R.T. Currie v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing ( 2016 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert T. Currie                        :
    : No. 1819 C.D. 2015
    v.                   : Submitted: April 22, 2016
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
    Department of Transportation,           :
    Bureau of Driver Licensing,             :
    :
    Appellant      :
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN                        FILED: June 16, 2016
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation,
    Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from the September 3, 2015, order of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) sustaining the appeal of
    Robert T. Currie (Licensee) from the one-year suspension of his operating privilege
    imposed pursuant to section 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S.
    §3804(e)(2)(i). We reverse.
    On May 15, 2012, the trial court convicted Licensee of two counts of
    driving under the influence (DUI) for incidents occurring on July 20, 2011, and
    December 8, 2011. The Allegheny County Department of Court Records (Records
    Department) certified the conviction arising from the July 20, 2011, DUI and
    transmitted it to DOT.    However, the Records Department did not certify the
    conviction arising from the December 8, 2011, DUI at that time.
    After receiving certification of Licensee’s conviction for the July 20,
    2011, DUI, DOT suspended Licensee’s operating privilege for one year, effective
    November 7, 2012. After the suspension period ended and Licensee paid the required
    fines, DOT restored Licensee’s operating privilege on March 23, 2015.
    On April 22, 2015, the Records Department certified Licensee’s
    conviction from the December 8, 2011, DUI and transmitted it to DOT. On May 26,
    2015, DOT suspended Licensee’s operating privilege for one year, effective June 29,
    2015.
    Licensee filed a summary appeal from the May 26, 2015, notice of
    suspension with the trial court. On September 3, 2015, after a de novo hearing, the
    trial court sustained Licensee’s appeal. In its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial
    court acknowledged “the long line of cases holding that in order to sustain an appeal
    on the basis of unreasonable delay, the delay must be attributable to [DOT].” (Trial
    Ct. Op. at 3.) The trial court determined, however, that such a result would be
    unreasonable and unjust under the circumstances of this case.
    To sustain this particular license suspension where the delay
    was not caused by [DOT], and clearly not by [Licensee],
    but by the [Records Department] would result in prejudice
    to [Licensee] . . . . Moreover, it does not further the goal of
    the . . . Vehicle Code to maintain safety on public roads,
    when the suspension will take place three years after
    [Licensee’s] conviction.        Such a decision tends to
    undermine the public’s confidence and trust in the judicial
    system and frustrate the reasonable expectations of the
    public that the courts treat defendants in a timely, fair and
    consistent manner.
    2
    (Id. at 4.) DOT now appeals from that decision.1
    DOT contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining
    Licensee’s appeal based on unreasonable delay where the delay was not attributable
    to DOT. In light of this court’s recent en banc decision on this issue, Gingrich v.
    Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    134 A.3d 528
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc), we cannot agree.2 However, because we conclude that,
    under Gingrich, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Licensee was
    prejudiced by the delay, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
    As the trial court acknowledged in its opinion, prior case law
    consistently held that in order for a licensee to successfully challenge a suspension on
    the basis of unreasonable delay, the delay must be attributable to DOT. See, e.g.,
    Pokoy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 
    714 A.2d 1162
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v.
    Green, 
    546 A.2d 767
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), aff’d, 
    569 A.2d 350
    (Pa. 1990). The
    general rule is that “where DOT is not guilty of administrative delay, any delay
    caused by the judicial system (e.g., the Clerk of Courts) [in] not notifying DOT in a
    timely manner, will not invalidate a license suspension.” 
    Pokoy, 714 A.2d at 1164
    .
    1
    Our scope of review in a license suspension appeal is limited to determining whether the
    trial court’s factual findings “are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
    committed an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Pokoy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau
    of Driver Licensing, 
    714 A.2d 1162
    , 1164 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    2
    Generally, Pennsylvania appellate courts “apply the law in effect at the time of the
    appellate decision.” Blackwell v. State Ethics Commission, 
    589 A.2d 1094
    , 1099 (Pa. 1991). Thus,
    “‘a party whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of changes in law which
    occur[] before the judgment becomes final.’” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    3
    In Gingrich, however, this court created a limited exception to the
    unreasonable-delay rule.     In that case, DOT imposed a one-year suspension of
    Gingrich’s operating privilege, effective November 28, 2014, after receiving the clerk
    of courts’ report that Gingrich was convicted of DUI on August 24, 2004. 
    Gingrich, 134 A.3d at 529
    . Gingrich appealed to the trial court, which held a de novo hearing.
    
    Id. At the
    hearing, DOT’s counsel stated that the clerk of courts transmitted
    the report of Gingrich’s 2004 conviction to DOT on October 10, 2014, and that DOT
    timely issued the suspension notice within ten days. 
    Id. Gingrich testified
    that since
    her 2004 conviction, she had earned associate’s and bachelor’s degrees, married,
    obtained a job with the United States Department of Agriculture, and had a child. 
    Id. at 530.
    Gingrich further testified that the suspension would impact her ability to
    drive her child to school and would likely result in the loss of her job, which requires
    her to drive. 
    Id. DOT did
    not dispute that Gingrich was prejudiced by the delay. 
    Id. The trial
    court found that the clerk of courts’ ten-year delay in reporting
    Gingrich’s conviction to DOT “was ‘truly unconscionable.’” 
    Id. (quoting trial
    court
    opinion). Nonetheless, the trial court upheld the suspension because the delay was
    not attributable to DOT; however, the trial court urged this court “‘to clarify, if not
    modify, its prior holdings to take into consideration what [it perceived] to be a patent
    denial of due process.’” 
    Id. (quoting trial
    court opinion).
    On appeal, this court reiterated the general rule that only delays
    attributable to DOT may invalidate a license suspension. 
    Id. at 534.
    We explained,
    4
    however, “that there may be limited extraordinary circumstances where the
    suspension loses its public protection rationale and simply becomes an additional
    punitive measure resulting from the conviction, but imposed long after the fact.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Thus, we held that “[w]here a conviction is not reported [to DOT]
    for an extraordinarily extended period of time, the licensee has a lack of further
    violations for a significant number of years before the report is finally sent, and [the
    licensee] is able to demonstrate prejudice, it may be appropriate for [the] common
    pleas [court] to grant relief.” Id.3 We then concluded:
    [T]he extraordinary delay in reporting Gingrich’s 2004
    conviction that resulted in a gap of ten years between her
    conviction and 2014 suspension, combined with her lack of
    additional issues since her last conviction in 2006 and her
    showing of prejudice, has created a circumstance where the
    [2014] suspension has lost the underlying public safety
    purpose and now simply is a punitive measure sought to be
    imposed too long after the fact.
    
    Id. at 535.
    Therefore, we reversed the trial court’s decision and vacated Gingrich’s
    suspension. 
    Id. Applying the
    Gingrich rationale to the facts of this case, we must
    determine whether:        (1) the Records Department failed to report Licensee’s
    conviction to DOT for an “extraordinarily extended period of time”; (2) Licensee had
    no further Vehicle Code violations for a “significant number of years” before the
    Records Department sent the report to DOT; and (3) Licensee has been prejudiced by
    the delay. See 
    id. at 534.
    3
    Although we declined to “impose a bright line as to what constitutes an extraordinarily
    extended period of time,” we determined that the ten-year delay in that case satisfied the test.
    
    Gingrich, 134 A.3d at 535
    n.7.
    5
    Here, Licensee testified that after DOT restored his operating privilege
    in March 2015, he moved from Pennsylvania to New Jersey; however, he has been
    unable to obtain a New Jersey driver’s license due to the Pennsylvania suspension.
    (N.T., 9/3/15, at 6-8.) Moreover, Licensee’s certified driving history establishes that
    Licensee had no Vehicle Code violations following his 2012 DUI convictions. (See
    DOT’s Ex. 3.) The trial court credited Licensee’s testimony and determined that the
    suspension imposed three years after Licensee’s conviction prejudiced Licensee and
    no longer served its public safety objective. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.) Based on our
    review of Gingrich and the certified record in this case, however, we conclude that
    the trial court abused its discretion in finding prejudice.4
    The record shows that on September 7, 2012, DOT imposed the first
    one-year suspension on Licensee’s operating privilege, effective November 7, 2012;
    that suspension should have ended on November 7, 2013. However, DOT did not
    restore Licensee’s operating privilege until March 23, 2015, because Licensee failed
    to pay the required fines. (N.T., 9/3/15, at 6-7.) After the Records Department sent
    notice to DOT of the second DUI conviction on April 22, 2015, DOT imposed the
    second one-year suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege, effective June 29,
    2015. Although technically this suspension was imposed three years after Licensee’s
    conviction, it was imposed only three months after Licensee’s operating privilege was
    restored. Even if the Records Department had reported both DUI convictions to DOT
    4
    We also question whether the Records Department’s failure to report Licensee’s conviction
    to DOT for three years constitutes an “extraordinarily extended period of time” under Gingrich.
    However, because we find that Licensee was not prejudiced by the delay, we need not reach this
    question.
    6
    simultaneously in 2012, Licensee could not have begun to serve the second
    suspension until his first suspension ended in March 2015. See Department of
    Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Gonzalez, 
    543 A.2d 231
    , 232 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1988) (holding that the Vehicle Code requires that mandatory periods of
    suspension upon conviction for two incidents of DUI be served consecutively, even
    though both convictions were imposed on the same date); Department of
    Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Martin, 
    517 A.2d 216
    , 217 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1986) (“[I]t is proper for penalties imposed for separate violations of the
    Vehicle Code to be imposed consecutively.”).          Furthermore, the only reason
    Licensee’s first suspension was extended to March 2015 was because Licensee
    neglected to pay the required fines.          (N.T., 9/3/15, at 6-7.)   Under these
    circumstances, we cannot conclude that Licensee was prejudiced by the delay.
    Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court abused its
    discretion in sustaining Licensee’s appeal, we reverse.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    7
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert T. Currie                      :
    : No. 1819 C.D. 2015
    v.                 :
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,         :
    Department of Transportation,         :
    Bureau of Driver Licensing,           :
    :
    Appellant     :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 2016, we hereby reverse the
    September 3, 2015, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
    ___________________________________
    ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1819 C.D. 2015

Judges: Jubelirer, Wojcik, Friedman

Filed Date: 6/16/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024