J. Schimes v. City of Scranton Non-Uniform Pension Board ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Joseph Schimes,                        :
    Appellant           :
    :
    v.                               : No. 1526 C.D. 2018
    : SUBMITTED: June 21, 2019
    City of Scranton Non-Uniform           :
    Pension Board; Mayor William           :
    Courtright, and City of Scranton       :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE CEISLER                                          FILED: August 1, 2019
    Appellant Joseph Schimes (Schimes), appeals pro se from the Court of
    Common Pleas of Lackawanna County’s (Trial Court) October 3, 2018 order
    affirming the City of Scranton Non-Uniform Pension Board’s (Board) March 3,
    2017 adjudication. The Board determined it had been improperly making double
    pension payments to Schimes and other former City of Scranton (City) employees
    for a number of years. The Board elected to remedy this mistake by halving the dollar
    amount of future pension payments to those individuals. After thorough review, we
    affirm.
    I. Background
    This action is the latest salvo in a long-running saga concerning the pension
    benefits Schimes receives as a result of his years of employment with the City. In
    December 2002, the City extended a one-time offer for early retirement for qualified
    employees. The proposal allowed any employee who had 25 years or more of service
    to the City and was less than 55 years of age to retire no later than December 31,
    2002, with pension and healthcare benefits. Schimes believed he could purchase up
    to 10 years of pension time, as well as pension time for his military service.
    Therefore, he concluded that he could meet the 25-year service requirement and
    qualify for the early retirement offer. The offer appealed to him because of the
    healthcare benefits. Schimes’ wife was seriously ill at the time, and it was important
    to him to maintain healthcare benefits for her. Accordingly, Schimes applied for the
    early retirement incentive. At the time of his retirement, Schimes was 50 years old.
    Schimes v. Scranton Non-Uniform Pension Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 193 C.D. 2006,
    filed Dec. 18, 2006), slip op. at 2-3.
    The Board subsequently denied Schimes’ request to purchase additional years
    of service towards his pension, which rendered him ineligible for a City pension at
    that point in time. 
    Id. at 3-5.
    Schimes appealed the Board’s denial to the Trial Court,
    which reversed. The Trial Court found the Board’s denial was not supported by
    substantial evidence. Further, contrary to the Board’s determination, the Trial Court
    found Schimes was permitted by the applicable collective bargaining agreement to
    purchase up to 10 additional years of service credit. 
    Id. at 5-6.
    This Court affirmed
    the Trial Court via an unpublished decision in December 2006. 
    Id. at 10.
          Following our decision, the City agreed to extend its early retirement offer to
    additional employees who were similarly situated to Schimes. A number of
    employees submitted early retirement applications in 2007 in response to the
    Board’s offer.
    In the fall of 2014, the Board received a question relating to a double pension
    benefit that a retiree was allegedly receiving. Upon investigation, the Board learned
    2
    that in 2003, its Secretary had sent two letters to the City’s pension plan
    administrator stating that the City had passed ordinances authorizing retroactive
    pension payment increases to former employees who retired pursuant to the 2002
    early retirement offer. However, no ordinances had been properly passed, and thus,
    the payment increases were not legally authorized. Tr. Ct. Op., 10/3/18, at 16-17.
    The Pennsylvania Department of Auditor General (Department) then
    conducted a review of the pension payments made pursuant to the 2002 early
    retirement offer and the 2007 extension. In June of 2015, the Department issued a
    report in which it concluded that the City “failed to properly analyze, document, and
    implement the retirement benefit incentive offered to its [ ] non-uniform employees
    who retired in 2002 and subsequently in 2007.” 
    Id. at 3-4.
    The Department “found
    no authorization or City Ordinance to support any double pension payments to City
    . . . employees who retired in either 2002 or 2007.” 
    Id. The Department
    concluded:
    A. The City did not obtain and review a cost study of the actual plan
    benefit modification scenario that it provided to the 2002 retirees, when
    it should have done so prior to the retirement incentive offer, prior to
    the 2002 retirements, and prior to the ordinances modifying the plan
    benefits. Therefore, Plan officials failed to comply with Act 205[1] by
    1
    Act 205 is formally known as the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and
    Recovery Act, Act of December 18, 1984, P.L. 1005, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 895.101-895.1131.
    The General Assembly enacted Act 205 as “an Act mandating actuarial funding
    standards for all municipal pension systems; establishing a recovery program for
    municipal pension systems determined to be financially distressed; providing for
    the distribution of the tax on premiums of foreign fire insurance companies; and
    making repeals.” [Section 101 of Act 205,] 53 P.S. § 895.101. Its purpose was to
    strengthen municipal pension plans “by requiring actuarially[ ]based current
    funding standards and by establishing state-aided, voluntary remedial rules to aid
    seriously under[-]funded pension plans in achieving compliance with the
    standards.” City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, American Federation of
    State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL–CIO, . . . 
    598 A.2d 256
    , 261 ([Pa.]
    1991).
    3
    not properly and timely evaluating the cost and long-term effects of the
    retirement incentive on the Plan.
    B. The City failed to authorize the doubling of pension benefits for the
    2002 retirees. While it appears the City intended to offer a retirement
    incentive, the doubling of pension benefits was not approved in any of
    the four ordinances related to the 2002 retirees, as required by Act
    400.[2]
    C. Based on a 2006 Commonwealth Court decision and on the
    subsequent advice of its solicitor, the . . . Board offered additional
    employees an opportunity to retire in 2007 and to receive the double-
    pension benefits paid to the 2002 retirees. It did so without first
    considering the impact of this additional cost on the Plan.
    
    Id. The Department
    recommended that the City and the Board determine who was
    actually eligible for the incentive, whether the Board and the City were obligated to
    continue paying double pension benefits, and whether any amounts paid should be
    recouped by the City. 
    Id. Hearings were
    conducted in July 2016. The hearing officers concluded there
    was no legal foundation for doubling the pension payments to the 2002 and 2007
    retirees, and that the Board was entitled to correct the error going forward. However,
    the hearing officers found it would be unreasonable for the Board to recoup past
    overpayments. The Board adopted the hearing officers’ recommendations. 
    Id. at 3-
    4.
    Schimes appealed the Board’s decision to the Trial Court, naming William
    Courtright, Mayor of Scranton (Mayor), as well as the City and the Board, as
    “respondents.” The Mayor and the City filed preliminary objections, on the basis
    City of Erie v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local 293, 
    836 A.2d 1047
    , 1049 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    2
    Act 400 refers to sections 551 through 579 of what is known as the Second Class A City
    Code, Act of September 23, 1959, P.L. 970, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 30551-30579, which permit
    the creation of a retirement system in such cities.
    4
    that neither of them was involved with the proceedings held by the hearing officers
    and, thus, neither could be named as a responsive party to Schimes’ statutory appeal.
    The Trial Court agreed with this argument, sustaining the preliminary objections and
    dismissing both the Mayor and City from this matter on November 21, 2017. Tr. Ct.
    Op., 11/21/17, at 7-14.
    In October 2018, the Trial Court affirmed the Board’s adjudication in full.
    This appeal by Schimes followed.3
    II. Issues
    Schimes raises five separate arguments for our consideration in his pro se
    brief, which we have reordered and streamlined for the sake of clarity and efficient
    disposition.4
    First, Schimes asserts the Board’s March 3, 2017 adjudication was unlawful
    and void. He contends three Board members – the Mayor, the president of City
    Council, and the City Controller – did not attend the public meeting at which the
    Board adopted the hearing officers’ recommendations. Instead, they voted by proxy.
    Second, Schimes contends the Board’s solicitor conducted an improper
    investigation into the pension payments made to Schimes and other retirees. He
    insists the solicitor revealed “a conflict of interest” by issuing a legal opinion that
    3
    The Trial Court did not direct Schimes to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained
    of on Appeal, but nonetheless issued an order on January 4, 2019, stating that all of the issues
    raised by Schimes on appeal had been sufficiently addressed in the Trial Court’s October 2018
    memorandum opinion. Tr. Ct. Or., 1/4/19, at 1.
    4
    When considering an appeal stemming from a local agency’s adjudication, where a
    complete record was developed before said agency, our review is limited to determining whether
    the agency violated constitutional rights, committed errors of law, failed to adhere to statutory
    procedural requirements, or abused its discretion by issuing rulings and/or findings of fact that
    were not supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 754(b).
    5
    the double pension payments were proper, but then issuing a second legal opinion
    expressing the opposite conclusion.
    Third, Schimes argues the Board did not have statutory authority under the
    Second Class A City Code to decrease the pension payments being made to him.
    Fourth, Schimes insists the Trial Court erred by sustaining the preliminary
    objections filed by the City and the Mayor. Thus, the Trial Court incorrectly
    dismissed those parties from Schimes’ statutory appeal.
    Finally, Schimes asserts the Board’s decision to halve his pension payments
    going forward was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Schimes argues this
    Court’s 2006 opinion affirming his ability to purchase additional years of pension
    service precluded reduction of his pension payments.
    III. Discussion
    A. Waiver
    The Trial Court determined that Schimes waived his first and second issues,
    due to his failure to develop either one in the briefs he submitted in support of his
    statutory appeal. See Tr. Ct. Op., 10/3/18, at 37-39. The Court of Common Pleas of
    Lackawanna County Rules of Civil Procedure do not set forth the briefing
    requirements for statutory appeals. However, “[a]lthough not strictly bound by the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court, acting as an appellate
    court, may look to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure for guidance[.]”
    King v. City of Philadelphia, 
    102 A.3d 1073
    , 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The Trial
    Court apparently did so here. Schimes had an “affirmative duty to prosecute the
    appeal he filed.” Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of Philadelphia v. Wenitsky, 
    521 A.2d 80
    , 82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). Arguments not supported with legal analysis and
    citations of authority are waived. See Berner v. Montour Twp., 
    120 A.3d 433
    (Pa.
    6
    Cmwlth. 2015). Accordingly, we conclude that the Trial Court did not abuse its
    discretion by finding waiver.
    With regard to Schimes’ remaining arguments, we address each in turn.
    B. Pension Decreases under the Second Class A City Code
    In the event an inadvertent mistake results in any pension plan contributor or
    beneficiary receiving more or less than he should have received, Section 28 of the
    Second Class A City Code, 53 P.S. § 30578, vests the Board with the ability to
    correct the error by adjusting the pension payments made to the affected individual.
    As discussed above, there is ample information in the Board’s record showing that
    Schimes had been receiving improperly large pension payments of twice the amount
    which was authorized by the applicable City ordinances. There is substantial
    evidence in the record supporting the Board’s conclusion that these doubled
    payments were not purposefully made. Accordingly, the Board properly exercised
    its statutory powers to remedy this mistake. Schimes’ argument to the contrary is
    without merit.5
    C. Dismissal of the City and Mayor
    Next, we agree with Schimes that the Trial Court erred by sustaining the
    preliminary objections of the City and the Mayor. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
    Procedure are not applicable to statutory appeals; thus, preliminary objections, the
    grounds for which are set forth in Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028, cannot be used as a vehicle
    for challenging such an appeal. Appeal of Borough of Churchill, 
    575 A.2d 550
    , 553
    (Pa. 1990).
    5
    Schimes also did not brief this argument before the Trial Court. However, the Trial Court
    did not declare it to be waived and, instead, addressed it on the merits. See Tr. Ct. Op., 10/3/18,
    at 20-23.
    7
    Even so, “[a]n appellate court may affirm the trial court [on] grounds different
    than those relied upon by the trial court where other grounds for affirmance exist.”
    Philadelphia Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 
    109 A.3d 298
    , 321
    n.35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Pursuant to the Local Agency Law, the proper appellee in
    an appeal from a local agency’s adjudication is the local agency itself. See 2 Pa. C.S.
    §§ 752-54.
    Here, as the Board rendered the decision which Schimes challenges, it is the
    only party Schimes could name as the appellee in this matter. Consequently, we
    affirm on this basis the Trial Court’s November 21, 2017 decision to dismiss the
    City and the Mayor from Schimes’ statutory appeal.6
    D. Res Judicata
    Finally, we disagree with Schimes’ contention that res judicata barred the
    Board from reducing his pension.
    Res judicata encompasses two related, yet distinct principles: technical
    res judicata and collateral estoppel. . . . Technical res judicata provides
    that where a final judgment on the merits exists, a future lawsuit on the
    same cause of action is precluded. . . . Collateral estoppel acts to
    foreclose litigation in a subsequent action where issues of law or fact
    were actually litigated and necessary to a previous final judgment.
    Stilp v. Com., 
    910 A.2d 775
    , 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
    “However, in order for either collateral estoppel or [technical] res judicata to apply,
    the issue of law or fact decided in the prior action must be identical to the one
    presented in the later action.” Blair v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, State
    Bd. of Nursing, 
    72 A.3d 742
    , 754-55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
    6
    Schimes did not mention the Trial Court’s November 21, 2017 ruling in his notice of
    appeal. Despite this, in situations where a trial court has issued interlocutory orders dismissing
    fewer than all appellees, claims, or defendants, “an appeal from the order dismissing the remaining
    claim[s] or part[ies] is sufficient to bring for review [those] earlier issued [interlocutory] orders.”
    K.H. v. J.R., 
    826 A.2d 863
    , 871 (Pa. 2003).
    8
    Such identity of issues does not exist here. Our 2006 decision dealt with
    whether Schimes could purchase service years to put towards the City’s pension
    eligibility requirements, whereas the instant matter revolves around whether the
    Board could prospectively halve the dollar amount of Schimes’ pension payments
    in order to cease making what it had concluded were legally impermissible double
    payments. Thus, Schimes’ res judicata argument is without merit.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Trial Court’s October 3, 2018 order, in
    full.
    __________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Joseph Schimes,                     :
    Appellant        ::
    :
    v.                            : No. 1526 C.D. 2018
    :
    City of Scranton Non-Uniform        :
    Pension Board; Mayor William        :
    Courtright, and City of Scranton    :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 1st day of August, 2019, the Court of Common Pleas of
    Lackawanna County’s October 3, 2018 order, which affirmed the City of Scranton
    Non-Uniform Pension Board’s March 3, 2017 adjudication, is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge