed a document
    titled Notice to Plead to Respondent’s Preliminary Objections in which he sought to advance a
    new theory for relief based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    164 A.3d 1189
     (Pa. 2017). In Muniz, the court ruled that SORNA is punitive in nature, and therefore,
    retroactive application of the statute violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state
    constitutions. 
    Id.
     However, Williams cannot prevail on this basis for two reasons. First, an “action
    filed in mandamus must define the issues. . . in the complaint.” Nickson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
    Parole, 
    880 A.2d 21
    , 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Williams failed to advance an ex post facto claim
    in his petition. Second, “[t]he material facts on which a cause of action. . . is based shall be stated
    in a concise and summary form.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1019(a). In particular, “[a]verments of time. . .
    shall be specifically stated.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1019(f). In an ex post facto claim, the date of the
    offense at issue is an essential fact, but Williams has failed to include the dates of his crimes in
    any of his pleadings. For these reasons, we decline to address Williams’ Muniz claim.
    5
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Bryan K. Williams, Jr.,                  :
    Petitioner             :
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    Pennsylvania State Police,               :   No. 20 M.D. 2017
    Respondent            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 21st day of March, 2018, the Preliminary Objections
    of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus in the
    above-captioned matter are OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part:
    (1) PSP’s preliminary objection based on the statute of
    limitations is OVERRULED;
    (2) PSP’s preliminary objection in the nature of a
    demurrer is SUSTAINED; and
    (3) The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus is DISMISSED
    WITH PREJUDICE.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20 M.D. 2017

Judges: Fizzano Cannon, J.

Filed Date: 3/21/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021