HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ( 2017 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    HIKO Energy, LLC,                                 :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                                :   No. 5 C.D. 2016
    :   Argued: December 14, 2016
    Pennsylvania Public Utility                       :
    Commission,                                       :
    Respondent               :
    BEFORE:         HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge
    OPINION
    BY JUDGE SIMPSON                                  FILED: June 8, 2017
    This appeal presents a challenge to the Pennsylvania Public Utility
    Commission’s (PUC) imposition of a civil penalty of approximately $1.8 million
    against an electric generation supplier1 (EGS) which, during the polar vortex2
    1
    An “electric generation supplier” is:
    A person or corporation, … brokers and marketers, aggregators or
    any other entities, that sells to end-use customers electricity or
    related services utilizing the jurisdictional transmission or
    distribution facilities of an electric distribution company or that
    purchases, brokers, arranges or markets electricity or related
    services for sale to end-use customers utilizing the jurisdictional
    transmission and distribution facilities of an electric distribution
    company. …
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    effects of the winter of 2014, intentionally billed its customers at a rate that
    exceeded the company’s guaranteed introductory rate on nearly 15,000 invoices at
    the direction of its management and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). In particular,
    (continued…)
    66 Pa. C.S. §2803. Additionally, an “electric distribution company” or EDC, is: “The public
    utility providing facilities for the jurisdictional transmission and distribution of electricity to
    retail customers ….” 
    Id. Each retail
    customer falls within the territory of a local EDC, and the price-to-compare is
    the default rate that a retail customer is billed by the EDC. Id.; 52 Pa. Code § 54.182. In 1996,
    the General Assembly enacted the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act,
    66 Pa. C.S. §§2801-2815, which allowed retail customers to purchase electricity directly from
    EGSs rather than their local utility and allowed EGSs to use the transmission and distribution
    facilities of EDCs. Coalition for Affordable Util. Servs. & Energy Efficiency in Pa. v. Pa. Pub.
    Util. Comm’n, 
    120 A.3d 1087
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc). While the PUC continues to
    regulate the transmission and distribution rates of EDCs, it lacks authority to regulate rates
    charged by EGSs to determine whether they are “just and reasonable,” and it lacks the authority
    to compel EGSs to file tariffs. 
    Id. at 1101
    (quoting 66 Pa. C.S. §1301).
    2
    As explained by the National Weather Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration, the polar vortex is
    a large area of low pressure and cold air surrounding both of the
    Earth’s poles. It ALWAYS exists near the poles, but weakens in
    summer and strengthens in winter. The term ‘vortex’ refers to the
    counter-clockwise flow of air that helps keep the colder air near
    the Poles. Many times during winter in the northern hemisphere,
    the polar vortex will expand, sending cold air southward with the
    jet stream …. This occurs fairly regularly during wintertime and is
    often associated with large outbreaks of Arctic air in the United
    States. The one that occurred January 2014 is similar to many
    other cold outbreaks that have occurred in the past, including
    several notable colder outbreaks in 1977, 1982, 1985 and 1989. …
    Polar vortexes are not something new. The term ‘polar vortex’ has
    only recently been popularized, bringing attention to a weather
    feature that has always been present. It is also not a feature that
    exists at the Earth’s surface.
    What is the Polar Vortex? Nat’l Weather Serv. & Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
    http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/cold/polar_vortex.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
    2
    HIKO Energy, LLC (HIKO) asks whether the PUC erred or abused its discretion in
    imposing a civil penalty of this magnitude.
    Specifically, HIKO argues the civil penalty constitutes an excessive
    fine in contravention of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions. HIKO further
    contends the PUC’s civil penalty impermissibly penalizes HIKO for exercising its
    right to litigate this matter. It also asserts the PUC exceeded its statutory authority
    or abused its discretion by imposing a “per invoice” methodology in calculating
    the number of alleged offenses, resulting in an excessive, unprecedented civil
    penalty. Additionally, HIKO maintains the PUC improperly adopted the civil
    penalty recommended by the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in their initial
    decision, despite finding an absence of substantial evidence to support several key
    factual predicates for imposition of the penalty amount. Upon review, we affirm.
    I. Background
    In February 2012, HIKO, which operates in several states, filed an
    application with the PUC to operate as an alternative retail electric supplier in
    Pennsylvania. Several months later, the PUC issued an order tentatively and
    conditionally approving HIKO’s license to supply EGS services to residential,
    small commercial, large commercial, industrial and governmental customers in all
    electric distribution company (EDC) service territories, subject to certain reporting
    requirements regarding its sales and marketing practices. The conditions applied
    “for a term of 18 months [sic] from the start of [HIKO’s] marketing activities in
    the [s]tate.” ALJs’ Initial Dec., 8/21/15, at 3. The PUC imposed the conditions
    based on the high number of complaints regarding HIKO that the PUC’s technical
    3
    staff discovered in New York. Because no adverse comments to the tentative order
    were received, it subsequently became final by operation of law.
    In December 2012, HIKO began marketing in Pennsylvania. HIKO’s
    EGS license was subject to the 18-month conditional, probation period from
    December 2012 through June 2014.
    HIKO’s business model was to purchase energy on the spot market
    through a third-party energy trading firm. HIKO advertised, marketed, offered for
    sale and sold EGS services to retail customers in Pennsylvania through door-to-
    door solicitations, telephone solicitations and HIKO’s website. HIKO delivers its
    energy to customers through local utilities.      It began enrolling customers in
    Pennsylvania in variable rate plans on December 31, 2012.
    Beginning in August 2013, HIKO offered a variable rate product that
    included a six-month introductory price guarantee.         More particularly, in its
    welcome letter and disclosure statement, HIKO promised customers it would
    provide savings that were at least 1-7% less than the price-to-compare (PTC) of the
    customer’s local utility (EDC) for the first six monthly billing cycles. Specifically,
    HIKO’s welcome letter to customers stated:
    Guaranteed Savings! You have been enrolled onto a
    variable rate, which is guaranteed to be 1-7% less than
    your local [u]tility’s price to compare, for the first six
    monthly billing cycles. After the six-month introductory
    rate plan, you will be automatically rolled over onto a
    competitive variable rate, which will be determined by
    [HIKO], based on numerous key factors, including
    4
    current market conditions and climate. The variable rate
    can change regularly.
    ALJs’ Initial Dec., 8/21/15, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 45 (emphasis in original).
    HIKO also issued a “Disclosure Statement” to customers who enrolled in its price
    offering, which stated that the rate was the “price stated at sign-up and confirmed
    in your written Welcome Letter from HIKO.” F.F. No. 46.
    In January 2014, wholesale market prices for energy supply increased
    dramatically in part based on a period of sustained cold weather referred to as a
    “polar vortex,” resulting in an increased use of electricity in Pennsylvania and the
    PJM Interconnection LLC3 (PJM) service area. F.F. No. 21. Also during the
    winter of 2014, natural gas prices in Canada increased because of a change in
    regulation on the TransCanada Pipeline, indirectly contributing to increased
    demand and increased prices for natural gas in Pennsylvania. F.F. No. 22.
    Prior to the polar vortex, PJM sales of electricity to HIKO were
    approximately $0.08 per kWh. The price increased approximately 300% to $0.227
    per kWh in January 2014 and remained at or above $0.138 per kWh until the end
    of March 2014. During the winter of 2014, HIKO experienced an unexpected
    increase in the price of purchasing spot market wholesale electricity, and it found it
    difficult to obtain electric power supply except at exorbitant rates as supply costs
    tripled or quadrupled.
    3
    PJM Interconnection LLC is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the
    movement of wholesale electricity in 13 states (including Pennsylvania) and the District of
    Columbia. Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    22 A.3d 353
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (en
    banc).
    5
    HIKO’s CEO Harvey Klein determined it was impossible for HIKO to
    stay in business while honoring the 1% less than PTC introductory rate guarantee;
    thus, HIKO’s CEO and management made a business decision to intentionally
    overcharge approximately 5,700 customers enrolled in the guaranteed savings plan
    between January and April 2014. The approximately 5,700 customers enrolled in
    the guaranteed savings plan were billed an aggregate sales revenue of $3.29
    million, approximately $1.8 million of which corresponded to overcharges not in
    accordance with the HIKO’s welcome letter and disclosure statement. HIKO
    overcharged customers as much as $0.29 per kWh, or up to 400% the EDCs’ PTC.
    The average overcharge that HIKO billed customers was $124. HIKO voluntarily
    ceased marketing its variable rate plan offerings in Pennsylvania by February
    2014.
    In January 2014, HIKO began receiving a large volume of telephone
    calls and emails from customers complaining about their bills, which overwhelmed
    HIKO’s customer service department. In response, HIKO hired an additional 11
    employees for its customer service department and enlisted a call center based in
    Florida to respond to customer complaints from all states in which it had
    customers.
    Beginning   in   February       2014,   HIKO   voluntarily   refunded
    approximately $160,000 to some of its complaining customers in Pennsylvania. It
    also instituted some changes to its business model, and it now purchases some
    energy under longer term contracts (i.e. six months), hedging against sudden
    increases in wholesale prices. HIKO no longer offers the guaranteed savings
    6
    introductory plan with its variable rate service; however, HIKO’s CEO indicated a
    willingness to move forward with the plan in the future.
    In March 2014, the PUC’s Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement
    (I&E) initiated an informal investigation into HIKO as a result of customer
    complaints received by the PUC’s Bureau of Consumer Services (BCS) regarding
    allegations that HIKO overcharged customers. In response to I&E’s data requests,
    HIKO provided billing data for electric generation service it supplied to residential
    customers within each EDC service territory in which it operates and billed from
    January through April 2014. I&E reviewed HIKO’s responses to the data requests,
    including spreadsheets with billing data HIKO submitted to EDCs from January to
    April 2014 for customers in the service territories of Duquesne Light Company,
    Metropolitan Edison Company (Met-Ed), Pennsylvania Electric Company
    (Penelec), PPL Electric Utilities (PPL), West Penn Power Company and PECO.
    Thereafter, in July 2014, I&E filed a complaint against HIKO alleging
    that between January and April 2014, HIKO billed 5,708 customers at a rate that
    exceeded the discounted introductory rate it guaranteed to customers on 14,689
    invoices. I&E alleged each of the 14,689 overcharges constituted a violation of 52
    Pa. Code §54.4(a) (stating “EGS prices billed must reflect the marketed prices and
    the agreed upon prices in the disclosure statement.”). I&E requested a civil penalty
    of $14,689,000 (or $1,000 per violation). It also asked the PUC to revoke HIKO’s
    authority to operate as an EGS in Pennsylvania and to provide a refund to each
    customer.   In response, HIKO filed an answer, new matter and preliminary
    7
    objections.   The ALJs overruled HIKO’s preliminary objections.           A hearing
    ensued.
    In the interim, the Commonwealth, by its then Attorney General,
    through the Bureau of Consumer Protection (OAG), and the Acting Consumer
    Advocate (OCA) (collectively, OAG/OCA), filed a joint complaint against HIKO
    with the PUC alleging HIKO engaged in misleading marketing and improper
    billing. OAG/OCA sought restitution, revocation of HIKO’s EGS license and a
    prohibition on future deceptive practices.      Ultimately, the ALJs approved a
    settlement in the OAG/OCA case pursuant to which HIKO agreed to: make
    restitution to customers who were overcharged as a result of its failure to adhere to
    the guaranteed introductory rate; a moratorium on accepting any new customers
    until June 30, 2016; and, make a contribution of $25,000 to the local EDCs’
    hardship funds. The restitution provided for in the settlement required HIKO to
    establish a refund pool of $2,025,383.85, in addition to the voluntary refund of
    $159,320.15 HIKO already provided, which would ensure overcharged customers
    received refunds so as to realize a 3.5% savings from their respective PTC rates for
    the period at issue.
    At the hearing on I&E’s complaint against HIKO, I&E presented the
    testimony of Daniel Mumford, manager of the BCS’ Informal Compliance and
    Competition Unit. I&E also presented documentary evidence. For its part, HIKO
    presented the testimony of its CEO, Klein, and the rebuttal testimony of expert
    witness Charles J. Cicchetti, Ph.D., an independent consultant with a background
    8
    in economics and utility regulation. It also presented documentary evidence. After
    the hearing, the parties filed briefs.
    The ALJs subsequently issued a decision in which they found that,
    between January and April 2014, HIKO intentionally billed customers at a rate
    higher than the rate guaranteed in its welcome letter and disclosure statement,
    resulting in customers not receiving the discounted guaranteed price. Additionally,
    the ALJs found HIKO was aware it did not honor the price offering when it broke
    the guarantee, and HIKO’s conduct was not the result of negligence, administrative
    error or data glitch. Rather, HIKO made a decision to remain in business rather
    than abandon its Pennsylvania EGS license, and it decided to charge its customers
    in excess of the guaranteed price offering at enrollment. HIKO’s failure to honor
    its price offering occurred while its license was subject to the conditions outlined
    in the PUC’s June 2012 tentative order. The ALJs also found that if HIKO exited
    the retail electric market in Pennsylvania, HIKO’s customers would have been
    transferred to default service provided by the local EDCs and would not have been
    deprived of essential electricity. Further, the ALJs found that HIKO’s refunds to
    customers were initially made only to those customers who complained or filed
    complaints with governmental agencies. HIKO did not proactively issue refunds
    to all overcharged customers.
    Ultimately, the ALJs granted, in part, I&E’s complaint, denied as
    moot the request for customer refunds based on the settlement reached in the
    OAG/OCA case and denied the request for revocation of HIKO’s EGS license in
    light of the settlement reached in the OAG/OCA case. The ALJs also granted
    9
    I&E’s request for a civil penalty under Section 3301 of the Public Utility Code, 66
    Pa. C.S. §3301, albeit in a lesser amount than that sought by I&E.
    More particularly, the ALJs directed HIKO to pay a civil penalty of
    $1,836,125. The ALJs calculated the civil penalty by multiplying the number of
    violations of 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a), 14,689,4 by $125, a figure that represented the
    approximate average overcharge per invoice. The ALJs imposed this penalty
    based on their determination that HIKO made a conscious decision not to honor its
    price savings guarantee to customers within the six-month introductory period,
    and, as a result, intentionally billed 5,708 customers in six separate EDC territories
    a total of 14,689 overcharges. In imposing the civil penalty, the ALJs undertook
    an analysis of the 10 factors and standards set forth in 52 Pa. Code §69.1201. That
    provision states:
    § 69.1201. Factors and standards for evaluating
    litigated and settled proceedings involving violations
    of the Public Utility Code and [PUC] regulations--
    statement of policy.
    (a) The [PUC] will consider specific factors and
    standards in evaluating litigated and settled cases
    involving violations of 66 Pa.C.S. (relating to Public
    Utility Code) and this title. These factors and standards
    will be utilized by the [PUC] in determining if a fine for
    violating a [PUC] order, regulation or statute is
    appropriate, as well as if a proposed settlement for a
    violation is reasonable and approval of the settlement
    agreement is in the public interest.
    4
    The original number of 14,780 invoices was reduced to 14,689 invoices during the
    proceedings before the ALJs.
    10
    (b) Many of the same factors and standards may be
    considered in the evaluation of both litigated and settled
    cases. When applied in settled cases, these factors and
    standards will not be applied in as strict a fashion as in a
    litigated proceeding. The parties in settled cases will be
    afforded flexibility in reaching amicable resolutions to
    complaints and other matters so long as the settlement is
    in the public interest. The parties to a settlement should
    include in the settlement agreement a statement in
    support of settlement explaining how and why the
    settlement is in the public interest. The statement may be
    filed jointly by the parties or separately by each
    individual party.
    (c) The factors and standards that will be considered by
    the [PUC] include the following:
    (1) Whether the conduct at issue was of a serious
    nature. When conduct of a serious nature is
    involved,     such      as    willful    fraud    or
    misrepresentation, the conduct may warrant a
    higher penalty. When the conduct is less
    egregious, such as administrative filing or
    technical errors, it may warrant a lower penalty.
    (2) Whether the resulting consequences of the
    conduct at issue were of a serious nature. When
    consequences of a serious nature are involved,
    such as personal injury or property damage, the
    consequences may warrant a higher penalty.
    (3) Whether the conduct at issue was deemed
    intentional or negligent. This factor may only be
    considered in evaluating litigated cases. When
    conduct has been deemed intentional, the conduct
    may result in a higher penalty.
    (4) Whether the regulated entity made efforts to
    modify internal practices and procedures to
    address the conduct at issue and prevent similar
    conduct in the future. These modifications may
    include activities such as training and improving
    company techniques and supervision. The amount
    11
    of time it took the utility to correct the conduct
    once it was discovered and the involvement of top-
    level management in correcting the conduct may
    be considered.
    (5) The number of customers affected and the
    duration of the violation.
    (6) The compliance history of the regulated entity
    which committed the violation. An isolated
    incident from an otherwise compliant utility may
    result in a lower penalty, whereas frequent,
    recurrent violations by a utility may result in a
    higher penalty.
    (7) Whether the regulated entity cooperated with
    the [PUC’s] investigation. Facts establishing bad
    faith, active concealment of violations, or attempts
    to interfere with [PUC] investigations may result
    in a higher penalty.
    (8) The amount of the civil penalty or fine
    necessary to deter future violations. The size of
    the utility may be considered to determine an
    appropriate penalty amount.
    (9) Past [PUC] decisions in similar situations.
    (10) Other relevant factors.
