Centre County DA's Office v. A. Manivannan v. County of Centre ~ Appeal of: A. Manivannan ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Centre County District Attorney’s:
    Office                           :
    :
    v.              :                  No. 660 C.D. 2021
    :                  Submitted: May 6, 2022
    Ayyakkannu Manivannan            :
    :
    v.              :
    :
    County of Centre                 :
    :
    Appeal of: Ayyakkannu Manivannan :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                  FILED: November 18, 2022
    Ayyakkannu Manivannan (Requester) appeals the April 16, 2021 order
    of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court), which granted in part
    and denied in part Requester’s objections to the non-production of certain records
    by the Centre County District Attorney’s Office (D.A.) and the County of Centre
    (County) relative to Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1 requests filed by Requester.
    Upon review, we affirm the order of the trial court.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On April 9, 2019, Requester submitted an RTKL request to the D.A.
    seeking “records related to the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing” of
    1
    Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
    Requester (First Request). Off. of Open Recs. (OOR) Final Determination, 7/24/19,
    at 1. Specifically, Requester sought:
    [A]ll emails, phone calls, messages, conference calls, notes, files,
    etc., from Centre County (PA) (Ms. Stacy Parks Miller and Ms.
    Megan McGoron) related to [the Requester]. This includes but
    is not limited to the following:
    1. All Centre County DA/[Assistant DA (ADA)] phone
    records (in/out) with DOE/NETL[2] to date.
    2. All written correspondence (including emails) with
    NETL/DOE (including records of communications between
    Centre County DA and ADAs with NETL/DOE Attorney
    Mr. Mark Hunzeker) to date.
    3. Paul Detwiler's communication records delivered by
    NETL/DOE to Centre County DA (Ms. Megan McGoron).
    4. The certified authorization letter by the DOE/NETL
    custodian for issuing government documents to Centre
    County DA (Ms. Megan McGoron).
    5. All records by Centre County DA (Ms. Megan McGoron)
    related to the 1:30PM Friday, April 15, 2016 conference
    call with Mr. Mark Hunzeker and Ms. Mary Ann Alvin.
    6. All notes and communications related to the preparation
    of subpoenas, search warrants (in accordance with law) for
    federal agency NETL/DOE documents and witness.
    7. The specific email from Ms. Megan McGoron that was
    attached with the Court subpoena for Mary Ann Alvin
    (NETL) to appear at Centre County Courthouse on April
    18-20, 2016, to testify on behalf of the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania against [Requester].
    8. All records and notes of paper/verbal communications
    provided by Mr. Mark Hunzeker to Ms. Megan McGoron
    on the internal investigation testimonies of [Requester], Dr.
    David Tucker and Mr. Daniel Haynes.
    2
    “DOE” is the United States Department of Energy. “NETL” is the National Energy
    Technology Laboratory.
    2
    9. All communication records by Ms. Megan McGoron
    regarding [Requester’s] appeal case and appeal law firm
    with any third party.
    10. All communications with Penn State University Police
    Officer Jessica Myers as mentioned in the Penn State
    University police reports.
    11. All record notes from Ms. Mark Hunzeker’s
    communications with Ms. Megan McGoron and Ms.
    Crystal Hundt before, during the trial (April 18th & 19th
    2016) and to date.
    12. Records related to the acquisition of the large head shot
    photograph of [Requester] in the Facebook page posting by
    Ms.             Stacy               Parks             Miller.
    (https://www.facebook.com/stacyparksmiller).
    13. All communications and notes between Centre County
    and the media related to [Requester’s] case to date.
    14. DA and ADA office records (all forms) in which
    tentative sentencing of [Requester] was discussed inside
    and outside the office before sentencing (10th June 2016).
    15. Records of any advice given to Centre County
    Prosecutor by Federal Agency employees regarding
    [Requester’s] case.
    Id. at 2-3.   The D.A. partially denied the request, providing redacted records, and
    Requester appealed to the OOR.
    OOR granted the appeal in part, denied it in part, and dismissed it in
    part as moot. Id. at 1. Regarding the requested phone records and certain email
    records, which the D.A. had neither produced nor listed in its exemption log, OOR
    determined that the D.A. had failed to prove that these records did not exist in its
    possession, custody, or control. Id. at 6, 8-9. Thus, OOR directed production of
    these records. Id. In all other respects, OOR agreed with the D.A.’s claims that the
    requested records were either not in its possession, subject to exemption and
    3
    redaction, or related to a criminal investigation over which OOR had no jurisdiction.
    Id. at 7, 9-14.
    On July 7, 2019, Requester made a second RTKL request (Second
    Request), which was specifically directed to the County, and sought:
    All [] County DA/ADA (Ms. Stacy Parks Miller and ADA Ms.
    Megan McGoron phone records (in/out)[)] with Mr. Mark
    Hunzeker of [DOE/NETL] since 2014 related to [Requester].
    DA/ADA [] County landlines especially (telephone number
    omitted) with [Mr.] Mark Hunzeker (including land line & cell)
    of DOE/NETL (telephone number omitted) from 2014 to date.
    OOR Final Determination, 8/1/19, at 1. The County denied this request on the basis
    that no responsive records existed, and Requester appealed to OOR. Upon review,
    OOR granted the appeal on the basis that the County had failed to support its
    assertion that no responsive records existed within its possession, custody, or
    control. Id.
    II. TRIAL COURT’S REVIEW
    The D.A. timely sought review with the trial court and joined the
    County as an indispensable party. In response, Requester filed a counter-petition to
    enforce OOR’s final determination against the D.A. and a cross-claim in mandamus
    seeking to compel the County to conduct a search and to produce any responsive
    records, as had been directed by OOR.
    The trial court directed the D.A. and the County to produce any
    additional responsive documents within 30 days. See Trial Ct. Order, 9/11/20. The
    D.A. and County complied, but following this subsequent production, Requester
    filed objections alleging that (1) the D.A. failed to search its email servers, (2) the
    County phone records did not contain incoming phone calls, (3) no cell phone
    4
    records were produced by either the D.A. or the County, and (4) the D.A.’s
    submission contained improper redactions. Trial Ct. Op. & Order, 4/19/21, at 1.
    Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court further directed the D.A. and the
    County to provide the trial court with any additional attestations, as well as
    unredacted emails to review, in camera, to determine if the redactions were
    appropriately made. Id. at 3. Thereafter, the trial court entered a decision, reasoning
    as follows.
    In regard to the matter of the email server, the trial court noted that the
    County presented an attestation from Mr. Michael Crocker, director of the company
    that maintains the County’s electronic records, asserting it was possible that
    responsive records could be on the County’s backup computer equipment (tapes).
    However, the trial court accepted the D.A.’s and the County’s assertion that there
    has been a records retention policy in place since 2016, which provides for the
    deletion of any emails not moved into archives after 90 days, that a search of
    individual employee email boxes and computer archives was conducted, and all
    responsive records had been provided to Requester. In addition, the trial court
    accepted Mr. Crocker’s aforementioned attestation to the extent it further explained
    that the backup tapes were created for emergency purposes only and not readily
    searchable. Further, files on the servers were not readily retrievable, because
    anything more than 90 days old was stored on tapes, and efforts to restore/recreate
    the information on the tapes would likely be time consuming, cost nearly $9,700,
    and would require the purchase of additional equipment. The trial court determined
    it would be unreasonable and unnecessary to require the D.A. and the County to
    search the backup server, and, thus, they were not required to do so. See id. at 3-6.
    5
    The trial court further determined that the County was required to
    produce all responsive landline phone records in its possession, including records of
    incoming calls from the DOE, with the caveat that the D.A. would first have an
    opportunity to review the record of calls to determine whether they revealed any
    information relative to witnesses or victims. See id. at 6-7.
    In regard to Requester’s request for all cell phone records of
    communications between the D.A. and DOE/NETL, the trial court determined that
    the D.A. does not have possession, custody, or control over any remaining
    responsive records, because they are maintained by Verizon, and the D.A. does not
    have the ability to access them. Because the records requested by Requester were
    between Verizon and an individual who is no longer employed by, or a contractor
    with, the D.A. or the County, the trial court decided there was no requirement to
    provide them to Requester. See id. at 7-8.
    Finally, the trial court determined that the D.A. was not required to
    provide unredacted versions of the emails and other documents previously produced.
    The trial court stated that it had reviewed the redacted portions of those emails, in
    camera, and determined that many of the redactions were related to a criminal
    investigation and, thus, exempt under the RTKL. Further, the trial court determined
    that other redactions were protected under the work-product doctrine because the
    redactions related to theories and strategies for trial, including specific evidence and
    witnesses. Thus, the trial court determined that the redactions were appropriate and
    properly made pursuant to the RTKL and that the D.A. did not waive its right to
    redact same, where it had not redacted other parts of the records that may have also
    been protected for the same reasons. See id. at 9-11.
    6
    Accordingly, the trial court overruled Requester’s objections to
    production and determined that the records produced by the D.A. and the County
    were sufficient to satisfy the obligations to Requester in this matter. Id. at 11.3
    Requester then timely appealed.4
    III. APPEAL
    A. Issues
    Requester raises five issues.5 First, Requester argues that the trial court
    erred and abused its discretion by relying on affidavits and attestations submitted
    after it had concluded an evidentiary hearing. Requester’s Br. at 4. Second,
    Requester argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the D.A. and the
    County were not required to search their email servers to determine whether
    responsive emails exist. Id. Third, Requester asserts that the trial court erred by
    allowing the D.A. and the County to redact landline phone records that contain phone
    numbers of victims or witnesses. Id. Fourth, Requester asserts the trial court erred
    by determining that the D.A.’s cell phone records are not in the D.A.’s or the
    County’s possession, custody, or control. Id. Finally, Requester contends the trial
    court erred by allowing certain email communications to be redacted under the
    attorney work-product doctrine and the criminal investigation exemption of the
    RTKL. Id.
    3
    As we noted previously, the trial court concluded that the County must provide Requester
    with the landline records of incoming calls to the D.A. from DOE/NETL after the D.A. has an
    opportunity to review the records for any witness or victim information.
    4
    Our review of the trial court’s decision determines whether findings of fact are supported
    by substantial evidence or whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of
    discretion in reaching its decision. In re Right to Know Law Request Served on Venango Cnty.’s
    Tourism Promotion Agency & Lead Econ. Dev. Agency, 
    83 A.3d 1101
    , 1104 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2014).
    5
    We have reordered the issues for ease of disposition.
    7
    The County responds that it made a good faith search of the records in
    its possession by searching individual employee emails in Outlook, in addition to
    the D.A.’s server, and that there is no obligation to search emergency backup tapes
    or to recreate records deleted from a server. Further, the County asserts that the trial
    court’s decision was in accordance with the email search requirements of the RTKL.
    Next, the County responds that its ability to conduct a landline phone records search
    is limited to a specific number or exchange, rather than a name or other identifying
    information, and that it produced all records within its possession, custody, or
    control. Further, the County reiterates that it has no responsibility to produce the
    requested cell phone records because those records are not in its possession, custody,
    or control. See Cnty.’s Br. at 9-10.
