L. Walker v. Super. K. Kauffman ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Lydell Walker, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Superintendent Kevin Kauffman, :
Deputy Superintendent W.S. Walters; :
Activities Manager C. Frailey; :
Maintenance Manager C. Stone, :
Activities Specialist John Doe #1, :
and Maintenance Technician : No. 1161 C.D. 2021
John Doe #2 : Submitted: July 29, 2022
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: January 6, 2023
Lydell Walker (Walker) appeals, pro se, from the Huntingdon County
Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) September 20, 2021 order dismissing his pro se
complaint against State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Huntingdon Superintendent
Kevin Kauffman (Kauffman), Deputy Superintendent W.S. Walters (Walters),
Activities Manager C. Frailey (Frailey), Maintenance Manager C. Stone (Stone),1
Activities Specialist John Doe #1, and Maintenance Technician John Doe #2
(collectively, Appellees) (Complaint) as frivolous pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
1
According to the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) Office of General Counsel’s May
27, 2022 Non-Participation Notice Letter, Walters’s, Frailey’s, and Stone’s full names are:
William Walters, Curtis Frailey, and Christian Stone. See May 27, 2022 Non-Participation Notice
Letter at 1.
Civil Procedure (Rule) 240(j)(1), Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). Essentially, the issue before
this Court is whether Walker’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted and, thus, is wholly frivolous. After review, this Court affirms in part,
and vacates and remands in part.
Background
Until January 21, 2022, Walker was incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon.2
Walker mailed a Praecipe for Issuance of Writ of Summons (Praecipe) to the trial
court to initiate a civil action against Appellees on or about January 6, 2021.3 See
Original Record (O.R.) Item 4, Petition for Relief from Judgment of Non Pros
(Petition), Ex. A. On January 11, 2021, the trial court notified Walker that in order
to initiate his action, he must file a civil cover sheet and send a filing fee or an
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP Application). See Petition Ex. B.
On January 17, 2021, Walker sent a civil cover sheet and his IFP Application to the
trial court. See Petition Ex. C. The trial court docketed the Praecipe and IFP
Application on January 25, 2021, and returned time-stamped copies thereof to
Walker, which he received on January 28, 2021. See Petition Ex. D. On April 30,
2021, the trial court dismissed Walker’s action pursuant to Rule 240(j)(2), because
2
Walker was released on parole (Parole No. 132DO) on January 21, 2022. Walker’s parole
status is publicly available through the DOC’s Inmate/Parolee Locator. See
http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov (last visited January 5, 2023).
3
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 121(f) states:
A pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated in a correctional
facility is deemed filed as of the date of the prison postmark or the
date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of
mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip or
other reasonably verifiable evidence.
Pa.R.A.P. 121(f). According to the trial court, the envelope was postmarked January 6, 2021.
However, the postmarked envelope was not included in the record the trial court submitted to this
Court. Walker’s Praecipe is dated January 3, 2021.
2
Walker failed to file a complaint within 90 days of filing the Praecipe.4 See Petition
Ex. E.
On July 26, 2021, Walker filed the Petition, therein explaining that he
never received an order disposing of the IFP Application or notice that the trial court
issued a writ of summons, and describing his limited law library access, technical
difficulties and the COVID-19 pandemic that critically impeded his ability to timely
file the Complaint. See Petition at 2-6; see also Petition Ex. F, Correspondence
History Log. Walker appended the Complaint to the Petition. See Petition Ex. G,
Complaint.
Walker declared in the Complaint that while using the lateral pull-down
machine in SCI-Huntingdon’s covered yard weightlifting area on January 3, 2019,
he sustained a serious injury to his lumbar spine when the metal cable suddenly
detached from the lateral pull-down machine and the lateral bar struck him in the
chest, causing him to lose his balance, and land forcefully on the concrete floor in a
seated position. See Petition Ex. G, Complaint. Walker sought monetary damages
pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section
1983), from all of the Appellees for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment
to the United States (U.S.) Constitution (Eighth Amendment), U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII, based on their deliberate indifference to his health and safety (Counts I and II),
4
Rule 240(j)(2) specifies:
If the petitioner commences the action by writ of summons, the court
shall not act on the petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
until the complaint is filed. If the complaint has not been filed
within ninety days of the filing of the petition, the court may dismiss
the action pursuant to [Rule 240](j)(1).
Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(2).
3
and from Kauffman, Walters, Frailey, and Stone based on their negligence (Count
III).5 See id.On September 20, 2021, the trial court granted the Petition,6 and
simultaneously dismissed the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1),
effectively dismissing Walker’s Section 1983 claim and his negligence claim. See
O.R. Item 5. Walker appealed to this Court.7
By May 27, 2022 letter, the Department of Corrections’ Office of
General Counsel (DOC) notified this Court that although Kauffman, Walters,
Frailey, and Stone are Appellees, they “will not participate in this appeal as the
matter was dismissed by the [trial court] prior to service.” May 27, 2022 Non-
Participation Notice Letter at 1. On December 17, 2021, the trial court filed its
5
Walker asserted that the lateral pull-down machine was a permanent fixture on DOC’s
real property. See Petition Ex. G, Complaint.
6
In its opinion filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)
(1925(a) Opinion), the trial court declared: “[Walker] submitted a properly supported [IFP
Application], which was approved by this [trial c]ourt, and notice thereof was sent to [Walker].”
O.R. Item 5, 1925(a) Op., at 2. However, the trial court docket included with the record submitted
to this Court does not reflect that the trial court approved Walker’s IFP Application or notified
him. Further, because Rule 240(j)(1) specifies that a trial court may only dismiss an action as
frivolous “prior to action upon the [IFP Application,]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1), this Court has ruled
that a trial court errs when it grants an IFP application and thereafter dismisses a complaint under
Rule 240(j)(1). See LeBlanc v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1172 C.D. 2021, filed Sept. 1, 2022); see
also Grosso v. Love, 667 A.2d 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Finally, Rule 240(j)(2) specifies that when
“the petitioner commences the action by writ of summons, the court shall not act on the [IFP
Application] until the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(2). Accordingly, this Court treats
the IFP Application as if the trial court had not acted upon it.
This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for [their] persuasive value,
but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). The unreported opinions cited herein are cited for their
persuasive value.
7
“Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been
violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, or whether the trial court committed an error
of law.” Mohica v. SCI-Mahanoy Sec., 224 A.3d 811, 812 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quoting
Lichtman v. Glazer, 111 A.3d 1225, 1227 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).
Walker filed an IFP Application in this Court, which this Court granted on December 21,
2021.
4
opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) (1925(a)
Opinion), wherein the trial court declared: “[T]he [trial c]ourt rests upon [its
September 20, 2021] order and the reasoning set forth therein, and incorporates it by
reference herein.” O.R. Item 8, 1925(a) Op., at 1.
Discussion
Initially, Rule 240(j)(1) provides, in relevant part:
If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or
proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a
petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court
prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action,
proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue
or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is
frivolous.
Note: A frivolous action or proceeding has been
defined as one that “lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, [326] . . . (1989).
Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) (italics omitted). “An action is frivolous under [Rule 240(j)]
if, on its face, it does not set forth a valid cause of action[.]” Bennett v. Beard, 919
A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)). “As we review [Walker’s C]omplaint for validity under Rule
240[(j)(1)], we are mindful that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed simply
because it is not artfully drafted.” Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 979 A.2d 352,
354 (Pa. Super. 2009) (italics omitted); see also Garcia v. Howell (Pa. Cmwlth. No.
800 C.D. 2018, filed Aug. 23, 2019).
5
Section 1983 Action - Eighth Amendment
In the Complaint Counts I and II, Walker
contends that he has stated a claim for a violation of
[Section] 1983. See Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d 607 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2002) (to state a claim under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured under
the [U.S.] Constitution or [U.S.] law[;] and (2) show that
the alleged violation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law).
Bundy v. Beard, 924 A.2d 723, 727 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d, 941 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2007).
Specifically, Walker claims that Appellees violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. “The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the [s]tates through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV], prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ on
those convicted of crimes.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991) (citation
omitted). Thus, despite that prisoners surrender numerous rights upon conviction
and incarceration, they remain entitled to be free from the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. Accordingly,
the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison
officials, who may not, for example, use excessive
physical force against prisoners. The [Eighth]
Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who
must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison
officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must “take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates[.]” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-[]27 . . .
(1984).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted).
Not every governmental action affecting the interests or
well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny, however. “After incarceration, only the
‘“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”’ . . .
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the
6
Eighth Amendment.” Ingraham v. Wright, [] 430 U.S.
[651,] 670 . . . [(1977)] (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, [] 429
U.S. [97,] 103 . . . [(1976)] (citations omitted). To be cruel
and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to
be punishment at all[,] must involve more than ordinary
lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. . . .
It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error
in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by
the [Eighth Amendment.]
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
In Wilson, the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
[O]nly the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’”
implicates the Eighth Amendment, [Estelle, 429 U.S.] at
104 . . . (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 . . .
(1976) (joint opinion) (emphasis added))[;] a prisoner
advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege
“deliberate indifference” . . . . [Estelle,] 429 U.S.[] at 106
. . . . “It is only such indifference” that can violate the
Eighth Amendment, []id. (emphasis added); allegations of
“inadvertent failure . . . ,” id.[] at 105 . . . , or of []
“negligen[ce] . . . ,” id.[] at 106 . . . , simply fail to establish
the requisite culpable state of mind.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297.
This Court has observed:
In Farmer . . . , the [U.S.] Supreme Court concluded that
the inquiry into whether a prison official was deliberately
indifferent is a subjective one, requiring the demonstration
of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness,[8] and held
8
Section 302(b)(3) of Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code states:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
in the actor’s situation.
7
that a prisoner must establish that: (i) the prison official
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from
which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the
inference. [Id.] at 837, 840 . . . . The [Farmer] Court also
emphasized that the duty of a prison official under the
Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety and that
prison officials who respond reasonably to the alleged risk
cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, even
where the measures taken by prison officials failed to
abate the substantial risk. Id. at 844-[]45[.]
Tindell v. Dep’t of Corr., 87 A.3d 1029, 1039-40 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (footnote
omitted). Notwithstanding, “Section 1983 actions against state officials in their
official capacity that seek only monetary damages are [] barred, as such a suit against
a state official in his official capacity constitutes [a] suit against the state itself.”
Watkins v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 196 A.3d 272, 275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
Here, Walker pled that he was entitled to monetary damages from
Appellees because he was injured when the lateral pull-down machine - a permanent
fixture of DOC’s real property that Appellees were required to inspect, maintain,
and repair - malfunctioned, caused him injury, pain and suffering, and prevented him
from performing his usual and customary duties and occupation, to his financial loss
and detriment.
The trial court concluded:
Assuming, arguendo, that [Walker’s] submission of [the]
incomplete [Praecipe] on January 6, 2021, was sufficient
to satisfy the two-year statute of limitations applicable to
his claim,[FN]3 he has not alleged facts sufficient to
establish an Eighth Amendment claim.
An inmate asserting an Eighth Amendment claim for
failure to prevent harm must prove that prison officials
acted with “deliberate indifference” to “conditions posing
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3).
8
a substantial risk of serious harm” to that inmate. Farmer
. . . , 511 U.S. [at] 834 . . . (citations omitted). Mere
negligence is not enough to show deliberate indifference.
Rather, the inmate must prove that the defendants’ actions
were “reckless,” as defined by criminal law. Id. at 837,
839-40.
Here, [Walker] tries mightily to characterize [Appellees’]
actions as arising from “deliberate indifference.”
However, it is clear on the face of the Complaint that he
has alleged only ordinary negligence as opposed to
criminal recklessness. Dismissal is therefore appropriate.
[FN]3
See [Section 5524(2) of the Judicial Code,] 42
Pa.C.S. § 5524(2) (action to recover damages for
“injuries to the person” must be filed within two
years).
O.R. Item 5, 1925(a) Op., at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
This Court agrees with the trial court that Walker’s Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983. In addition,
regardless of whether Walker asserted sufficient facts to support an Eighth
Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference, accepting Walker’s
allegations against Appellees as true, he cannot succeed in his Section 1983 action
in the first instance. Despite that Walker asserted in the Complaint that Appellees
acted under color of state law, with deliberate indifference to his safety and violated
his Eighth Amendment rights, see Bundy, “[b]ecause the [C]omplaint asserted only
claims for money damages, [Walker’s] claims against [Appellees] in their official
capacity [] [do not] state a cause of action under Section 1983.” Watkins, 196 A.3d
at 275. Consequently, Walker’s Section 1983 action is frivolous. Accordingly, the
trial court properly dismissed Counts I and II of Walker’s Complaint pursuant to
Rule 240(j)(1).