    
    Id. Before the
    PUC, both parties filed exceptions, which the PUC denied
    in an extensive, 56-page opinion. In short, the PUC adopted the ALJs’ initial
    decision ordering HIKO to pay the $1,836,125 civil penalty. In determining the
    penalty was appropriate, the PUC stated it agreed that HIKO acted “knowingly and
    deliberately” and “effectively treated its own customers as the financial guarantors
    12
    of its own business plan, which backed contracts offering customers guaranteed
    savings with what was essentially a speculative supply portfolio based exclusively
    on spot market purchases.” Commission Op., 12/3/15, at 44.
    Thereafter, HIKO filed a petition for review to this Court. It also filed
    an application for stay, which a single judge of this Court granted, pending
    resolution of the appeal.5 This matter is now before us for disposition.
    II. Issues
    On appeal,6 HIKO states the following issues:
    1. Whether the [PUC’s] determination to impose the
    highest civil penalty it has ever imposed against any
    entity, a civil penalty of $1,836,125 against HIKO,
    violates the Excessive Fines Clause of Article I, Section
    13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Eighth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution where the
    penalty is not reasonably proportionate in light of the
    underlying violations and the [PUC’s] prior decisions
    approving much smaller penalties for similar or more
    egregious conduct?
    2. Whether the [PUC’s] unprecedented civil penalty of
    $1,836,125 impermissibly penalizes HIKO for exercising
    its right to litigate this matter, thus depriving HIKO of its
    right of appeal under Article 5, Section 9 of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution?
    5
    Through his opinion and order, the single judge also required that HIKO file a bond in
    an amount equal to 120% of the civil penalty imposed by the PUC.
    6
    When reviewing the PUC’s findings and conclusions, our review is limited to
    determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed
    or whether the PUC’s findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.
    Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    713 A.2d 1110
    (Pa. 1998).
    13
    3. Whether the [PUC] exceeded its statutory authority or,
    in the alternative, abused its discretion when it imposed a
    ‘per invoice’ methodology for calculating the number of
    alleged offenses, which resulted in an excessive and
    unprecedented civil penalty against HIKO?
    4. Whether the [PUC] improperly adopted an
    unprecedented civil penalty of $1,836,125 that had been
    recommended by the ALJs, despite the [PUC’s] finding
    of an absence of substantial evidence to support several
    key factual predicates for the imposition of such an
    amount?
    Br. for Petitioner at 7 (Statement of Questions Involved).
    III. Discussion
    A. Excessive Fine
    1. Contentions
    HIKO first asserts the PUC’s decision to impose a civil penalty of
    $1,836,125 violates the Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania
    Constitutions. HIKO argues that, in levying a nearly $2 million civil penalty
    against it, the PUC chose to impose the highest civil penalty in its nearly 80 year
    history without any evidence that HIKO was financially able to bear that penalty,
    without acknowledging the financial constraints HIKO faced during the polar
    vortex, and without considering the significantly smaller civil penalties the PUC
    approved in the settlement of analogous cases. Indeed, HIKO contends, the civil
    penalty imposed here is between 14 to 80 times higher than the penalties the PUC
    approved in cases involving other EGS companies for similar or even more
    egregious conduct, and is wholly disproportionate to the alleged violations,
    particularly given the significant mitigating circumstances supported by record
    evidence.   Thus, HIKO maintains, as a constitutional matter, the PUC’s civil
    penalty cannot be sustained because it is grossly disproportionate both to the
    14
    gravity of the alleged offense and to the magnitude of the fine the PUC approved
    against other similar offenders.
    HIKO argues Pennsylvania law requires civil penalty determinations
    to be proportional to the alleged offense and to the treatment of other offenders for
    similar conduct. Pennsylvania’s prohibition against excessive fines set forth in
    Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is coextensive with the
    Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 
    98 A.3d 1268
    (Pa. 2014). Further, the proscription against excessive fines applies to a
    “civil penalty” if the penalty is designed, at least in part, to serve “either retributive
    or deterrent purposes.” Austin v. United States, 
    509 U.S. 602
    (1993).
    HIKO argues the “dispositive inquiry” in determining whether a
    mandatory fine violates Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
    centers on the question of whether, under the circumstances, the fine is “irrational
    or unreasonable.” Commonwealth v. Gipple, 
    613 A.2d 600
    , 602 (Pa. Super. 1992).
    Similarly, under the Eighth Amendment, a fine “violates the Excessive Fines
    Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense[,]” a
    standard mirrored in the Pennsylvania Constitution. United States v. Bajakajian,
    
    524 U.S. 321
    , 334 (1999); see Eisenberg.
    In undertaking the proportionality test, HIKO maintains, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on the test set forth in Solem v. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    (1983), which requires a court to compare the magnitude of the fine to the
    gravity of the offense, to the treatment of other offenders in the same jurisdiction
    15
    and to the treatment of the same offense in other jurisdictions. Thus, HIKO
    contends it was incumbent on the PUC to ensure the civil penalty it imposed here
    could be harmonized with its decisions approving civil penalties in other contexts,
    especially those involving similar violations. However, it asserts, the PUC did not
    do so.
    HIKO argues the civil penalty here is grossly disproportionate to the
    treatment of other alleged offenders for similar or more egregious conduct. It
    argues the PUC seeks to justify the civil penalty by characterizing the intentional
    nature of the conduct, from HIKO’s top management, combined with the
    magnitude of the violation as the two factors that most underscore the nature of the
    violation.
    However, HIKO contends, those same factors are present in other
    proceedings involving similar or more egregious conduct, but which resulted in
    only a fraction of the civil penalty the PUC imposed here.            Indeed, HIKO
    maintains, the grossly disproportionate nature of the penalty here is most clearly
    evidenced by the civil penalties assessed against other EGSs for engaging in very
    similar conduct.
    HIKO cites numerous PUC proceedings involving EGSs, which it
    contends involved conduct substantially similar to that of HIKO and for which the
    EGSs received far lesser penalties. See Commonwealth v. Respond Power, LLC,
    Nos. C-2014-2438640, C-2014-2427659 (Apr. 22, 2016) (recommending $125,000
    civil penalty for similar violations arising from variable rate price increases during
    16
    polar vortex period, including 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a)). Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v.
    Energy Servs. Providers, Inc. d/b/a Pa. Gas & Electric, No. M-2013-2325122 (June
    5, 2014), 
    2014 WL 2644840
    (Pa.P.U.C.) (Pa. G&E) (approving $150,200 civil
    penalty for slamming allegations involving 319 customer accounts, characterized
    as among the most egregious conduct ever investigated by I&E); Commonwealth
    v. IDT Energy, Inc., No. C-2014-2427657 (Nov. 19, 2015), 
    2015 WL 7873831
    (Pa.P.U.C.) (approving settlement with $25,000 civil penalty for alleged violations
    of PUC regulations for increasing variable rate prices during polar vortex period).
    HIKO maintains each of these cases involved pricing decisions
    initiated by the EGSs’ management that impacted thousands of customers during
    the polar vortex. Yet, none of these enforcement proceedings resulted in a civil
    penalty remotely close to the penalty levied against HIKO. HIKO asserts the
    PUC’s excuse—that settlement amounts are not precedential—misses the point. In
    particular, the PUC, including the ALJs and I&E, had to apply the same factors
    under the PUC’s penalty policy—including consideration of whether the penalty
    amount sufficed to deter future violations.        HIKO asserts the exponential
    differences in penalty amounts for violations against similar companies for similar
    violations arising from the same event cannot be justified on the ground that there
    was a trial against HIKO. HIKO argues this disparity shows the lack of “intra-
    Pennsylvania” proportionality, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described
    as “imperative.” 
    Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1282-83
    .
    HIKO further maintains the PUC’s decisions approving civil penalties
    for similar violations, including Section 54.4(a), are not the only comparable cases.
    17
    It asserts the PUC also approved settlements with significantly lower civil penalties
    against EGSs that engaged in the more egregious act of “slamming,”7 which the
    PUC described as fraudulent conduct for which it has “zero tolerance.” Pa. Pub.
    Util. Comm’n, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement v. Pub. Power, LLC, No.
    M-2012-2257858 (Dec. 19, 2013), slip op. at 8, 
    2013 WL 6835126
    (Pa.P.U.C.) at
    *5. Yet, despite the PUC’s “zero tolerance” for “slamming,” HIKO asserts, EGSs
    charged with slamming hundreds of customers paid civil penalties far lower than
    the penalty levied against HIKO. See, e.g., Pa. G&E; Public Power.
    Further, despite its “zero tolerance” for slamming, HIKO argues, the
    PUC now attempts to discount the violations at issue in Public Power and Pa. G&E
    in order to justify the astronomical difference between the civil penalties it
    approved against those companies and the penalty imposed against HIKO. In its
    final order, the PUC characterizes the conduct of Public Power and Energy
    Services Providers as mistaken or initiated by a rogue, low-level employee, rather
    than a top executive or management. But, HIKO contends, a review of the factual
    findings in those cases reveals otherwise.
    HIKO acknowledges there are very few PUC decisions applying the
    penalty policy factors in litigated cases. Here, the ALJs stated there were no PUC
    decisions applying the factors in a litigated case against an EGS like HIKO, or in a
    litigated case involving similar violations. Therefore, it could only rely on PUC
    7
    “Slamming” is an unauthorized change made to a customer’s supply service. See Pa.
    Pub. Util. Comm’n, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement v. ResCom Energy LLC, No. M-
    2013-2320112 (June 19, 2014), 
    2014 WL 2876696
    (Pa.P.U.C.).
    18
    decisions approving settlements with other EGSs or approving settlements of other
    “serious” violations affecting thousands of customers.
    HIKO further maintains a relevant factor in determining the
    appropriate penalty is the size of the company, which would bear on its ability to
    withstand the penalty and the amount needed for deterrence. 52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(8). It argues the PUC acknowledged that consideration of “size” was
    expressly mentioned in the penalty policy, but noted there was very little in the
    record on that point, stating—“[i]t is difficult to determine the size of HIKO”—
    except to note it was small in comparison with EDCs. ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 49.
    HIKO contends that neither I&E nor the PUC offered anything to distinguish
    HIKO in size from any other EGS subject to regulatory proceedings that paid
    lesser civil penalties. Further, HIKO argues, in granting HIKO’s stay application
    here, a single judge of this Court found “troubling,” the PUC’s failure to make any
    finding regarding whether the penalty was appropriate for a company of HIKO’s
    size.” HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 5 C.D.
    2016, filed February 12, 2016) (unreported) (single judge op.), Slip Op. at 6.
    Moreover, HIKO asserts, the PUC gave no weight to its statements in
    approving settlements with far larger EDCs for far more serious violations. Those
    cases involved gas pipeline explosions, including several that caused deaths,
    serious injuries and millions of dollars in property damage, which the penalty
    policy explicitly defines as “consequences of a serious nature [that] … may
    warrant a higher penalty.” 52 Pa. Code § 69.1201(c)(2); see, e.g., Pa. Pub. Util.
    Comm’n, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement v. UGI Utils., Inc., Gas Div.,
    19
    No. C-2012-2308997 (Feb. 19, 2013) (approving $500,000 civil penalty in
    connection with UGI’s settlement of violations for inadequate leak detection
    measures and faulty pipeline replacement procedures that caused natural gas
    explosion resulting in five deaths, including two children, destruction of eight
    residences and substantial property damage). HIKO maintains that in that case the
    PUC rejected a proposed settlement with a $386,000 civil penalty, but accepted a
    $500,000 civil penalty as sufficient to deter future violations by UGI, a company
    far larger than HIKO. ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 49 (noting that number of customers
    HIKO served was “small in comparison with the EDCs’ respective customer
    counts”); see also Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 301a-03a (HIKO expert witness,
    Dr. Cicchetti, explaining the size of most EDCs in terms of rate base, balance
    sheets, revenue, income and access to capital are different than those of an EGS
    and therefore such larger companies are better able to absorb a multi-million dollar
    penalty).
    HIKO further contends the PUC approved the $500,000 penalty
    knowing UGI was the subject of prior PUC proceedings for repeated, similar
    violations of pipeline safety and operating regulations over a five-year period that
    resulted in personal injuries and property damage. Perhaps even more telling,
    HIKO asserts, when the PUC apparently decided those prior penalties were
    inadequate and wanted to signify to UGI’s management that it did not do enough
    to change its safety practices, the PUC approved a penalty of $1 million, or just
    54% of the penalty levied against HIKO. See Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Bureau of
    Investigation & Enforcement v. UGI Penn Nat. Gas, No. M-2013-2338981 (Sept.
    26, 2013), 
    2013 WL 5488626
    (Pa.P.U.C.). HIKO contends approval of those
    20
    penalties as sufficient against a far larger EDC—and one that engaged in repeated
    violations that caused far more serious injuries—must be taken as an indication of
    what the PUC believes serves as adequate deterrence.
    HIKO argues that, given its concededly much smaller size, its lack of
    any history of non-compliance, the extraordinary time period in which the
    violations occurred and the absence of any threat to public safety, it was arbitrary
    for the PUC to require an amount more than 80% higher than the UGI penalty in
    order to deter future violations by HIKO.
    Also, HIKO asserts, in adopting and affirming the ALJs’ factual
    findings, the PUC accepted the testimony of HIKO’s energy expert, Dr. Cicchetti,
    who testified the polar vortex coincided with and exacerbated extraordinary
    regulatory disruptions in the wholesale energy markets.       Thus, in addition to
    abnormally cold conditions during this period, prices for both natural gas and
    electricity surged to unanticipated (and unprecedented) levels. This too the PUC
    admitted. See Review of Rules, Policies & Consumer Educ. Measures Regarding
    Variable Rate Retail Elec. Prods., No. M-2014-2406134 (March 4, 2014), 
    2014 WL 1092815
    (Pa.P.U.C.).
    HIKO argues the unprecedented and exponential increase in spot
    market prices for wholesale electricity was felt by all EGSs and their variable rate
    customers. HIKO, in particular, faced severe financial difficulty in satisfying PJM
    collateral calls and meeting its ongoing monthly electricity purchase requirements.
    Had HIKO failed to satisfy PJM’s increasing collateral calls, it asserts, it would
    21
    have been banned from participating in any PJM market activities and lost all its
    customers in every state in which it operated. Further, its failure to satisfy its PJM
    requirements also would have caused it to violate its EGS license requirements,
    which require HIKO to maintain PJM membership. HIKO argues none of this
    evidence was disputed by the PUC. Nevertheless, the PUC did not consider any of
    these circumstances as an excuse for HIKO’s breach of its guaranteed rate promise,
    believing HIKO should have simply filed for bankruptcy or gone out of business.
    HIKO points out that, in order to keep the company afloat during the
    polar vortex, its CEO personally guaranteed a $20 million loan and risked
    significant personal assets. HIKO argues it could not have survived if it continued
    to honor the price guarantee during the polar vortex. Again, it asserts, the PUC did
    not refute any of this evidence.
    Instead, the PUC minimized the import of these unforeseeable
    conditions, affirming the ALJs’ finding that the impact of the polar vortex and
    accompanying market disruption provided “no excuse” for HIKO’s failure to
    honor the price guarantee because “the customer information [HIKO] provided
    with the guaranteed savings rate plan contained no reservations due to outside
    circumstances.” Commission Op. at 47. The PUC further noted, “relying on the
    spot market for 100% of its supply exposed HIKO to known risks” and HIKO
    “knew or should have known that many moving pieces affecting the wholesale
    spot market were outside its control.” 
    Id. at 47,
    48. Yet, HIKO argues, this
    rationale is undermined by the PUC’s own admission regarding the unforeseeable
    nature of the polar vortex.
    22
    In addition, HIKO maintains, the PUC exceeded its statutory authority
    or abused its discretion in rejecting these mitigating circumstances based on an
    interpretation of HIKO’s contract with price guarantee customers. First, HIKO
    argues, there is nothing in the Public Utility Code that authorizes the PUC to
    interpret the terms and conditions of a private contract between an EGS and its
    customers.   Indeed, the PUC concluded its jurisdiction “does not extend to
    interpreting the terms and conditions of a contract between an EGS and a customer
    to determine whether a breach has occurred or setting the rates an EGS can
    charge.” Office of Small Bus. Advocate v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. (“FES”),
    No. P-2014-2421556 (Jan. 26, 2015), slip op. at 18; see Adams v. Pa. Pub. Util.
    Comm’n, 
    819 A.2d 631
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Allport Water Auth. v. Winburne
    Water Co., 
    393 A.2d 673
    (Pa. Super. 1978).
    Further, HIKO argues, the PUC’s decision to penalize HIKO for
    allegedly failing to meet its price guarantee is nothing more than an end-run around
    controlling authority that deprives the PUC of the power to regulate EGS prices.
    HIKO argues nothing in the Public Utility Code authorizes the PUC to regulate
    EGS’ prices. Thus, while Section 1301 of the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa. C.S.
    §1301, gives the PUC statutory authority to determine “just and reasonable” rates,
    those are rates demanded or received by a “public utility,” which excludes EGSs.
    Specifically, Section 2806(a) of the Public Utility Code provides that “the
    generation of electricity shall no longer be regulated as a public utility service or
    function except as otherwise provided for in this chapter.” 66 Pa. C.S. §2806(a).
    The definition of “public utility” in Section 102 of the Public Utility Code does not
    include EGSs except for the limited purposes in Sections 2809 and 2810 of the
    23
    Public Utility Code, 66 Pa. C.S. §§2809, 2810. See Delmarva Power & Light Co.
    v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    870 A.2d 901
    (Pa. 2005). HIKO contends those Sections
    have no bearing on prices charged by EGSs.
