R.S. Leventhal v. Com Com. v. R.S. Leventhal ( 2018 )


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  •         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Ronald S. Leventhal,                     :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                           :   No. 186 F.R. 2016
    :   Argued: June 6, 2018
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,            :
    Respondent          :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,            :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                           :   No. 213 F.R. 2016
    :   Argued: June 6, 2018
    Ronald S. Leventhal,                     :
    Respondent      :
    BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE BROBSON                         FILED: November 2, 2018
    This is one of several related matters, challenging the assessment of
    Pennsylvania personal income tax (PIT) liability on nonresident investors on account
    of the 2005 foreclosure of a commercial property located in the City of Pittsburgh
    (Property). We resolved the first round of appeals through en banc opinions and
    orders issued in 2012, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in Wirth v.
    Commonwealth, 
    95 A.3d 822
    (Pa. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Houssels v.
    Pennsylvania, 
    135 S. Ct. 1405
    (2015).1 Petitioner Ronald S. Leventhal (Taxpayer),
    a resident of the State of Florida, is among the second round of challengers.2
    In a decision dated February 24, 2016, the Board of Finance and
    Revenue (Board) assessed Taxpayer’s PIT liability on account of the foreclosure of
    the Property at $51,699, “plus appropriate interest, less any payments and credits to
    his account.”      Both Taxpayer and the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue
    (Department) challenge aspects of the Board’s decision. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND3
    600 Grant Street Associates Limited Partnership (Partnership),
    organized under Connecticut law, purchased the Property for $360 million. Of this
    $360 million purchase price, the Partnership financed $308 million with a Purchase
    Money Mortgage Note (PMM Note) secured only by the Property. The PMM Note
    was nonrecourse, meaning that the Partnership and the lender agreed that the
    lender’s only recourse for nonpayment of the obligations under the PMM Note was
    to pursue foreclosure of the Property. As the name of the Partnership suggests, the
    Partnership’s primary purpose was the ownership and management of the Property.
    1
    Our lead opinion disposing of those earlier appeals was Marshall v. Commonwealth,
    
    41 A.3d 67
    (Pa. Cmwlth.) (en banc) (Marshall I), exceptions overruled, 
    50 A.3d 287
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Wirth v. Commonwealth, 
    95 A.3d 822
    (Pa. 2014), cert.
    denied sub nom. Houssels v. Pennsylvania, 
    135 S. Ct. 1405
    (2015).
    2
    Others in the second round include Craig S. and Christine L. Andrews (Docket Nos. 185,
    212 F.R. 2016), John Thompson (Docket Nos. 188, 215 F.R. 2016), and Annette Sharpe (Docket
    Nos. 187, 214 F.R. 2016).
    3
    The background is drawn from the parties’ Joint Stipulation of Facts (Stipulation) and
    accompanying exhibits, which we adopt as our findings of fact in this de novo tax appeal. In so
    doing, we note that the Stipulation is largely consistent with the facts as found by this Court in
    Marshall I.
    2
    Interest on the PMM Note accrued on a monthly basis at a rate
    of 14.55%. If the monthly accrued interest exceeded the net operating income of
    the Partnership, the Partnership was not required to pay the excess (i.e., the amount
    of monthly accrued interest less monthly net operating income). Instead, the accrued
    but unpaid excess would be deferred and, thereafter, compounded on an annual basis
    subject to the same interest rate as the principal amount of the PMM Note. The
    original maturity date of the PMM Note was November 1, 2001. In 1998, the lender
    and the Partnership amended the PMM Note to extend the maturity date to
    January 2, 2005.
    Taxpayer purchased a limited partnership interest (½ unit) in the
    Partnership on or about December 31, 1984, for $74,445. His ½ unit interest
    amounted to a 0.075641% interest in the Partnership. Taxpayer was a passive
    investor.    He never participated in the management of the Partnership or the
    Property.
    Over the years, the Partnership’s net income from operations did not
    keep pace with projections. The Partnership incurred losses from operations for
    financial accounting, federal income tax, and PIT purposes every year of its
    existence. For PIT purposes, the Partnership allocated its annual losses from
    operations to each partner, including Taxpayer. Taxpayer filed Pennsylvania PIT
    returns for tax years 1985 through 2005, reporting thereon his pass-through share4
    4
    Under Section 306 of the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (Code), Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6,
    as amended, added by the Act of August 31, 1971, P.L. 362, 72 P.S. § 7306, partnerships as legal
    entities are not subject to PIT. Rather, the partners of the partnership pay PIT on their respective
    shares of the partnership’s income or gain. Section 306 of the Code provides:
    Except as provided under section 306.2[ of the Code, Act of July 9, 2013,
    P.L. 270, 72 P.S. § 7306.2], a partnership as an entity shall not be subject to the tax
    imposed by this article, but income or gain of a member of a partnership in respect
    3
    of the Partnership losses “derived from or in the form of rents, royalties, patents and
    copyrights,” which is one of eight separate classes of income subject to PIT under
    Section 303 of the Code.5 In these tax years, Taxpayer had no offsetting income of
    the same class.
    Because of the Partnership’s dismal operations, the Partnership paid
    less monthly interest on the PMM Note than it had projected. Under the terms of
    the PMM Note, this led to a greater amount of accrued but unpaid interest over the
    years. According to the comprehensive “Offering Memorandum” shared with
    investors, the Partnership projected accrued but unpaid interest on the PMM Note at
    maturity (November 1, 2001, later extended to January 2, 2005) to be approximately
    $300 million. It also projected that proceeds upon sale of the Property at maturity
    would be sufficient to pay off the principal and accrued interest on the PMM Note,
    with excess funds available to distribute to the partners as a return on their
    investment. At the date of foreclosure, the Partnership had an accrued but unpaid
    interest obligation of approximately $2.32 billion.                The Partnership had used
    approximately $121,600,000 of this amount to offset its income from operations that
    would otherwise have been subject to PIT. Neither the Partnership nor Taxpayer
    derived any PIT benefit from the remainder.
    The lender foreclosed on the Property on June 30, 2005. By that time,
    what began as a $308 million Partnership liability on the PMM Note had grown into
    of said partnership shall be subject to the tax and tax shall be imposed on his share,
    whether or not distributed, of the income or gain received by the partnership for its
    taxable year ending within or with the member’s taxable year.
    5
    Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, added by the Act of August 4, 1991, P.L. 97,
    72 P.S. § 7303. Specifically, Section 303(a)(4) of the Code provides for a class of income
    encompassing “[n]et gains or income derived from or in the form of rents, royalties, patents and
    copyrights.”
    4
    a liability of more than $2.6 billion, of which only $308 million represented
    principal. Neither the Partnership nor its individual limited partners received any
    cash or other property as a result of the foreclosure. That same year, the Partnership
    terminated operations and liquidated.                 Taxpayer did not recover his capital
    investment in the Partnership at foreclosure or liquidation. Indeed, Taxpayer did not
    receive any cash or other property upon liquidation of the Partnership.
    The Partnership reported a gain on foreclosure of the Property for tax
    year 2005 on federal Form 1065 and Pennsylvania Form PA-65 (information return),
    the overwhelming majority of which is attributable to the full amount of the PMM
    Note debt obligation (principal plus accrued but unpaid interest) discharged upon
    foreclosure.      The Partnership reported to Taxpayer on Pennsylvania Schedule
    NRK-1 for tax year 2005 his pass-through share of the Partnership gain, $1,890,163,
    in the class of “[n]et gains or income from the disposition of property.”
    Section 303(a)(3) of the Code.6 It also reported to Taxpayer his pass-through share
    of the Partnership’s operating losses that year as Section 303(a)(4) class income.
    6
    Section 303(a)(3) of the Code is quite lengthy. The general class description provides:
    Net gains or income from disposition of property. Net gains or net income,
    less net losses, derived from the sale, exchange or other disposition of property,
    including real property, tangible personal property, intangible personal property or
    obligations issued on or after the effective date of this amendatory act by the
    Commonwealth; any public authority, commission, board or other agency created
    by the Commonwealth; any political subdivision of the Commonwealth or any
    public authority created by any such political subdivision; or by the Federal
    Government as determined in accordance with accepted accounting principles and
    practices.
    In addition to providing this general description of the class, the General Assembly also expressly
    exempted several specific transactions from the class. See 72 P.S. § 7303(a)(3)(iii)-(vii). None of
    these exceptions, however, apply to the particular type of property disposition in this case.
    5
    In a Notice of Assessment dated April 15, 2008, the Department
    assessed Taxpayer $58,028 in PIT liability, plus penalties and interest of $5,096.72,
    for a total assessment of $63,124.72 (Assessment). In doing so, the Department
    determined that Taxpayer had a taxable gain from the foreclosure for PIT purposes
    in the amount of his pass-through share of the gain reported by the Partnership in its
    informational filing—$1,890,163. Taxpayer filed a petition for reassessment with
    the Department’s Board of Appeals (BOA), challenging the Assessment.                          On
    August 21, 2015,7 BOA rejected the majority of Taxpayer’s arguments.                           It,
    nonetheless, abated the assessed penalties in full and recalculated the amount of gain
    realized by the Partnership upon disposition of the Property, accounting for annual
    straight-line depreciation of the Property dating back to the year the Partnership
    acquired it.8 Taxpayer’s pass-through share of the Partnership’s revised gain was
    $1,825,769, thereby reducing Taxpayer’s principal PIT liability from $58,028 to
    $56,050.     The Department issued a Notice of Reassessment (Reassessment)
    consistent with BOA’s determination.
    Taxpayer appealed the Reassessment to the Board. Citing Wirth,
    Taxpayer contended that the tax benefit rule should be applied to exclude from the
    amount of the gain realized by the Partnership upon foreclosure that amount of prior
    year operating losses attributable to accrued but unpaid interest deductions for which
    the Partnership derived no tax benefit. Under Taxpayer’s view, this would reduce
    7
    BOA stayed consideration of Taxpayer’s petition pending the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court’s decision in Wirth.
    8
    As this Court noted in Marshall I, a gain for PIT purposes is recognized “where the
    amount realized from the disposition of the property exceeds the adjusted basis of the property at
    the time of disposition.” Marshall 
    I, 41 A.3d at 81
    . Further, depreciation, allowed or allowable,
    is one of the factors that determines the adjusted basis of property at disposition. Depreciation
    reduces the basis of the property.
    6
    the amount realized by the Partnership from $2.6 billion to just $429,600,000,
    reducing the taxable gain for the Partnership from $2,362,812,499 to just
    $163,914,948. Concomitantly, Taxpayer’s PIT liability for his pass-through share
    of the Partnership’s taxable gain would be reduced by approximately 93%.
    Taxpayer also challenged BOA’s determination that the Partnership
    was required to reduce its basis in the Property by straight-line depreciation dating
    back to the year that the Partnership acquired the Property. Section 303(a.2) was
    added to the Code by section 9 of Act 89 of 2002.9 Section 34 of Act 89 of 2002
    provides that Section 303(a.2) of the Code “shall apply to taxable years beginning
    after December 31, 2000.” Taxpayer argued that this language meant that the
    minimum straight-line depreciation provision should only be applied for tax
    years 2001 and thereafter and, therefore, did not mandate a minimum downward
    basis adjustment for straight-line depreciation in years preceding the 2001 tax year.
    The Department offered a competing interpretation. In its view, Section 303(a.2) of
    the Code relates to the calculation of income. In this case, the income in question is
    the gain on disposition of the Property, which occurred in 2005. Accordingly,
    because the income event occurred after the effective date of Section 303(a.2), the
    minimum straight-line depreciation provision applied to calculate the adjusted basis
    of the Property from inception through foreclosure and, consequently, any gain upon
    disposition.
    Taxpayer also argued that Pennsylvania lacks the authority to impose
    PIT liability on Taxpayer in this case, because doing so would violate the Commerce
    Clause of the United States Constitution.10 Taxpayer also contended that, in reality,
    9
    Act of June 29, 2002, P.L. 559.
    U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring on Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . .
    10
    among the several States”).
    7
    he did not experience a taxable gain in 2005 and, therefore, should not have to pay
    PIT, citing Commonwealth v. Rigling, 
    409 A.2d 936
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Finally,
    in a conclusory paragraph, Taxpayer cited a litany of state and federal constitutional
    violations and requested attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.
    The Board granted Taxpayer’s request for relief from the Reassessment
    in part and denied it in part. The Board revised downward the amount of gain
    realized by the Partnership, agreeing with Taxpayer that the Partnership was not
    required to reduce its basis in the Property by straight-line depreciation until the
    2001 tax year. Consequently, the Board revised downward Taxpayer’s pass-through
    share of the Partnership’s gain to $1,683,998, thereby reducing Taxpayer’s principal
    PIT liability to $51,699. The Board, however, rejected Taxpayer’s other challenges
    to the Reassessment. Taxpayer now appeals the Board’s rejection of his tax benefit
    rule and Commerce Clause arguments, and the Department appeals the Board’s
    interpretation and application of Section 303(a.2) of the Code, relating to
    straight-line depreciation.11
    II. DISCUSSION
    This Court adequately addressed all of the issues in this appeal in our
    opinion in Andrews v. Commonwealth, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth.,
    Nos. 185, 212 F.R. 2016, filed _____________, 2018). We incorporate that opinion
    by reference and reach the same conclusions in this case.
    11
    Our standard of review in this matter is covered by Rule 1571 of the Pennsylvania Rules
    of Appellate Procedure. “Appeals taken from the Board of Finance and Revenue are de novo in
    nature, with no record being certified by the board.” Tool Sales & Serv. Co. v. Bd. of Fin. &
    Revenue, 
    637 A.2d 607
    , 610 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Tom Mistick & Sons, Inc. v.
    Pa., 
    513 U.S. 822
    (1994). “Although the Court hears these cases under its appellate jurisdiction,
    the Court functions essentially as a trial court.” Scott Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 
    692 A.2d 289
    ,
    291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), exceptions dismissed, 
    704 A.2d 205
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    8
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Board’s assessment of
    Taxpayer’s PIT liability in all respects.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Ronald S. Leventhal,                         :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                              :   No. 186 F.R. 2016
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                :
    Respondent              :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                :
    Petitioner              :
    :
    v.                              :   No. 213 F.R. 2016
    :
    Ronald S. Leventhal,                         :
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2018, the order of the Board of
    Finance and Revenue is AFFIRMED.
    Unless    exceptions      are   filed   within   30   days   pursuant   to
    Pa. R.A.P. 1571(i), this order shall become final.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Ronald S. Leventhal,                          :
    Petitioner                  :
    :    No. 186 F.R. 2016
    v.                              :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                 :
    Respondent                    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                 :
    Petitioner                    :
    :    No. 213 F.R. 2016
    v.                              :
    :    Argued: June 6, 2018
    Ronald S. Leventhal,                          :
    Respondent                  :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    CONCURRING OPINION
    BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                        FILED: November 2, 2018
    I join in the Majority’s affirmance of the Board of Finance and
    Revenue’s application of section 303(a.2) of the Tax Reform Code of 19711
    1
    Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, added by the Act of June 29, 2002, P.L. 559,
    72 P.S. §7303(a.2).
    concerning minimum straight-line depreciation.       However, I concur with the
    Majority’s affirmance of the Board’s refusal to apply the tax benefit rule to reduce
    the personal income tax (PIT) liability of Ronald S. Leventhal, for the reasons set
    forth in my Concurring Opinion in Marshall v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ___
    A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 863 F.R. 2015 and 50 F.R. 2016, filed November 2,
    2018).
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    PAM - 2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 186 F.R. 2016 and 213 F.R. 2016

Judges: Brobson, J. ~ Concurring Opinion by McCullough, J.

Filed Date: 11/2/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/2/2018