    For its part, the D.A. adopts the argument of the County that it satisfied
    its obligations relative to email records under the RTKL and that it is not required to
    conduct an additional search of the server. Second, the D.A. argues that to the extent
    outstanding landline records may still exist, they may be disclosed only after they
    are reviewed to ensure they do not contain victim or witness information. As for the
    requested cell phone records, the D.A. asserts that those are not in its control because
    they were maintained in the former D.A.’s personal cell phone account, and she
    personally contracted with Verizon in her own name, rather than in the name of the
    D.A.’s office. Accordingly, the D.A. maintains that it is does not have any authority
    over that account or any records associated with it.6 In regard to the matter of record
    redactions reviewed by the trial court in camera, the D.A. argues that the redactions
    were appropriate under the criminal investigation and work-product exemptions to
    6
    The D.A. states that the RTKL does not require it to seek requested records from former
    employees or officials when the records are not in the possession, custody, or control of the entity.
    D.A.’s Br. at 7 (citing Breslin v. Dickinson Twp., 
    68 A.3d 49
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
    8
    the RTKL. Finally, the D.A. argues that the trial court’s reliance on attestations at
    the evidentiary hearing complies with the precedential case law relative to RTKL
    evidentiary hearings. See D.A.’s Br. at 4.
    B. Analysis
    We begin our analysis with a review of the applicable legal principles.
    The RTKL is “designed to promote access to official government information in
    order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the actions of public officials, and make public
    officials accountable for their actions[.]” Bowling v. Off. of Open Recs., 
    990 A.2d 813
    , 824 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), aff’d, 
    75 A.3d 453
     (Pa. 2013). Generally, records7 in
    the possession of an agency are presumed to be public unless they are privileged or
    exempt under Section 708 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708 (relating to exemptions
    for public records), and an agency is not required to create a record if it does not
    exist. This Court has stated that an agency may satisfy its burden of proof that a
    record is not within its possession with either an unsworn attestation by the
    individual who searched for the record or a sworn affidavit of the nonexistence of
    the record. Moore v. Off. of Open Recs., 
    992 A.2d 907
    , 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    Section 706 of the RTKL states, in pertinent part:
    If an agency determines that a public record . . . contains
    information which is subject to access as well as information
    which is not subject to access, the agency’s response shall grant
    access to the information which is subject to access and deny
    7
    Section 102 of the RTKL defines a “record” as
    [i]nformation, regardless of physical form or characteristic, that documents
    a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained
    pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the
    agency. The term includes a document, paper, letter, map, book, tape, photograph,
    film or sound recording, information stored or maintained electronically and a date-
    processed or image-processed document.
    65 P.S. § 67.102.
    9
    access to the information which is not subject to access. If the
    information which is not subject to access is an integral part of
    the public record . . . and cannot be separated, the agency shall
    redact from the record the information which is not subject to
    access, and the response shall grant access to the information
    which is subject to access. The agency may not deny access to
    the record if the information which is not subject to access is able
    to be redacted.
    65 P.S. § 67.706.
    1. Post-hearing affidavits
    Requester contends that the trial court erred by relying on affidavits that
    were submitted after the evidentiary hearing in this matter. Requester maintains that
    such reliance denied him fundamental due process because he did not have an
    opportunity to cross-examine the affiants “who submitted these inadmissible, out-
    of-court, post-hearing statements, which were ultimately relied upon to resolve
    important issues in this proceeding.” Requester’s Br. at 37. We disagree. As this
    Court stated in Sherry v. Radnor Township School District, 
    20 A.3d 515
    , 519-21 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2011):
    [N]either the RTKL nor the courts have extended a right to
    discovery or a right to due process to a requesting party in a
    RTKL action.        While [S]ections 504 and 505 of the
    Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 504, 505, provide that
    a party before an administrative agency is entitled to notice and
    an opportunity to be heard, including the right to examine and
    cross-examine witnesses, [S]ection 1309 of the RTKL
    specifically states that the provisions of the Administrative
    Agency Law are inapplicable to RTKL proceedings. 65 P.S. §
    67.1309. Hence, the provisions of the Administrative Agency
    Law requiring an evidentiary hearing do not apply. See also
    Prison Legal News v. [Off. of Open Recs.], 
    992 A.2d 942
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2010). In Prison Legal News, we further held that due
    process does not require a hearing because the right to
    information provided by the RTKL does not involve a property
    10
    right; rather, it is a privilege granted by the General Assembly . .
    ..
    Recently, this Court held that the RTKL does not expressly
    restrain a reviewing court from supplementing the record through
    a hearing or remand. We indicated [] that, similar to the OOR
    appeals officer, a reviewing court has discretion to determine if
    the record created before OOR is sufficient for purposes of
    judicial review. Nevertheless, neither the aforementioned
    sections of the RTKL nor our [previous decision(s)] establish a
    requester’s right to a hearing.
    We perceive no error on the part of the trial court in refusing to
    permit [requester] to depose or cross-examine the affiants.
    (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).            As the D.A. asserts,
    “[Requester] fails to recognize that there was no burden on the D.A. [] or the County
    to ever put witnesses on the stand relating to the substance of the attestations and
    that, regardless of whether the attestations were submitted prior to or after the
    evidentiary hearing, [Requester] would never have the opportunity to cross-examine
    attestation witnesses.” D.A.’s Br. at 12. Our case law supports this position.
    Further, under the RTKL, an affidavit, in and of itself, may serve as
    sufficient evidentiary support. See Sherry, 
    20 A.3d at 520-21
    ; Moore 
    992 A.2d at 909
     (“The Department [of Corrections] searched its records and submitted both
    sworn and unsworn affidavits that it was not in possession of Moore’s judgment of
    sentence—that such a record does not currently exist. These statements are enough
    to satisfy the Department’s burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of the record
    in question, and obviously the Department cannot grant access to a record that does
    not exist.”). In the absence of any evidence that the D.A. or the County has acted in
    bad faith or that the record does, in fact, exist, “the averments in [the affidavit]
    should be accepted as true.” McGowan v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 
    103 A.3d 374
    , 382-
    11
    83 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citing Off. of the Governor v. Scolforo, 
    65 A.3d 1095
    , 1103
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
    Given our prior holdings, the presumption of the validity of the
    affidavits and attestations submitted in the present matter, and the lack of evidence
    to support that there was any bad faith on the part of the D.A. or the County, we see
    no error in the trial court’s decision to rely on affidavits and attestations submitted
    both before and after the evidentiary hearing.
    2. Search of backup servers
    We next address Requester’s contention that the trial court erred by not
    requiring the D.A. and the County to search their servers for responsive records. The
    sworn attestation that the recovery of any responsive information that might exist on
    backup tapes would require the re-creation of data and its transfer to different media,
    simply to be searched for responsive information, was enough to satisfy the D.A.’s
    and the County’s obligations under the RTKL, as there is no obligation for an agency
    to re-create data that no longer exists. As we stated in PG Publishing Company, Inc.
    v. Governor’s Office of Administration, 
    120 A.3d 456
    , 463 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015):
    [J]ust as Section 705 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.705,[8] does not
    require an agency to create a record which does not exist, Section
    507 [of the] RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.507, does not create a duty on
    the part of agencies to maintain records if they are destroyed as
    part of a records-retention policy. Simply, the RTKL governs
    whether records currently in existence must be disclosed.
    8
    Section 705 of the RTKL states: “When responding to a request for access, an agency
    shall not be required to create a record which does not currently exist or to compile, maintain,
    format or organize a record in a manner in which the agency does not currently compile, maintain,
    format or organize the record.” 65 P.S. § 67.705.
    12
    In the matter sub judice, the County offered the attestation of Mr.
    Crocker, director of the company that maintains the County’s electronic records,
    who attested:
    5.) While it is possible that information responsive to the request
    is contained on backup equipment, the files are not readily
    retrievable for the following reasons:
    a. The new system employed for the County’s electronic
    system [] was initiated in March[] 2015, but backups
    beyond 90 days are stored on tape (rather than disk which
    stores the last remaining 90 days) and therefore require the
    information to be located on the backup tapes, indexed,
    restored and recreated, then extracted to different media
    so the same could be searched to locate any records
    responsive to a request for information.
    b. Further, tapes may contain data that is problematic –
    used former email systems – so the restoration/re[-
    ]creation may fail and numerous attempts to recreate the
    same will involve more time and expense.
    ****
    9.) Given that records will have to be recreated to review them
    . . . there is no way for the County to know if there are in fact any
    records that exist . . . .
    Cnty.’s Response, 3/9/21, Ex. B (Attestation of Michael W. Crocker) (emphasis
    added). Although the trial court notably relied on the high cost and the technical
    difficulty associated with searching for the email records, the more salient point is
    that this process would require the creation and/or re-creation of records that no
    longer exist as a result of a legitimate record retention schedule.
    Relative to the matter of a record retention policy, we note that the
    RTKL does not “modify, rescind or supersede” an agency’s record retention policy.
    Section 507 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.507. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
    when it determined that the D.A. and the County were not required to conduct a
    13
    search of its backup system for records that were potentially responsive to
    Requester’s RTKL request.
    3. Information related to criminal victims and witnesses
    We next address Requester’s argument that the trial court erred by
    allowing the D.A. and the County to redact landline phone records to the extent they
    contained phone numbers of victims or witnesses. See Requester’s Br. at 26-28.
    The RTKL specifically allows for such sensitive information to be redacted under
    Section 708(b)(16), which specifically exempts records of an agency relating to or
    resulting from a criminal investigation. 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16). Section 708(b)(16)
    of the RTKL states, in pertinent part, that the following are exempt:
    A record of an agency relating to or resulting in a criminal
    investigation, including:
    ****
    (iii) A record that includes the identity of a confidential
    source . . . .
    ****
    (v) Victim information, including any information that
    would jeopardize the safety of the victim.
    (vi) A record that, if disclosed, would do any of the
    following:
    (A) Reveal the institution, progress or result of a
    criminal investigation, except the filing of criminal
    charges.
    ****
    (C) Impair the ability to locate a defendant or
    codefendant.
    (D) Hinder an agency’s ability to secure an arrest,
    prosecution or conviction.
    (E) Endanger the life or physical safety of an
    individual.
    14
    65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16). Thus, the statute is plain that such information is exempt
    from the RTKL’s definition of a public record and, thus, may properly be withheld
    via redaction, per Section 708 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708.
    4. Cell phone records not in D.A.’s possession, custody, or control
    Requester next contends that the trial court erred by determining that
    cell phone records of the former district attorney are not in its possession, custody,
    or control. The placement of these records in the D.A.’s name does not necessarily
    exempt them from the definition of public record under the RTKL. However, where,
    as here, the available records were disclosed and additional records are not
    obtainable, as confirmed by sworn attestation, we see no error. Matt Metzger, an
    assistant district attorney in the D.A.’s office, attested to the following:
    3. Stacy Parks[ ]Miller is not an employee of, nor is she
    in any contractual relationship with, the [D.A.’s] Office. She has
    had no such relations with the [D.A.’s] Office since District
    Attorney Bernard Cantorna took office on January 1, 2018.
    4. To the extent Stacy Parks[ ]Miller maintained an
    employee Verizon cell phone account in her own name, [] the
    [D.A.’s] Office does not have access to any usage records from
    that account, and all retained payment invoices from the account
    are available on the [D.A.’s] website.
    5. During the transition from Stacy Parks[ ]Miller to DA
    Cantorna, [D.A.] staff was only able to transfer the existing
    phone numbers from the Stacy Parks[ ]Miller personal account
    to the current County account with Stacy Parks[ ]Miller’s explicit
    authorization.
    D.A.’s Response, 3/4/21, Ex. A (Attestation of Matt F. Metzger). As this Court
    noted in Breslin v. Dickinson Township, 
    68 A.3d 49
    , 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013),
    “pursuant to Section 901 [of the RTKL] [], when an open records officer receives a
    request for records, he or she must make a good faith effort to determine whether:
    15
    (1) the record is a public record; and (2) the record is in the possession, custody, or
    control of the agency . . . . [T]his Court [has] held that a record is in the control or
    constructive possession of an agency when it is in the possession of one of the
    agency’s officials.” (Emphasis in original). Further, “the RTKL does not require []
    [an Agency] to seek requested documents from former employees or officials, nor
    does it forbid it.” 
    Id. at 55
     (emphasis added). While the D.A. states that it “in no
    way condones how the prior administration structured the account for employee cell
    phone service—as evidenced by the change made by District Attorney Cantorna as
    soon as he took office—the present administration simply does not have access to
    the cell phone records of [the former D.A.’s] account beyond those already made
    public . . . .” D.A.’s Br. at 8. Thus, the trial court did not err when it determined
    that the D.A. was not required to provide the requested cell phone records to the
    Requester, per the RTKL.
    5. Attorney work-product and information re: criminal investigation
    Finally, Requester contends that the trial court erred by allowing certain
    communications to be redacted under the attorney work-product doctrine and the
    criminal investigation exemption. See Requester’s Br. at 32-35. Section 305 of the
    RTKL provides, in part, that the presumption that a record is public applies unless it
    is protected by a privilege. 65 P.S. § 67.305. Section 102 (Definitions) of the RTKL
    specifically includes “[t]he attorney[] work[-]product doctrine” in the definition of
    privilege. 65 P.S. § 67.102. Further, as we addressed above, Section 708(b)(16) of
    the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16), provides for an exemption for records that are
    part of a criminal investigation. In our view, the criminal investigation exemption
    clearly applies.9
    9
    Because we conclude that the criminal investigation applies, we need not consider
    whether the attorney work-product doctrine is also applicable.
    16
    The responsive records were disclosed and reviewed by the trial court,
    in camera, and the trial court found that “[t]he redactions made by the [D.A.] were
    appropriate . . . pursuant to 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16), which exempts all
    correspondence related to a criminal prosecution.” Trial Ct. Op. at 10. Notably,
    Requester does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the proposed redactions
    conceal information related to a criminal investigation. See Requester’s Br. at 32-
    35; Requester’s Reply Br. at 21-22. Requester concedes this finding. Rather,
    Requester asserts that the criminal investigation exemption should not apply because
    any criminal investigation into his actions has concluded. According to Requester,
    the records are not exempt because “by this point in the proceedings, [he] had already
    been charged,” and “systematic inquiry . . . into a potential crime had concluded.”
    Requester’s Br. at 33-34.
    Plainly, Requester has misconstrued the scope of the criminal
    investigation exemption. Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL exempts from disclosure
    records that would “[r]eveal the institution, progress or result of a criminal
    investigation.” 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16)(vi)(A). Thus, the criminal investigation
    exemption extends beyond any initial or systematic inquiry into whether a crime has
    occurred and includes records related to the results of a criminal investigation. Id.
    Thus, we conclude that the legal premise of Requester’s argument is without merit,
    and we discern no basis upon which to disturb the trial court’s determination.
    17
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Per the foregoing review and analysis, we see no basis upon which we
    would disturb the trial court’s order, as it was based on substantial evidence and was
    free from legal error or abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
    ____________________________
    LORI A. DUMAS, JUDGE
    18
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Centre County District Attorney’s:
    Office                           :
    :
    v.              :       No. 660 C.D. 2021
    :
    Ayyakkannu Manivannan            :
    :
    v.              :
    :
    County of Centre                 :
    :
    Appeal of: Ayyakkannu Manivannan :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 18th day of November, 2022, the April 16, 2021
    order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________
    LORI A. DUMAS, JUDGE