UGI Utilities, Inc. v. City of Lancaster , 2015 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 444 ( 2015 )


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  •                IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    UGI Utilities, Inc.,                     :
    Petitioner        :
    :   No. 464 M.D. 2013
    v.                          :
    :   Argued: June 17, 2015
    City of Lancaster, Charlotte             :
    Katzenmoyer, Director of Public          :
    Works, City Council for the City         :
    of Lancaster and Pennsylvania            :
    Public Utility Commission,               :
    Respondents           :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
    HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    OPINION BY
    JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                           FILED: October 15, 2015
    Presently before this Court is the application of UGI Utilities, Inc. (UGI)
    for partial summary relief seeking a declaration that several provisions of
    Administrative Ordinance No. 16-2013 (the Ordinance) enacted by the City of
    Lancaster (City) are invalid and preempted by the Public Utility Code (Code), 66
    Pa.C.S. §§101-3316, and an order enjoining enforcement of these provisions.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute.                    UGI is a
    Pennsylvania corporation and a regulated public utility providing natural gas and
    other utility services to residential and business customers throughout eastern and
    central Pennsylvania. UGI serves approximately 355,000 customers in a service
    territory encompassing portions of 16 Pennsylvania counties. Within the City and its
    immediately surrounding suburban area, UGI serves approximately 42,000
    customers, including 18,000 customers in the City alone.                     In order to serve its
    customers, UGI has developed a network of underground natural gas distribution
    mains, service lines, and other facilities. UGI maintains approximately 54 lineal
    miles of underground distribution lines within the City’s streets and other public
    rights-of-way.
    On May 28, 2013, the City enacted Administrative Ordinance No. 2-
    2013 for the purpose of implementing a comprehensive program for management of
    the City’s rights-of-way, including management of public utilities and public utility
    facilities within these rights-of-way. The City also adopted, on this same day, a
    resolution which set forth a fee schedule related to activities and uses in the public
    rights-of-way.1 On September 17, 2013, UGI filed a petition for review in the nature
    of a complaint in this Court’s original jurisdiction seeking declaratory and injunctive
    relief, naming the City, Charlotte Katzenmoyer, the City’s Director of Public Works,
    City Counsel, and the PUC as defendants.2
    1
    This fee schedule sets forth, inter alia, a five-year use permit fee, curb and sidewalk and
    street opening permit and inspection fees, street opening degradation fees, and an annual assessment
    per linear foot of underground facilities located in the City’s rights-of-way.
    2
    The City, Katzenmoyer, and City Council shall be referred to collectively as the City.
    2
    II. December 17, 2013 Ordinance
    On December 17, 2013, the City enacted the Ordinance at issue, which
    repealed the previously enacted Administrative Ordinance No. 2-20133 and
    implemented another program for management of the City’s rights-of-way, again
    including management of public utilities and public utility facilities within these
    rights-of-way. The City relied on the powers granted to it under the Third Class City
    Code (TCCC)4 and the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law5 in enacting the
    Ordinance.6
    The Ordinance describes the City’s rights-of-way as a “valuable resource
    and asset, not only for City purposes, but also for the benefit of third-party users, who
    rely upon the Rights-of-Way of the City for the installation and maintenance of
    various facilities owned and operated by such third-parties to their economic benefit .
    . . .” (Ordinance at 2.) The Ordinance stated that the management and maintenance
    of the public rights-of-way represented a “significant continuing operational and
    capitol cost” for the City, which, by extension, is passed on to City taxpayers,
    residents, and business owners. 
    Id. The Ordinance
    also stated that it was necessary
    to recoup these maintenance and management costs from “the actual users of such
    facilities” in the City’s rights-of-way. (Ordinance at 3.)
    3
    The fee resolution remained in effect.
    4
    Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, as amended, 53 P.S. §§35101-39701.
    5
    53 Pa.C.S. §§2901-2984.
    6
    However, the City is actually organized under the Optional Third Class City Charter Law,
    Act of July 15, 1957, P.L. 901, as amended, 53 P.S. §§41101-41625.
    3
    Section 263B of the Ordinance addresses PUC-regulated utilities and
    purports to impose certain duties on public utilities and grant various powers to the
    City. For example, section 263B-2 requires each public utility to submit to the City’s
    Department of Public Works two paper copies and one electronic copy of a map
    depicting and certifying the location of all existing facilities within the City’s rights-
    of-way.      (Ordinance at 6, 7.)          Section 263B-3 authorizes the City to conduct
    inspections to ensure that utility facilities within the rights-of-way do not constitute a
    public safety hazard and remain in compliance with PUC standards. Additionally,
    section 263B-4(9) requires each public utility that has been issued a street opening
    permit by the City to submit an updated map or maps. Further, section 263B-5
    permits the City to impose an annual maintenance fee “in connection with the
    ongoing use and occupancy of City Rights-of-Way.7 (Ordinance at 8.)
    7
    The relevant provisions of the Ordinance state, in full, as follows:
    §263B-2 As-Built Maps
    On or before March 1, 2014, each Public Utility shall submit to the
    Department [of Public Works of the City of Lancaster] two paper
    copies and one electronic copy of as-built map or maps and
    engineering specifications as set forth in the Policies and Procedures
    depicting and certifying the location of all its existing Facilities
    within the Right-of-Way. Such electronic and paper maps and
    engineering specifications shall be submitted in a format and include
    the information required by the City by [sic] in the Policies and
    Procedures. If the maps are not provided electronically in the
    required format, then the Utility shall reimburse the City for the cost
    of converting the paper maps into electronic form or the cost of
    converting electronic maps in another format into the required format.
    Such maps are, and shall remain, confidential documents and are
    exempt from public disclosure under Pennsylvania’s Right to Know
    Law, 65 Pa.C.S. §708; the Public Utility Confidential Security
    Information Disclosure Protection Act, 35 P.S. §§2141.1-2141.3; and
    the Public Utility Commission Regulations relating to Confidential
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    4
    (continued…)
    Security Information, 52 Pa. Code §102.1. After submission of the
    as-built maps required under this Section, each Public Utility having
    facilities in the City Rights-of-Way shall update such maps as
    required under this Ordinance.
    §263B-3 Right to Inspect
    The City may conduct inspections of the City Rights-of-Way in order
    to ensure that Utility Facilities located within such Rights-of-Way do
    not constitute a public safety hazard, and remain in compliance with
    the standards set forth by the [PUC]. Such inspections shall be
    limited to establishing whether such Facilities meet relevant [PUC]
    standards, and comply with such City construction standards as relate
    to the opening and closing of City streets, curbs, and sidewalks, as
    provided under 15 Pa.C.S. §1511(e). In the event that the City
    determines that any Facilities of a Utility are not in compliance with
    such standards, then the City may bring a complaint against such
    Utility before the [PUC], in accordance with established [PUC]
    procedures. The City may also elect, in its discretion, to notify the
    Utility of the existence of any non-compliant Facilities, in order to
    abate such violations without the need for the filing of a formal
    [PUC] complaint.
    §263B-4 Construction in the Rights-of-Way
    ...
    (9) Facilities Maps. Each Utility issued a Street Opening Permit shall
    submit to the City, not later than thirty (30) days after completion of
    the permitted construction (or any party thereof, if required by the
    City), two paper copies and one electronic copy of updated as-built
    map or maps and engineering specifications as set forth in the
    Policies and Procedures depicting and certifying the location of the
    new Facilities constructed or updated. Such documents shall be
    submitted in a format and include the information required by the
    City in its Policies and Procedures. If the maps are not provided
    electronically in the required format, then the Utility shall reimburse
    the City for the cost of converting paper maps into electronic form or
    the cost of converting electronic maps in another format into the
    required format. Such maps are exempt from public disclosure under
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    5
    III. Amended Petition for Review
    UGI thereafter filed an amended petition for review again seeking
    declaratory and injunctive relief. UGI argued that the Ordinance violated the policy
    of the Commonwealth for a uniform, state-wide regulation of public utilities and
    public utility facilities; was preempted by the Commission’s exclusive authority over
    the location, construction and maintenance of all public utility facilities; violated
    UGI’s statutory right under section 1511(e) of the Business Corporation Law of 1988,
    (continued…)
    Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law, 65 Pa.C.S. §708; the Public
    Utility Confidential Security Information Disclosure Protection Act,
    35 P.S. §§2141.1-2141.3; and the Public Utility Commission
    Regulations relating to Confidential Security Information, 52 Pa.
    Code §102.1.
    ...
    §263B-5 Right-of-Way Maintenance Fee
    (1) Compensation for Right-of-Way Use. Occupancy of City Rights-
    of-Way by any Utility is subject to the City’s right to fix annually a
    fair and reasonable compensation, which shall be directly related to
    the City’s actual Right-of-Way maintenance costs.
    (2) Annual Right-of-Way Maintenance Fee. Each Utility with
    Facilities in the City’s Rights-of-Way shall pay an annual fee to
    compensate the City for its costs incurred in connection with the
    ongoing use and occupancy of City Rights-of-Way. The Annual
    Right-of-Way Maintenance Fee shall be determined by the City and
    authorized by resolution of City Council and shall be based on the
    City’s actual [right-of-way] maintenance costs. The Annual Right-of-
    Way Maintenance fee shall be fixed on a per-linear foot bases for
    Underground Facilities and on a per linear foot basis for Aerial
    Facilities. . . .
    (Ordinance at 6-8.)
    6
    15 Pa.C.S. §1511(e), to use public rights-of-way without charge;8 and imposed
    excessive fees, charges, costs, and assessments that will have a material adverse
    impact on utility rates and services.                  UGI sought a declaration that the
    aforementioned provisions of the Ordinance were preempted by the Code and, hence,
    were invalid and unenforceable, and that the imposition of the new maintenance and
    sidewalk and street opening fees, as well as the cost of requiring it to submit maps
    and drawings, were excessive and unreasonable.
    The City filed preliminary objections alleging that this Court lacked
    jurisdiction because the PUC was not an indispensable party to this action. The City
    further alleged a demurrer as to all counts stating that it acted entirely within its
    police powers in adopting the Ordinance and that UGI failed to plead how the
    specific Ordinance provisions interfere with the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction or are
    preempted by the Code. UGI filed a response denying these allegations. By order
    dated April 28, 2014, this Court overruled the City’s preliminary objections and
    directed the City to file an answer to UGI’s amended petition for review.
    8
    Section 1511(e) states that:
    A public utility corporation shall have the right to enter upon and
    occupy streets, highways, waters and other public ways and places for
    one or more of the principal purposes specified in subsection (a)
    (related to general rule that public utilities have the power of eminent
    domain) and ancillary purposes reasonably necessary or appropriate
    for the accomplishment of the principal purposes, including the
    placement, maintenance and removal of aerial, surface and subsurface
    public utility facilities thereon or therewith. Before entering upon
    any street, highway or other public way, the public utility corporation
    shall obtain such permits as may be required by law and shall comply
    with the lawful and reasonable regulations of the governmental
    authority having responsibility for the maintenance thereof.
    7
    The City later filed an answer denying the material allegations of UGI’s
    amended petition for review and reiterating in new matter its previous assertions that
    it acted entirely within its police powers in adopting the Ordinance and that UGI
    failed to demonstrate how the specific Ordinance provisions interfere with the PUC’s
    exclusive jurisdiction or are preempted by the Code. The City also asserted that the
    PUC has no jurisdiction to regulate rights-of-way fees, including maintenance fees,
    and that such fees are a legitimate method of cost recovery. Both UGI and the PUC
    filed answers to this new matter, denying these assertions.
    IV. Application for Summary Relief
    UGI thereafter filed its application for summary relief which is presently
    before this Court.9 UGI alleges that no material facts are in dispute and that its right
    to relief is clear. UGI seeks a declaration that sections 263B-2, 263B-3, 263B-4(9),
    and 263B-5 of the Ordinance are invalid.
    V. Discussion
    A. Preemption
    “Municipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of
    their own. Rather, they possess only such powers of government as are expressly
    9
    Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) states that “[a]t any time after the filing of a petition for review in an
    appellate or original jurisdiction matter the court may on application enter judgment if the right of
    the applicant thereto is clear.” Moreover, in ruling on a request for summary relief, this Court
    “views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and enters judgment only
    if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the right to relief is clear as a matter of law.”
    Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 
    77 A.3d 587
    , 602 (Pa.
    2013). “A fact is considered material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the case under the
    governing law.” 
    Id. 8 granted
    to them and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Huntley &
    Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 
    964 A.2d 855
    , 862 (Pa. 2009).
    Additionally, under the law of preemption, “even in areas over which municipalities
    have been granted power to act, the state may bar local governing bodies from
    legislating in a particular field.” Hoffman Mining Company v. Zoning Hearing Board
    of Adams Township, 
    32 A.3d 587
    , 593 (Pa. 2011).
    In Hoffman Mining Company, our Supreme Court noted that there are
    three generally recognized types of preemption:
    (1) express or explicit preemption, where the statute
    includes a preemption clause, the language of which
    specifically bars local authorities from acting on a particular
    subject matter; (2) conflict preemption, where the local
    enactment irreconcilably conflicts with or stands as an
    obstacle to the execution of the full purposes of the statute;
    and (3) field preemption, where analysis of the entire statute
    reveals the General Assembly’s implicit intent to occupy
    the field completely and to permit no local enactments.
    
    Id. at 593-94
    (citations omitted).
    B. Exclusive Authority of the PUC
    The exclusive authority of the PUC has been extensively discussed in the
    companion case of PPL Electric Utilities Corporation v. City of Lancaster, ___ A.3d
    ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 462 M.D. 2013, filed October 15, 2015), and need not be
    recited here.
    C. City of Lancaster Ordinance
    We begin this section of the opinion by noting that the issues and the
    arguments advanced by the parties in this appeal relating to sections 263B-3 and
    9
    263B-5 of the Ordinance are substantially the same as those set forth and disposed of
    by this Court in the companion case of PPL Electric Utilities Corporation. In that
    case, we granted, in part, the application for summary relief filed by PPL Electric
    Utilities Corporation, concluding that section 263B-3 of the Ordinance is preempted
    by the Code, and, hence, is invalid. However, we denied the application for summary
    relief with respect to section 263B-5 of the Ordinance, concluding that this section
    was not preempted by the Code and noting that the issues regarding the
    reasonableness of the annual maintenance fee imposed under section 263B-5 of the
    City’s Ordinance, and whether said fee is a tax, may require further factual
    development before this Court. We incorporate that opinion by reference and reach
    the same conclusions herein.
    We now turn to sections 263B-2 and 263B-4(9) of the Ordinance, both
    of which, as discussed above, require a public utility to submit and/or update maps
    and engineering specifications depicting and certifying the location of all existing
    facilities within the City’s rights-of-way. Section 1501 of the Code imposes certain
    obligations on all public utilities regarding the character of its service and facilities,
    including that all such “service and facilities shall be in conformity with the
    regulations and orders of the [PUC].” 66 Pa.C.S. §1501.10
    10
    Section 1501 states, in full, as follows:
    Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient,
    safe, and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such
    repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions, and
    improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary
    or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its
    patrons, employees, and the public. Such service also shall be
    reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or
    delay. Such service and facilities shall be in conformity with the
    regulations and orders of the commission. Subject to the provisions
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    10
    The PUC has promulgated a specific regulation addressing the maps,
    plans, and records of a public utility. Section 59.37 of the PUC’s regulations requires
    that:
    Each public utility shall keep complete maps, plans, and
    records of its entire distribution and other system showing
    the size, character, and location of each main, district
    regulator, street valve and drip, and each service
    connection, together with such other information as may be
    necessary. The maps, plans, and records required by the
    provisions of this section shall be kept up to date so that the
    utility may promptly and accurately furnish any information
    regarding its facilities, or copies of its maps, upon request
    by the Commission.
    52 Pa. Code §59.37.
    Sections 263B-2 and 263B-4(9) of the City’s Ordinance impose
    additional requirements on public utilities, mandating that each public utility submit
    to the City two paper copies and one electronic copy of a “map or maps and
    engineering specifications” depicting and certifying the location of all its existing
    and/or updated facilities within the City’s rights-of-way. These sections further
    require the public utility to reimburse the City the cost of converting paper maps into
    (continued…)
    of this part and the regulations or orders of the commission, every
    public utility may have reasonable rules and regulations governing
    the conditions under which it shall be required to render service. Any
    public utility service being furnished or rendered by a municipal
    corporation beyond its corporate limits shall be subject to regulation
    and control by the commission as to service and extensions, with the
    same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by a
    public utility. The commission shall have sole and exclusive
    jurisdiction to promulgate rules and regulations for the allocation of
    natural or artificial gas supply by a public utility.
    11
    electronic form or the cost of converting electronic maps from one format to another.
    In essence, these sections allow the City to become a regulator itself, which
    contradicts the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the Code, as set forth in
    the long-established case law more fully discussed in the companion case of PPL
    Electric Utilities Corporation. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Company v. Upper St. Clair
    Township, 
    105 A.2d 287
    (Pa. 1954) (regulation of utilities expressly committed to the
    PUC); York Water Company v. York, 
    95 A. 396
    , 397 (Pa. 1915) (“Under the guise of
    a police regulation cities cannot undertake to determine the reasonableness of rates
    charged by public service corporations, nor can they prescribe regulations relating to
    the facilities, service and business of such corporations.”); PECO Energy Company v.
    Township of Upper Dublin, 
    922 A.2d 996
    , 1005 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (“the legislature
    intended the Public Utility Code to preempt the field of public utility regulation”).
    Thus, we must conclude that sections 263B-2 and 263B-4(9) of the Ordinance are
    preempted by the Code, and, hence, are invalid.
    Conclusion
    Summary relief is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
    material fact and the right to relief is clear as a matter of law. Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b);
    Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania. A century of case law has
    firmly established that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the Code and its
    predecessor statute was to provide for the uniform, statewide regulation of public
    utilities and public utility facilities. Indeed, this Court has expressly held that “the
    legislature intended the Public Utility Code to preempt the field of public utility
    regulation.” Township of Upper 
    Dublin, 922 A.2d at 1005
    . For the reasons stated
    above, we conclude that sections 263B-2, 263B-3, and 263B-4(9) of the City’s
    12
    Ordinance are preempted by the Code, and, hence, are invalid.                   However, we
    conclude that section 263B-5 of the City’s Ordinance, by which the City imposes an
    annual right-of-way maintenance fee, is not a public utility regulation and, hence, is
    neither preempted by the Code nor invalid.
    Because no genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided and
    UGI has, in part, established a clear right to relief as a matter of law, we grant UGI’s
    application for summary relief and enter judgment in its favor with respect to sections
    263B-2, 263B-3, and 263B-4(9) of the Ordinance. Further, the City is specifically
    enjoined from enforcing these sections. We deny UGI’s application for summary
    relief as to section 263B-5 of the Ordinance. As noted above, the issues regarding
    the reasonableness of the annual maintenance fee imposed under section 263B-5 of
    the City’s Ordinance, and whether said fee is a tax, may require further factual
    development before this Court.11
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    Judge McGinley dissents.
    Judge Leadbetter joins in part but dissents to maintenance fees (Section 263B-5) and
    maps (Section 263B-2 and B-4(9)) only.
    11
    Based upon this determination, we need not address UGI’s alternative arguments relating
    to statutory construction and its right to occupy a right-of-way under section 1511(e) of the
    Business Corporation Law of 1988, 15 Pa.C.S. §1511(e).
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    UGI Utilities, Inc.,                     :
    Petitioner        :
    :    No. 464 M.D. 2013
    v.                          :
    :
    City of Lancaster, Charlotte             :
    Katzenmoyer, Director of Public          :
    Works, City Council for the City         :
    of Lancaster and Pennsylvania            :
    Public Utility Commission,               :
    Respondents           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2015, the application for
    summary relief filed by UGI Utilities, Inc., is granted as to sections 263B-2, 263B-
    3, and 263B-4(9) of the December 17, 2013 Ordinance enacted by the City of
    Lancaster (City). We hereby declare sections 263B-2, 263B-3, and 263B-4(9) of
    the Ordinance to be preempted by the Public Utility Code, and enjoin the City
    from enforcing these sections. UGI’s application for summary relief as to section
    263B-5 of the Ordinance is denied. Section 263B-5 is not preempted by the Code.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    UGI Utilities, Inc.,                   :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                        : No. 464 M.D. 2013
    : Argued: June 17, 2015
    City of Lancaster, Charlotte           :
    Katzenmoyer, Director of Public        :
    Works, City Council for the City       :
    of Lancaster and Pennsylvania          :
    Public Utility Commission,             :
    Respondents         :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
    HNORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    DISSENTING OPINION BY
    PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI                               FILED: October 15, 2015
    For the reasons set forth in PPL Electric Utilities Corporation v. City of
    Lancaster and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 462 M.D.
    2013, filed October 15, 2015), I respectfully dissent.
    ________________________________
    DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
    Judge McGinley joins in this dissenting opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 464 M.D. 2013

Citation Numbers: 125 A.3d 858, 2015 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 444, 2015 WL 5974321

Judges: McCullough, Pellegrini, McGinley, Leadbetter, Jubelirer, Simpson, Brobson, Patricia

Filed Date: 10/15/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024