9
Negligence
Although not addressed by the trial court,9 in the Complaint Count III,
Walker also sought monetary damages from Kauffman, Walters, Frailey, and Stone
on the basis that they were negligent, careless, and reckless by:
(a) failing to cause the cabled weight machines to be
properly inspected to detect fraying of the cables and/or
other signs indicative of impending structural failure;
(b) failing to require the performance of regular and timely
preventative maintenance of the weight machines,
including replacement of the cables affixed to said
machines prior to the breakage, snapping, fraying and/or
other structural failure;
(c) failing to develop and/or implement adequate
safeguards to prevent the injury to [Walker]; and/or
(d) being otherwise negligent, careless and reckless under
the circumstances.
Petition Ex. G, Complaint at 10.
This Court has explained:
Pursuant to [a]rticle [I], [s]ection 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, the General Assembly declared that ‘the
Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting
within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain
immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall
specifically waive the immunity.’ 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310.
Minor v. Kraynak, 155 A.3d 114, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (footnote omitted).
This Court determines whether a Commonwealth
employee is protected by sovereign immunity by
considering “whether the . . . employee was acting within
9
Rule 240(j)(1) does not expressly mandate or authorize the trial court to dismiss a
complaint in its entirety when fewer than all of the counts or causes of action are deemed frivolous.
Moreover, this Court has reversed and remanded a portion of a trial court’s Rule 240(j)(1)
dismissal order to allow the action to proceed as to defendants against whom potentially valid
causes of action were alleged. See Williams v. Syed, 782 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
10
the scope of his or her employment; whether the alleged
act which causes injury was negligent and damages would
be recoverable but for the availability of the immunity
defense; and whether the act fits within one of the nine
exceptions to sovereign immunity.”
Id. at 122 (quoting La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992));
see also Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522, commonly known as
the Sovereign Immunity Act (Act).
Thus, “[t]o impose liability on a Commonwealth party, (1)
the alleged negligent act must involve a cause of action
that is recognized at common law or by a statute, and (2)
the case must fall within one of [the] exceptions to
sovereign immunity listed in Section 8522(b)” of [the
Act]. Bufford v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 670 A.2d 751, 753
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)).
[Walker], therefore, bore the “initial burden” of setting
forth a claim for negligence against [Appellees] where
damages would be recoverable under the common law or
a statute creating a cause of action. LaChance v. Michael
Baker Corp., 869 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), as
amended (Feb. 10, 2005); see also Williams v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., 873 A.2d 81, 85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“The
threshold question in a case of . . . sovereign immunity is
whether [Walker] would have an action in damages at
common law or statute if [Appellees] could not claim the
defense of governmental or sovereign immunity.”).
Young v. Wetzel, 260 A.3d 281, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)10 (footnotes omitted).
In order to satisfy the first immunity waiver requirement, there must be
a cause of action involving negligence recognized at common law or by statute. See
Young. This Court has explained: “To state a negligence claim, ‘the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant
breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
suffered an actual loss or damage.’” Id. at 289 (quoting Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d
458, 461 (Pa. 1998)). “The [] duty of care a Commonwealth agency owes to those
10
This Court ordered Young’s publication on July 8, 2021.
11
using its real estate, is such as to require that the condition of the property is safe for
the activities for which it is regularly used, intended to be used[,] or reasonably
foreseen to be used.” Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307, 312 (Pa. 1989).
Here, Walker claims that DOC employees Kauffman, Walters, Frailey,
and Stone owed him a duty of care, they breached that duty by failing to inspect,
maintain, and repair the lateral pull-down machine under their care, custody and
control, and he was injured and sustained damages as a result. Because Walker pled
a cause of action recognized at common law or by a statute, he met the first immunity
waiver requirement.
In order to satisfy the second immunity waiver requirement, the action
must fall within one of the exceptions listed in Section 8522(b) of the Act. See
Young. Here, Walker alleges in the Complaint that the lateral pull-down machine
was “a permanent fixture of the real property” under Appellees’ control. Petition
Ex. G, Complaint at 4; see also Complaint at 10. Section 8522(b)(4) of the Act
expressly waives sovereign immunity for negligence claims against Commonwealth
employees relative to, inter alia, “Commonwealth real estate . . . -- A dangerous
condition of Commonwealth agency real estate . . . , including Commonwealth-
owned real property . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b) (emphasis omitted).
Because the General Assembly’s intent in the Act is to shield
government from liability except as specifically provided in the statutes, see U.S.
Venture, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 321 (Pa. 2021), “the exceptions to
sovereign immunity must be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted[.]” Casteel
v. Tinkey, 151 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). “In construing the real estate
exception, Pennsylvania courts have held that the ‘dangerous condition must derive,
originate from, or have as its source the Commonwealth realty.’” Hall v. Sw. Pa.
Water Auth., 87 A.3d 998, 1000 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting Snyder, 562 A.2d at
12
311). “[T]he focus must be on whether there is proof of a defect in the real property
itself.” Nardella v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 34 A.3d 300, 304 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
In the instant matter, Walker has pled that the lateral pull-down
machine was a permanent fixture of Commonwealth realty such that the action may
fall under the real property exception in Section 8522(b)(4) of the Act.11 Thus, it
appears that Walker’s Complaint could satisfy the second immunity waiver
requirement. Although this Court offers no view on the merits of Walker’s
11
Although decided pursuant to the portion of the Judicial Code commonly referred to as
the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542, which is
applicable to local (rather than state) government agencies and employees, this Court has
determined that inmates may be able to state valid negligence claims for injuries sustained when
prison equipment malfunctions. See Davis v. Brennan, 698 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)
(wherein this Court reversed a trial court order entering summary judgment in the county’s favor
because a substantial issue of material fact existed regarding whether the grab bar in a county
prison shower that broke free and caused the inmate to hit his head was part of the real estate, and
remanded for the trial court to determine whether the shower was so affixed to the county prison
real estate as to be real property itself). “[The] ‘real property exception’ to governmental immunity
[under the Tort Claims Act] includes articles of personal property or chattels which have been
affixed to real property so as to become realty itself-namely, fixtures.” Id. at 1383; see also
Brewington v. City of Phila., 149 A.3d 901 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 199 A.3d 348 (Pa. 2018).
“‘A fixture is an article in the nature of personal property which has been so annexed to the realty
that it is regarded as part and parcel of the land.’ Gore [v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.], 537 A.2d
[913,] 915 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)] (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 574 (5th ed. 1979)).”
Brewington, 149 A.3d at 908 n.7. The Brewington Court explained that personal property “so
annexed to the [real] property that [it] cannot be removed without material injury to the real estate
or to [itself] . . . [is] realty, even in the face of an expressed intention that [it] should be considered
personalty[.]” Id. at 909 n.8 (quoting Blocker v. City of Phila., 763 A.2d 373, 375 (Pa. 2000)).
Moreover, “while the question of whether . . . allegations of negligence concern real property or
personalty is a question of law for the court to decide, it is well settled that . . . whether a
defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury is a question of fact to be decided by a jury.”
Id. at 911. In the instant matter, the trial court did not address Walker’s negligence claims, let
alone determine the viability of Walker’s fixture theory under the Act.
Although this Court does not herein decide whether the fixture theory applies to negligence
actions brought against Commonwealth agencies/employees under the Act’s real estate exception,
we observe that this Court has concluded that DOC cell bars are fixtures of Commonwealth real
estate that could implicate the Act’s real property exception. See Gallagher v. Bureau of Corr.,
545 A.2d 981 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Further, where, as here, the immunity exceptions are similar,
this Court has considered the reasoning in Tort Claims Act real estate exception cases when
deciding real estate exception cases under the Act. See id.; see also Snyder.
13
negligence claims against Kauffman, Walters, Frailey, and Stone, we cannot
conclude that Walker’s allegations on their face “lack[] an arguable basis either in
law or in fact” and, thus, are frivolous. Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) Note (quoting Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 326). Because Walker’s Complaint may have stated a valid negligence
claim not barred by sovereign immunity, the trial court erred by dismissing Walker’s
negligence action pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1).
Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, the portion of the trial court’s order
dismissing Counts I and II of Walker’s Complaint is affirmed. The portion of the
trial court’s order dismissing Count III of the Complaint is vacated, and the matter
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Lydell Walker, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Superintendent Kevin Kauffman, :
Deputy Superintendent W.S. Walters; :
Activities Manager C. Frailey; :
Maintenance Manager C. Stone, :
Activities Specialist John Doe #1, :
and Maintenance Technician : No. 1161 C.D. 2021
John Doe #2 :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of January, 2023, the portion of the
Huntingdon County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) September 20, 2021 order
dismissing Counts I and II of Lydell Walker’s (Walker) pro se Complaint is
affirmed. The portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Count III of Walker’s
Complaint is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge