Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority of City of Philadelphia v. S. Atuahene ( 2020 )


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  •                   IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Philadelphia Redevelopment                       :
    Authority of City of Philadelphia                :
    :
    v.                               :
    :
    Steve Atuahene,                                  :    No. 332 C.D. 2019
    Appellant                 :    Submitted: December 6, 2019
    BEFORE:         HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                           FILED: April 22, 2020
    Steve Atuahene (Atuahene) appeals, pro se, from the Philadelphia
    County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) January 24, 2019 order sustaining the
    Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (Redevelopment Authority) of the City of
    Philadelphia’s (City) preliminary objections (Redevelopment Authority’s Preliminary
    Objections) to Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections and Petition for Appointment of a
    Board of Viewers (Petition) and dismissing Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections and
    Petition. Essentially, Atuahene presents three issues for this Court’s review: (1)
    whether the trial court erred by dismissing Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections and
    Petition as time-barred; (2) whether the Redevelopment Authority failed to join an
    indispensable party; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying Atuahene discovery
    and/or a hearing relative to the City’s 2004-2005 purported de facto taking/inverse
    condemnation and dismissing the Petition.1 After review, we affirm in part, and
    vacate and remand in part.
    1
    In the interest of clarity, this Court combined and reordered Atuahene’s issues.
    Facts
    In 2012, Atuahene owned the property located at 4653 North Warnock
    Street in Philadelphia (Property).           On July 10, 2012, pursuant to the Urban
    Redevelopment Law (URL)2 and the Eminent Domain Code (Code),3 the
    Redevelopment Authority issued Resolution No. 19,338 (Resolution), to acquire title
    to land necessary to redevelop the area known as the Logan Redevelopment Area,
    Logan Urban Renewal Area, Condemnation 1C (Logan Redevelopment), which
    included the Property.4 See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 13a-16a.
    On December 14, 2012, pursuant to the Resolution, the Redevelopment
    Authority filed a Declaration of Taking (Declaration) in the trial court. See R.R. at
    9a-21a. According to the Proof of Service of Notice to Condemnees, Mortgagees and
    Lienholders (Proof of Service), the Redevelopment Authority served notice of the
    Declaration on the owners of the condemned properties by certified mail, and by
    2
    Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 1701-1719.2.
    3
    26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106.
    4
    Section 9 of the URL specifies, in relevant part:
    An [a]uthority shall constitute a public body, corporate and politic,
    exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency thereof,
    which powers shall include all powers necessary or appropriate to
    carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of this [URL],
    including the following powers in addition to those herein otherwise
    granted:
    ....
    (i) To acquire by eminent domain any real property, including
    improvements and fixtures for the public purposes set forth in this act,
    in the manner hereinafter provided, except real property located
    outside a redevelopment area[.]
    35 P.S. § 1709. Section 12.1(a) of the URL, added by Section 2 of the Act of June 23, 1978, P.L.
    556, states: “[A]ny [r]edevelopment [a]uthority shall have the power to acquire by purchase, gift,
    bequest, eminent domain or otherwise, any blighted property as defined in this section . . . . This
    power shall be exercised in accord with the procedures set forth in this section.” 35 P.S. §
    1712.1(a). “[The] [p]ower of eminent domain shall be exercised pursuant to a resolution of the
    [r]edevelopment [a]uthority and the procedure set forth in the [Code.]” 35 P.S. § 1712.1(g).
    2
    posting and advertising. See R.R. at 20a-21a. The Proof of Service reflects that the
    Redevelopment Authority served notice of the Declaration upon Atuahene by
    December 19, 2012 certified mailing. See R.R. at 21a, 49a. After two certified
    mailings to Atuahene’s last known address were returned as undeliverable, the
    Redevelopment Authority advertised notice in the Philadelphia Daily News and the
    Legal Intelligencer on December 26, 2012, and posted on the Property on December
    28, 2012. See R.R. at 21a, 43a-45a, 49a; see also Original Record (O.R.) Item 19 at
    Ex. C.
    On December 2, 2014, the Redevelopment Authority filed a petition for
    leave to pay into the trial court estimated just compensation for properties condemned
    for the Logan Redevelopment, including $400.00 for the Property. See O.R. Item 9,
    Ex. A at 2.     The trial court granted the petition on January 13, 2015, and the
    Redevelopment Authority deposited the monies with the trial court on March 11,
    2015, for eventual distribution to Atuahene and other parties in interest. See O.R.
    Items 10, 11.
    On October 4, 2018, Atuahene filed a petition to intervene in the
    Redevelopment Authority’s condemnation action. See O.R. Item 14. On November
    9, 2018, after a hearing, the trial court granted Atuahene’s petition to intervene.
    On November 19, 2018, Atuahene filed his Preliminary Objections to
    the Declaration, seeking to dismiss the Declaration for lack of notice (Objection No.
    1) and/or strike it as invalid because the City previously condemned the Property
    (Objection No. 2). See R.R. at 22a-33a. Specifically, Atuahene contends that the
    Redevelopment Authority’s notice was deficient because the City has been aware
    since 1990 that his legal and residential address was 5800 North 17th Street,
    Philadelphia, PA 19141 (North 17th Street Address). See Atuahene Prelim. Obj. at 6;
    R.R. at 29a. Atuahene also asserts that, between December 2004 and January 2005,
    the City demolished the Property without pre- and post-deprivation notice “[a]s part
    3
    of a strategy . . . to make way for [the Redevelopment Authority] to later file [the
    Declaration] to condemn Frempong-Atuahene’s properties at no cost or at [a] lower
    cost to [the Redevelopment Authority]” and, thus, the Declaration is void. Atuahene
    Prelim. Obj. at 6; R.R. at 29a. Atuahene included the Petition in his Preliminary
    Objections, requesting therein that a board of viewers be appointed to assess damages
    to which Atuahene is entitled by reason of the City’s 2004-2005 de facto
    taking/inverse condemnation of the Property. See R.R. at 29a-31a.
    On December 7, 2018, the Redevelopment Authority filed its
    Preliminary Objections to Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections, claiming that
    Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections are barred by Section 306 of the Code, 26 Pa.C.S.
    § 306 (relating to limitations period for preliminary objections to declarations of
    taking).     See R.R. at 34a-38a, 47a-51a; see also Redevelopment Authority’s
    Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 1b-5b, 18b-22b. The Redevelopment
    Authority’s Preliminary Objections also challenged the Petition, stating that it was
    barred by Section 19.2 of the URL, 35 P.S. § 1719.2 (relating to limitations period for
    challenging just compensation).5              See R.R. at 38a-39a, 51a-53a; see also
    Redevelopment Authority’s S.R.R. at 5b-6b, 22b-24b. On January 7, 2019, Atuahene
    filed his answer to the Redevelopment Authority’s Preliminary Objections. See R.R.
    at 55a-64a.
    On January 24, 2019, in two separate orders, the trial court sustained the
    Redevelopment         Authority’s     Preliminary      Objections,      overruled   Atuahene’s
    Preliminary Objections and dismissed Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections and the
    Petition. See O.R. Items 21, 22. Atuahene appealed to this Court. Pursuant to the
    trial court’s March 5, 2019 order, Atuahene filed a statement of errors complained of
    5
    Added by Section 3 of the Act of October 2, 2002, P.L. 796.
    4
    on appeal on March 26, 2019. See O.R. Item 27. The trial court issued its opinion on
    July 23, 2019. See R.R. at 66a-79a.
    Discussion
    Atuahene argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his Preliminary
    Objections and his Petition as time-barred because the Redevelopment Authority’s
    failure to strictly comply with the Code’s notice requirements and constitutional due
    process of law caused his late filings.
    “[A] condemnation proceeding . . . encompasses two distinct
    proceedings. The first goes to the propriety and validity of the taking, including
    whether a taking has been effected [(i.e., preliminary objections)]. The second goes
    to damages [(i.e., petition to appoint board of viewers)].” Petition of Ramsey, 
    375 A.2d 886
    , 888 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977).
    1. Preliminary Objections
    “[This] [C]ourt’s review of a trial court’s decision to sustain or overrule
    preliminary objections to a declaration of taking ‘is limited to a determination of
    whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.’” In re
    Condemnation by Dep’t of Transp., of Right-of-Way for State Route 0022, Section
    034 in Twp. of Frankstown v. Commonwealth, 
    194 A.3d 722
    , 728 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2018) (quoting In re Redevelopment Auth. of the City of Phila., 
    938 A.2d 341
    , 345
    (Pa. 2007)).
    The power of discretion over what areas are to be
    considered blighted[, like the Logan Redevelopment area,]
    is solely within the power of the [Redevelopment]
    Authority. The only function of the courts in this matter
    is to see that the [Redevelopment] Authority has not acted
    in bad faith; to see that the [Redevelopment] Authority has
    not acted arbitrarily; to see that the [Redevelopment]
    5
    Authority has followed the statutory procedures in
    making its determination; and finally, to see that the
    actions of the [Redevelopment] Authority do not violate
    any of our constitutional safeguards.
    In re Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 
    822 A.2d 135
    , 138
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court dismissed Atuahene’s
    Preliminary Objections as time-barred.
    “In eminent domain cases, preliminary objections are intended as a
    procedure to resolve expeditiously the factual and legal challenges to a declaration of
    taking before the parties proceed to determine damages.” Twp. of Millcreek v. Angela
    Cres Tr. of June 25, 1998, 
    142 A.3d 948
    , 952 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Accordingly,
    Section 306(a)(1) of the Code mandates: “Within 30 days after being served with
    notice of condemnation, the condemnee may file preliminary objections to the
    declaration of taking.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 306(a)(1). However, Section 306(a)(2) of the
    Code authorizes that “[t]he [trial] court upon cause shown may extend the time for
    filing preliminary objections.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 306(a)(2). Specifically, a trial court
    may permit late filing where the condemnee offers good cause and the
    condemnor is responsible for the delay. See In re Condemnation of .036 Acres,
    More or Less, of Land Owned by Wexford Plaza Assocs., 
    674 A.2d 1204
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1996) (a trial court properly dismissed late-filed preliminary objections
    where the condemnee offered no good cause for the delay and the condemnor was not
    responsible therefor); see also Appeal of Hill, 
    545 A.2d 463
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).
    Consequently, whether the trial court erred by dismissing Atuahene’s Preliminary
