M.N. Walker v. UCBR ( 2020 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Melissa N. Walker,                             :
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                       :   No. 787 C.D. 2019
    :   SUBMITTED: March 26, 2020
    Unemployment Compensation Board                :
    of Review,                                     :
    Respondent                 :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge (P.)
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                            FILED: April 27, 2020
    Melissa N. Walker, Claimant, petitions for review of the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dismissing her appeal from the
    Referee’s decision as untimely under Section 502 of the Unemployment
    Compensation Law (Law).1
    The facts are as follows. Claimant initially filed her claim against her
    former employer, Lillian’s Care, Inc. (Employer) on February 27, 2018. (Certified
    Record “C.R.,” Item 1.) Employer requested relief from charges asserting that
    Claimant’s separation was voluntary. (C.R., Item 2.) On November 14, 2018, the
    Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 822.
    Benefits sent a letter with questionnaires to Claimant, due November 21, 2018.
    (C.R., Item 3.)
    On January 9 and 10, 2019, the Department issued determinations
    denying benefits pursuant to Section 402(b)2 of the Law and assessing a fault
    overpayment against Claimant pursuant to Section 804(a) of the Law.3 (C.R., Item
    4.) The final dates to appeal these determinations were January 23 and 25, 2019,
    respectively. (Id.) Claimant filed an appeal from the Department’s determinations
    on February 7, 2019, and a referee conducted a hearing. (C.R., Items 5-8.)
    On March 13, 2019, the referee issued a decision which dismissed
    Claimant’s appeal as untimely pursuant to Section 501(e) of the Law.4 (C.R., Item
    9.) A copy of the referee’s decision was mailed to Claimant at her last known post
    office address at that time. (Id.) The decision was accompanied by a notice stating
    that interested parties had fifteen days in which to file a valid appeal. (Id.) There is
    no indication that the decision mailed to Claimant was returned by the postal
    authorities as undeliverable. (See C.R.) Thus, in order to be timely, Claimant’s
    appeal needed to be filed on or before March 28, 2019. (C.R., Item 9.) Claimant’s
    appeal was filed on April 19, 2019. (C.R., Item 10.)
    The Board sent Claimant a letter on April 25, 2019 notifying her that
    her appeal was filed more than fifteen days after the referee’s decision was mailed
    and that:
    If you believe that you filed your appeal within the fifteen
    (15) day period or that it should be deemed timely or other
    reasons, you must request in writing that a hearing be
    scheduled to allow you the opportunity to set forth your
    2
    43 P.S. § 802(b).
    3
    43 P.S. § 874(a).
    4
    43 P.S. § 821(e).
    2
    reasons as to why you believe your appeal was timely
    filed. . . . Unless the Board receives a reply, specifically
    requesting a hearing on the timeliness issue,
    postmarked by May 10, 2019, it will proceed to issue an
    appropriate order. This may result in the dismissal of your
    appeal, in which case the Referee’s decision becomes final
    and binding on all parties.
    [C.R., Item 14 (emphasis in original).] Claimant sent a written response (by fax) to
    the Board stating, “I, Melissa Walker, would like to appeal my court hearing I have
    a [sic] excuse. Please if you have any question please call, Melissa [W]alker at
    [phone number].” (C.R., Item 12.)              On May 31, 2019, the Board dismissed
    Claimant’s appeal as untimely under Section 502 of the Law. (C.R., Item 13.)5
    5
    A letter from Claimant dated June 6, 2019, after the Board’s decision and order, stated as
    follows:
    My name is Melissa Walker, I am writing you about my
    unemployment case that was filed. But later on in the following year
    was brought up to unemployment that I quit my job. Which was a
    lie that came from the company that I worked for which was shut
    down for almost a year.
    I am writing to appeal and to ask for you to reconsider your decision
    that have [sic] been made about my case. Please this is my first time
    ever going through something like this[.] The reason why I was late
    with my Appeal is because of the Mailman[.] I was receiving all my
    mail late or it was either in someone else's Mail box. I have been
    trying to state my point many of times but it seem like I was filling
    out things and sending letters that was [sic] not written the correct
    way. Please consider a hearing for me please! I am new to this type
    of situation this is not only for me it's for my family. I have a future
    that I am trying to create and with this being held over my head
    would not look good at all. Also I am employed now been employed
    for almost a year. However unemployment made a lot of mistakes
    on their [sic] behalf and the employer I was working for and I would
    like to handle this in a professional manner. Which would be a
    hearing, my Mail is always late I even have bills that I was late on
    3
    Claimant petitions for review from the Board’s decision and order,
    raising the following issue: “Did the Board err in dismissing [her] appeal for
    untimeliness under Section 502 of the Law?” (Claimant’s Br. at 6.) Claimant argues
    that she did not have to use “specific language or a designated phrase” in complying
    with the requirement that she request a hearing. 6
    Under Section 502 of the Law, an appeal to the Board must be filed
    “within fifteen days after the date of [the referee’s] decision . . .” or the referee’s
    decision “shall be deemed a final decision of the Board.” 43 P.S. § 822. This fifteen-
    day appeal period is mandatory; if an appeal is not timely filed within the specified
    period of time, the determination becomes final and the Board does not have
    jurisdiction to consider the matter. Shea v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
    
    898 A.2d 31
    , 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The Board’s regulations provide as follows:
    If an appeal from a decision of the Department . . . appears
    to have been filed beyond the applicable time limit, the
    tribunal shall advise the appealing party in writing that it
    appears not to have a [sic] jurisdiction because of the late
    filing, and that the appeal . . . will be dismissed without a
    hearing unless the appealing party notifies the tribunal in
    writing within the succeeding [fifteen] days from the date
    of such notice, that he contends the appeal or application
    for further appeal was timely filed and that he desires a
    hearing. If no reply from the appealing party is received
    within the [fifteen]-day period, or if the appealing party
    does not request a hearing, the tribunal shall dismiss the
    appeal or application for further appeal.
    also because of this situation. Therefore could you please reconsider
    your decision I would really appreciate it.
    (C.R., Item 14.)
    6
    As the issue raised is a question of law, we exercise plenary review. Powell v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    157 A.3d 884
    , 890 (Pa. 2017).
    4
    34 Pa. Code § 101.61(a) (emphasis added).
    Claimant asserts that her case differs from Han v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    42 A.3d 1155
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), which was relied
    upon by the Board in its decision and is cited again in its brief to this Court. In Han,
    the claimant sent a written response to a similar letter from the Board, but did not
    request a hearing on the timeliness of his appeal.
    Id. at 1156.
    This Court relied upon
    Section 502 of the Law and 34 Pa. Code § 101.61 in concluding that the claimant
    had failed to timely appeal the referee’s decision within fifteen days and had failed
    to request a hearing on the issue of timeliness.
    Id. The difference
    between her case
    and Han, Claimant argues, is that Claimant requested a chance to explain her reason
    for a late appeal. (Claimant’s Br. at 13.)
    Claimant likens this case to that described in the unreported decision in
    Phillips v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1191-
    1198 C.D. 2016, filed May 12, 2017), in which the claimant requested a “chance to
    state [her] case,”
    Id., slip op.
    at 3, and cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller
    v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    476 A.2d 364
    , 366-67 (Pa. 1984),
    for the proposition that the Supreme Court has refused to give “overly technical,
    restrictive readings to procedural rules,” particularly with respect to remedial
    statutes like the Law, with dismissals being “particularly disfavored.” Phillips, slip
    op. at 4 (quoting 
    Miller, 476 A.2d at 366-67
    ).
    Miller involved an appeal governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Appellate Procedure. As we noted in Han, while Miller is the standard by which the
    timeliness of appeals under the Rules of Appellate Procedure must certainly be
    judged, the Supreme Court’s holding in that case is not applicable to appeals made
    to administrative agencies.      
    Han, 42 A.3d at 1158
    n.8 [quoting Vereb v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    676 A.2d 1290
    , 1294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)].
    5
    We have distinguished Miller from cases such as the instant one, in that the
    regulations governing unemployment compensation appeals to the Board do not
    provide for substantial compliance. See UGI Utils., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp.
    Bd. of Review, 
    776 A.2d 344
    , 348 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
    In Phillips, this Court held that “under the specific circumstances
    presented,” the Board should have scheduled a hearing on the timeliness of the
    claimant’s appeal. Phillips, slip op. at 4. The specific circumstances included the
    claimant’s requesting in her appeal to the Board “a chance to state her case,” but also
    allegations that she did not receive anything in the mail and that she had contacted
    the Department several times and spoke to the “wrong people.”
    Id., slip op.
    at 3.
    This Court found that the “aforementioned communications were sufficient to
    inform the Board that [c]laimant requested to be heard on the timeliness of her
    Decision Appeal Petitions.”
    Id., slip op.
    at 4.
    Clearly here, Claimant did not specifically request a hearing. However,
    the Board’s letter informed her that her appeal was late and that if she wished to
    contest that determination she had to request a hearing in writing. Having been told
    that her only option for moving forward was to request a hearing, “to set forth your
    reasons why you believe your appeal [should be deemed timely],” she replied, in
    writing, “I have [an] excuse.” While not a model of clarity, we believe her response
    was sufficient to advise the Board that she wished to tell her side of the story with
    respect to the only issue it raised, timeliness of her appeal.
    For the above reasons, we will reverse the order of the Board and
    remand for a hearing on the timeliness issue.
    _____________________________________
    BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
    Senior Judge
    6
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Melissa N. Walker,                          :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                        :   No. 787 C.D. 2019
    :
    Unemployment Compensation Board             :
    of Review,                                  :
    Respondent              :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 27th day of April, 2020, the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) in the instant matter is
    REVERSED and the matter is remanded for a hearing on the issue of the timeliness
    of Melissa N. Walker’s appeal to the Board.
    Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    _____________________________________
    BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
    Senior Judge