    HIKO further asserts the PUC recognized its lack of jurisdiction to
    regulate prices charged by EGSs. See Commonwealth v. Blue Pilot Energy, LLC,
    No. C-2014-2427655 (Dec. 11, 2014); see also CRH Catering Co. v. Blue Pilot
    Energy, LLC, Nos. P-2014-2451865, C-2014-2415277, C-2014-2415278, C-2014-
    2415281, C-2014-2415282 (Feb. 24, 2015), 
    2015 WL 849251
    (Pa.P.U.C.). HIKO
    maintains these rulings are consistent with prior PUC determinations, which
    indicated that the rates consumers pay in the retail electric market are governed by
    the terms of their contract with their EGS. Thus, HIKO contends any attempt by
    the PUC to construe HIKO’s contracts and enforce price terms through imposition
    of a civil penalty is expressly prohibited.
    HIKO further argues the PUC’s civil penalty analysis fails to properly
    consider HIKO’s efforts to mitigate financial harm to its customers. For example,
    HIKO voluntarily suspended all marketing efforts as early as January 2014. HIKO
    argues that, as its CEO testified, HIKO was not in the business of making promises
    to Pennsylvania consumers it knew it could not keep. HIKO maintains the ALJs
    agreed HIKO did not set out to defraud consumers by selling a guaranteed rate it
    knew it could not meet. During the period of suspended marketing, HIKO asserts,
    its customer base (including customers under the price guarantee and other
    customers with pure variable rates) plummeted from about 10,000 to about 3,000.
    HIKO argues this significant loss of customers, coupled with the growing financial
    24
    burdens of staying afloat resulted in significant financial losses. HIKO contends
    that, although the decision of other EGSs to voluntarily suspend the sale of
    variable rate products was previously considered a mitigating factor, see IDT
    Energy, the PUC refused to acknowledge it here.
    HIKO also asserts it began issuing refunds to its price guarantee
    customers as early as February 2014. And, at the time the PUC issued its final
    order here, it simultaneously approved the settlement in the OAG/OCA case in
    which HIKO agreed to pay more than $2 million in restitution to Pennsylvania
    customers.
    For these reasons, HIKO maintains, a civil penalty of $1,836,125 is
    grossly disproportionate when compared to other civil penalties the PUC imposed
    and when viewed in light of all mitigating circumstances. HIKO contends it bears
    no rational relation to the offense or the record, and, therefore, violates the
    excessive fines provisions of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See St.
    Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 
    251 U.S. 63
    , 67 (1919) (state-ordered
    monetary penalties violate due process clause’s guarantee against unlawful
    deprivation of property when penalties are “wholly disproportioned to the offense
    and obviously unreasonable”).       HIKO asserts the PUC here approved an
    unprecedented civil penalty that lacked record support and was unreasonably
    disproportionate to the sanctions levied against other alleged offenders for similar
    or more egregious conduct. Thus, this Court should set aside the civil penalty.
    25
    2. Analysis
    Initially, our review of the notes of testimony of the ALJs’ hearing as
    well as HIKO’s pre-hearing memorandum reveals no mention of HIKO’s assertion
    that the penalty I&E sought (which was eight times the amount of the penalty
    ultimately imposed by the PUC) would violate the Excessive Fines Clauses of the
    U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Nor did HIKO raise this issue in its brief
    after the ALJs’ hearing.8          Additionally, HIKO did not raise this issue in its
    exceptions to the ALJs’ initial decision filed with the PUC. Indeed, in its opinion
    denying HIKO’s emergency motion for supersedeas pending appeal to this Court,
    the PUC observed that HIKO failed to raise this issue at the appropriate stage of
    the proceeding, i.e., in its exceptions following the ALJs’ Initial Decision. R.R. at
    1184a. Thus, this issue is waived. Lyft, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    145 A.3d 1235
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc) (petitioner’s failure to raise issues before PUC
    results in waiver); Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    778 A.2d 785
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (petitioner’s claim that allocation of costs against it
    resulted in unconstitutional taking was waived where petitioner did not raise issue
    before ALJ or PUC).9
    8
    In its reply brief, HIKO asserts it preserved this issue in its brief after the ALJs’ hearing
    as well as in its answer and new matter filed in response to I&E’s complaint. See R.R. at 83a,
    837a. Our review of these documents reveals no mention of HIKO’s present assertion that the
    proposed penalty would violate the Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania
    Constitutions.
    9
    In any event, the primary case upon which HIKO relies in support of its excessive fines
    argument, Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 
    98 A.3d 1268
    (Pa. 2014), is distinguishable. There, the
    Supreme Court determined that the imposition of a $75,000 mandatory fine under the
    Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, 4 Pa. C.S. §§1101–1904, based on a
    casino employee’s misdemeanor criminal conviction for a single theft of $200 violated the
    Excessive Fines Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Among other things, the Court stated:
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    26
    Further, as to those claims HIKO properly preserved before the PUC,
    we discern no error in the PUC’s rejection of HIKO’s assertions. With regard to
    our review of the PUC’s decision, in Lyft, we explained:
    [T]he PUC’s interpretations of the [Public Utility] Code,
    the statute for which it has enforcement responsibility,
    and its own regulations are entitled to great deference and
    should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. [On
    review], the Court should neither substitute its judgment
    for that of the PUC when substantial evidence supports
    the PUC’s decision on a matter within [the PUC’s]
    expertise, nor should it indulge in the process of
    weighing evidence and resolving conflicting testimony.
    (continued…)
    In our view, the fine here, when measured against the
    conduct triggering the punishment, and the lack of discretion
    afforded the trial court, is constitutionally excessive. Simply put,
    appellant, who had no prior record, stole $200 from his employer,
    which happened to be a casino. There was no violence involved;
    there was apparently no grand scheme involved to defraud either
    the casino or its patrons. Employee thefts are unfortunately
    common; as noted, appellant’s conduct, if charged under the
    Crimes Code[,] [18 Pa. C.S. §§101–9402], exposed him to a
    maximum possible fine of $10,000. Instead, because appellant’s
    theft occurred at a casino, the trial court had no discretion, under
    the Gaming Act, but to impose a minimum fine of $75,000—an
    amount that was 375 times the amount of the theft.
    
    Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1285
    .
    Unlike Eisenberg, and as discussed throughout this opinion, the supported findings of the
    ALJs and the PUC here reveal HIKO’s management made a decision to intentionally charge its
    customers at a rate that exceeded its guaranteed rate on 14,689 invoices over a four-month period
    in violation of PUC regulations. The fine imposed here approximated the average overcharge on
    each of the 14,689 invoices and represented 12.5% of the maximum statutory fine allowable
    under Section 3301 of the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa. C.S. §3301.
    Further, none of the cases HIKO cites in its discussion of the principles relating to an
    excessive fines analysis involve consideration of the constitutionality of a civil penalty imposed
    by a state agency.
    27
    The PUC’s decision must be supported by
    substantial evidence, meaning more than a mere trace of
    evidence or suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to
    be established. The party seeking affirmative relief from
    the PUC bears the burden of proving its claims with
    competent evidence. That the record may contain
    evidence that supports a different result than that reached
    by the PUC is irrelevant so long as the record contains
    substantial evidence supporting the PUC’s decision.
    
    Lyft, 145 A.3d at 1240
    (citations omitted). Further, this Court may not reduce a
    fine imposed by the PUC if the PUC has not violated constitutional rights,
    committed errors of law or failed to support its findings of fact by substantial
    evidence. Pub. Serv. Water Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    645 A.2d 423
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1994).
    Here, we reject HIKO’s argument that the civil penalty is
    disproportionate to the PUC’s treatment of other entities that engaged in similar
    conduct. In rejecting HIKO’s reliance on administrative proceedings involving
    other entities, the PUC explained that HIKO relied on settled rather than fully
    litigated cases and, in any event, the cases were factually distinguishable.
    To that end, none of the cases HIKO cited involved intentional
    conduct directed by the company’s highest-level executives such as that directed
    by HIKO’s executives here, which involved the intentional decision to overcharge
    the accounts of more than 5,700 customers on nearly 15,000 invoices over a four-
    month period. F.F. Nos. 26 (citing Certified Record (C.R.), HIKO St. 1-R at 9;
    HIKO St. 2-R at 49; ALJs’ Hr’g, 4/20/15, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 193-95),
    72 (citing N.T. at 165, 217); ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 54, 56;
    28
    Commission Op. at 27, 53. Thus, as the PUC explained, “we believe that the
    intentional decision by top management and the broad scope of HIKO’s violations
    substantially distinguish it from the cases upon which HIKO relies.” Commission
    Op. at 27. The PUC observed:
    With respect to HIKO’s claims that the ALJs did
    not properly consider the level of civil penalties approved
    against other EGSs, including those in settled cases, we
    find HIKO’s argument to be erroneous. First, as to the
    precedential value of settlements … the well-established
    legal principle often invoked by and before [the PUC]
    [is] that settlements do not set precedent. Cases that
    proceed to a settled conclusion are often incomparable in
    many ways. For example, in Public Power, cited often
    by HIKO, the parties agreed to a settlement following an
    informal investigation by I&E, not the filing and full
    prosecution of a formal complaint as is the case here.
    Further, the settlement document itself in that
    proceeding, as is typical in settlements, stated that
    because settlements avoid the necessity of full litigation,
    all parties compromised their positions, and the
    investigated party, without admitting culpability, agreed
    to a lower penalty that avoided the possibility of more
    adverse consequences, including a higher fine. See Pa.
    PUC Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement v. Public
    Power, LLC, Docket No. M-2012-2257858 (Order
    entered August 29, 2013), Attached Settlement
    Agreement at 15, ¶ 36.
    HIKO also misstates the distinction between
    settled and litigated proceedings under our policy
    statement. While HIKO contends that our policy
    statement ‘explicitly states’ that the factors to be
    considered in both litigated and settled proceedings are
    the same, that oversimplifies the requisite analysis, which
    also explicitly provides that consideration of the factors
    will be applied more strictly in litigated cases, a
    provision overlooked by HIKO. See 52 Pa. Code §
    69.1201(b). While we may consider the same factors, we
    do not consider them as strictly in settled cases. This is
    29
    not only because we encourage settlements but also, as
    the ALJs and I&E noted, the records in settled cases
    often contain substantially different evidence and no
    admission of wrongdoing. [ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 52; I&E
    Reply Exceptions at 20]. We also note that the third
    factor we consider, whether the conduct was intentional
    or negligent, is as HIKO asserted only considered in
    evaluating litigated cases. In this case, however, the
    intentional nature of the conduct, from [HIKO’s] top
    management, combined with the magnitude of the
    violation, are perhaps the two factors that most
    underscore the egregious nature of the violation and
    support as a minimum the penalty recommended by the
    ALJs.
    Commission Op. at 52-53 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
    As the PUC explained, and contrary to HIKO’s assertions, the
    stringency in application of the factors and standards the PUC utilizes in evaluating
    cases involving violations of the Public Utility Code and its regulations differ in
    settled and litigated cases. Indeed, the PUC’s penalty policy expressly states, in
    pertinent part (with emphasis added):
    (a) The [PUC] will consider specific factors and
    standards in evaluating litigated and settled cases
    involving violations of 66 Pa.C.S. (relating to Public
    Utility Code) and this title. These factors and standards
    will be utilized by the [PUC] in determining if a fine for
    violating a [PUC] order, regulation or statute is
    appropriate, as well as if a proposed settlement for a
    violation is reasonable and approval of the settlement
    agreement is in the public interest.
    (b) Many of the same factors and standards may be
    considered in the evaluation of both litigated and settled
    cases. When applied in settled cases, these factors and
    standards will not be applied in as strict a fashion as in a
    litigated proceeding. The parties in settled cases will be
    30
    afforded flexibility in reaching amicable resolutions to
    complaints and other matters so long as the settlement is
    in the public interest. …
    52 Pa. Code §69.1201(b). Further, as the PUC indicated, the third penalty factor,
    i.e., whether the conduct at issue was intentional or negligent, “may only be
    considered in evaluating litigated cases.           When conduct has been deemed
    intentional, the conduct may result in a higher penalty.”                  52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(3) (emphasis added).
    In addition, our independent review of the various PUC cases cited by
    HIKO reveals that every case involved a settlement. Further, those cases are
    factually distinguishable in that they involved: far fewer customer accounts10 or far
    fewer purported violations;11 alleged misconduct by a third-party vendor without
    the company’s knowledge;12 or no determination that the conduct at issue was
    intentional.13 In specific response to HIKO’s arguments regarding an approved
    penalty for UGI, those cases involved settlements (factors applied less strictly, case
    non-precedential), and involved no determination that the conduct at issue was
    10
    Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Energy Servs. Providers, Inc. d/b/a Pa. Gas & Electric, No.
    M-2013-2325122 (June 5, 2014), 
    2014 WL 2644840
    (Pa.P.U.C.).
    11
    Commonwealth v. Respond Power, LLC, Nos. C-2014-2438640, C-2014-2427659
    (Apr. 22, 2016).
    12
    Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement v. Pub. Power, LLC,
    No. M-2012-2257858, (Dec. 19, 2013), 
    2013 WL 6835126
    (Pa.P.U.C.).
    13
    Commonwealth v. IDT Energy, Inc., No. C-2014-2427657 (Nov. 19, 2015), 
    2015 WL 7873831
    (Pa.P.U.C.); Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement v. UGI
    Penn Nat. Gas, No. M-2013-2338981 (Sept. 26, 2013), 
    2013 WL 5488626
    (Pa.P.U.C.); Pa. Pub.
    Util. Comm’n, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement v. UGI Utils., Inc., Gas Div., No. C-
    2012-2308997 (Feb. 19, 2013).
    31
    intentional. Also, the UGI cases did not involve an entity whose licensure was in
    conditional, probationary status.     It is clearly within the PUC’s discretion to
    distinguish this matter from the UGI cases on those bases.
    Nevertheless, HIKO asserts the PUC erred in failing to consider
    various circumstances that were outside of HIKO’s control during the period at
    issue, including the financial constraints it faced. As the PUC observed, however,
    HIKO’s reliance on an 18-month pricing history did not serve as an adequate basis
    on which to guarantee unconditional pricing savings of up to 7% for an initial six-
    month period. Commission Op. at 46 (citing ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 29); F.F. No. 13
    (citing C.R., HIKO St. 1-R at 2-5). More specifically, during the period at issue
    here, HIKO made 100% of its electric purchases on the spot market. F.F. No. 13.
    Clearly, this practice assumed certain risks regarding the volatility of wholesale
    market prices. Commission Op. at 46 (citing ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 29). And, even
    if HIKO
    did not foresee at the time of enrollment of customers in
    the 1-7% guaranteed savings plans the high risk HIKO or
    its variable rate customers were assuming because of the
    impending on-the-spot wholesale market price increases
    that were about to occur in [January 2014], the surprise
    does not justify the fact that the end-user customers
    enrolled in guaranteed savings plans are shouldering a
    substantial portion of the burden of the increase in
    wholesale rates.
    
    Id. at 47
    (citing ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 29-30).
    Further, the PUC and the ALJs specifically considered the various
    circumstances HIKO alleged were outside of its control, but found these
    32
    circumstances did not justify HIKO’s actions.                In particular, the customer
    information HIKO provided with its guaranteed savings rate plan contained no
    reservations based on outside circumstances. Thus,
    the polar vortex weather condition, the increase in natural
    gas prices due to the Canadian regulatory change, the
    increase in demand because of the weather, PJM’s
    operational requirements, and/or the resulting spot
    market energy prices do not constitute a good excuse for
    HIKO’s business decision to not honor a guaranteed
    discount under the terms and conditions of its [p]rice
    [o]ffering nor mitigate the warranted imposition of a civil
    penalty in this case.
    There is no evidence to suggest that HIKO’s
    disclosure statement or welcome letter indicated to the
    customer that its introductory rate would be dependent
    upon any of these aforementioned factors. …
    Commission Op. at 47 (quoting ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 57) (emphasis added). No
    error is apparent in this reasoning. Indeed, HIKO’s disclosure statement and
    welcome letter were devoid of any indication that the guaranteed introductory rate
    HIKO promised its customers was subject to change based on any of the various
    circumstances upon which HIKO now relies.14
    14
    In a footnote, HIKO asserts, even if the PUC was authorized to engage in contract
    interpretation to enforce or regulate HIKO’s prices, the PUC’s determination that HIKO’s
    customer information for the price guarantee program did not contain any reservations as to
    outside circumstances is contradicted by a plain reading of the contract. HIKO argues its terms
    and conditions included a force majeure provision, which states: “HIKO will not be liable for
    any interruptions caused by a Force Majeure Event, and HIKO is not and shall not be liable for
    damages caused by Force Majeure Events.” See Commonwealth v. HIKO Energy, LLC, Dkt.
    No. C-2014-2427652, Joint Compl., App. A at ¶ 11. The provision defines “Force Majeure
    Events” to include acts of God. HIKO argues the polar vortex of 2014 may be reasonably
    characterized as an act of God, which is “[a]n overwhelming, unpreventable event caused
    exclusively by forces of nature.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (8th ed. 1999). Thus, HIKO
    asserts, the PUC’s determination that HIKO’s customer information offered no information
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    33
    Moreover, the PUC agreed with the ALJs that HIKO’s reliance on the
    spot market for 100% of its energy supply exposed HIKO to known risks, if not
    foreseeable events, given that numerous factors upon which the wholesale market
    depends were outside HIKO’s control. Commission Op. at 47-48. As such,
    “HIKO [could not] credibly claim that relying on a market subject to so many
    known exposures is not inherently risky, such that they were risks [HIKO]
    apparently was willing to assume.” Commission Op. at 48. In other words, it was
    or should have been foreseeable that exclusive reliance on the wholesale spot
    (continued…)
    regarding the impact of such unforeseeable and uncontrollable events is unsupported by the
    record.
    Contrary to HIKO’s assertions, when read in its entirety, we do not believe the provision
    of the customer disclosure statement upon which HIKO relies is helpful to its position. That
    provision states:
    11. Force Majeure. HIKO will make commercially reasonable efforts to
    provide electricity hereunder but HIKO does not guarantee a continuous supply
    of electricity to Customer. Certain causes and events out of the control of HIKO
    (‘Force Majeure Events’) may result in interruptions in service. HIKO will not
    be liable for any such interruptions caused by a Force Majeure Event, and HIKO
    is not and shall not be liable for damages caused by Force Majeure Events.
    Force Majeure Events shall include acts of God, fire, flood, storm, terrorism,
    war, civil disturbance, acts of any governmental authority, accidents, strikes,
    labor disputes or problems, required maintenance work, inability to access the
    local distribution system, non-performance by the EDC (including, but not
    limited to, a facility outage on its distribution lines or electric facilities), changes
    in laws, rules, or regulations of any governmental authority or any other cause
    beyond HIKO’s control.
    Commonwealth v. HIKO Energy, LLC, Dkt. No. C-2014-2427652, Joint Compl., App. A at ¶ 11
    (emphasis added). We fail to see how this provision was sufficient to place HIKO’s customers
    on notice that the six-month discounted rate HIKO guaranteed its customers could change based
    on the cold weather experienced in the winter of 2014.
    Further, we disagree with HIKO that the polar vortex effects of the winter of 2014
    constitute an act of God. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “act of God” as “[a]n
    overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of nature, such as an
    earthquake, flood, or tornado.” Black’s Law Dictionary 37 (8th ed. 1999) (emphasis added). We
    do not believe the polar vortex effects of the winter of 2014 fall within this definition,
    particularly in light of the enumerated examples.
    34
    market could, depending on the confluence of several independent factors at any
    one time, produce less than favorable pricing conditions. 
    Id. In addition
    to the fact
    HIKO knew or clearly should have known many “moving pieces” affecting the
    wholesale spot market were outside its control, HIKO “also should have been able
    to foresee that relying on its customers as financial guarantors, when its finances
    were stretched because of those many circumstances outside its control, was not a
    valid option in the face of its contractual guarantees and existing regulatory
    protections.”      
    Id. Indeed, it
    was HIKO’s sole decision how to structure a
    compatible price and supply scheme. F.F. No. 76 (citing N.T. at 162).
    In an analogous situation, this Court rejected the PUC’s determination
    that a public utility company established that it was subject to price increases that
    were outside of the public utility company’s control, explaining:
    We agree with [the dissenting PUC Commissioner’s]
    assessment that the [PUC’s] interpretation is clearly
    erroneous because the plain meaning of the term ‘outside
    of the control’ does not means [sic] that ratepayers will
    act as the surety for companies that act to maximize their
    return, and not, as other utilities did, to protect their
    exposure from known and definable obligations.
    An event ‘outside of the control’ of a person or
    group typically refers to sudden illness, fire, theft, acts of
    God and natural disasters, not situations where a party
    can take actions to protect himself or herself from risk.
    See Peister v. State of Colorado, Department of Social
    Services, 
    849 P.2d 894
    (Colo.Ct.App.1993). Strategic
    business planning always involves decisions on how
    much risk to accept and where the burden of risk is
    placed. In this case, [the public utility company] made a
    choice to divest itself of its generation assets and, unlike
    other utilities, not to protect itself by entering into long-
    term contracts within the rate caps to protect itself from
    35
    PLR [“provider of last resort”] costs. Instead, it made a
    bet that electric rates would remain below the rate caps
    and chose to maximize its profits. This was not an event
    outside of its control, but a conscious business decision.
    The General Assembly did not intend that if a utility lost
    money on choices it made, it would be allowed to recover
    more in rates. As [PUC] Commissioner Brownell stated,
    ‘the statute did not establish a ‘heads I win, tails you
    lose’ construct.’ Because an event that is “outside of the
    control” does not mean the results of business decisions,
    it was plainly erroneous for the [PUC] to allow revenues
    to be increased above the legislatively mandated rate
    caps.
    ARIPPA v. Pa. Pub. Util Comm’n, 
    792 A.2d 636
    , 665-66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (en
    banc).
    Further, HIKO’s assertion that it lacked any prior history of non-
    compliance is unpersuasive. As to HIKO’s history of operation as an EGS in
    Pennsylvania, the PUC tentatively and conditionally granted HIKO’s application to
    operate as an EGS in June 2012. F.F. Nos. 5-6. Based on numerous complaints
    against HIKO in New York, the PUC conditionally approved HIKO’s license
    subject to certain reporting requirements as to its sales and marketing practices.
    F.F. No. 6 (citing C.R., I&E St. 1 at 50-51).       The conditions applied from
    December 2012 through June 2014. 
    Id. As such,
    the violations at issue here
    (which occurred between January and April 2014), took place while HIKO’s EGS
    license was subject to conditions on its sales and marketing practices. Given that
    the significant and abundant violations here began merely a-year-and-a-half after
    HIKO received tentative and conditional EGS license approval and all of the
    violations occurred while HIKO’s EGS license remained in conditional status, we
    36
    reject HIKO’s argument that the PUC erred in failing to consider its purported
    “history of compliance.”
    We also reject HIKO’s argument that the PUC’s failure to afford
    sufficient weight to HIKO’s size in fashioning the civil penalty here warrants
    disturbing the PUC’s decision. On that point, the PUC’s penalty policy states, in
    relevant part: “The factors and standards that will be considered by the [PUC]
    include … [t]he amount of the civil penalty or fine necessary to deter future
    violations. The size of the utility may be considered to determine an appropriate
    penalty amount.” 52 Pa. Code §69.1201(c)(8) (emphasis added). Here, the PUC
    clearly considered this factor. Commission Op. at 52. However, it was reluctant to
    place much weight on the ALJs’ analysis of HIKO’s size. The PUC agreed with
    the ALJs that as a supplier licensed in eight states, HIKO certainly had an
    opportunity to acquire a combined customer base, if not also economies of scale
    and scope, that could exceed that of any one EDC in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless,
    the PUC believed there was insufficient evidence on this point; as such, it placed
    little emphasis on its importance. Regardless, it found ample support for the
    remainder of the ALJs’ analysis to adopt the recommended civil penalty. As
    discussed throughout this opinion, the record amply supports the PUC’s decision
    regarding its imposition of the civil penalty. Further, as the ALJs recognized, the
    total amount of the civil penalty imposed here closely reflects the actual, aggregate
    overcharge that HIKO billed its customers. ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 49.
    In addition, we reject HIKO’s contention that the PUC engaged in an
    “end-run” around controlling authority that deprives it of the power to regulate
    37
    EGS prices. The PUC has subject matter jurisdiction to regulate certain aspects of
    the services provided by EGSs. See Sections 2807, 2809 of the Public Utility
    Code, 66 Pa. C.S. §§2807, 2809. Under Section 2809(b) of the Public Utility
    Code, 66 Pa. C.S. §2809(b), EGSs are required to abide by PUC regulations.
    (“A[n] [EGS] license shall be issued to any qualified applicant, authorizing the
    whole or any part of the service covered by the application, if it is found that the
    applicant is fit, willing and able … to conform to the provisions of this title and the
    lawful orders and regulations of the [PUC] under this title, including the [PUC’s]
    regulations regarding standards and billing practices ….”). For EGSs serving
    residential customers, this includes adherence to the regulations set forth in Title
    52, Chapter 54, which relate to, among other things, bill format, disclosure
    statements and marketing and sales activities. See Herp v. Respond Power LLC,
    No. C-2014-2413756 (Dec. 17, 2014). As set forth above, Section 54.4(a) states:
    “EGS prices billed must reflect the marketed prices and the agreed upon prices in
    the disclosure statement.”     52 Pa. Code §54.4(a).       Thus, we reject HIKO’s
    assertion that the PUC engaged in an “end-run” around controlling authority that
    deprives it of the power to regulate EGS prices here.
    Similarly, we reject HIKO’s assertion that the PUC exceeded its
    authority in interpreting HIKO’s private contracts with its customers when the
    PUC determined HIKO breached its price guarantee. In this case, HIKO’s CEO
    admitted that HIKO billed its customers in excess of its guaranteed introductory
    rate. N.T. at 165. As such, in analyzing this matter, the PUC applied its regulation
    and determined each overcharge constituted a violation of Section 54.4(a) of its
    38
    regulations. Thus, the PUC did not improperly engage in contract interpretation;
    rather, it applied its regulations to HIKO’s admitted overcharges.
    Finally, we reject HIKO’s contention that the PUC did not properly
    consider HIKO’s efforts to mitigate financial harm to its customers. On this point,
    the PUC determined (with emphasis added):
    It appears from the record that in the early phases
    of HIKO’s overbilling, [HIKO] made no effort to
    voluntarily cease the overbilling. I&E Exhibits 12 and
    13 show that only once customers filed informal
    complaints with BCS, did HIKO take action to refund
    overcharged amounts to customers. I&E Exhibits 12 and
    13 are further supported by the testimony of HIKO’s
    expert:
    Q. Dr. Cicchetti, do you know if with regard to this
    proceeding whether HIKO had any specific
    remedial plan to provide refunds to the affected
    customers?
    A. I know before this proceeding began that they
    were dealing with customer complaints, and that
    they made refunds to specific customers who
    complained.
    N.T. [at] 204.
    As the spreadsheet data shows [sic], HIKO’s
    overbilling occurred not as a single occurrence, but over
    a four-month period. There were at least four separate
    decisions to continue HIKO’s pattern of overbilling – one
    for each of the January, February, March and April 2014
    billing cycles. N.T. [at] 217. Taking this same logic
    even further, the spreadsheet data contained in Column 4
    titled ‘Invoice Data’ in I&E Exhibits 6A through 11A
    shows [sic] multiple invoice dates for each month,
    suggesting that the decision to continue its scheme of
    39
    overbilling could have been confirmed prior to each and
    every invoice date.
    HIKO ceased offering the guaranteed rate in
    February, hired 11 additional customer service
    representatives, and contracted with an answering service
    in Florida to handle the numerous customer complaints
    from several States. [Klein] testified that HIKO now also
    purchases hedges regarding power supply, i.e. 6-month
    contracts. However, whether that alone is sufficient risk
    management to ensure that HIKO’s variable rate prices
    do not exceed its guaranteed savings plans remains to be
    seen. There is no evidence the company modified its
    internal practices or procedures to address the conduct at
    issue. Of particular concern is that [Klein] testified he
    still intends to offer the 1% guaranteed rate. N.T. [at]
    167-168. Thus, it appears the guaranteed savings plan is
    still a goal and part of the business model.
    ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 43; see also Commission Op. at 49. Additionally, the PUC
    explained:
    The ALJs were unpersuaded that HIKO’s actions outside
    of those agreed to in OAG/OCA-HIKO Settlement
    warranted consideration of a lower penalty. We agree
    and find most compelling the ALJs’ conclusion that
    HIKO’s illegal billing practices continued for four
    consecutive months with [HIKO] beginning to issue
    refunds only after customers filed informal complaints
    with [the BCS].
    Commission Op. at 49. Thus, we reject HIKO’s assertions on this point.
    B. Penalty for Right to Litigate
    1. Contentions
    HIKO next argues the PUC’s determination to impose a civil penalty
    of $1,836,125 impermissibly penalizes HIKO for exercising its right to litigate this
    40
    matter. In light of the PUC’s refusal to consider civil penalty decisions in settled
    cases   involving    substantially    similar   allegations,   HIKO      asserts,   the
    disproportionate civil penalty levied against it can have no other explanation than
    as a penalty because HIKO chose to litigate rather than settle this matter. HIKO
    contends the PUC approved the enormous civil penalty here, despite the fact it is
    nearly 80 times higher than the civil penalty it approved against another EGS for
    similar conduct during the same period. And, HIKO argues, the PUC’s sole basis
    for rejecting any consideration of the amounts approved in those cases is because
    they were settled rather than litigated. Yet, as discussed above, HIKO asserts,
    there is no reason the penalty decisions in settled cases should have no bearing in
    determining an appropriate civil penalty here, given the dearth of litigated cases
    involving similar allegations, and the requirement that the PUC consider the very
    same penalty standards in both litigated and settled cases.
    Further, while HIKO acknowledges a lower civil penalty is a common
    condition of a settlement, it asserts that the fuller evidentiary record in a litigated
    proceeding does not justify an exponential increase in the civil penalty, especially
    where HIKO was never presented with any real option than to settle this matter.
    To that end, HIKO argues, when I&E initiated this proceeding before the PUC,
    HIKO was faced with a claim for $15 million in civil penalties, potential license
    revocation and a refusal to settle on any terms other than a multi-million dollar
    penalty. HIKO asserts it had no practical alternative except to litigate the penalty
    action. Having done so, the PUC imposed its highest ever penalty, effectively
    punishing HIKO for refusing to settle. And, in affirming this unprecedented
    41
    penalty, HIKO contends, it was penalized again by not being allowed to rely on
    any settled cases as precedent to show that a lesser penalty was appropriate.
    Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, HIKO argues, it had a right to
    refuse settlement and litigate this matter, including through an appeal to this Court.
    Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for appeals to courts
    of record from administrative agencies. It states: “[T]here shall also be a right of
    appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record
    or to an appellate court ….” PA. CONST. art. 5, §9. HIKO maintains that, by
    imposing astronomical and disproportionate civil penalties against it simply
    because it decided to exercise its right to litigate, the PUC impermissibly attempted
    to chill HIKO’s right of appeal. If pursuing litigation results in a disproportionate
    civil penalty, HIKO argues, parties will inevitably be coerced into abandoning their
    rights to litigate civil penalty assessments regardless of the merits of the cases
    against them.
    HIKO argues that an action by the government that unnecessarily
    chills the exercise of a constitutional right is invalid. See Commonwealth v.
    Brown, 
    26 A.3d 485
    (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing United States v. Jackson, 
    390 U.S. 570
    (1968)). It asserts the stark disparity between the civil penalty ultimately
    assessed against it and the civil penalty assessed against other EGSs for the same
    or even more egregious conduct underscores the arbitrariness of the PUC’s
    decision and compels the conclusion that the amount reflects, not what the record
    evidence warranted, but a punishment for HIKO’s decision to litigate. HIKO
    contends that permitting the PUC to enforce this unsubstantiated civil penalty
    42
    violates HIKO’s right to due process in that it places too high a price on HIKO’s
    constitutional right to litigate this matter.
    2. Analysis
    We reject HIKO’s argument that the PUC imposed the civil penalty
    here based on HIKO’s choice to litigate rather than settle this matter. Rather, our
    review of the decisions rendered by the ALJs and the PUC reflects that, in
    fashioning the civil penalty here, the tribunals applied the 10 factors set forth in the
    PUC’s penalty policy to the facts presented.
    Further, with regard to HIKO’s repeated assertions that the PUC erred
    in failing to consider settled case, the PUC previously explained that it
    “vigorously, and without equivocation, reject[s] considering a settlement as
    precedent, as to any subsequent issue, in any proceeding.” Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n
    v. The Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., No. R-811819 (Nov. 10, 1988), 1988 Pa. PUC LEXIS
    572 at *19 (emphasis in original). Thus, “the [PUC’s] approval of a settlement
    does not establish legal precedent, because parties frequently waive their legal
    rights regarding certain issues in a settlement.” Customer Assistance Programs:
    Funding Levels & Cost Recovery Mechanisms, No. M-00051923 (Oct. 19, 2006),
    
    2006 WL 6610966
    (Pa.P.U.C.) at *11.
    To that end, as set forth above, HIKO mischaracterizes the PUC’s
    penalty policy statement as it pertains to litigated rather than settled cases. As
    stated above, “[w]hen applied in settled cases, [the penalty policy] factors and
    standards will not be applied in as strict a fashion as in a litigated proceeding.” 52
    Pa. Code §69.1201(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the parties in settled cases will be
    43
    afforded flexibility in reaching amicable resolutions to complaints and other
    matters so long as the settlement is in the public interest. 
    Id. Additionally, the
    third penalty factor, which involves a determination of whether the conduct at issue
    is intentional or negligent, and which the PUC considered of great import here,
    “may only be considered in evaluating litigated cases.”              52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(3) (emphasis added). Indeed, when conduct is deemed intentional, it
    may result in a higher penalty. 
    Id. Further, as
    explained above, the settled cases upon which HIKO relies
    are factually distinguishable. In particular, none of the cases HIKO cited involved
    intentional conduct directed by the company’s highest-level executives such as that
    directed by HIKO’s CEO and management here, which involved the intentional
    decision to overcharge the accounts of more than 5,700 customers on nearly
    15,000 invoices over a four-month period. F.F. Nos. 26 (citing C.R., HIKO St. 1-R
    at 8-9; HIKO St. 2-R at 49; N.T. 193-95), 72 (citing N.T. at 165, 217); ALJs’
    Initial Dec. at 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 54, 56; Commission Op. at 27, 53. Indeed, the
    PUC stated that the two factors that highlighted the egregious nature of the
    violations and supported the penalty determination were: (1) the intentional nature
    of the conduct from HIKO’s top management; and, (2) the magnitude of the
    violation.   Commission Op. at 53.      Indeed, I&E’s witness, Daniel Mumford,
    manager of the BCS’ Informal Compliance and Competition Unit, testified: “I’m
    not aware of any previous case whether this large [a] number of customers were
    overcharged deliberately.” N.T. at 132; see also N.T. at 124 (Mumford testified
    “I’m not aware of any comparable cases, cases that could be compared to this one.
    …”). Therefore, contrary to HIKO’s assertions, there is no indication the PUC
    44
    imposed the penalty here based solely on HIKO’s decision to litigate rather than
    settle this matter.
    In addition, while HIKO claims the PUC penalized it for refusing to
    settle, it points to nothing in the record that substantiates this bald assertion. To
    that end, through its complaint I&E sought the maximum penalty of nearly $15
    million (based on the statutory maximum fine of $1,000 per violation), see R.R. at
    41a, and the PUC ultimately imposed a penalty that was one-eighth (or 12.5%) of
    that amount, or $1,836,125.          Thus, while the PUC’s policy is to “encourage
    settlements,” 52 Pa. Code §5.231(a), there is nothing to indicate that HIKO was
    compelled to litigate rather than settle this matter.
    For these reasons, we reject HIKO’s argument that the PUC’s
    imposition of the civil penalty here impermissibly penalized HIKO for exercising
    its right to litigate this matter.
    C. Penalty Computation
    1. Contentions
    HIKO next maintains the PUC erred in applying a “per invoice”
    methodology that resulted in a finding of 14,689 separate violations. HIKO argues
    its failure to honor the price guarantee during the polar vortex was the result of a
    single business decision, not 14,689 separate decisions to overcharge customers.
    Also, by adopting a penalty computation based on invoices rather than prices
    actually billed, HIKO asserts, the ALJs arrived at a civil penalty that improperly
    penalized HIKO for actions that did not violate PUC regulations.
    45
    HIKO contends that, as the PUC found that HIKO’s alleged
    overcharges violated Section 54.4(a) of the PUC’s regulations, each day its
    business decision remained effective constituted a separate and distinct offense.
    See 66 Pa. C.S. §3301(b). As such, the PUC was required to apply a civil penalty
    for each violation of Section 54.4(a) during the four months affected by the polar
    vortex. Even if the PUC applied the maximum penalty of $1,000 for each day’s
    violation, HIKO asserts, the PUC would have arrived at a total civil penalty of
    $120,000—a penalty proportional to the civil penalties levied against other EGSs
    for similar violations.
    HIKO argues the PUC’s “per invoice” methodology is contrary to the
    language of Section 54.4(a), which provides: “EGS prices billed must reflect the
    marketed prices and the agreed upon prices in the disclosure statement.” 52 Pa.
    Code §54.4(a) (emphasis added). HIKO contends the regulation does not state that
    each EGS invoice must conform to the marketed price. HIKO asserts the invoice
    amount and the actual amount billed to a customer may be different, as the PUC
    acknowledged by its decision to remove “re-billed” charges from the total number
    of alleged violations. R.R. at 902a. Moreover, HIKO maintains, it did not “bill”
    customers itself; rather, the customer’s local EDC actually sent the invoices.
    HIKO’s customer records simply showed each customer’s account, the usage, the
    rate and the total charges over specific periods. HIKO argues I&E did not produce
    a single customer invoice to support its case. It asserts this distinction is critical
    where, as here, there are thousands of customer billing entries in HIKO’s records
    and each instance in which the “amount invoiced” is actually billed to a customer
    can carry a civil penalty up to $1,000.
    46
    Further, HIKO maintains, based on his industry experience, its expert,
    Dr. Cicchetti, offered a number of explanations as to why approximately 300
    invoice entries in HIKO’s records were likely not billed to customers. HIKO
    argues I&E offered no proof one way or the other, and thus did not carry its burden
    of proving those occurrences constituted violations.
    2. Analysis
    Section 3301 of the Public Utility Code (“Civil penalties for
    violations”) states, in relevant part:
    (a) General rule.--If any public utility, or any other
    person or corporation subject to this part, shall violate
    any of the provisions of this part, or shall do any matter
    or thing herein prohibited; or shall fail, omit, neglect, or
    refuse to perform any duty enjoined upon it by this part;
    or shall fail, omit, neglect or refuse to obey, observe, and
    comply with any regulation or final direction,
    requirement, determination or order made by the [PUC]
    … such public utility, person or corporation for such
    violation, omission, failure, neglect, or refusal, shall
    forfeit and pay to the Commonwealth a sum not
    exceeding $1,000, to be recovered by an action of
    assumpsit instituted in the name of the Commonwealth.
    In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section,
    the violation, omission, failure, neglect, or refusal of any
    officer, agent, or employee acting for, or employed by,
    any such public utility, person or corporation shall, in
    every case be deemed to be the violation, omission,
    failure, neglect, or refusal of such public utility, person or
    corporation.
    (b) Continuing offenses.--Each and every day’s
    continuance in the violation of any regulation or final
    direction, requirement, determination, or order of the
    [PUC] … or of any final judgment, order or decree made
    by any court, shall be a separate and distinct offense. If
    any interlocutory order of supersedeas, or a preliminary
    47
    injunction be granted, no penalties, shall be incurred or
    collected for or on account of any act, matter, or thing
    done in violation of such final direction, requirement,
    determination, order, or decree, so superseded or
    enjoined for the period of time such order of supersedeas
    or injunction is in force.
    66 Pa. C.S. §3301(a), (b).
    As set forth above, the pertinent PUC regulation states: “EGS prices
    billed must reflect the marketed prices and the agreed upon prices in the disclosure
    statement.” 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a) (emphasis added). HIKO challenges the PUC’s
    interpretation of this regulation.       As set forth above, however, the PUC’s
    interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to great deference and will not be
    reversed unless clearly erroneous. Lyft.
    Here, the PUC rejected HIKO’s proffered interpretation of 52 Pa.
    Code §54.4(a), explaining (with emphasis added):
    Although HIKO argues that Section 54.4(a) ‘does
    not state that each EGS invoice must conform to the
    marketed price’ but rather contains a ‘general’ statement
    that ‘prices billed must reflect the marketed price and the
    agreed upon prices in the disclosure statement’ we find
    that distinction to be one without a difference. HIKO
    [Exceptions] at 12 (emphasis in original). The prices in
    HIKO’s invoices did not match the customer
    information[15] provided, which guaranteed savings of
    between 1% and 7%. We find no basis to adopt an
    analysis that Section 54.4(a) demands anything more
    15
    As the PUC noted in its opinion, its regulations define the term “Customer
    information” as “[w]ritten, oral or electronic communications used by electricity providers
    [(which expressly includes EGSs)] to communicate to consumers prices and terms of service.”
    52 Pa. Code §54.2.
    48
    than disparate pricing in order for us to adopt the ALJs’
    conclusion that HIKO billed prices that did not match its
    customer information.
    Commission Op. at 25-26. We do not believe the PUC’s interpretation of the plain
    language of Section 54.4(a) of its regulations is clearly erroneous; thus, we may
    not disturb it.
    Further, the record supports the PUC’s determination that HIKO
    violated Section 54.4(a) by charging its customers amounts that exceeded HIKO’s
    marketed prices and the agreed upon prices in HIKO’s disclosure statement. The
    ALJs determined each overcharge equated to a violation of Section 54.4(a) of the
    PUC’s regulations. ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 31. HIKO marketed and agreed to a
    discount of 1% to 7% off the customer’s EDC’s PTC through its disclosure
    statement and welcome letter. 
    Id. HIKO issued
    a disclosure statement to each
    customer who enrolled in its price offering, which stated that the rate is the “price
    stated at sign-up and confirmed in your written Welcome Letter from HIKO.” 
    Id. at 32
    (citing C.R., I&E Ex. 4; N.T. 143-44). HIKO’s Welcome Letter to customers
    enrolled in its price offering stated:
    Guaranteed Savings! You have been enrolled onto a
    variable rate, which is guaranteed to be 1-7% less than
    your local Utility’s price to compare, for the first six
    monthly billing cycles. After the six-month introductory
    rate plan, you will be automatically rolled over onto a
    competitive variable rate, which will be determined by
    [HIKO], based on numerous key factors, including
    current market conditions and climate. The variable rate
    can change regularly.
    
    Id. (quoting C.R.,
    I&E Ex. 3) (emphasis in original).
    49
    HIKO did not dispute that it failed to honor the guaranteed discounted
    rate during the winter of 2014. 
    Id. (citing C.R.,
    HIKO St. 1-R at 9; C.R., HIKO St.
    2-R at 33-34, 39, 49, 59; N.T. at 164-66, 191, 193, 195, 197). In particular, HIKO
    admitted that from January through April 2014, it billed a large number of its
    customers in the service territories of Duquesne Light, Met-Ed, PECO, Penelec,
    PPL and West Penn a unit rate for electricity supply during the customers’
    introductory periods that exceeded, and sometimes far exceeded, the discounted
    introductory rate guaranteed at the time of each customer’s enrollment as a HIKO
    supply customer. 
    Id. The ALJs
    explained that I&E Exhibits 6A through 11A showed the
    number of violations. Further, HIKO’s CEO, Klein, confirmed the spreadsheets
    were true and correct business records representing billing data for HIKO
    customers of this price guarantee from January through April 2014 in each EDC
    service territory. N.T. at 147. Klein testified each row of data set forth in the
    spreadsheets represented a single invoice entry. N.T. 148. Klein confirmed the
    meaning of each column heading. N.T. at 148-51. Klein confirmed the process for
    determining whether an invoice entry was deemed an overcharge under the terms
    of the price offering. N.T. at 151-54.
    Further, the ALJs credited the testimony of I&E witness Mumford
    that the spreadsheets show 14,689 occurrences of HIKO’s overcharging over 99%
    of the PTC of the EDC in six EDC territories. ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 33; N.T. at 49.
    The ALJs also found persuasive Mumford’s testimony that each overcharge was a
    reasonable way of defining an “instance.” 
    Id. at 34
    (citing N.T. at 38-39, 136-37).
    50
    The ALJs explained that the record revealed 14,689 overcharges. 
    Id. at 35.
         Contrary to Dr. Cicchetti’s claim that I&E’s penalty assessment was
    exaggerated “for what was essentially a single business decision,” the ALJs stated,
    violations of Section 54.4(a) are not based on the number of business decisions, but
    rather, the number of overcharges. 
    Id. (citing C.R.,
    HIKO St. 2 at 49). On each
    occasion, HIKO submitted a bill for a charge that was contrary to what it promised.
    
    Id. (citing N.T.
    at 87-88).
    Further, as the ALJs recognized, the imposition of a civil penalty for
    each overcharge is lawful and appropriate in light of the fact that each overcharge
    can be feasibly segregated into a discrete violation. See Newcomer Trucking, Inc.
    v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    531 A.2d 85
    , 87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (“[I]t becomes
    obvious that Section 3301(a) of the [Public Utility] Code permits the PUC to
    impose a fine of up to $1,000 for each and every discrete violation of the [Public
    Utility] Code or PUC regulation, regardless of the number of violations that
    occur.”).
    In Newcomer, the PUC determined that a trucking company,
    Newcomer Trucking, Inc. (Newcomer), violated a PUC regulation 184 times on
    128 separate days by transporting the goods of more than one consignor on one
    truck at the same time. The PUC imposed a penalty per regulatory violation. In
    rejecting Newcomer’s challenges to the PUC’s penalty calculation, this Court
    explained:
    First, Newcomer contends that [Section 3301 of the
    Public Utility Code] limits to $1,000 the amount of the
    penalty the PUC can impose upon a violator of any single
    51
    Code provision regardless of the number of violations
    committed. Thus, Newcomer asserts that, even though it
    had violated 52 Pa.Code § 31.24 a total of 184 times on
    128 separate days, the total fine that the PUC could assess
    was $1,000. We are compelled to disagree with this
    strained and unreasonable interpretation.
    As our research has uncovered no case law
    interpreting [Section 3301 of the Public Utility Code], we
    must turn to the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Act),
    1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991, for guidance. Two sections of
    the Act are particularly instructive here. Under Section
    1922, a statute is to be interpreted so as to avoid an absurd
    or unreasonable result. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1). Interpreting
    Section 3301(a) of the Code in the fashion proposed by
    Newcomer, however, would be both absurd and
    unreasonable. Under Newcomer’s argument, no matter
    how many times a Code provision or PUC regulation is
    violated, be it once or 100 times, the maximum penalty
    that the PUC could levy would be $1,000. Clearly, this
    could not have been the intent of the legislature, and we
    decline to so find.
    Moreover, Section 1930 of the Act states:
    “Whenever a penalty or forfeiture is provided for the
    violation of a statute, such penalty or forfeiture shall be
    construed to be for each such violation.” 1 Pa. C.S. §
    1930. When this section is read in conjunction with
    Section 1922(1) of the Act, it becomes obvious that
    Section 3301(a) of the Code permits the PUC to impose a
    fine of up to $1,000 for each and every discrete violation
    of the Code or PUC regulation, regardless of the number
    of violations that occur.
    Alternatively, however, Newcomer argues that even
    if the PUC can impose a penalty in excess of $1,000,
    subsection (b) of Section 3301 of the Code requires the
    PUC to impose the monetary penalty on a per day, not per
    violation, basis. Thus, according to Newcomer, since the
    violation here occurred on 128 separate days, it should
    have been fined only $12,800.
    52
    While again, no cases have interpreted [Section 3301(b)
    of the Public Utility Code], cases citing its virtually
    identical predecessor, Section 1301(b) of the Public
    Utility Law,[16] are instructive. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(4)
    (“[w]hen a court of last resort has construed the language
    used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent
    statutes on the same subject matter intends the same
    construction to be placed upon such language”).
    In York Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
    Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, [
    121 A.2d 605
                 (Pa. Super. 1956)], the court affirmed a PUC order fining
    a public utility $50 per day for the 655 days it failed to
    comply with an earlier PUC order to acquire additional
    manpower to improve its service. In so doing, the court
    recognized that ‘continuing offenses’ are not simply
    offenses repeated on more than one day; rather,
    ‘continuing offenses’ are proscribed activities that are of
    an ongoing nature and cannot be feasibly segregated into
    discrete violations so as to impose separate penalties.
    [121 A.2d at 617] (Rhoades, P.J., concurring and
    dissenting); see also Gornish v. Pennsylvania Public
    Utility Commission, [
    4 A.2d 569
    (Pa. Super. 1939)].
    In the case at bar, however, although the proscribed
    shipments occurred on 128 separate days, 184 separate
    shipments were identified. Each shipment constituted a
    separate violation of 52 Pa. Code § 31.24, and thus the
    PUC acted within its power under Section 3301 when it
    assessed a penalty for each violation.
    
    Newcomer, 531 A.2d at 86-88
    (emphasis added).
    Similar to Newcomer, the record here reveals HIKO overcharged its
    customers on 14,689 invoices during the four-month period at issue. Each invoice
    constituted a separate violation of 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a); thus, the PUC acted
    16
    Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, as amended, 66 P.S. §1491(b). Section 1301 was
    repealed by Section 2 of the Act of July 1, 1978, P.L. 598.
    53
    within its authority under Section 3301 of the Public Utility Code in assessing a
    penalty for each violation. Further, as indicated in the above-quoted excerpt from
    Newcomer, we specifically rejected the argument HIKO advances here, that the
    PUC was required to calculate the penalty under Section 3301(b) of the Public
    Utility Code on a per day rather than per violation basis.
    In addition, although HIKO relies on the opinion of its expert, Dr.
    Cicchetti, that 300 invoice entries were likely not billed to customers, the PUC and
    ALJs expressly rejected this testimony, explaining: “[Dr.] Cicchetti was unspecific
    about which line items were incorrectly included in the calculations. He also
    seemed unsure whether the customer was billed the re-bill or not. As his testimony
    contains conjecture, we find I&E carried its burden of proving 14,689 violations
    did occur during the four month period in question.” Commission Op. at 32
    (quoting ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 31). As set forth in greater detail below, the record
    supports the PUC’s finding on this point.
    In sum, the record supports the finding of the PUC and ALJs that
    HIKO charged its customers at rates in excess of its marketed prices and the agreed
    upon prices in its disclosure statement on 14,689 invoices. Further, the PUC and
    ALJs properly determined each overcharge constituted a separate violation of 52
    Pa. Code §54.4(a). Newcomer.
    D. Substantial Evidence
    1. Contentions
    As a final issue, HIKO maintains the PUC erred in sustaining a civil
    penalty that lacks substantial record support. HIKO argues the PUC adopted the
    54
    same penalty amount the ALJs recommended even though the PUC admitted the
    ALJs made factual mistakes that led them to weigh some of the required penalty
    factors against HIKO. In so doing, HIKO asserts, the PUC erred.
    HIKO contends the PUC was free to wholly disregard and supersede
    the ALJs’ findings, especially where the recommended civil penalty was not
    supported by substantial evidence.     See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Pa. Pub. Util.
    Comm’n, 
    458 A.2d 1026
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). HIKO argues where the relief
    granted is a civil penalty for violations of PUC regulations, the PUC’s civil penalty
    determination must be supported by evidence presented on each of the 10 factors in
    the penalty policy. See Rosi v. Bell Atl.-Pa, Inc. & Sprint Commc’ns, L.P., No. C-
    0092409 (Mar. 16, 2000), 
    2000 WL 1407936
    (Pa.P.U.C.). HIKO asserts that, in
    assigning proper weight to each of the penalty factors, the PUC should have, at a
    minimum, reduced the civil penalty to reflect the shortcomings it found in the
    ALJs’ findings, as well as the uncertainties inherent in applying a “per invoice”
    method of computing an appropriate civil penalty.
    HIKO contends the PUC expressly acknowledged that the ALJs relied
    on insufficient evidence to support certain conclusions as to the required penalty
    factors. First, the PUC conceded the ALJs’ conclusion that customers suffered
    financial hardship as a result of the overcharges was “lacking on this record.”
    Commission Op. at 48. HIKO asserts the ALJs drew this conclusion despite the
    fact that I&E did not present any such evidence at the hearing. HIKO argues the
    evidence it presented supported the opposite conclusion as nearly two-thirds of the
    customer overcharges were less than $100. Moreover, HIKO agreed to make full
    55
    restitution to all affected customers in its settlement of the OAG/OCA case. HIKO
    asserts the ALJs’ improper conclusion of financial hardship prejudiced HIKO by
    more heavily weighting the “seriousness of the violation” element of the penalty
    policy, 52 Pa. Code §69.1201(c)(2), against HIKO.             Nevertheless, HIKO
    maintains, the PUC did not reduce the ALJs’ recommended civil penalty.
    Next, HIKO asserts, the PUC admitted that the ALJs’ conclusion that
    HIKO did not comply with the PUC’s surety requirements was “unclear at best,”
    and the PUC was “unable to reach any conclusion on this point.” Commission Op.
    at 49. Again, HIKO argues, although the ALJs weighted the “compliance history”
    penalty factor, see 52 Pa. Code §69.1201(c)(6), against HIKO, it did not adjust the
    recommended penalty amount.
    In addition, HIKO contends, the PUC conceded there was
    “insufficient evidence” to support the ALJs’ analysis that a nearly $2 million civil
    penalty was proper given HIKO’s size. Commission Op. at 52. At the hearing,
    HIKO asserts, I&E produced no evidence as to HIKO’s size, see 52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(8), to show the enormous civil penalty was warranted to deter HIKO
    or could even be borne by the company. Again, HIKO asserts, the PUC refused to
    depart from the civil penalty recommended by the ALJs, saying only, “it placed
    little emphasis on [the] value” of the evidence as to HIKO’s size. Commission Op.
    at 52.
    HIKO argues that, having admitted the ALJs improperly drew
    conclusions that weighed each of those penalty factors against HIKO, the PUC
    56
    should have at the very least reduced the penalty. Yet, HIKO asserts the PUC
    approved the exact same amount the ALJs recommended, without modification. In
    the PUC’s view, none of these evidentiary shortcomings “[rose] to such a level as
    to persuade [it] that the proposed civil penalty [was] inappropriate or
    unsupported.” Commission Op. at 43. HIKO contends that such a vague basis for
    ignoring crucial deficiencies in the initial decision is contrary to constitutional law.
    In the context of regulatory penalties, the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and
    Pennsylvania Constitutions mandate that a party have reasonable notice of the
    penalty that may accrue for a violation, as well as the underlying basis on which it
    rests. See S. Union Twp. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
    839 A.2d 1179
    , 1192 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2003); see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 
    269 U.S. 385
    , 391 (1926).
    Effectively conceding substantial evidence was lacking on 3 of the 10
    required elements of the penalty policy, HIKO argues, the PUC was required to re-
    calibrate the civil penalty the ALJs computed. Had it done so, in light of the PUC
    decisions approving settlements in other relevant cases, see 52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(9), HIKO asserts, it could not have upheld the $1,836,125 penalty.
    HIKO also reiterates its argument that the PUC used an improper
    method for computing the number of violations. It asserts the PUC affirmed the
    ALJs’ finding that HIKO billed its customers 14,689 times in amounts that
    exceeded the price guarantee and that each billing constituted a separate violation
    of Section 54.4(a). Yet, in the same breath, the PUC acknowledged the inherent
    inconsistencies and uncertainties of the underlying data that this “per invoice”
    computation relied on.
    57
    HIKO asserts that, in affirming the ALJs’ penalty determination, the
    PUC again disregarded these deficiencies, reasoning: “HIKO had the opportunity
    to correct mistakes in I&E’s calculation” and ultimately “fail[ed] to carry its
    burden of persuasion once [I&E’s] burden shifted from I&E to [HIKO].”
    Commission Op. at 33. HIKO argues this explanation ignores basic principles of
    burden of proof and burden-shifting. It maintains, there is no dispute that I&E had
    the burden of proving Section 54.4(a) was violated on 14,689 separate occasions.
    HIKO contends I&E’s burden also required it to eliminate confusion about the
    meaning of its proofs and to establish any seemingly anomalous entries were, in
    fact, invoices actually billed to customers. To do that, HIKO asserts, I&E could
    have served written discovery to establish what the entries meant. HIKO argues
    I&E could have obtained the actual customer invoices to confirm whether the
    customer was actually billed the invoice amount or presented customer testimony.
    But, I&E elected to do none of these things.
    HIKO contends that where I&E’s exhibits are inconsistent, misleading
    or unreliable, I&E does not to carry its burden. HIKO argues it should not incur
    greater penalties because of that failure. Because I&E did not offer any evidence
    proving these partial, duplicative or corrected invoice entries actually amounted to
    violations of the PUC’s regulations, HIKO argues, I&E did not meet its burden of
    proving HIKO violated Section 54.4(a) on 14,689 separate occasions.
    In addition, HIKO contends, the total number of violations the PUC
    accepted includes hundreds of other anomalous and questionable invoices that
    58
    should not have been considered violations of Section 54.4(a) because they
    involved de minimis amounts.
    HIKO also asserts Dr. Cicchetti testified that at least 118 of the
    invoices (0.8%) included in I&E’s computation contained overcharges of less than
    $1 and 1,293 of the invoices (8.8%) were less than $10. And, HIKO argues, the
    ALJs credited this testimony. Yet, the PUC approved a civil penalty computation
    that included a substantial penalty for each of these overcharges. HIKO contends
    this is overly punitive. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 
    6 A.2d 843
    , 848
    (Pa. 1939) (“[T]he court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in
    the application of statutes ... Where there are irregularities of very slight
    consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of penalties should be inflexibly
    severe.”). Therefore, HIKO maintains, the PUC should have entirely removed or
    significantly discounted these invoice entries in the penalty calculation.
    HIKO argues that a “per customer” methodology would recognize a
    violation for each of the 5,708 affected HIKO customers at the average $124
    customer overcharge and result in a far lower but still substantial penalty of
    $707,792. It asserts such a penalty would be many times higher than any other
    civil penalty the PUC approved against another EGS, and much higher than
    virtually all the civil penalties approved in settlements for EDCs for gas explosions
    that caused serious physical injuries and property damage. HIKO contends the
    PUC’s prior penalty decisions regarding similar claims comport with a “per
    customer” method for violations of Section 54.4(a). See Herp. HIKO maintains
    the PUC did not address its decision in Herp here.
    59
    2. Analysis
    We reject HIKO’s various assertions on this issue. At the outset, we
    note, HIKO does not dispute the PUC’s determinations as to several of the penalty
    policy factors. In particular, HIKO does not dispute that: (a) under the first penalty
    factor, its conduct was of a serious nature, which “may warrant a higher penalty,”
    52 Pa. Code §69.1201(c)(1); (b) under the third penalty factor, its conduct was
    intentional, which “may result in a higher penalty,” see 52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(3); (c) under the fifth penalty factor, its conduct involved a large
    number of customers (more than 5,700) over the course of a four-month period;
    and, (d) under the sixth penalty factor, all of the violations here occurred while
    HIKO’s Pennsylvania EGS license was still in conditional status.
    Nevertheless, HIKO first asserts that, in light of the PUC’s concession
    that the record lacked substantial evidence that HIKO’s customers suffered
    financial hardship, the PUC was obligated to reduce the civil penalty. The ALJs
    mentioned this point in the context of their analysis of the second penalty factor,
    which involves consideration of: “Whether the resulting consequences of the
    conduct at issue were of a serious nature. When consequences of a serious nature
    are involved, such as personal injury or property damage, the consequences may
    warrant a higher penalty.” See 52 Pa. Code §69.1201(c)(2). With regard to the
    second factor, the ALJs stated:
    HIKO’s argument that since the allegations do not
    involve the consequences of death, personal injury, or
    property damage, no or a low penalty is warranted. As
    an example, HIKO cites as authority for its position,
    [UGI Penn Natural Gas], wherein after repeated
    violations of gas safety regulations spanning the course
    of nearly five years, with consequences that included
    60
    many deaths and substantial property damage, the largest
    civil penalty imposed on UGI Utilities, Inc. (‘UGI’) was
    only $1,000,000. It is difficult to compare settled
    outcomes involving natural gas explosions with the
    instant case. We have no way of knowing whether the
    violations alleged in the UGI cases would have been
    proven by a preponderance of the evidence. …
    Focusing on the instant case, it would be
    unreasonable given the magnitude of the number of
    overcharges in violation of 52 [Pa. Code] § 54.4(a) to not
    direct any penalty at all. Further, it is unknown the
    hardship the approximately 5,700 customers experienced,
    even if their average monthly overcharge was only $124.
    If the EGS’s [PTC] rate increased by 400% without prior
    notice and without the expectation for the occurrence, we
    infer that there was some financial hardship experienced
    by the customers and, therefore, the consequences of
    HIKO’s actions were of a serious nature. [C.R.,] I&E St.
    1 at 49. We accept as credible Dr. Cicchetti’s testimony
    that some of the overcharges were for less than a dollar.
    N.T. [at] 211. This fact and the fact that the conduct
    complained of is not ‘slamming’ may warrant less than
    the maximum penalty per occurrence; however, the
    conduct is serious as evidenced by the number of
    informal complaints BCS received regarding the
    company, the number of total violations as depicted in
    Appendix C to I&E’s Main Brief, and the number of
    customers that cancelled their agreements with HIKO
    from January – April, 2014.
    ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 39-40 (emphasis added). While the PUC declined to uphold
    the ALJs’ inference regarding customer hardship, it nevertheless recognized that
    the $125 per violation penalty levied by the ALJs was appropriate because it
    approximated HIKO’s average overcharge on customer invoices during the four-
    month period at issue, which was $124. Commission Op. at 48. The PUC also
    indicated that consumer testimony admitted in connection with the OAG/OCA
    case addressed the issue of customer hardship. 
    Id. 61 Regardless,
    the PUC determined its decision not to adopt the ALJs’
    inference regarding financial hardship to HIKO’s customers did not warrant an
    adjustment to the penalty amount arrived at by the ALJs. 
    Id. This is
    not surprising
    given the PUC’s determinations regarding the magnitude of HIKO’s continuous,
    intentional violations of PUC regulations here.
    Indeed, the PUC clearly believed that the consequences of HIKO’s
    widespread and prolonged overcharging of its customers in direct infringement of
    its price guarantee and PUC regulations were serious. As I&E’s witness Mumford
    explained during his direct testimony, “[w]hen customers shop in the retail electric
    marketplace, they need to be able to trust that the rates that are marketed and
    promised at the time of enrollment are the rates that will be charged for electric
    generation. Otherwise, retail electric competition will not be successful.” C.R.,
    I&E Statement No. 1 at 49.        To that end, the PUC explained that HIKO
    “knowingly and deliberately” chose to dishonor its promised and contracted-for
    savings of 1% to 7% on 14,689 occasions to 5,708 customers, in direct violation of
    Section 54.4(a) of the PUC’s regulations. Commission Op. at 44. In so doing, the
    PUC determined, HIKO effectively treated its own customers as the financial
    guarantors of its own business plan, which backed contracts offering customers
    guaranteed savings with what was essentially a speculative supply portfolio based
    exclusively on spot market purchases. 
    Id. Thus, although
    this case did not involve
    personal injury or property damage, the PUC clearly considered HIKO’s recurring
    regulatory violations to have serious consequences.
    62
    As further support for its argument that the PUC should have reduced
    the penalty, HIKO points to the PUC’s determination that it was unable to clearly
    determine whether HIKO complied with the PUC’s surety or bond requirements.
    Although HIKO correctly points out that the PUC stated that evidence of HIKO’s
    compliance with the PUC’s surety requirements was “unclear at best,”
    Commission Op. at 49, we disagree with HIKO that this fact required the PUC to
    reduce the penalty imposed against HIKO.
    To that end, the ALJs addressed the surety issue in their discussion of
    the sixth penalty policy factor, which concerns “[t]he compliance history of the
    regulated entity which committed the violation. An isolated incident from an
    otherwise compliant utility may result in a lower penalty, whereas frequent,
    recurrent violations by a utility may result in a higher penalty.” 52 Pa. Code
    §69.1201(c)(6). With regard to HIKO’s compliance history, as set forth in greater
    detail above, HIKO’s 14,689 violations of Section 54.4(a) of the PUC’s
    regulations, which involved 5,708 customers over the course of a four-month
    period, all occurred during the period HIKO’s EGS license was in conditional,
    probationary status in which the PUC had placed conditions on HIKO’s sales and
    marketing practices.   In light of the fact that HIKO’s widespread, repeated
    violations here occurred while its EGS license remained in conditional status, in
    evaluating the “history of compliance” penalty policy factor, the PUC stated, “at
    the time of the January through April 2014 violations, HIKO was still operating in
    a ‘probationary’ period of its licensure.” Commission Op. at 52.
    63
    Next, as to HIKO’s argument regarding the lack of record evidence as
    to its size, as explained above, the PUC’s eighth penalty policy factor states: “The
    amount of the civil penalty or fine necessary to deter future violations. The size of
    the utility may be considered to determine an appropriate penalty amount.” 52 Pa.
    Code §69.1201(c)(8) (emphasis added). Here, the PUC clearly considered this
    factor. Commission Op. at 52. However, it declined to place much weight on the
    ALJs’ analysis of HIKO’s size. Regardless, the PUC found ample support for the
    remainder of the ALJs’ analysis to adopt the recommended civil penalty.
    Additionally, as the ALJs recognized, the total amount of the civil penalty closely
    reflects the actual, total overcharge HIKO billed its customers. ALJs’ Initial Dec.
    at 49. As discussed throughout this opinion, the record amply supports the PUC’s
    decision regarding its imposition of the civil penalty.
    Finally, as to HIKO’s argument that the PUC erred in utilizing a “per
    invoice” method of computing the civil penalty, the PUC, adopting the ALJs’
    reasoning, explained, in pertinent part:
    HIKO made 14,689 separate and distinct
    overcharges to 5,708 Pennsylvania customer accounts
    from January through April 2014. Based on the invoice
    entries set forth in I&E Exhibits 6A through 11A, and as
    summarized in I&E Exhibit 14, the evidence shows a
    total of 14,689 overcharges disaggregated as follows: 264
    in Duquesne Light service territory, 1,624 in Met-Ed
    service territory, 1,599 in PECO service territory, 1,782
    in Penelec service territory, 8,018 in PPL service territory
    and 1,402 in West Penn service territory. …
    In Exhibits 6A, 7A, 9A, 10A and 11A, the number
    of violations appears to be accurately highlighted. Where
    there is a re-bill in these exhibits, it is clearly marked
    ‘Rebilled Energy Charge’ and these charges do not
    64
    appear to be highlighted or included in the total number
    of violations, i.e. Exhibit 7A, at 1. However the PECO
    exhibit does not have any line-itemed re-bill charges
    expressly stating such. [Dr.] Cicchetti testified as
    follows:
    There were a lot of overcharges where, if
    you look at the data, there were probably at least
    300 instances where it was one of these bills dated
    one day, and then two days later it was modified
    and it was another bill. And I’m not sure the
    customer even saw that. It may have just been
    between HIKO and the utility.
    [Dr.] Cicchetti was unspecific about which line
    items were incorrectly included in the calculations. He
    also seemed unsure whether the customer was billed the
    re-bill or not. As his testimony contains conjecture, we
    find I&E carried its burden of proving 14,689 violations
    did occur during the four month period in question.
    ****
    HIKO does not dispute that it failed to honor the
    guaranteed discounted rate during the winter of 2014.
    HIKO admits that from January 2014 through April
    2014, HIKO billed a large number of customers within
    the service territories of Duquesne Light, Met-Ed, PECO,
    Penelec, PPL and West Penn a unit rate for electricity
    supply during the customers’ introductory periods that
    exceeded, and sometimes far exceeded, the discounted
    introductory rate that was guaranteed at the time of each
    customer’s enrollment as a HIKO supply customer.
    I&E Exhibits 6A through 11A show the
    highlighted number of violations. HIKO’s witness,
    [Klein], confirmed that the spreadsheets were true and
    correct business records representing billing data for
    HIKO customers of this price guarantee for January
    through April 2014 in each EDC service territory. [Klein]
    testified that each row of data set forth in the
    spreadsheets represents a single invoice entry. [Klein]
    confirmed the meaning of each column heading. [Klein]
    65
    confirmed the process for determining whether an
    invoice entry was deemed to be an overcharge under the
    terms of the [p]rice [o]ffering.
    The testimony of I&E’s witness [Mumford],
    Manager of the Informal Compliance and Competition
    Unit of BCS, is persuasive and supports a finding that
    these spreadsheets show 14,689 occurrences of HIKO’s
    overbilling over 99% of the price to compare rate of the
    EDC in six EDCs’ territories. Although we note that in
    the PECO Exhibit 8A there are approximately 60
    highlighted charges that appear to involve thirty double
    billings (the same account number, the same time period,
    and different usage amounts and billed amounts), since
    the line items are labeled Energy Charge instead of
    Rebilled, we are willing to accept these also as violations
    of 52 Pa. Code [§]54.4(a).
    Commission Op. at 30-32 (quoting ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 30-33) (emphasis in
    original). The record supports the PUC’s necessary determinations. See N.T. at
    38-39, 49, 146-154, 210-11, C.R., I&E Exs. 6A-11A, I&E St. No. 1 at 16-45; see
    also R.R. at 818a-19a.
    Further, as the PUC explained, HIKO had the opportunity to correct
    mistakes in I&E’s calculation.     However, Klein, HIKO’s CEO and President,
    confirmed that the data presented in I&E’s exhibits were “true and correct business
    records representing billing data for HIKO customers of this price guarantee for
    January through April 2014 in each EDC service territory[.]” 
    Id. at 32
    (quoting
    ALJs’ Initial Dec. at 32-33). Additionally, HIKO presented no clear evidence of
    any errors that would impact the outcome. 
    Id. While HIKO
    offered the testimony
    of Dr. Cicchetti, an independent consultant, Dr. Cicchetti testified that the entries
    HIKO disputed “likely represented” contested billing that was later corrected or
    66
    replaced, and the ALJs rejected this testimony as conjecture. 
    Id. at 33
    (citing
    HIKO Exceptions at 16).
    In short, as the PUC explained, I&E presented evidence of HIKO’s
    billing invoices utilizing data that HIKO provided, and HIKO did not present any
    clear evidence to refute that evidence. 
    Id. In addition
    , based on their analysis of the penalty policy factors, the
    ALJs determined that the average amount of HIKO’s overcharge mitigated in favor
    of less than the maximum $1,000 per violation penalty authorized under Section
    3301(a) of the Public Utility Code. Thus, the ALJs arrived at a per violation
    penalty of $125, which closely resembled HIKO’s average monthly overcharge of
    $124, and only 12.5% of the maximum per violation penalty I&E requested.
    Further, contrary to HIKO’s argument, the PUC did consider the fact
    that some of the overcharges were relatively small. However, the PUC explained
    that there was no “de minimis” exception contained in its regulations requiring it to
    ignore violations “likely” affecting seasonal homeowners or, as I&E asserted,
    rendering them irrelevant to a determination of whether a violation occurred.
    Commission Op. at 34.
    Finally, Herp, relied on by HIKO, is distinguishable. Herp involved
    the complaint of a single customer (rather than an investigation by I&E) regarding
    a misleading statement about an EGS’ rates made by a third-party marketing agent
    for the EGS during a door-to-door solicitation.
    67
    Here, unlike in Herp, the fact-finder determined that HIKO’s highest-
    level executives made the decision to intentionally overcharge approximately
    5,708 customers on nearly 15,000 invoices in a manner contrary to the clear
    language of its welcome letter and disclosure statement. Thus, the intentional
    misconduct by HIKO’s top management, combined with the sheer magnitude of
    the violations, separates this case from Herp.
    IV. Conclusion
    For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    68
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    HIKO Energy, LLC,                      :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                          :   No. 5 C.D. 2016
    :   Argued: December 14, 2016
    Pennsylvania Public Utility            :
    Commission,                            :
    Respondent    :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 8th day of June, 2017, the order of the Pennsylvania
    Public Utility Commission is AFFIRMED.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    HIKO Energy, LLC,                     :
    Petitioner            :
    :
    v.                        :   No. 5 C.D. 2016
    :   Argued: December 14, 2016
    Pennsylvania Public Utility           :
    Commission,                           :
    Respondent          :
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge
    DISSENTING OPINION
    BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT                                    FILED: June 8, 2017
    The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) has imposed a
    civil penalty of $1,836,125 upon HIKO Energy, LLC (HIKO), an electric
    generation supplier (EGS), because its invoices to 5,708 customers over a four-
    month period “did not reflect the marketed prices and agreed upon prices in the
    disclosure statement.” 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a). This civil penalty, the highest in the
    history of utility regulation in Pennsylvania when ordered, is grossly
    disproportionate to the penalties of $25,000 to $125,000 imposed upon other EGSs
    for the same conduct during the same time period. A grossly disproportionate civil
    penalty violates the PUC’s Statement of Policy for calculating civil penalties and
    the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines. Because the PUC erred and
    abused its discretion, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm
    the PUC.
    HIKO has its principal place of business in New York. In December
    of 2012, the PUC granted HIKO a license to supply electric generation services in
    Pennsylvania to residential, small commercial, large commercial, industrial, and
    governmental customers in the service territories of various electric distribution
    companies (EDC).          The license was granted on condition of an 18-month
    probationary period, from December 2012 through June 2014, and shortly
    thereafter HIKO began providing service in Pennsylvania.                    HIKO purchased
    electrical energy on the spot market and then sold it to retail customers.                     It
    developed its customer list by door-to-door, telephone, and website solicitation.
    HIKO delivered electric service through utilities local to its customers.
    In August 2013, HIKO began to offer a six-month introductory price,
    which guaranteed that the customer’s cost for electricity would be at least one to
    seven percent less than the price-to-compare (PTC) of the customer’s local utility.
    Thereafter, customers would be enrolled in HIKO’s variable rate program whereby
    prices would be determined by market conditions and climate. HIKO confirmed
    the introductory price offer in a “Welcome Letter and Disclosure Statement” issued
    to customers that accepted this offer.1
    In January 2014, wholesale market prices for electrical energy
    increased dramatically. A period of sustained cold weather, referred to as a “polar
    vortex,” caused a surge in the use of electricity in Pennsylvania. At the same time,
    1
    HIKO’s welcome letter stated that the rate “is guaranteed to be 1-7% less than [the] local
    Utility’s price to compare, for the first six months billing cycles. After the six-month
    introductory rate plan, [customers] will be automatically rolled over onto a competitive variable
    rate, which will be determined by HIKO Energy, based on numerous key factors, including
    current market conditions and climate.” ALJ Decision at 15, Finding of Fact No. 45. The
    Disclosure Statement provided that the rate is the “price stated at sign-up and confirmed in
    [customers’] written Welcome Letter from HIKO.” ALJ Decision at 15, Finding of Fact No. 46.
    MHL-2
    an increase in natural gas prices in Canada increased the costs of electrical
    generating plants. Prior to the polar vortex, PJM Interconnection LLC2 (PJM) sold
    electricity to HIKO at approximately $0.08 per kWh. In January 2014, the price
    increased approximately 300% to $0.227 per kWh, and the price remained at or
    above $0.138 per kWh until April 2014. As a result, HIKO was able to secure
    electrical power only at exorbitant rates during this period.
    Consistent with its variable rate program, HIKO passed its unexpected
    costs along to its customers. This decision included the 5,708 customers enrolled
    in HIKO’s introductory price discount program. During the first four months of
    2014, those 5,708 customers were billed in the aggregate $3.29 million. Of that
    total, approximately $1.8 million represented charges in excess of the introductory
    price discount. HIKO charged customers as much as $0.29 per kWh, or up to
    400% of the PTC of the local utility. The average aggregate overcharge for each
    HIKO customer in the introductory price discount program was $124.                 ALJ
    Decision at 13; Finding of Fact No. 29.
    Customers complained to HIKO. In response, beginning in February
    2014, HIKO made refunds that totalled $159,320.15. It also stopped offering the
    six-month introductory price discount.
    Customers also complained to the PUC’s Bureau of Consumer
    Services, which referred the matter for an investigation. In response to the PUC’s
    investigation, HIKO provided all requested information, which included a
    spreadsheet of 14,689 invoice entries for the first four months of 2014. That
    2
    PJM is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale
    electricity in 13 states (including Pennsylvania) and the District of Columbia.
    MHL-3
    included invoices issued above the introductory discounted rate as well as invoices
    that were duplicate “re-bills.” ALJ Decision at 18, Finding of Fact No. 69.
    Based on the information provided by HIKO, the PUC’s Bureau of
    Investigation and Enforcement (I&E) filed a complaint, alleging that each of
    HIKO’s 14,689 invoices constituted a separate violation of the PUC’s regulation,
    which requires an EGS to bill at the “agreed upon price stated in the disclosure
    statement.” 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a).3 The complaint requested a civil penalty of
    $14,689,000, or $1,000 for each alleged violation. HIKO filed an answer with new
    matter,     asserting,   inter   alia,   that   the   requested     penalty    was     grossly
    disproportionate. HIKO Answer, New Matter ¶11; Reproduced Record at 83a
    (R.R. ___). The PUC appointed Elizabeth H. Barnes and Joel H. Cheskis to serve
    as Administrative Law Judges to hear evidence in the case and recommend a
    decision.
    In the meantime, the Office of Attorney General, by its Bureau of
    Consumer Protection and its Office of Consumer Advocate (collectively, Attorney
    General), filed a complaint with the PUC, accusing HIKO of misleading marketing
    and improper billing.       The PUC appointed ALJ Barnes and ALJ Cheskis to
    conduct a hearing on the Attorney General’s complaint.                    HIKO sought to
    consolidate the two proceedings, but the ALJs denied its request.
    The Attorney General and HIKO settled their litigation. HIKO agreed
    to pay $2,025,383.85 into a refund pool, in addition to the refund of $159,320.15 it
    3
    This regulation states:
    (a) EGS prices billed must reflect the marketed prices and the agreed upon prices
    in the disclosure statement.
    52 Pa. Code §54.4(a).
    MHL-4
    had already made to affected customers. HIKO agreed to give customers that had
    enrolled in HIKO’s introductory discount program a refund that gave them the
    benefit of their bargain.4 HIKO further agreed to cease accepting new customers
    until June 30, 2016; to pay up to $50,000 for the costs and expenses related to
    administering the refund pool; and to contribute $25,000 to the local EDC hardship
    funds. The parties submitted the settlement to the ALJs for review, and on August
    21, 2015, the ALJs approved the settlement between the Attorney General and
    HIKO.
    The very same day, the ALJs issued a decision in I&E’s enforcement
    action against HIKO and ordered a civil penalty of $1,836,125. In so doing, the
    ALJs referred to the PUC’s Statement of Policy on civil penalties, which states:
    (a) The [PUC] will consider specific factors and standards in
    evaluating litigated and settled cases involving violations of 66
    Pa. C.S. (relating to Public Utility Code) and this title. These
    factors and standards will be utilized by the [PUC] in
    determining if a fine for violating a [PUC] order, regulation or
    statute is appropriate, as well as if a proposed settlement for a
    violation is reasonable and approval of the settlement
    agreement is in the public interest.
    (b) Many of the same factors and standards may be considered
    in the evaluation of both litigated and settled cases. When
    applied in settled cases, these factors and standards will not be
    applied in as strict a fashion as in a litigated proceeding. The
    parties in settled cases will be afforded flexibility in reaching
    amicable resolutions to complaints and other matters so long as
    4
    During the first four months of 2014, HIKO lost 70 percent of its customers in Pennsylvania;
    80 percent of those were in the guaranteed discount program. In large part, this was attributed to
    HIKO’s decision to stop marketing in January 2014. Some customers left the state or switched
    utilities. The refund pool was created to pay the administrative expenses associated with
    locating the customers entitled to a refund as well as paying for the refunds themselves.
    According to HIKO’s expert, Charles Cicchetti, a number of the overcharges “were less than a
    dollar. Quite a few under $10.” R.R. 577a.
    MHL-5
    the settlement is in the public interest. The parties to a
    settlement should include in the settlement agreement a
    statement in support of settlement explaining how and why the
    settlement is in the public interest. The statement may be filed
    jointly by the parties or separately by each individual party.
    (c) The factors and standards that will be considered by the
    [PUC] include the following:
    (1) Whether the conduct at issue was of a serious
    nature. When conduct of a serious nature is
    involved,     such      as    willful    fraud    or
    misrepresentation, the conduct may warrant a
    higher penalty.       When the conduct is less
    egregious, such as administrative filing or
    technical errors, it may warrant a lower penalty.
    (2) Whether the resulting consequences of the
    conduct at issue were of a serious nature. When
    consequences of a serious nature are involved,
    such as personal injury or property damage, the
    consequences may warrant a higher penalty.
    (3) Whether the conduct at issue was deemed
    intentional or negligent. This factor may only be
    considered in evaluating litigated cases. When
    conduct has been deemed intentional, the conduct
    may result in a higher penalty.
    (4) Whether the regulated entity made efforts to
    modify internal practices and procedures to
    address the conduct at issue and prevent similar
    conduct in the future. These modifications may
    include activities such as training and improving
    company techniques and supervision. The amount
    of time it took the utility to correct the conduct
    once it was discovered and the involvement of top-
    level management in correcting the conduct may
    be considered.
    (5) The number of customers affected and the
    duration of the violation.
    MHL-6
    (6) The compliance history of the regulated entity
    which committed the violation.       An isolated
    incident from an otherwise compliant utility may
    result in a lower penalty, whereas frequent,
    recurrent violations by a utility may result in a
    higher penalty.
    (7) Whether the regulated entity cooperated with
    the [PUC]’s investigation. Facts establishing bad
    faith, active concealment of violations, or attempts
    to interfere with [PUC] investigations may result
    in a higher penalty.
    (8) The amount of the civil penalty or fine
    necessary to deter future violations. The size of
    the utility may be considered to determine an
    appropriate penalty amount.
    (9) Past [PUC] decisions in similar situations.
    (10) Other relevant factors.
    52 Pa. Code §69.1201. The ALJs addressed some, but not all, of the above-listed
    ten factors.
    The ALJs found that HIKO made a conscious decision not to bill at
    the agreed upon six-month introductory price in the disclosure statement given to
    approximately 5,700 customers.         They found the resulting “overcharges” to
    constitute serious violations but rejected the $14.69 million penalty proposed by
    I&E. The ALJs concluded that a civil penalty of $1.84 million, approximately
    25% of HIKO’s annual gross revenue, in addition to $160,000 in refunds and
    HIKO’s agreement to provide an additional $1.67 million in refunds to the same
    customer class, constituted a “reasonable deterrence” to future violations. ALJ
    Decision at 50.
    In reviewing past PUC decisions, the ALJs noted that there were “not
    many fully litigated cases specifically regarding Section 54.4(a) of the [PUC]’s
    MHL-7
    regulations.” ALJ Decision at 50. The ALJs disregarded the much lower civil
    penalties the PUC had imposed on other EGS companies that had also overcharged
    their customers during the polar vortex because they were the result of settlements.
    The ALJs reasoned that settled cases do not have any precedential value to a
    litigated case.
    To calculate the $1,836,125 civil penalty, the ALJs treated each
    spreadsheet invoice entry as a violation, for a total of 14,689 violations. The ALJs
    multiplied that number by $125, the aggregate average overcharge per customer.
    The ALJs concluded that the $1,836,125 penalty was “appropriate upon
    consideration of the ten factors and standards.” ALJ Decision at 64, Conclusion of
    Law No. 12.       Acknowledging that a civil penalty of this magnitude was
    “unprecedented,” the ALJs rationalized its size by noting that the $125 per
    violation was far less than the $1,000 per violation penalty requested by I&E. ALJ
    Decision at 62.
    HIKO filed exceptions with the PUC. It argued that the penalty
    recommended by the ALJs could not be reconciled with the PUC’s Statement of
    Policy for calculating an appropriate civil penalty. It also argued that the ALJs
    erred in basing the penalty on the number of spreadsheet invoices instead of the
    number of customers or the number of decisions by HIKO management. It further
    argued that the $1,836,125 civil penalty was grossly disproportionate because it
    was nearly 80 times higher than the civil penalties imposed on the EGS companies
    that had engaged in the same conduct during the same period of time and for the
    same reason, i.e., unexpected cost increases caused by the polar vortex. The ALJs
    improperly disregarded those other decisions where the penalties ranged from
    $25,000 to $125,000 simply because they were settled cases. HIKO was not able
    MHL-8
    to settle with I&E because it refused to consider any penalty below several million
    dollars.
    On December 3, 2016, the PUC issued the instant adjudication
    denying HIKO’s exceptions. The PUC observed that “HIKO effectively treated its
    own customers as the financial guarantors of its own business plan, which backed
    contracts offering customers guaranteed savings with what was essentially a
    speculative supply portfolio based exclusively on spot market purchases.” PUC
    Adjudication at 44. Because the $125 per violation was comparable to HIKO’s
    average overcharge of $124, the PUC concluded that the penalty was appropriate.
    The PUC held that its other decisions, where the penalty approved was reached by
    settlement, were entitled to little weight because HIKO had required I&E to
    litigate.
    In its appeal to this Court, HIKO argues that the PUC imposed a
    grossly disproportionate penalty that violated the PUC’s Statement of Policy and
    the excessive fines clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.5 It
    contends that the $1,836,125 civil penalty is grossly disproportionate to the
    sanctions levied against other EGSs for the same, and even more egregious
    misconduct, that occurred at the same time period. HIKO further argues that the
    PUC erred in determining the number of violations on a “per invoice” basis, which
    was never proved by the I&E.
    5
    Specifically, the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: “[e]xcessive bail shall
    not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
    CONST. amend. VIII. The Pennsylvania Constitution contains similar language. PA. CONST. art.
    I, §13 (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
    punishments inflicted”).
    MHL-9
    This Court’s review of PUC adjudications is governed by Section 704
    of the Administrative Agency Law, which states:
    After hearing, the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it
    shall find that the adjudication is in violation of the
    constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance
    with the law, or that the provisions of Subchapter A of Chapter
    5 (relating to practice and procedure of Commonwealth
    agencies) have been violated in the proceedings before the
    agency, or that any finding of fact made by the agency and
    necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by
    substantial evidence.
    2 Pa. C.S. §704. See Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 
    493 A.2d 653
    , 655 (Pa. 1985). Whether an agency decision is “in accordance with
    law” also considers whether the agency’s determination represents an abuse of
    discretion. Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    735 A.2d 96
    , 99 (Pa. 1999). The abuse of discretion standard does not allow the
    appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. In re Petition of
    Acchione, 
    227 A.2d 816
    , 820 (Pa. 1967).
    In support of its argument that the $1,836,125 civil penalty is grossly
    disproportionate, HIKO directs the Court’s attention to two recent PUC decisions,
    Commonwealth v. IDT Energy, Inc.6 and Commonwealth v. Respond Power LLC.7
    Those enforcement proceedings arose during the same confluence of events in
    2014: abnormally cold weather attributable to the “polar vortex,” record breaking
    use of natural gas and electricity, and a dramatic increase in wholesale market
    prices for electrical energy.
    6
    PUC Docket No. C-2014-2427657, penalty approved by the PUC on June 6, 2016.
    7
    PUC Docket No. C-2014-2427659 & 2438640, penalty approved by the PUC on August 11,
    2016.
    MHL-10
    In the first case, the Attorney General accused IDT Energy, an EGS,
    of making misleading and deceptive promises of savings; switching customers
    without their consent (a practice known as “slamming”); and providing inaccurate
    pricing information. This resulted in overcharges in the amount of $6.5 million.
    IDT Energy, ALJ Decision (11/19/2015) at 36. Under its settlement with the
    Attorney General, IDT Energy agreed (1) to pay $6,577,000 in refunds; (2) to pay
    a $25,000 civil penalty; (3) to contribute $75,000 to a local EDC hardship fund;
    and (4) to modify its business practices. The ALJs approved the settlement in its
    entirety. Notably, the ALJs rejected an intervenor’s objection that the $25,000
    civil penalty and the $75,000 contribution to the hardship funds were inadequate to
    deter future violations. Instead, the ALJs specifically found the $25,000 civil
    penalty to be “reasonable and in the public interest.” 
    Id. at 46.
    The PUC entered a
    decision adopting the ALJs’ recommended approval.             IDT Energy, PUC
    Adjudication (6/30/2016) at 67.
    In the second case, the Attorney General accused Respond Power
    LLC, another EGS, of “making misleading and deceptive claims, making
    misleading and deceptive promises of savings, slamming and failing to provide
    accurate pricing information.” Respond Power, ALJ Decision (5/17/2016) at 1.
    This conduct resulted in approximately $5 million in overcharges to its customers.
    
    Id. at 19.
    Under the settlement with the Attorney General, Respond Power agreed
    (1) to pay $4,122,224.91 in refunds in addition to the $971,279.45 it had already
    refunded; (2) to pay a $125,000 civil penalty; (3) to contribute $50,000 to EDC
    hardship funds; and (4) to make modifications to its business practices. 
    Id. at 1.
    The ALJs approved the settlement in its entirety, finding that the $125,000 civil
    penalty and the $50,000 contribution to the hardship funds constituted a
    MHL-11
    “reasonable” deterrent and was “in the public interest.” 
    Id. at 50-51.
    The ALJs
    reasoned:
    Although the civil penalty constitutes a small fraction of the
    amount provided in the Refund Pool, we believe that the
    provisions of the Settlement must be considered as a whole, not
    piecemeal. When doing so, the Settlement as a whole deters
    future violation, is in the public interest and warrants being
    adopted.
    
    Id. at 62.
    The PUC entered a decision adopting the ALJs’ recommended approval.
    Respond Power, PUC Adjudication (8/11/2016) at 1.
    Even though HIKO’s conduct was very similar to that committed by
    the respondents in IDT Energy and Respond Power, it has been ordered to pay a
    civil penalty that is 73% higher than the penalty in IDT Energy and 15% higher
    than the penalty in Respond Power. The conduct of the respondents in IDT Energy
    and Respond Power was more egregious because it included violations in addition
    to their common violation of 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a). IDT Energy and Respond
    Power engaged in misleading and deceptive practices that included “slamming”
    customers.    I&E never accused HIKO of engaging in such conduct.          To the
    contrary, the ALJs found, specifically, that HIKO did not intend to defraud its
    customers in its initial price offering:
    [T]here is no evidence to support a finding that HIKO intended
    in its August offering to defraud customers initially or in
    advance of the offering. Rather, the testimony is convincing
    that the company based its offering upon an 18-month historical
    data which showed price elasticity and stability in the spot
    market.
    MHL-12
    ALJ Decision at 51 (internal citation omitted). The ALJs concluded that HIKO’s
    misconduct was limited to one violation, i.e., deviating from the agreed upon
    discounted rate in violation of 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a).
    Notwithstanding these factual differences that favored HIKO, the
    ALJs imposed a penalty of $1.84 million. This was grossly disproportionate to the
    $25,000 civil penalty imposed on IDT Energy for its $6.5 million in overcharges,
    and the $125,000 civil penalty imposed on Respond Power for its $5 million in
    overcharges. Notably, the ALJs stated that the $125,000 civil penalty imposed on
    Respond Power was reasonable when the settlement taken “as a whole deters
    future violation.” Respond Power, ALJ Decision (5/17/2016) at 62. The ALJs did
    not consider HIKO’s “settlement as a whole” with the Attorney General, which
    required HIKO to pay $2,025,383.85 into a refund pool (on top of $160,000 it had
    already voluntarily refunded); $50,000 in expenses to administer the refunds; and
    $25,000 to the EDC hardship funds. The same ALJs made the decisions in HIKO,
    IDT Energy and Respond Power. Their different outcomes cannot be reconciled.
    The PUC rationalizes the differences by explaining that it applies the
    ten factors in its Statement of Policy differently for settled and for litigated cases.
    That Statement of Policy states, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (b) Many of the same factors and standards may be considered
    in the evaluation of both litigated and settled cases. When
    applied in settled cases, these factors and standards will not be
    applied in as strict a fashion as in a litigated proceeding. The
    parties in settled cases will be afforded flexibility in reaching
    amicable resolutions to complaints and other matters so long as
    the settlement is in the public interest. The parties to a
    settlement should include in the settlement agreement a
    statement in support of settlement explaining how and why the
    settlement is in the public interest. The statement may be filed
    jointly by the parties or separately by each individual party.
    MHL-13
    52 Pa. Code §69.1201(b) (emphasis added). Because it does not apply the factors
    as strictly in a settled case as in a litigated case, the PUC contends that settled cases
    do not have any precedential value. PUC Adjudication at 26. This rationale is
    inconsistent with the PUC’s own Statement of Policy.
    First, the Statement of Policy commits the PUC to look at “past
    Commission       decisions”   involving    similar   misconduct.       52    Pa.   Code
    §69.1201(c)(9). The policy says “past decisions” without regard to whether the
    decision was made in a litigated case or in a settled case. All penalties, whether
    reached by settlement or by litigation, require a decision of the PUC. Here, the
    only “past decisions” that were similar to HIKO’s were PUC decisions approving
    settlements.
    Second, in every PUC decision approving a settlement, there must be
    a finding that the penalty will deter future violations and is in the public interest.
    The ALJs found that IDT Energy’s penalty of $25,000 would deter future
    violations and was in the public interest. The ALJs needed to explain why HIKO
    needs to pay a penalty of $1.84 million for the same conduct. The purpose of the
    penalty is to deter future violations, not to deter litigation. Every utility has the
    right to be heard.
    Third, the ALJs approved the Attorney General’s settlement with
    HIKO as in the public interest, even though it did not include any civil penalty.
    The Attorney General, instead, looked for a contribution to the EDC hardship
    funds and the creation of a refund pool.
    The PUC imposed penalties against other EGSs for the same
    violation, arising during the same confluence of weather and market conditions, at
    a fraction of that imposed upon HIKO. HIKO argues that it did not “elect” to
    MHL-14
    litigate this case. Rather, I&E never presented HIKO with a realistic settlement of
    its demand for $15 million in civil penalties and a license revocation. HIKO Reply
    Brief at 27. Because I&E would not negotiate, HIKO asserts it had no practical
    alternative except to litigate. HIKO Brief at 48.
    Deterrence is a consideration in any civil penalty. A penalty deters
    the utility subject to the enforcement action from repeating the violation and other
    utilities from committing a violation. In this way, the PUC maintains discipline in
    the utility industry. HIKO acknowledges that deterrence requires the exercise of
    judgment and that the PUC is not obligated to impose the exact same amount of
    penalty in every overcharge case. HIKO even acknowledges a lower civil penalty
    is a common feature to a settlement. Nevertheless, the meaning of “deterrence”
    should not “mean something different in the settlement context than in a litigated
    case.” HIKO Reply Brief at 9. I agree.
    The amount of the penalty the PUC imposed in other decisions
    involving similar, albeit more egregious, misconduct by EGSs was held to be
    reasonable to deter future violations.     This amount ranged from $25,000 to
    $125,000. If these amounts have been determined to have a deterrent effect against
    future misconduct, then, logically, all penalties imposed for the same conduct that
    has already taken place during the same period of time should relate to that range.
    If the misconduct is repeated during the next polar vortex, that is the time to
    impose higher penalties in excess of the range of $25,000 to $125,000.
    The $1,836,125 penalty violated the excessive fine clauses of the
    United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The majority does not address this
    point because it concludes that it was waived. I disagree. HIKO asserted in its
    Answer to I&E’s Complaint that the penalty sought by I&E was “grossly
    MHL-15
    disproportionate.” HIKO Answer to I&E’s Complaint, New Matter ¶11; R.R. 83a.
    HIKO’s exception to the ALJs’ penalty decision also asserted that the civil penalty
    was “grossly disproportionate.” HIKO Exception to ALJs’ Initial Decision at 30-
    31; R.R. 1003a-1004a. A party may identify additional legal authority on appeal to
    support a claim it raised before a lower court or agency. See Allegheny County v.
    Commonwealth, 
    490 A.2d 402
    (Pa. 1985) (rejecting Commonwealth’s waiver
    claim because the County “merely identified additional legal authority in support
    of its claims; the County’s basic theory is the same[.]”). 
    Id. at 413
    n.9. HIKO is
    not asserting a new claim but offering additional legal authority to support its claim
    that the civil penalty is grossly disproportionate.8
    The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
    that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
    and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Pennsylvania
    Constitution contains a similar provision: “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
    nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” PA. CONST. art. I,
    §13. Our Supreme Court has observed that the excessive fines clause set forth in
    the Pennsylvania Constitution is coextensive with the Eighth Amendment to the
    U.S. Constitution. Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 
    98 A.3d 1268
    , 1281 (Pa. 2014).
    8
    Section 753(a) of the Administrative Agency Law provides that “if a full and complete record
    of the proceedings before the agency was made such party may not raise upon appeal any other
    question not raised before the agency (notwithstanding the fact that the agency may not be
    competent to resolve such question) unless allowed by the court upon due cause shown.” 2 Pa.
    C.S. §753(a).
    Throughout the administrative proceeding, HIKO challenged the proposed penalty as
    grossly disproportionate. It challenged I&E’s proposed penalty of $14,689,000, and then
    challenged the ALJs’ recommended penalty of $1,836,125. HIKO now challenges the PUC’s
    decision to impose a penalty of $1,836,125 as grossly disproportionate.
    MHL-16
    To determine whether the excessive fines clause has been violated, a
    court considers “whether the statutory provision imposes punishment; and if so,
    whether the fine is excessive.” Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce Street, 
    890 A.2d 35
    , 38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce Street, 
    832 A.2d 396
    , 399 (Pa. 2003)). The PUC acknowledges that the $1,836,125 civil
    penalty imposed a punishment. To determine whether that penalty was excessive,
    we must employ a proportionality analysis, i.e., a comparison of the amount of the
    fine to the gravity of the offense. 
    Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1281
    . Whether a fine is
    unconstitutionally excessive is a question of law, rendering the standard of review
    de novo and the scope of review plenary. 
    Id. at 1279.
                 In applying the proportionality test, our Supreme Court has pointed to
    Solem v. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    (1983), which directs the court to compare the
    magnitude of the fine to the treatment of other offenders in the same jurisdiction,
    and to the treatment of the same offense in other jurisdictions. 
    Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1282
    .   Our Supreme Court has further noted the special need for “intra-
    Pennsylvania” proportionality and explained that “comparative and proportional
    justice is an imperative within Pennsylvania’s own borders.” 
    Id. at 1283
    (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    78 A.3d 1044
    , 1055 (Pa. 2013) (Castille, C.J.,
    concurring, joined by Saylor and Todd, JJ.)).
    It was incumbent on the PUC to ensure that the civil penalty it
    imposed on HIKO could be harmonized with its other decisions imposing civil
    penalties on utilities that committed similar violations.        It did not do so.
    Accordingly, the grossly disproportionate civil penalty imposed on HIKO, inter
    alia, violates the prohibition against excessive fines found in both the United States
    and Pennsylvania Constitutions as well as the PUC’s own Statement of Policy.
    MHL-17
    HIKO also challenges the methodology by which its penalty was
    calculated. The ALJs found 14,689 violations and then multiplied that number by
    $125.   In adopting this penalty, the PUC found that $125 per violation was
    appropriate because it was comparable to the average $124 overcharge for
    customers enrolled in the introductory price discount program. PUC Adjudication
    at 48. However, the $124 figure, as found by the ALJs, was “per customer” and
    not per invoice. ALJ Decision at 13, Finding of Fact No. 29 (“[t]he average
    overcharge that HIKO billed customers was $124”). Under the PUC’s own logic,
    the $125 number should have been multiplied by 5,708, i.e., the number of
    customers. This results in a penalty of $713,500, which is still higher than any of
    the penalties imposed in the other cases but would at least be consistent with the
    PUC’s own stated rationale for its penalty decision.
    Before the ALJs, HIKO’s expert, Charles Cicchetti, explained the
    difference between a tariff violation and a violation of the regulation at 52 Pa.
    Code §54.4(a). HIKO’s invoiced charges were not illegal in themselves; they
    simply did not conform to the disclosure statements. The PUC did not approve
    HIKO’s prices; the marketplace set those prices. HIKO’s expert opined that HIKO
    committed one violation, i.e., the decision not to charge at “the agreed upon prices
    in the disclosure statement” lest it be forced out of business, which would have
    been more harmful to consumers. 52 Pa. Code §54.4(a). Upon questioning by
    ALJ Cheskis, Cicchetti conceded that under his logic, each billing cycle could
    constitute a separate violation, i.e., four violations. R.R. 583a.
    However, the finding that HIKO committed 14,689 violations of
    Section 54.4(a) is not supported by substantial evidence. That number was based
    upon the number of invoice entries on HIKO’s spreadsheets, which included
    MHL-18
    rebillings, or duplicate invoices, as the PUC acknowledged. Nevertheless, the
    PUC used the 14,689 figure for the stated reason that “HIKO had the opportunity
    to correct mistakes in I&E’s calculation,” and “HIKO’s failure to do so resulted in
    its failure to carry its burden of persuasion once that burden shifted from I&E to
    [HIKO].”     PUC Adjudication at 32-33.         The PUC’s explanation defies the
    fundamentals on burden of proof. It was I&E’s burden to prove 14,689 violations;
    it was never HIKO’s burden to prove the number of times it violated 52 Pa. Code
    §54.4(a).
    Section 332(a) of the Public Utility Code provides that “[e]xcept as
    may be otherwise provided in section 315 (relating to burden of proof) or other
    provisions of this part or other relevant statute, the proponent of a rule or order has
    the burden of proof.” 66 Pa. C.S. §332(a). Factual findings must be supported by
    substantial evidence, which is “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Coalition for Affordable Utility
    Services and Energy Efficiency in Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
    Commission, 
    120 A.3d 1087
    , 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
    At the hearing, Cicchetti, HIKO’s expert, also testified about the
    spreadsheets. He explained as follows:
    There were a lot of overcharges where, when you look at the
    data, there was probably at least 300 instances where it was one
    of these bills dated one day, and then two days later it was
    modified and it was another bill. And I’m not sure the
    customer even saw that. It may have just been between HIKO
    and the utility.
    Notes of Testimony, 4/20/2015, at 210-211 (N.T.__); R.R. 576a-77a. The ALJs
    accepted this testimony and found that the 14,689 invoice entries included invoices
    that were subsequently corrected on “re-bills.” ALJ Decision at 18, Finding of
    MHL-19
    Fact No. 69.    The ALJs faulted Cicchetti for the stated reason that he was
    “unspecific about which line items were incorrectly included in the calculations.
    He also seemed unsure whether the customer was billed the re-bill or not.” ALJ
    Decision at 31. However, it was not Mr. Cicchetti’s job to carry I&E’s water in
    proving its case against HIKO.
    I&E had the burden to prove that each of the 14,689 invoice entries
    constituted a separate violation of Section 54.4(a). I&E could have done discovery
    to establish the actual significance of these invoice entries; it could have also
    obtained copies of the actual customer invoices.      Instead, I&E chose only to
    present HIKO’s spreadsheets.     Simply, the ALJs’ finding that HIKO violated
    Section 54.4(a) 14,689 times is not supported by substantial evidence.
    The PUC abused its discretion in imposing the $1,836,125 civil
    penalty. The penalty is grossly disproportionate to the penalties imposed on other
    EGSs for the same misconduct. As such, the penalty was not consistent with the
    PUC’s own Statement of Policy, and it violated the constitutional proscriptions
    against excessive fines.     The penalty was computed by using a flawed
    methodology because I&E did not prove that HIKO violated the regulation 14,689
    times but only that it generated 14,689 data entries. I would reverse the PUC’s
    order and remand for further proceedings to recalculate a penalty that conforms to
    the PUC’s Statement of Policy and the constitutional limits on penalties.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    Judge Cohn Jubelirer and Judge Covey join in this dissenting opinion.
    MHL-20