    Objections as time-barred depends upon whether the Redevelopment Authority
    properly served him with notice.
    The law is well settled that “[t]he [Code] is the exclusive procedure for
    giving notice to a condemnee of the declaration of taking.” N. Penn Water Auth. v. A
    6
    Certain Parcel of Land, 
    650 A.2d 1197
    , 1200 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Section 305 of
    the Code specifies, in pertinent part:
    (a) Written notice.--Within 30 days after the filing of the
    declaration of taking, the condemnor shall give written
    notice of the filing to the condemnee, to any mortgagee of
    record and to any lienholder of record.
    (b) Service.--
    (1) The notice shall be served, within or without this
    Commonwealth, . . . by registered mail to the last known
    address of the person being served.[6]
    (2) If service cannot be made in the manner set forth
    under paragraph (1), then service shall be made by
    posting a copy of the notice upon the most public part of
    the property and by publication of a copy of the notice, . .
    . one time each in one newspaper of general circulation and
    the legal journal, if any, published in the county.
    ....
    (e) Proof of service.--The condemnor shall file proof of
    service of the notice.
    26 Pa.C.S. § 305 (bold text emphasis added). This Court has declared that “[s]trict
    compliance with [] service requirement[s] protect[] the procedural due process rights
    of all interested parties to notice and an opportunity to be heard and also guards
    against deprivation of property without substantive due process of law.” City of
    Phila. v. Manu, 
    76 A.3d 601
    , 606 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
    Here, the Redevelopment Authority represented that it twice sent notice
    of the Declaration to Atuahene by certified mail to the Property, and both mailings
    were returned as undeliverable. See Redevelopment Authority Prelim. Obj. at 3-5;
    R.R. at 36a-38a. Thereafter, “the [Redevelopment] Authority, in accordance with the
    6
    “Where the notice is mailed, the condemnor has the option of using either certified or
    registered mail.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 305, Comments.
    7
    [Code], served [Atuahene] with notice of the [c]ondemnation action on December 26,
    2014 (by advertising) and December 28, 2014 (by posting).”                        Redevelopment
    Authority Prelim. Obj. at 3-5; R.R. at 36a-38a. The Redevelopment Authority filed
    proof of service in the trial court, attached to which was an affidavit by
    Redevelopment Authority employee Anthony Leuzzi (Leuzzi) that he “personally
    posted [notice] on the premises of the attached list of properties [(including the
    Property)].”     R.R. at 43a; see also R.R. at 20a-21a, 42a-47a.                  The trial court
    concluded that, since the Redevelopment Authority issued notice by posting at the
    Property and by local publication,7 Atuahene was properly served.
    However, Section 305(b) of the Code specifies that, before posting and
    publication constitute acceptable notice, the Redevelopment Authority must
    have first served Atuahene by certified mail at his “last known address.” 26
    Pa.C.S. § 305(b)(1) (emphasis added). Although the Code does not specifically
    define the phrase “last known address,” 26 Pa.C.S. § 305(b)(1), this Court has ruled
    in municipal tax sale cases that a taxpayer’s last known address is “the last address
    [an authority] can be charged with knowing.”8 Merchants Nat’l Bank of Allentown v.
    Chevy Chase Inv. Co., Inc., 
    397 A.2d 836
    , 838 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979); see also
    Return of Tax Sale by Indiana Cty. Tax Claim Bureau v. Clawson, 
    395 A.2d 703
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1979).
    The Redevelopment Authority sent the notice of Declaration to the
    Property’s physical address. It is not clear from the record whether the Property’s
    7
    Atuahene contends that, since the Redevelopment Authority’s advertisement listed “Steve
    Atunhene” at a “wrong address,” neither he nor the public were put on notice of the Declaration.
    Atuahene Br. at 14. Because the Property’s address was correct, and Atuahene’s last name was
    incorrect by only one letter, Atuahene and the public were nevertheless on notice of the Declaration.
    Accordingly, the error was harmless.
    8
    “[B]ecause both condemnation notices and tax sale notices involve a governmental taking
    of private property, the same due process safeguards [for notice] apply.” In re Tax Claim Bureau of
    Beaver Cty. Tax Sale September 10, 1990, 
    600 A.2d 650
    , 654 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); see also
    Pivirotto v. City of Pittsburgh, 
    528 A.2d 125
    (Pa. 1987).
    8
    address was the only address the Redevelopment Authority could be charged with
    knowing.      Atuahene claimed in his Preliminary Objections that, “[a]t all times
    relevant and necessary[,] the City knew and was aware [] [Atuahene’s] legal and
    residential address since 1990 [w]as [the North 17th Street Address].”9 Atuahene’s
    Preliminary Objections at 6; R.R. at 29a. However, that purported fact is not of
    record. Atuahene has held himself out to the City and this Court as Steven Atuahene,
    Stephen A. Frempong, Steven Frempong, Stephen Frempong Atuahene, Stephen
    Atuahene Frempong, and Frempong-Atuahene.10 See City of Phila. v. Frempong (Pa.
    Cmwlth. No. 228 C.D. 2019, filed January 22, 2020), slip op. at 3 n.3.11 The North
    17th Street Address is among Atuahene’s numerous documented addresses. See
    id. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court has held that, “due process . . .
    requires at a minimum that an owner of land be actually notified by government, if
    reasonably possible, before his land is forfeited by the state.” Tracy v. Chester Cty.,
    Tax Claim Bureau, 
    489 A.2d 1334
    , 1339 (Pa. 1985); see also City of Phila. v. Jones,
    
