I.R. Woodson v. PennDOT, Bureau of Motor Vehicles ( 2017 )


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  •              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Irma R. Woodson                        :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,          :
    Department of Transportation,          :
    Bureau of Motor Vehicles,              :   No. 1218 C.D. 2016
    Appellant      :   Submitted: February 17, 2017
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                FILED: May 17, 2017
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation,
    Bureau of Motor Vehicles (DOT) appeals from the Allegheny County Common Pleas
    Court’s (trial court) June 30, 2016 order reversing DOT’s order suspending Irma R.
    Woodson’s (Woodson) registration for three months. The sole issue before this Court
    is whether the trial court erred in sustaining Woodson’s appeal. After review, we
    vacate and remand.
    On February 8, 2016, Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford)
    cancelled a car insurance policy issued to Woodson that covered her 2006 Jeep
    station wagon (Jeep). Hartford reported the policy cancellation to DOT. On April
    14, 2016, DOT mailed a notification to Woodson advising her that the Jeep’s
    registration was being suspended for three months effective May 19, 2016. Woodson
    appealed from the registration suspension to the trial court. On June 30, 2016, the
    trial court held a hearing and sustained Woodson’s appeal. DOT appealed to this
    Court.1 The trial court issued an order directing DOT to file a Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal (Rule
    1925(b) Statement). DOT filed its Rule 1925(b) Statement on August 2, 2016. On
    October 13, 2016, the trial court filed its opinion.
    DOT argues that because Woodson maintained that she did not receive
    notice of her Hartford insurance policy termination, the trial court should have
    continued the matter in order to allow Woodson to file a nunc pro tunc petition for
    review with the Insurance Commissioner.
    Section 1786(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code requires DOT to
    ‘suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three
    months if it determines the required financial responsibility
    was not secured. . . .’ 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(1). In order to
    sustain a suspension on these grounds, DOT must prove
    that: ‘the vehicle is registered or of a type that is required to
    be registered under this title; and there has been either
    notice to [DOT] of a lapse, termination or cancellation in
    the financial responsibility coverage as required by law for
    that vehicle. . . .’ 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(i), (ii). This
    Court has held that:
    DOT may satisfy its burden by certifying that it
    received documents or electronic transmissions
    from the insurance company informing DOT that
    the insurance coverage has been terminated. Once
    DOT meets that burden, two presumptions arise: (1)
    that the cancellation was effective under 75 Pa.C.S.
    § 1377(b)(2)[;] and (2) that the vehicle in question
    lacks the requisite financial responsibility under 75
    Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(ii).
    Choff v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    861 A.2d 442
    , 446–47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (citations and
    footnote omitted).
    1
    “This Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed
    an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion in reaching its decision.” McGonigle v. Dep’t of
    Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    37 A.3d 1273
    , 1274 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Dinsmore
    v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    932 A.2d 350
    , 353 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)).
    2
    McGonigle v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    37 A.3d 1273
    , 1274-75
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    In the instant matter, DOT met its burden by admitting into evidence the
    certified copy of Hartford’s electronic notification of Woodson’s insurance
    termination. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 8a, 19a. The certification gave rise to
    the presumptions that Woodson’s cancellation was effective, and that she was at least
    temporarily uninsured.
    Once DOT establishes its prima facie burden of proof, a
    vehicle owner must prove that financial responsibility was
    continuously maintained on the vehicle as required by
    Section 1786(a) of the [Vehicle Code], 75 Pa.C.S. §
    1786(a), or that the vehicle owner fits within one of the
    three statutorily[-]defined defenses outlined in Section
    1786(d)(2)(i-iii) of the [Vehicle Code], 75 Pa.C.S. §
    1786(d)(2)(i-iii).[FN]10
    [FN]10. The three statutorily[-]defined defenses set
    forth in Section 1786(d)(2)(i-iii) of the [Vehicle
    Code] . . . are:
    (i) The owner or registrant proves to the satisfaction
    of [DOT] that the lapse in financial responsibility
    coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and
    that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit
    the operation of the vehicle during the period of
    lapse in financial responsibility.
    (ii) The owner or registrant is a member of the
    armed services of the United States, . . . .
    (iii) The insurance coverage has terminated or
    financial responsibility has lapsed simultaneously
    with or subsequent to expiration of a seasonal
    registration, as provided in [S]ection 1307(a.1) [of
    the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1307(a.1)] (relating
    to period of registration).
    Fell v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    925 A.2d 232
    , 237-38 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2007) (footnote omitted).
    3
    Here, Woodson claims to have paid Hartford on February 22, 2016.
    Woodson testified, “I didn’t even know the insurance was lapsed. I didn’t receive
    any notification on [sic] that.” R.R. at 12a. Notwithstanding, it is uncontested that
    Woodson’s insurance lapsed on February 8, 2016 for non-payment. See R.R. at 19a.
    DOT’s 1925(b) Statement and the trial court’s opinion both state that, after Hartford
    refused to accept Woodson’s March 21, 2016 payment, she acquired a Progressive
    insurance policy for the Jeep effective March 22, 2016.2 See R.R. at 37a, 41a. Thus,
    the record evidence reveals that Woodson was uninsured for a period of more than 31
    days.
    Nevertheless,
    Section 2006 of Article XX of the Insurance Company Law
    of 1921 (Article XX) provides: ‘A cancellation . . . by an
    insurer of a policy of automobile insurance shall not be
    effective unless the insurer delivers or mails to the
    named insured at the address shown in the policy a
    written notice of the cancellation. . . .’ [Act of May 17,
    1921, P.L. 682, as amended, added by Section 1 of the Act
    of June 17, 1988, P.L. 464, 40 P.S. § 991.2006.] If a
    cancellation is ineffective for lack of notice under Article
    XX, DOT has no authority to impose a suspension.
    McGonigle, 
    37 A.3d at 1273
     (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Further,
    Section 1786(d)(5) of the Vehicle Code provides as
    follows:
    An alleged lapse, cancellation or termination of a
    policy of insurance by an insurer may only be
    challenged by requesting review by the Insurance
    Commissioner pursuant to [Article XX]. Proof that
    a timely request has been made to the Insurance
    Commissioner for such a review shall act as a
    supersedeas, staying the suspension of registration
    or operating privilege under this section pending a
    2
    However, based upon our review of the original record, including the hearing transcript,
    there is no evidence of this replacement coverage.
    4
    determination [or] final order pursuant to. . .
    [Article XX].
    75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(5). The law is clear that
    ‘examination, beyond the record on its face, into the
    validity of an insurer’s policy cancellation . . . is
    properly brought for review to the Insurance
    Commissioner under Section 1786(d)(5) [of the Vehicle
    Code], and not to a trial court.’ Webb [v. Dep’t of
    Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles], 870 A.2d [968,] 974
    [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)].
    McGonigle, 
    37 A.3d at 1275-76
     (emphasis added).
    Notably, at the hearing, DOT’s counsel advised the trial court:
    [W]ith respect to [Woodson’s claim that she had no notice
    of Hartford’s cancellation], in the notice of suspension that
    was mailed to [] Woodson, there is now a statement that
    says, if you believe your insurance failed to notify you of
    the termination of your insurance policy for the vehicle
    listed above, you have a right to file for a review of the
    termination by the Pennsylvania Insurance Commission.
    And then it instructs how to request such a review.[3]
    The Courts have held that that is not something for the [trial
    court] in a license appeal to determine. That’s something
    for the Insurance Commission to determine whether or not
    the cancellation is proper.
    R.R. at 9a-10a. Notwithstanding, the trial court reversed DOT’s suspension, holding:
    3
    Woodson’s suspension notice expressly advised:
    If you believe your insurance company failed to notify you of the
    termination of the insurance policy for the vehicle listed above, you
    also have the right to request a review of this termination of insurance
    by the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner. A request for review
    can be filed via the website at www.insurance.pa.gov or mailed to the
    Pennsylvania Insurance Department, Bureau of Consumer Services,
    1209 Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120. Please include your
    insurance company name and policy number with your request.
    R.R. at 6a.
    5
    The evidence was clear and convincing that [Woodson] was
    diligent in obtaining replacement insurance within thirty
    (30) days of the first time she learned from Hartford that it
    would no longer provide her coverage retroactively to
    February 8, 2016, although it was in possession of her
    February payment for over a month. [DOT] submitted no
    evidence to the contrary. It relied only upon the allegation
    that Hartford reported [Woodson’s] insurance cancelled.
    [DOT] would compel the [trial c]ourt to rely on this
    hearsay. lt would deny [Woodson] any resort to justice,
    even in the event that her cancellation was unknown to
    her through absolutely no fault of her own.
    R.R. at 41a-42a.
    While we sympathize with Woodson’s plight and understand the basis
    for the trial court’s ruling, it is not in accordance with the law.
    The [C]ourt’s scope of review in an appeal from a vehicle
    registration suspension shall be limited to determining
    whether:
    (i) the vehicle is registered or of a type that is
    required to be registered under this title; and
    (ii) there has been either notice to [DOT] of a lapse,
    termination or cancellation in the financial
    responsibility coverage as required by law for that
    vehicle or that the owner, registrant or driver was
    requested to provide proof of financial
    responsibility to [DOT], a police office[r] or another
    driver and failed to do so. . . .
    75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(3) (emphasis added).
    While we acknowledge that strict application of the
    mandatory registration suspension provisions of [S]ection
    1786 [of the Vehicle Code] will inevitably create hardship,
    it is now well-settled that courts have no discretion to
    decide such matters based on equitable considerations.
    Instead, our decisions, like those of the courts of common
    pleas, ‘must be founded on firm jurisprudence.’ Banks [v.
    Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles], 856 A.2d
    [294,] 297 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)] (quoting [Commonwealth
    v.] Moogerman, . . . 122 A.2d [804,] 806 [(Pa. 1956)]).
    6
    Greenfield v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    67 A.3d 198
    , 202 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2013) (bold emphasis added).           Accordingly, under the circumstances
    presented in this case, we must vacate and remand this matter to the trial court to stay
    these proceedings in order to allow Woodson to file a nunc pro tunc request for
    review with the Insurance Commissioner within 20 days from the date of the trial
    court’s order staying this action.
    For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is vacated, and the
    matter is remanded for disposition in accordance with this opinion.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    Judge Cosgrove concurs in the result only.
    7
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Irma R. Woodson                              :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                :
    Department of Transportation,                :
    Bureau of Motor Vehicles,                    :   No. 1218 C.D. 2016
    Appellant            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2017, the Allegheny County Common
    Pleas Court’s (trial court) June 30, 2016 order is vacated and the matter is remanded
    to the trial court for disposition consistent with this opinion.
    Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge