B. Burks v. DOC ( 2016 )


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  •                 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Brian Burks,                                 :
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    Department of Corrections,                   :   No. 684 C.D. 2015
    Respondent           :   Submitted: November 13, 2015
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge1
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                      FILED: March 21, 2016
    Brian Burks (Burks) petitions this Court pro se for review of the
    Department of Corrections’ (Department) March 26, 2015 order directing Burks to
    reimburse the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) $3,363.60 through a
    monetary assessment against his inmate account for costs caused, arising or stemming
    from his involvement in an assault on another inmate. Essentially, Burks presents
    one issue for this Court’s review: whether Burks’ constitutional rights were violated
    because the Department failed to order the assessment at the time it made its findings
    and ordered sanctions for his misconduct. After review, we affirm.
    Burks is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at
    Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale). On July 1, 2014, while housed at SCI-Houtzdale, Burks
    was found guilty of Class I misconduct (Misconduct) and sanctioned for his
    involvement in the physical assault on inmate Christopher C. McCoy (McCoy). On
    1
    This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 4, 2016, when Judge Leavitt
    became President Judge.
    August 17, 2014, Burks accepted service of the Department’s Notice of Assessment
    for the costs associated with the Misconduct. On September 8, 2014, Burks was
    notified that a hearing was scheduled to determine the amount of the assessment. On
    October 23, 2014, a Holloway hearing2 was conducted.
    The Holloway hearing was conducted by video conference in Burks’
    presence and before a Hearing Examiner. Evidence was received during the hearing
    which demonstrated that the Commonwealth sustained a total cost of $5,096.37 for
    McCoy’s medical treatment due to the Misconduct. Under Department Policy DC-
    ADM 801 § VIII B4 (Department Policy), if assessments are based upon costs
    incurred to provide medical treatment to an inmate whose injury was caused by
    another inmate’s assaultive conduct, the assaultive inmate shall be required to pay
    two-thirds of the total cost of medical service provided to the injured inmate.
    Therefore, in accordance with Department Policy, the Hearing Examiner found Burks
    responsible for $3,363.60 of McCoy’s medical expenses.
    On December 9, 2014, Burks was personally served with the Hearing
    Examiner’s Report and Recommendation. On or about December 18, 2014, Burks
    filed timely Exceptions.        On March 26, 2015, the Department denied Burks’
    Exceptions and entered an order directing Burks to reimburse the Commonwealth
    $3,363.60. Burks appealed to this Court.3
    Burks argues that his constitutional rights were violated because the
    Department failed to order the assessment on July 1, 2014, when it issued its findings
    2
    “See Holloway v. Lehman, 
    671 A.2d 1179
     (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (before an assessment of
    damages against an inmate’s prison account can occur, the inmate must be provided with a hearing
    and adjudication that comports with Sections 504-07 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 504-07).” Jerry v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    990 A.2d 112
    , 113 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    3
    “Our scope of review of the final order of an administrative agency is limited to
    determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or
    whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Speight v. Dep’t of
    Corr., 
    989 A.2d 77
    , 79 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    2
    and sanctions for his Misconduct. Specifically, Burks contends that his constitutional
    rights were violated because the original Disciplinary Hearing Report he received did
    not include an assessment sanction, see Burks’ Br., App. C, as opposed to the
    Disciplinary Hearing Report he received on October 23, 2014, which did include an
    assessment.4 See Burks’ Br., App. D.
    Burks asserts that by separating the misconduct findings and sanctions
    from the assessment, he was denied procedural due process because an assessment
    hearing requires procedural due process, but a misconduct hearing does not. For this
    reason, Burks does not dispute the assessment, only the timing thereof because he
    believes if the two were joined it would have heightened his due process rights at the
    misconduct hearing. Burks basically claims that his defense to the assessment is that
    he is innocent of the misconduct, and since the hearings were separate he could not
    make this argument.5 However, even if the original Hearing Disciplinary Report that
    Burks received contained an order of assessment, the Holloway hearing still would
    have occurred at a later date. Thus, this argument is not sustainable.
    4
    Notably, Burks received a Notice of Assessment on August 17, 2014. See Certified
    Record, Tab 3, H. Ex. 4.
    Burks also argues that the Department violated CD-ADM-801 § VIII B1 which provides that
    when, as a result of a misconduct hearing, a hearing examiner orders an inmate to pay costs
    associated with the Department’s loss, that order should be given to the facility business manager.
    Here, although it appears that one order included the assessment and one did not, there is no
    evidence as to which order the facility business manager received. Notwithstanding, which order
    the facility business manager received is irrelevant to whether Burks’ constitutional rights were
    violated by the separation of the two hearings.
    5
    Burks further maintains in his Reply Brief that had he known he would have been assessed
    costs as a consequence of his misconduct, he would have appealed from the misconduct findings.
    However, according to Burks’ Statement of the Case, Burks was formally charged on June 19, 2014
    for his misconduct. “In said misconduct report it was stated that ‘Burks . . . should be assessed all
    medical costs associated with McCoy’s medical treatment.’” Burks’ Br. at 5 (emphasis added).
    Thus, by Burks’ own admission he was aware that the assessment was a consequence of the
    Misconduct.
    3
    The misconduct hearing is a prison disciplinary matter.                   “Prison
    disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply
    of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
    
    418 U.S. 539
    , 556 (1974). “[D]ue process in internal prison disciplinary proceedings
    does not extend to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.” Jerry
    v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    990 A.2d 112
    , 115 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).6 Thus, the two
    hearings were properly bifurcated.
    The assessment is a statutory and regulatory consequence of the
    misconduct. Section 93.10(a) of the Department’s Regulations provides in relevant
    part:
    (1) Inmates found guilty of Class I misconduct charges may
    be subjected to one or more of the following sanctions:
    ....
    (ii) A sanction permitted for Class II misconducts, without
    change in class of misconduct.
    ....
    (2) Inmates found guilty of Class II misconducts may be
    subjected to one or more of the following sanctions:
    ....
    (iii) Payment of the fair value of property lost or destroyed
    or for expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct.
    
    37 Pa. Code § 93.10
    (a) (emphasis added).               Further, Section 3303(b)(2) of the
    Correctional Institution Medical Services Act7 states: “an inmate may be required to
    pay a fee for medical services provided because of injuries the inmate inflicted upon .
    . . another inmate.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 3303(b)(2). Moreover, “no statute of limitation
    6
    For these reasons, we will not address the issues Burks raised in his brief regarding his
    Misconduct hearing.
    7
    61 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-3307.
    4
    applies to the assessment, as that assessment [is] a statutorily[-]authorized
    consequence of [the inmate] being found guilty of institution misconduct.” Brome v.
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    756 A.2d 87
    , 89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
    Here, Burks was found guilty of Class I misconduct. See Misconduct
    Report, Burks’ Br., App. E.      Because the Department’s assessment was both
    statutorily and regulatory authorized once Burks was found guilty of the Misconduct,
    the Department was not required to make the assessment at the time it issued its
    misconduct finding and sanctions. Accordingly, Burks’ constitutional rights were not
    violated by the timing of the Department’s assessment.
    For all of the above reasons, the Department’s order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    5
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Brian Burks,                            :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    Department of Corrections,              :   No. 684 C.D. 2015
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 21st day of March, 2016, the Department of
    Corrections’ March 26, 2015 order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 684 C.D. 2015

Judges: Covey, J.

Filed Date: 3/21/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/21/2016