    221 A.3d 737
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). The United States Supreme Court has concluded:
    “[A]t the end of the day, [] someone who actually wanted to alert [a property owner]
    that he was . . . losing his [property] would do more when the attempted notice letter
    was returned unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could be done.” Jones
    v. Flowers, 
    547 U.S. 220
    , 238 (2006). The Tracy Court specifically ruled that,
    “where [a] mailed notice has not been delivered because of an inaccurate address,
    the authority must make a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts
    9
    In his brief to this Court, Atuahene claims that the North 17th Street Address was known to
    the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections and its Office of Property Assessment. See
    Atuahene Br. at 13.
    10
    Atuahene refers to himself as Steve Frempong-Atuahene in the Petition. See Atuahene
    Preliminary Objections at 29a.
    11
    This Court acknowledges that its unreported memorandum opinions may only be cited
    “for [their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
    Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Frempong is not cited herein as
    legally binding precedent, but as judicial notice of its opinion.
    9
    of the owner(s).” 
    Tracy, 489 A.2d at 1338-39
    . Accordingly, when “[r]easonable
    efforts to effect actual notice [are] not carried out . . . , [] the [property’s] sale . . .
    must be set aside.”
    Id. at 1339.
                  Here, after the notice the Redevelopment Authority sent by certified mail
    to the vacant Property was returned as undeliverable, the Redevelopment Authority
    was obliged to make a reasonable effort to ascertain an alternate address for
    Atuahene. At the same time, although it may be true that Atuahene’s North 17th
    Street Address appears elsewhere among the City’s vast records, there is nothing in
    this record to show that the Redevelopment Authority had access to the City’s
    records, or knew or could reasonably determine that Atuahene should or would
    receive notice at any address other than the Property, let alone the North 17th Street
    Address.12
    Based upon the defective notice claims in Atuahene’s Preliminary
    Objections, there existed a question of fact regarding the last address the
    Redevelopment Authority could be charged with knowing. Section 306(f)(2) of the
    12
    In City of Philadelphia v. Morris Park Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Pa. Cmwlth.
    No. 264 C.D. 2015, filed March 7, 2016), the property owner failed to update its address with the
    City and claimed that the City should have searched its various department records for its correct
    address. The Court concluded:
    The [Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act (MCTLA), Act of May 16,
    1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7505,] does not require
    the City to search through the records of each of its many
    [d]epartments prior to initiating a [s]heriff’s sale to collect municipal
    taxes. Moreover, the record does not support [the a]ppellant’s
    argument that the City had notice of the correct contact information
    for [the a]ppellant and failed to act upon it. . . . [T]he contact
    addresses, individuals, and named organizations differ. Had the City
    searched the records of its many [d]epartments and discovered these
    records, there was no basis to conclude which address was correct or
    that one of the many provided was more likely to reach [the a]ppellant
    than the address on [the a]ppellant’s deed.
    Morris Park Congregation, slip op. at 9-10 (footnote omitted). Morris Park Congregation is cited
    herein for its persuasive value. See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
    10
    Code directs: “If an issue of fact is raised, the [trial] court shall take evidence by
    depositions or otherwise.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 306(f)(2). Because it was not evident on the
    face of the record presented, the trial court should have conducted a hearing or
    ordered the taking of discovery to determine whether the Redevelopment Authority’s
    certified mailings were sent to Atuahene’s last address the Redevelopment Authority
    was charged with knowing. The trial court erred by not doing so.
    Moreover, “when it comes to the location of posting, each case will be
    fact-specific, depending on the unique nature of the property and the particular
    placement of the notice on the property.” U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. United Hands
    Cmty. Land Tr., 
    129 A.3d 627
    , 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Although the affidavit
    attached to the Redevelopment Authority’s Proof of Service states that Leuzzi posted
    notice on the Property on December 28, 2012, the affidavit does not represent that
    notice was posted “upon the most public part of the [P]roperty.”          26 Pa.C.S. §
    305(b)(2).
    This Court acknowledges the presumption of regularity set forth in
    Section 6104(a) of the Judicial Code, which states: “A copy of a record of
    governmental action or inaction authenticated as provided in [S]ection 6103 [of the
    Judicial Code] (relating to proof of official records) shall be admissible as evidence
    that the governmental action or inaction disclosed therein was in fact taken or
    omitted.”    42 Pa.C.S. § 6104(a).    The presumption of regularity is prima facie
    evidence that public officials will properly carry out their official duties, unless and
    until contrary evidence is presented. See U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n; see also Hughes v.
    Chaplin, 
    132 A.2d 200
    (Pa. 1957); Picknick v. Wash. Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 
    936 A.2d 1209
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). However, this Court has ruled that, under that
    presumption, an affidavit of posting establishes only that a property was posted,
    and not that it was posted on the most public part of the property, as Section
    11
    305(b)(2) of the Code requires.13 See U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n; see also Duquesne City
    v. Comensky (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 389 C.D. 2016, filed February 1, 2017); City of Phila.
    v. Morris Park Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 264 C.D.
    2015, filed March 7, 2016).14
    This Court has explained:
    [T]he City was granted the power to take private property, a
    power so extraordinary under our system of governance that
    it is constitutionally restrained. In accordance with this
    constitutional restraint, the General Assembly established
    strict procedural requirements that a municipality must
    follow to exercise its power to take private property . . . .
    The momentous nature of the act of taking property . . .
    likewise requires the courts to examine the record in a
    [condemnation matter] with a close, independent and
    vigorous eye to ensure that the procedural requirements for
    notice . . . have been adhered to and due process of law has
    been adequately safeguarded.
    Morris Park Congregation, slip op. at 12. “The [t]rial [c]ourt had a duty to conduct
    an independent inquiry to ascertain if the [Redevelopment Authority] had fulfilled its
    statutory and constitutional obligations; by failing to do so here, the [t]rial [c]ourt
    abused its discretion[.]”
    Id. However, [t]here
    is no evidence in the record that [notice was] posted
    on the most public part of the Property. The record does
    not contain testimony from [Leuzzi] or from the
    13
    “[T]he presumption afforded a public official cannot overcome a statutory mandate.”
    Morris Park Congregation, slip op. at 7.
    14
    In so ruling, the Court interpreted the MCTLA. However, like Section 305(b)(2) of the
    Code, Section 39.2(a)(1) of the MCTLA, added by Section 4 of the Act of December 14, 1992, P.L.
    859, requires that notice be posted “on the most public part of the property[.]” 53 P.S. §
    7193.2(a)(1).
    A public official’s affidavit declaring merely the date and time that a property was posted
    may be sufficient under the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended,
    72 P.S. §§ 5860.101-5860.803, or similar statute that does not require posting on the most public
    part of a property. See Barylak v. Montgomery Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 
    74 A.3d 414
    (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2013).
    12
    [Redevelopment A]uthority elucidating the general practice
    [it] follows when posting properties under the [Code] or
    specifically when posting vacant properties. . . .
    Accordingly, there is no credible evidence of record to
    support the conclusion that the [Redevelopment Authority]
    complied with the posting requirement mandated by the
    [Code]. . . .
    The facts in this case also demonstrate the importance of
    posting where the [Redevelopment A]uthority has
    knowledge that service has otherwise been ineffective.
    Morris Park Congregation, slip op. at 7.
    In a first class city in this Commonwealth,[15] proper posting
    is not only an additional reasonable step that should be
    taken to adequately safeguard constitutional due process
    once a municipal authority has knowledge that service
    through the mail was ineffective, but a basic and
    longstanding statutory obligation.
    Id., slip op.
    at 11-12. Because it was not evident on the face of the record presented,
    the trial court should have conducted a hearing or ordered the taking of discovery to
    determine whether the Redevelopment Authority posted at the most public part of the
    Property. The trial court erred by not doing so.
    This Court acknowledges that “the notice provisions of the [] Code are
    strictly construed insofar as the irregularities in the procedural aspects of the
    condemnation are prejudicial.” In re Condemnation ex rel. Com., Dep’t of Transp.,
    
    76 A.3d 101
    , 109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Therefore,
    an owner of condemned property must establish prejudice
    as a result of defective notice in order to prevail against a
    statute of limitations defense asserted by the condemnor.
    The mere existence of a procedural defect is insufficient, in
    and of itself, to extend the time for objecting to a
    declaration of taking or petitioning for an appointment of a
    15
    “Philadelphia is the only city of the first class in the Commonwealth.” 
    Jones, 221 A.3d at 743
    n.16 (quoting Blount v. Phila. Parking Auth., 
    965 A.2d 226
    , 228 n.4 (Pa. 2009)).
    13
    board of viewers. In other words, in a situation where
    notice to the owner was defective, the owner must establish
    that the defective notice prejudiced the owner by preventing
    the owner from timely asserting its rights.
    Id. at 109-10.
       Here, Atuahene asserted in his Preliminary Objections that the
    Redevelopment Authority’s defective notice prevented him from timely filing them.
    Whether that was true could have been determined by the trial court at a hearing or by
    ordering discovery on the issue.
    Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred by concluding without a
    hearing that Atuahene received proper notice of the Declaration and that his
    Preliminary Objections were time-barred. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the
    trial court’s order dismissing Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections and remand the
    matter to the trial court for further fact-finding consistent with this opinion.
    2. Petition
    “[This Court’s] review of a trial court’s ruling on preliminary objections
    to a petition for appointment of a board of viewers is limited to determining whether
    an error of law was committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by
    substantial evidence.” Dep’t of 
    Transp., 76 A.3d at 106
    n.7.
    The trial court dismissed Atuahene’s Petition as time-barred. Section
    19.2 of the URL states that “a proceeding to challenge just compensation . . . if a
    redevelopment authority has exercised powers of condemnation . . . is subject to a
    one-year statute of limitations.” 35 P.S. § 1719.2; see also Alpha Fin. Mortg., Inc. v.
    Redevelopment Auth. of Fayette Cty., 
    152 A.3d 375
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
    ‘[T]he statute of limitations for filing a petition for
    appointment of a [b]oard of [viewers begins] to run from
    the payment of estimated just compensation.’ Wyland v.
    Dep’t of Transp., 
    799 A.2d 954
    , 956 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)
    (emphasis added). . . . [T]he statute of limitations does not
    14
    run from the filing of the declaration of taking or notice
    thereof.
    Dep’t of 
    Transp., 76 A.3d at 107
    .          Since the Redevelopment Authority paid
    Atuahene’s estimated just compensation to the trial court on March 11, 2015,
    pursuant to Section 19.2 of the URL, Atuahene had until March 10, 2016 to file the
    Petition. Because he filed his Petition on November 19, 2018, it was more than two
    and one-half years late. See Alpha Fin. Mortg., Inc. (petitions to appoint viewers
    filed more than two years after a redevelopment authority paid estimated just
    compensation are untimely).
    Notwithstanding, the Petition was not properly before the trial court in
    the first instance. Relevant to the Petition, Atuahene alleged in his Preliminary
    Objections:
    2. Between December 20, 2004 and January 30, 2005[,] the
    [City] seized the [P]roperty, posted [sic] cease and desist
    [o]rder and thereafter demolished said premises.
    R.R. at 25a. In the Petition, Atuahene requested appointment of a board of viewers
    because:
    6. At all times relevant and necessary[,] [Atuahene] did not
    receive any notices of violation from Department of
    Licenses and Inspections of the [City] related to code
    violations that could have resulted in the demolition of [the
    Property].
    7. In both instances[,] both the City and [the
    Redevelopment Authority] intentionally deny [sic] []
    Frempong-Atuahene[] the statutory notices so that they
    could acquire [his] properties without paying required just
    compensation.
    8. In this instant case[,] the City under the pretext of its
    police power seized and demolished [Atuahene’s]
    [P]roperty a 4653 Warnock Street, Philadelphia, PA 19140
    between December 2004 and January 30, 2005 without any
    statutory and municipal laws, notices and opportunities to
    be heard in clear violation of constitutional due process.
    15
    ....
    13. In the seizure and demolition of subject [P]roperty
    without requisite pre- and post-deprivation notices such
    demolition was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, reckless
    and unrelated to the public health, safety, morals and
    general welfare.
    14. Said City’s action in the demolition of subject
    [P]roperty was unconscionable, to say the least and it
    constitutes a Taking under the Takings Clause which is
    compensable under the Takings Clause of [the] 5th and 14th
    Amendment[s] to the United States Constitution, [] Article
    [I], [Section] 10 of [the] Pennsylvania Constitution and the
    [Code].
    R.R. at 29a-31a. Atuahene asserts that the City should have been joined as an
    indispensable party, and that he is entitled to compensation for the City’s 2004/2005
    de facto taking/inverse condemnation.
    a. Indispensable Party
    “Failure to join an indispensable party deprives the Court of subject
    matter jurisdiction and is fatal to a cause of action.” Bucks Cty. Servs., Inc. v. Phila.
    Parking Auth., 
    71 A.3d 379
    , 387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Accordingly, “[n]o court may
    grant relief in the absence of an indispensible [sic] party.” Nicoletti v. Allegheny Cty.
    Airport Auth., 
    841 A.2d 156
    , 163 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (quoting Biernacki v.
    Redevelopment Auth. of the City of Wilkes-Barre, 
    379 A.2d 1366
    , 1368 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1977)).
    This Court has expounded:
    ‘A party is generally regarded to be indispensable ‘when his
    or her rights are so connected with the claims of the
    litigants that no decree can be made without impairing those
    rights.’’ HYK Constr[.] Co[.], Inc. v. Smithfield T[wp.], 
    8 A.3d 1009
    , 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (quoting City of
    Phila[.] v. Commonwealth, . . . 
    838 A.2d 566
    , 581 ([Pa.]
    2003)). Thus, the main inquiry for determining whether a
    16
    party is indispensable involves whether justice can be
    accomplished in the absence of the party. Id.; see also
    Perkasie Borough Auth[.] v. Hilltown T[wp.] Water [&]
    Sewer Auth[.], 
    819 A.2d 597
    , 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)
    (holding that ‘an indispensable party is one whose rights are
    so connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief
    can be granted without infringing upon those rights’). The
    relevant analysis of whether a party is indispensable
    requires an examination of the following four factors:
    1. Do absent parties have a right or interest related
    to the claim?
    2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?
    3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of
    the issue?
    4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due
    process rights of absent parties?
    HYK Constr[.] 
    Co[.], 8 A.3d at 1015
    . When undertaking
    this inquiry, the nature of the particular claim and the type
    of relief sought should be considered.
    Id. Rachel Carson
    Trails Conservancy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res. of
    Commonwealth, 
    201 A.3d 273
    , 279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    The Redevelopment Authority and the City are separate entities that
    perform completely separate functions. Section 4(a) of the URL states:
    There are hereby created separate and distinct bodies
    corporate and politic, one for each city and one for each
    county of the Commonwealth, as herein defined. Each such
    body shall be known as the Redevelopment Authority of the
    city or the county, as the case may be, but shall in no way
    be deemed to be an instrumentality of such city or
    county, or engaged in the performance of a municipal
    function. Each such [Redevelopment] Authority shall
    transact no business or otherwise become operative until
    and unless a finding is made as hereinafter provided in this
    section.
    17
    35 P.S. § 1704(a) (emphasis added).        The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further
    clarified:
    An authority under the [URL] is an agent of the
    Commonwealth and not of the local government body. As
    can be seen, the legislature in no uncertain terms has made
    it clear that a redevelopment authority is a completely
    separate entity from the city. The fact that the mayor of
    the city is authorized to make the appointment of its
    members does not make an appointment a matter
    concerning the internal affairs of the city.
    Herriman v. Carducci, 
    380 A.2d 761
    , 763-64 (Pa. 1977) (emphasis added; citation
    omitted); see also City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 
    858 A.2d 75
    (Pa. 2004).
    Here, Atuahene’s sole allegation in the Petition was that he was entitled
    to damages for the City’s purported 2004/2005 demolition at the Property. His claim
    is unrelated to the Redevelopment Authority’s 2012 condemnation of the Property
    pursuant to its eminent domain power. Because the City and the Redevelopment
    Authority are distinct entities with separate duties, only the latter of which is
    implicated here, the City’s involvement is not necessary to afford meaningful relief in
    the instant matter. Accordingly, the City is not an indispensable party.
    b. De facto Taking/Inverse Condemnation
    A de facto or inverse condemnation . . . involves a situation
    where a governmental agency, by its conduct, may or may
    not physically invade property. The owner contends that
    such conduct impinges on the beneficial use of his property,
    resulting in a diminution of value for which he seeks
    compensation.
    Stein v. City of Phila., 
    557 A.2d 1137
    , 1138 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (emphasis added).
    “[T]here is no bright line test to determine when a government action results in a de
    facto taking; each case turns on its own facts.” Parker Ave., L.P. v. City of Phila.,
    
    122 A.3d 483
    , 488 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting In re Borough of Blakely, 
    25 A.3d 18
    458, 465 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)). However, “[t]his deprivation must be caused by the
    actions of an entity with eminent domain powers.” York Rd. Realty Co., L.P. v.
    Cheltenham Twp., 
    136 A.3d 1047
    , 1050 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Borough of
    
    Blakely, 25 A.3d at 463
    ).
    In order to establish a de facto taking, the burden is on the
    property owner to show that exceptional circumstances
    exist which substantially deprive the property owner of the
    beneficial use and enjoyment of his or her property.
    Further, the property owner must show that this substantial
    deprivation was occasioned by the actions of an entity
    clothed with the power of eminent domain, resulted from
    the exercise of that power and that the damages sustained
    by the owner were the immediate, necessary and
    unavoidable consequence of that exercise. The mere fact
    that a taking has occurred does not necessarily give rise
    to a cause of action under the Code because acts not
    done in the exercise of the right of eminent domain
    cannot serve as the basis of a proceeding in eminent
    domain. Thus, when determining whether a compensable
    taking under the Code has occurred, the dispositive
    question becomes whether the act complained of was, in
    fact, an exercise of eminent domain power.
    Hill v. City of Bethlehem, 
    909 A.2d 439
    , 444 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (bold and italic
    emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted).
    The Hill Court clarified:
    The eminent domain power is the power to take property for
    public use. Estate of Blose ex rel. Blose v. Borough of
    Punxsutawney, 
    889 A.2d 653
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). ‘The
    police power, on the other hand, involves the regulation of
    property to promote the health, safety, and general welfare
    of the people.’
    Id. at 657
    (quoting Balent v. City of Wilkes-
    Barre, . . . 
    669 A.2d 309
    , 314 ([Pa.] 1995)).
    
    Hill, 909 A.2d at 444
    . In fact, this Court has concluded that the City “has not ‘taken’
    anything when it asserts its police power to abate a nuisance, and need not provide
    compensation when it destroys the value of the property by abating the nuisance.”
    19
    
    Stein, 557 A.2d at 1139-40
    ; see also In re Condemnation by the Dep’t of Transp., of
    Two (2) Billboards Located on T.R. 209, 
    452 A.2d 83
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (where the
    Commonwealth removed violative billboards as part of its police power, rather than
    eminent domain power, the owner was not entitled to compensation under the Code).
    Notably, there is no record support for Atuahene’s claim in the Petition
    that the City demolished the Property in 2004/2005, or that the Redevelopment
    Authority was involved. In fact, the Redevelopment Authority responded that it did
    not “have any involvement with any alleged demolition, de facto taking and/or
    inverse condemnation which is alleged to have occurred in 2004[/2005].”
    Redevelopment Authority Prelim. Obj. at 3.
    In Linde Enterprises, Inc. v. Lackawanna River Basin
    Sewer Authority, 
    911 A.2d 658
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), this
    Court held that when reviewing preliminary objections to a
    petition for the appointment of viewers,
    [t]he trial court must determine whether, as a matter
    of law, the averments of the petition for the
    appointment of viewers, taken as true, in addition
    to any stipulated facts, are sufficient to state a
    cause of action for a de facto taking. If not, the
    preliminary objections must be sustained and the
    petition dismissed or allowed to be amended. If the
    averments, taken as true, might establish a de
    facto taking, the trial court must take evidence
    by depositions, or otherwise, so that a judicial
    determination might be made.
    Id. at 661
    (quoting Hill . . . , 909 A.2d [at] 443 . . .) (bold
    emphasis added).
    York Rd. Realty 
    Co., 136 A.3d at 1052
    .
    Here, even if the trial court had accepted Atuahene’s allegations in the
    Petition as true, he clearly seeks damages for the City’s exercise of its police power,
    rather than damages related to the Redevelopment Authority’s exercise of its eminent
    domain power. Because Atuahene’s Petition did not contain facts to support a de
    20
    facto/inverse condemnation claim or a challenge to the Redevelopment Authority’s
    payment of estimated just compensation into the trial court, the Petition was not
    properly before the trial court in the first instance.16 See Hill. Therefore, regardless
    of whether Atuahene’s Petition was timely filed, the trial court did not err by denying
    Atuahene discovery and/or a hearing relative to the City’s 2004-2005 de facto
    taking/inverse condemnation and dismissing the Petition.17
    Conclusion
    The trial court’s order is affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in
    part. The portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Atuahene’s Petition is affirmed.
    The portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections is
    vacated, and this matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a hearing or order
    the taking of discovery relative to whether the Redevelopment Authority properly
    served Atuahene with notice of the Declaration.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    16
    Atuahene’s remedy for such action would have been an action in trespass to recover
    damages for the condemnation and wrongful demolition. See Paul v. City of Phila., 
    427 A.2d 1292
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981); City of Pittsburgh v. Readie, 
    403 A.2d 192
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).
    17
    Although the trial court dismissed the Petition as time-barred, it is well settled that “[t]his
    Court . . . may affirm a trial court’s order on grounds other than those on which the trial court based
    its decision.” Twp. of Bristol v. 1 Enters., LLC, 
    177 A.3d 1045
    , 1051 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    21
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Philadelphia Redevelopment                  :
    Authority of City of Philadelphia           :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    Steve Atuahene,                             :   No. 332 C.D. 2019
    Appellant                :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2020, the Philadelphia County
    Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) January 24, 2019 order is affirmed in part, and
    vacated in part. The portion of the trial court’s order sustaining the Philadelphia
    Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia’s (Redevelopment Authority)
    Preliminary Objections to Steve Atuahene’s (Atuahene) Petition for Appointment of a
    Board of Viewers (Petition) and dismissing the Petition is affirmed. The portion of
    the trial court’s order dismissing Atuahene’s Preliminary Objections is vacated, and
    this matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a hearing or order the taking of
    discovery regarding whether the Redevelopment Authority properly served Atuahene
    with notice of the Declaration of Taking.
    Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 332 C.D. 2019

Judges: Covey, J.

Filed Date: 4/22/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/22/2020

Authorities (18)

Herriman v. Carducci , 475 Pa. 359 ( 1977 )

Pivirotto v. City of Pittsburgh , 515 Pa. 246 ( 1987 )

City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth , 575 Pa. 542 ( 2003 )

Blount v. Philadelphia Parking Authority , 600 Pa. 277 ( 2009 )

Stein v. City of Philadelphia , 125 Pa. Commw. 225 ( 1989 )

In Re Tax Claim Bureau of Beaver County Tax Sale September ... , 143 Pa. Commw. 659 ( 1991 )

HYK Construction Co. v. Smithfield Township , 2010 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 621 ( 2010 )

Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau , 507 Pa. 288 ( 1985 )

Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre , 542 Pa. 555 ( 1995 )

Jones v. Flowers , 126 S. Ct. 1708 ( 2006 )

North Penn Water Authority v. a Certain Parcel of Land ... , 168 Pa. Commw. 477 ( 1994 )

Perkasie Borough Authority v. Hilltown Township Water & ... , 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 152 ( 2003 )

Arrington v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh , 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 263 ( 2003 )

Nicoletti v. Allegheny County Airport Authority , 2004 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 32 ( 2004 )

Hill v. City of Bethlehem , 2006 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 539 ( 2006 )

In Re Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia , 595 Pa. 241 ( 2007 )

Picknick v. Washington County Tax Claim Bureau , 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 606 ( 2007 )

Estate of Blose Ex Rel. Blose v. Borough of Punxsutawney , 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 749 ( 2005 )

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