D.L. Harris v. PSP ( 2020 )


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  •                  IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Dontae Lee Harris,                               :
    Petitioner        :
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    Pennsylvania State Police,                       :    No. 625 M.D. 2019
    Respondent              :    Submitted: August 7, 2020
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                           FILED: September 17, 2020
    Before this Court is the Pennsylvania State Police’s (PSP) preliminary
    objection (Preliminary Objection) to Dontae Lee Harris’ (Harris) pro se petition for
    review in the nature of a writ of mandamus (Petition) filed in this Court’s original
    jurisdiction. After review, we sustain the Preliminary Objection and dismiss the
    Petition.
    On April 12, 2016, Harris was charged with two counts of Statutory
    Sexual Assault, one count of Sexual Assault, two counts of Corruption of Minors, three
    counts of Indecent Assault, and one count of Rape Forcible Compulsion.1 See Petition
    ¶5. On December 11, 2017, Harris pled guilty to one count of Statutory Sexual Assault
    1
    Harris alleges in his Petition that he committed the offenses on October 16, 2010; see Petition
    ¶27; however, in his brief, Harris states that the offenses were committed between August 2014 and
    December 2015. See Harris Br. at 7. According to the docket entries, the offenses were committed
    on December 29, 2015. See Docket for CP-15-CR-0001517-2016. “[P]reliminary objections raising
    an issue under subdivision (a)(2), (3) or (4) may be determined from facts of record so that further
    evidence is not required.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(c)(2) Note.
    and Corruption of Minors. See Petition ¶6. The remaining charges were withdrawn.
    Harris was sentenced to 28 to 56 months’ incarceration, and 5 months’ consecutive
    probation, respectively. See
    id. According to the
    inmate locator, Harris was released
    from custody on April 29, 2020. See http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov (last visited
    September 16, 2020). Upon his release, Harris was required to register as a sex
    offender pursuant to Subchapter H of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification
    Act (SORNA I), Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27 (Act 10), as amended, by the Act
    of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140 (Act 29), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75 (collectively,
    SORNA II).
    At the time Harris committed his offenses, SORNA I was in effect
    (effective December 20, 2012). In Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    164 A.3d 1189
    (Pa. 2017),
    the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared SORNA I unconstitutional to the extent that
    it applied to individuals who committed their offenses before December 20, 2012.
    Thereafter, the General Assembly enacted SORNA II, which has two subchapters.
    Subchapter H is based on SORNA I and is applicable to offenders who committed their
    offenses after the December 20, 2012 effective date of SORNA I; Subchapter I is
    applicable to offenders who committed their offenses prior to SORNA I’s effective
    date and to which the Muniz decision directly applied.
    On November 14, 2019, Harris filed his Petition challenging his sexual
    offender registration under SORNA I and/or SORNA II under Muniz. See Petition ¶12.
    Harris is also seeking in excess of $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages. See
    Petition ¶33. On December 24, 2019, PSP filed its Preliminary Objection in the nature
    of a demurrer asserting that because SORNA I was in effect at the time Harris
    committed his offenses, and Muniz only addressed the retroactive application of
    SORNA I, Harris’ ex post facto argument cannot rely on Muniz to circumvent his
    registration requirements under SORNA II.
    2
    The law is well settled:
    In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
    all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
    review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
    therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions of
    law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
    allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
    preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the
    law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
    resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
    A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
    every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review in the
    nature of a] complaint and all inferences reasonably
    deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the
    challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases
    where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which
    relief can be granted. When ruling on a demurrer, a court
    must confine its analysis to the [petition for review in the
    nature of a] complaint.
    Freemore v. Dep’t of Corr., ___ A.3d ___, ___ (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 536 M.D. 2019, filed
    May 1, 2020), slip op. at 5 (quoting Torres v. Beard, 
    997 A.2d 1242
    , 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2010) (citations omitted)).
    PSP argues that even if being required to register under SORNA II is
    considered punitive, there can be no ex post facto violation in the instant case, because the
    punishment Harris faced when he committed the offenses, i.e., under SORNA I, has not
    changed under SORNA II. PSP cites Commonwealth v. Brozik (Pa. Super. No. 318 WDA
    2019, filed October 4, 2019), appeal denied, 
    226 A.3d 1223
    (Pa. 2020),2 to support its
    position.
    Harris avers that SORNA I was in place when he committed his crimes;
    thus, because Muniz ruled that SORNA I violates the ex post facto clause, he cannot be
    2
    This Court recognizes that it is “not bound by the Superior Court’s precedents, although
    where persuasive, we are free to adopt the Superior Court’s reasoning.” Wertz v. Chapman Twp., 
    709 A.2d 428
    , 433 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), aff’d, 
    741 A.2d 1272
    (Pa. 1999).
    3
    required to register under SORNA I.3 See Petition ¶15. Harris also asserts that because
    Muniz declared SORNA I unconstitutional, and SORNA II was not yet enacted at the
    time he committed his offenses, he cannot be required to register as a sex offender
    under either statute. Harris relies upon Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 
    173 A.3d 723
    (Pa. 2017), to maintain this contention. See Petition ¶¶18, 31.
    SORNA I became effective December 20, 2012.                 Muniz addressed
    SORNA I, which applied to those sexual offenders whose crimes occurred between
    April 22, 1996 and December 20, 2012. Subchapter H of SORNA II applies to sexual
    offenders whose crimes occurred on or after December 20, 2012. Harris is a tier III
    offender, and under both SORNA I and SORNA II he is required to register for life.
    Pursuant to Section 1961 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972,
    [w]henever a statute reenacts a former statute, the provisions
    common to both statutes shall date from their first adoption.
    Such provisions only of the former statute as are omitted
    from the reenactment shall be deemed abrogated, and only
    the new or changed provisions shall be deemed to be the law
    from the effective date of the reenactment.
    1 Pa.C.S. § 1961.
    In Brozik, the petitioner committed the offense of statutory indecent
    assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b), on September 3, 2015, and was convicted thereof on
    September 12, 2017. The petitioner argued that his lifetime registration was illegal
    under Muniz. The Brozik Court held:
    In Muniz, our Supreme Court determined that SORNA [I]’s
    registration and reporting provisions are punitive and that
    retroactive application of SORNA [I]’s provisions violates
    the federal and state ex post facto clauses of the United States
    and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
    Id. at 1193.
    Here, the trial
    court correctly determined that because [the petitioner]
    committed the crime of statutory indecent assault, 18
    3
    Notably, because Harris committed his offense after December 20, 2012, Subchapter I of
    SORNA II does not apply to him. Rather, Subchapter H of SORNA II applies to Harris.
    4
    Pa.C.S.[] § 3122.1(b), on September 3, 2015, [the petitioner]
    was a [t]ier III sex offender under SORNA [I], with a lifetime
    registration requirement. See 42 Pa.C.S.[] §§ 9799.14(d)(3),
    9799.15(a)(3)[.] Because SORNA [I] became effective on
    December 20, 2012, well before the date [the petitioner]
    committed his crimes, the trial court did not retroactively
    apply SORNA [II]’s registration and reporting requirements
    to [the petitioner]. Thus, Muniz affords [the petitioner] no
    relief.
    Brozik, slip op. at 3 (record citations omitted). This Court finds the Superior Court’s
    reasoning in Brozik persuasive.
    Here, Harris committed statutory sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b),
    see Petition ¶5, on December 29, 2015. See Docket for CP-15-CR-0001517-2016;4 see
    also Harris Br. at 7. Thus, Harris is also a tier III sex offender under SORNA I, see 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(3), with a lifetime registration requirement. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9799.15(a)(3). Accordingly, “[b]ecause SORNA [I] became effective on December
    20, 2012, well before the date [Harris] committed his crimes, . . . Muniz affords [Harris]
    no relief.” Brozik, slip op. at 3.
    In Derhammer, upon which Harris relies, the petitioner was convicted of
    a sexual offense. Subsequent to his release from custody, on April 1, 2009, the
    petitioner moved to a new residence. On April 6, 2009, he registered with the PSP.
    Pursuant to Megan’s Law III,5 the statute in effect at the time the petitioner moved, the
    petitioner was required to register with the PSP within 48 hours. The petitioner was
    charged with the second-degree felony of failing to register as a sex offender. The
    petitioner was convicted therefor and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. After his
    direct appeal rights were restored nunc pro tunc, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
    4
    “Because [Harris] admits his criminal conviction[] and references [the docket number], we
    may take judicial notice of [the docket entries therein].” Guarrasi v. Scott, 
    25 A.3d 394
    , 397 n.3 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2011).
    5
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.75. SORNA I, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, replaced Megan’s
    Law III.
    5
    awarded him a new trial due to the trial court’s failure to conduct a jury-waiver
    colloquy. In the interim, Megan’s Law III expired and SORNA I was enacted.
    Pursuant to SORNA I, the petitioner had three business days to register his new address
    with the PSP. Because April 1, 2009 was a Friday, the petitioner timely registered
    under SORNA I. Thus, the Derhammer Court dismissed the petitioner’s charge.
    The Derhammer Court explained:
    In In re Dandridge, . . . 
    337 A.2d 885
    ([Pa.] 1975), this Court
    referenced the [United States] Supreme Court’s explanation
    that ‘[w]hen the legislature repeals a criminal statute or
    otherwise removes the [s]tate’s condemnation from conduct
    that was formerly deemed criminal, this action requires the
    dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding charging such
    conduct.’ Dandridge, . . 
    . 337 A.2d at 888
    (quoting Bell v.
    Maryland, 
    378 U.S. 226
    , 230 . . . (1964)) (emphasis added).
    Here, the condemnation was removed from [the petitioner’s]
    conduct when SORNA [I] was enacted, as SORNA [I] gave
    registrants three business days to report address changes - a
    requirement with which [the petitioner] complied[.]
    
    Derhammer, 173 A.3d at 730-31
    . Conversely, here, Harris’ lifetime sexual offender
    registration was required under SORNA [I] and remains required under SORNA II.
    Thus, Derhammer is inapposite.
    Because Harris is specifically challenging his sex offender registration
    under Muniz and Derhammer, Harris “has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief
    can be granted.”     Freemore, slip op. at 5 (quoting 
    Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245
    ).
    Accordingly, PSP’s Preliminary Objection is sustained. Since Harris has failed to state
    a claim for relief, he cannot be entitled to damages.
    For all of the above reasons, PSP’s Preliminary Objection is sustained and
    the Petition is dismissed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    6
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Dontae Lee Harris,                       :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                  :
    :
    Pennsylvania State Police,               :   No. 625 M.D. 2019
    Respondent      :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of September, 2020, the Pennsylvania State
    Police’s preliminary objection to Dontae Lee Harris’ petition for review in the nature
    of a writ of mandamus (Petition) is SUSTAINED and the Petition is DISMISSED.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge