In Re: York County Tax Claim Bureau ~ Appeal of: E. Oguejiofor and Wecan Transport, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    In Re: York County Tax Claim Bureau :
    :
    Emeka Kingsley Oguejiofor and        :
    Wecan Transport Incorporated and     :
    Konstantinos G. Sgagios              :
    :        No. 838 C.D. 2019
    Appeal of: Emeka Kingsley Oguejiofor :
    and Wecan Transport Incorporated     :
    In Re: York County Tax Claim Bureau,      :
    Emeka Kingsley Oguejiofor and             :
    Wecan Transport Incorporated, and         :
    Konstantinos G. Sgagios                   :
    :   No. 1250 C.D. 2019
    Appeal of: Emeka Kingsley                 :   Submitted: August 7, 2020
    Oguejiofor and Wecan Transport            :
    Incorporated                              :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT                                FILED: December 31, 2020
    In   these   consolidated    appeals,   Emeka     Kingsley    Oguejiofor
    (Oguejiofor) and Wecan Transport, Inc. (Wecan Transport) (collectively, Objectors)
    appeal two orders of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court). In
    the first order, the trial court denied Oguejiofor’s post-trial motion for a hearing to
    present additional evidence. In the second order, the trial court dissolved an
    injunction issued while the post-trial motion was pending. Because Objectors have
    waived all issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court.
    On September 27, 2018, the York County Tax Claim Bureau sold a
    property at 964 Old Rossville Road, Lewisberry, Pennsylvania 17339, to
    Konstantinos Sgagios (Purchaser) because of a 2016 tax delinquency. On November
    18, 2018, Oguejiofor petitioned to set aside the upset tax sale. Oguejiofor asserted
    that he was the equitable owner of the property and entitled to notice of the tax sale
    under the Real Estate Tax Sale Law.1 However, the Tax Claim Bureau did not serve
    him. Purchaser answered Oguejiofor’s petition and stated that the Tax Claim Bureau
    served the record owner of the property, Aumiller’s West, Inc. (Aumiller’s West),
    thereby complying with the statutory notice requirements. On April 25, 2019, the
    trial court held a hearing on Oguejiofor’s petition.
    The trial court found that Wecan Transport, not Oguejiofor, was the
    equitable owner of the property. The hearing involved the following exchange:
    THE COURT: [Oguejiofor is] not the equitable owner. Wecan
    Transport is the equitable owner. If this installment sales
    agreement means anything, that’s a corporation and that’s
    different than an individual.
    ATTORNEY [for Oguejiofor]: Well, if I may, Your Honor, he is
    Wecan Transport.
    THE COURT: I don’t care. If you are going to incorporate, you
    take the benefits of incorporation and you take the obligations of
    incorporation. He’s not the equitable owner. . . . Your client as
    named in the petition has no standing.
    ATTORNEY [for Oguejiofor]: Your Honor, if I may, and this
    explains the untimely filing of the instrument, when I met with
    [Oguejiofor], he indicated that he was the owner of the property.
    I didn’t receive the actual original of [the installment sales
    agreement] until February. This [matter] was filed back in, I
    believe . . . may be the first week in November, but had I known
    1
    Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5860.101 - 5860.803.
    2
    that [Wecan Transport] was the named party in the installment
    sales agreement, I would have moved to amend.
    THE COURT: It’s not your fault. I mean, your client has to know
    the distinctions when he’s operating an incorporated business.
    [Oguejiofor] has to know that he is not the business, he is not the
    incorporated business.
    ***
    I don’t even know what relationship [Oguejiofor] has to the
    incorporated business, if he’s a shareholder, if he’s an officer,
    director or what. But he is not an equitable owner, at least
    according to the documents that have been presented at this
    point.
    ATTORNEY [for Oguejiofor]: But, Your Honor, I believe that
    that’s through no fault of [Oguejiofor]. I don’t believe that was
    done in bad faith, Judge. I believe we had a copy of the original
    [installment sales agreement], which is what we were attempting
    to obtain for several months until we were actually getting a hold
    of the original to file, we attempted to file one, I would say it was
    sometime after 2019, but [] wouldn’t accept a photocopy.
    Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 4/25/2019, at 9-10.
    The installment sales agreement between Aumiller’s West and Wecan
    Transport was executed on January 17, 2014, and it was recorded on February 6,
    2019, after the tax sale. The agreement provided that Wecan Transport was to
    purchase the property from Aumiller’s West and to pay all real estate taxes levied
    on the property. Accordingly, the trial court allowed Wecan Transport to be
    substituted for Aumiller’s West.
    Nevertheless, the trial court found that the Tax Claim Bureau had
    complied with the notice requirements of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law by posting a
    notice on the property and sending notices of the sale by certified mail and First-
    3
    Class Mail to Aumiller’s West, the record owner. Based on these findings, the trial
    court overruled Objectors’ objections to the tax sale.
    On May 8, 2019, Oguejiofor filed a post-trial motion, requesting a
    hearing to present additional testimony and evidence on the issue of notice. On May
    10, 2019, the trial court scheduled argument on the motion.2 On May 17, 2019,
    Purchaser filed an answer and new matter, requesting a continuance of the hearing.
    Meanwhile, on May 24, 2019, Oguejiofor filed a petition for emergency injunctive
    relief to enjoin Adams Electric from disconnecting electricity service to the property
    while the post-trial motion was pending. The trial court granted Oguejiofor’s request
    for injunctive relief and thereafter scheduled a hearing on Oguejiofor’s post-trial
    motion.
    At the hearing on the post-trial motion, Oguejiofor argued that he had
    discovered new evidence relevant to his objections to the tax sale. Purchaser
    countered that Oguejiofor should not be allowed a “second bite” at the apple. N.T.,
    5/29/2019, at 15. On May 31, 2019, in two separate orders, the trial court denied
    Oguejiofor’s post-trial motion and dissolved the injunction.
    With respect to the post-trial motion, the trial court explained as
    follows:
    Essentially, the post[-]trial motion[] ask[s] us to reopen the
    record in the case and take additional evidence and testimony that
    was not presented during the course of the April hearing. We
    decline to do that at this point. Everyone had a day in court.
    They presented the evidence and testimony which they had
    available and, which we might add, everyone had plenty of time
    2
    Post-trial motions are governed by Rule 227.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. PA.
    R.C.P. No. 227.1. Although Rule 227.1(g) expressly provides that motions for post-trial relief are
    not permitted in statutory appeals, the trial court may entertain such filings in its discretion. See
    Appeal of Borough of Churchill, 
    575 A.2d 550
    , 553-54 (Pa. 1990).
    4
    to prepare for, and the Court made a decision based on the
    evidence that was before it.
    We have to agree with [Purchaser] that the purpose of [a] post[-
    ]trial motion[] is not to reopen the evidence and have a second
    bite at the apple, so to speak. Even if we were able to do so and
    the proffer of Wecan Transport was accepted by the Court and
    supported by evidence, we fail to see how this would overcome
    the findings that we made at our April hearing, given the fact that
    we found specifically that there was proper notice posted on the
    business premises operated by Wecan Transport and []
    Oguejiofor. It was on that basis, as well as the others stated on
    the record, that we held against him.
    Trial Court’s Order Denying Post-Trial Motion, 5/31/2019, at 2-3. Accordingly, the
    Court denied Oguejiofor’s post-trial motion.
    With respect to the dissolution of the injunction, the trial court
    explained as follows:
    Since we had previously held against [] Oguejiofor after our
    hearing which we conducted on the merits in April and we have
    today again denied him relief on post[-]trial motions, we
    conclude that [Oguejiofor] cannot meet the requirements of
    issuing a preliminary injunction since he cannot demonstrate a
    reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.
    Trial Court’s Order Dissolving Preliminary Injunction, 5/31/2019, at 2.
    Accordingly, the trial court dissolved the injunction of May 24, 2019.
    On June 3, 2019, Objectors appealed the trial court’s order dissolving
    the preliminary injunction to the Superior Court, which transferred the appeal to this
    Court. On June 6, 2019, the trial court directed Objectors to file a statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
    1925(b). The trial court’s order stated that, “[a] failure to comply with this direction
    may be considered by the [Commonwealth] Court as a waiver of all objections to
    5
    the [o]rder ... complained of.” See Trial Court’s Order Directing Objectors to File
    Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/6/2019. Objectors did not file a Rule 1925(b) Statement
    as ordered by the trial court.
    On July 1, 2019, Objectors filed a second appeal of the trial court’s
    order denying their post-trial motion. On July 3, 2019, the trial court directed
    Objectors to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement within 21 days and advised that “failure
    to comply with this direction may be considered by the [Commonwealth] Court as a
    waiver of all objections to the [o]rder … complained of.” See Trial Court’s Order
    Directing Objectors to File Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/3/2019. Objectors did not file
    a Rule 1925(b) Statement as ordered by the trial court.
    On August 2, 2019, the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)3 opinion
    explaining the reasons for its April 29, 2019, and May 31, 2019, orders as follows:
    The reasons for our decision resulting in the May 31, 2019 order
    denying [the] post-trial motion[] [is] contained in the order filed
    May 31, 2019. Additional support can be found in the original
    record, Transcript of Proceedings of May 29, 2019[,] at pages 5-
    6, and page 21.
    The reasons for our decision resulting in the underlying order
    from the April 25, 2019[,] proceeding, filed April 29, 2019, if
    [Objectors] intend[] to argue that order and the Court accepts that
    issue, can likely be found in the original record, the Transcript of
    3
    Rule 1925(a)(1) states, in relevant part:
    General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon receipt of the notice
    of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the
    reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall within the period set
    forth in Pa. R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons
    for the order, or for the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall specify in
    writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found….
    PA. R.A.P. 1925(a)(1).
    6
    Proceedings of April 25, 2019 [] (unofficial) at approximately
    pages 55 through 57.
    Trial Court’s Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/2/2019, at 5-6. This Court consolidated the
    two appeals and, on December 17, 2019, granted Objectors’ request for an injunction
    to enjoin Purchaser from interfering with Objectors’ day to-day business operations
    on the property pending disposition of this matter.
    On appeal,4 Objectors raise two issues. First, they assert that the trial
    court erred in holding that they were not entitled to notice of the sale from the Tax
    Claim Bureau. Second, they contend that the trial court erred by dissolving the
    injunction because, inter alia, they were likely to prevail on the merits given the Tax
    Claim Bureau’s failure to provide the notices required by the Real Estate Tax Sale
    Law.
    Purchaser5 counters that the trial court found that Wecan Transport was
    the equitable owner.         However, the Tax Claim Bureau satisfied the notice
    requirements of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law by mailing certified and First-Class
    Mail notices to Aumiller’s West, which was the recorded owner of the property.
    Purchaser contends that because Objectors did not file Rule 1925(b) Statements as
    ordered by the trial court, they have waived all issues on appeal.
    We begin with Purchaser’s argument that Objectors have waived all
    issues on appeal because they did not file Rule 1925(b) Statements. Pennsylvania
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) states, in relevant part, as follows:
    4
    Our review determines whether the trial court committed an error of law, abused its discretion,
    or rendered a decision without supporting evidence. Jenkins v. Fayette County Tax Claim Bureau,
    
    176 A.3d 1038
    , 1040 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    5
    The Tax Claim Bureau adopted, by reference, the arguments set forth in Purchaser’s brief. See
    Tax Claim Bureau’s Brief at 3.
    7
    (b) If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of
    appeal ... desires clarification of the errors complained of on
    appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to
    file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise
    statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).
    ***
    (2) Time for filing and service.
    (i) The judge shall allow the appellant at least 21 days from the
    date of the order’s entry on the docket for the filing and service
    of the Statement. Upon application of the appellant and for good
    cause shown, the judge may enlarge the time period initially
    specified or permit an amended or supplemental Statement to be
    filed. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, delay in the
    production of a transcript necessary to develop the Statement so
    long as the delay is not attributable to a lack of diligence in
    ordering or paying for such transcript by the party or counsel on
    appeal. In extraordinary circumstances, the judge may allow for
    the filing of a Statement or amended or supplemental Statement
    nunc pro tunc.
    PA. R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Where a trial court orders the appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement,
    the appellant “must comply in a timely manner.” In re Clinton County Tax Claims
    Bureau Consolidated Return for Sale of September 24, 2012, 
    109 A.3d 331
    , 334 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 
    925 A.2d 798
    , 803 (Pa. Super.
    2007)) (emphasis in original). Failure to comply with the trial court’s order will
    result in automatic waiver of all issues raised on appeal. In Commonwealth v.
    Castillo, 
    888 A.2d 775
    , 780 (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court held as follows:
    [W]e … re-affirm the bright-line rule first set forth in
    [Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
     (Pa. 1998),] that “in order
    to preserve their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants must
    comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a [Rule
    8
    1925(b) Statement]. Any issues not raised in a [Rule 1925(b)
    Statement] will be deemed waived.”
    Notably, waiver is not cured where the trial court chooses to file a Rule 1925(a)
    opinion in spite of the appellant’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement. Jenkins,
    176 A.3d at 1042.
    The trial court denied Objectors’ application for permission to file a late
    Rule 1925(b) Statement. Objectors did not make this request until after the trial
    court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 2, 2019, and after Objectors’ appeal
    was before this Court. As explained by the trial court in its order denying Objectors’
    request,
    [s]ince there is no practical way for this Court to grant
    [Objectors] the required time within which to file a [Rule 1925(b)
    Statement] and for this Court to respond to any filing with
    another Rule 1925(a) [S]tatement by the briefing deadline set by
    the Commonwealth Court, we see no reason at this late date to
    grant permission to file a statement.
    Trial Court’s Order Denying Application for Permission to File Rule 1925(b)
    Statement, 11/14/2019, at 3 (emphasis in original).
    The Rule 1925(b) Statement gives the trial judge the opportunity to
    address the issues which the appellant plans to raise on appeal and is, therefore, a
    “crucial component of the appellate process.” Lord, 719 A.2d at 308. Objectors did
    not respond to the trial court’s June 6 and July 3, 2019, orders directing them to file
    a Rule 1925(b) Statement. Nevertheless, the trial court opted to file a Rule 1925(a)
    opinion. In doing so, the trial court had to speculate on the issues Objectors would
    raise on appeal. See Trial Court’s Rule 1925(a) Opinion at 6 (indicating that “if
    [Objectors] intend[] to argue [the April 29, 2019] order and the Court accepts that
    issue...”).
    9
    Here, Objectors did not seek permission to file a late Rule 1925(b)
    Statement until shortly before their brief was due in this Court and after they had
    received several extensions to file their brief. The record is devoid of any evidence
    showing that Objectors had “good cause” let alone “extraordinary circumstances”
    that would warrant the filing of an untimely Rule 1925(b) Statement. The trial court
    held that Objectors did not give the trial court any basis upon which it could grant
    such relief. See PA. R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) (noting that good cause does not include “a
    lack of diligence”). We discern no error in the trial court’s holding.
    Because Objectors failed to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement and their
    request for additional time to file this statement was made too late, they have waived
    all issues on appeal.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court.
    _____________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    10
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    In Re: York County Tax Claim Bureau :
    :
    Emeka Kingsley Oguejiofor and        :
    Wecan Transport Incorporated and     :
    Konstantinos G. Sgagios              :
    :      No. 838 C.D. 2019
    Appeal of: Emeka Kingsley Oguejiofor :
    and Wecan Transport Incorporated     :
    In Re: York County Tax Claim Bureau,    :
    Emeka Kingsley Oguejiofor and           :
    Wecan Transport Incorporated, and       :
    Konstantinos G. Sgagios                 :
    :   No. 1250 C.D. 2019
    Appeal of: Emeka Kingsley               :
    Oguejiofor and Wecan Transport          :
    Incorporated                            :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 31st day of December, 2020, the orders of the York
    County Court of Common Pleas dated May 31, 2019 are AFFIRMED.                  The
    injunction issued by this Court by order dated December 17, 2019, while this matter
    was pending is hereby dissolved.
    _____________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 838 and 1250 C.D. 2019

Judges: Leavitt, President Judge

Filed Date: 12/31/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024