S. Freemore v. DOC ( 2020 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Shawn Freemore, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
:
Department of Corrections, : No. 536 M.D. 2019
Respondent : Submitted: March 13, 2020
OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: May 1, 2020
Before this Court are the Department of Corrections’ (Department)
preliminary objections (Preliminary Objections) to Shawn Freemore’s (Freemore) pro
se petition for review in the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief (Petition) filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction. After review, we
sustain the Preliminary Objections and dismiss the Petition.
Background1
On December 12, 2011, Freemore was convicted of first-degree murder
(Count I), for which the Monroe County Common Pleas Court (sentencing court)
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Petition Ex. A
(Sentencing Order) at 1; see also Petition Exs. B, C. He was also convicted of
criminal conspiracy to commit criminal homicide (Count II), for which he was
sentenced to 96 to 216 months (i.e., 8 to 18 years) in prison, “to run consecutive[ly]
with that imposed on Count I,” and “pay the costs of the[] proceedings.” Sentencing
Order at 2; see also Petition Exs. B, C. Lastly, Freemore was convicted of tampering
with and/or fabricating physical evidence (Count IV), for which he was sentenced to
1
The following facts are as alleged in the Petition.
serve 6 to 24 months in prison, “for a total aggregate [] sentence of life imprisonment
followed by a period of incarceration of not less than eight and [one-]half (8½) years
with the maximum not to exceed twenty (20) years.” Sentencing Order at 2; see also
Petition Exs. B, C. Freemore is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution (SCI) at Houtzdale.
On May 31, 2019, the Department sent Freemore notice that he owed
$667.50 in costs pursuant to Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code (Act 84), 42
Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5),2 and $60.00 for Crime Victim Compensation/Victim Services
Fund (CVC) fees (Notice).3 See Petition Ex. D. The Notice informed Freemore that
“[t]he [Department would] begin making deductions from [his] inmate account to
satisfy [his] financial obligations in accordance with [Act 84] and DC-ADM 005,
‘Collection of Inmate Debts.’” Notice at 1.
On June 8, 2019, Freemore challenged the Notice by filing a grievance,
wherein he argued that because the Sentencing Order directed his Count II sentence
to be served consecutive to his Count I sentence, and he is still serving his Count I
sentence, the Department may not now collect Count II costs. See Petition Ex. E
(Grievance). Freemore requested the Department to “[c]ease commencement of
deductions until Count II is being served.” Petition Ex. E at 1.
On June 12, 2019, the Grievance Officer denied the Grievance because
“Freemore supplied nothing to support his claim that costs are not due because he is
not currently serving [C]ount II . . . .” Petition Ex. F (Initial Review Response) at 1.
2
“[Act 84] provides a procedure for [the Department] to collect fines and court costs for
which a defendant is liable pursuant to a previous court order.” Russell v. Donnelly, 827 A.2d 535,
537 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003).
3
The $60.00 CVC fee is statutorily mandated and does not require imposition by a
sentencing court order. See Section 1101 of the Crime Victims Act, Act of November 24, 1998,
P.L. 882, as amended, 18 P.S. § 11.1101; Dep’t of Corr. v. Tate, 133 A.3d 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)
(holding that deductions from an inmate account to pay into the CVC fund are statutorily
authorized).
2
On June 27, 2019, Freemore appealed to the Facility Manager, see Petition Ex. G
(Facility Manager Appeal), therein quoting DC-ADM 005 Section 3.A.2.a (relating to
deferred restitution, costs and Act 84 penalty payments) and the Sentencing Order.
See Facility Manager Appeal, Attachment 1 at 1.
On July 1, 2019, the Facility Manager upheld the Grievance Officer’s
Initial Review Response on the following basis:
The Grievance Officer appropriately addressed the issues
contained in the [G]rievance. [The] appeal is completely
based on [Freemore’s] opinion that the [Department] lacks
jurisdiction to deduct funds . . . . The [Grievance] Officer
has clearly explained the policy and how it [is] applied.
[Freemore has] failed to show any proof that support[s]
[his] [Grievance] and [he] lack[e]d anything in the appeal to
argue the [Grievance] Officer’s findings. There is no
violation of policy and procedure in handling [Freemore’s]
debt collection.
Petition Ex. H (Facility Manager’s Appeal Response) at 1. On July 12, 2019,
Freemore appealed from the Facility Manager’s Appeal Response. See Petition Ex. I.
On August 8, 2019, the Department notified Freemore that his appeal
was referred to the Department’s Office of Chief Counsel. See Petition Ex. J. On
August 21, 2019, the Department issued its Final Appeal Decision, denying the
appeal because “the Office of Chief Counsel . . . determined that the Initial Review
Response was correct . . . .” Petition Ex. K (Final Appeal Decision) at 1. On
September 18, 2019, Freemore filed the Petition with this Court.4
4
On October 10, 2019, Freemore filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin
the Department from deducting the subject costs from his inmate account pending his appeal, and
from filing a motion for summary relief. Although it appears that no further action was taken on
Freemore’s motion for preliminary injunction, the matter is rendered moot by this opinion.
3
Facts
On November 25, 2019, the Department filed its Preliminary Objections,
arguing: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction because Freemore failed to serve the Petition
on the Department; and (2) Freemore failed to state a cause of action upon which
relief may be granted (demurrer) because the term consecutive in the Sentencing
Order refers only to the order in which Freemore’s sentences were to be served, and
not his financial obligation, which is due immediately. See Prelim. Objs. at 1-4. The
Department averred:
20. [Freemore’s] position would lead to an untenable
interpretation of the [sentencing] court’s orders because if
the life sentence is carried out, [Freemore] will be deceased
and unable to pay costs imposed at Count [II].
21. Moreover, as a general rule, the victims of second or
subsequent crimes, for which consecutive sentences are
imposed, should not be forced to wait for restitution where
an inmate has the money in his or her inmate account to pay
it.
22. Such [a]n interpretation runs counter to public policy
and undervalues the rights of crime victims to restitution.
Prelim. Objs. at 4. The Department asks this Court to hold that delaying the
collection of Act 84 monies for consecutive sentences is not legally required. See
Department Br. at 5.
On December 17, 2019, Freemore filed a response to the Preliminary
Objections, declaring that: (1) he properly served the Petition on the Department by
placing it in the prison mailbox on September 13, 2019 (and attached proof that the
mailing costs were thereafter deducted from his account and the Petition was sent to
the Department by certified mail on September 16, 2019); and (2) he states a viable
claim in the Petition, since the Sentencing Order controls, and it clearly stated that the
4
Count II costs were to be paid when he served his Count II sentence.5 See Freemore
Response to Prelim. Objs. at 1-2.
By December 19, 2019 order, this Court overruled the Department’s
objection that this Court lacked jurisdiction, and directed that the remaining demurrer
be submitted on briefs. See December 19, 2019 Order. On January 17, 2020, the
Department filed its Brief in Support of the Preliminary Objections. On February 19,
2020, Freemore filed his Brief in Opposition to the Preliminary Objections.
Accordingly, this matter is ready for disposition.
Discussion
The law is well settled:
In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions
of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that
the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review in the
nature of a] complaint and all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the
challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases
where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for
which relief can be granted. When ruling on a demurrer,
a court must confine its analysis to the [petition for
review in the nature of a] complaint.
Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (emphasis added; citations
omitted). “[C]ourts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts
5
Freemore further claims that the $60.00 CVC fees are no longer due because he paid them
in 2014. See Freemore Response to Prelim. Objs. at 2.
5
pled in the complaint, but also any documents or exhibits attached to it.” Allen v.
Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). This Court recognizes:
‘The allegations of a pro se complainant are held to a less
stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by
attorneys. If a fair reading of the complaint shows that the
complainant has pleaded facts that may entitle him to relief,
the preliminary objections will be overruled.’ Danysh v.
Dep’t[] of Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)
(citation and emphasis omitted), aff’d, . . . 881 A.2d 1263([Pa.] 2005).
Dep’t of Corr. v. Tate, 133 A.3d 350, 354 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
First, the Department argues, based on public policy, that where an
inmate is serving consecutive sentences, his obligation to pay Act 84 costs and
restitution is due regardless of when the later sentence commences, particularly where
Freemore’s Count I sentence concludes at his death, and he will thereafter be unable
to meet his financial obligations.
The law is well established, and Freemore does not refute, that Act 84
authorizes the Department to deduct monies from his account to pay his court-ordered
fines, costs and restitution after he was afforded notice and an opportunity to grieve
the deductions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5); see also Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551(Pa. 2018). Section 9728 of Act 84 also specifies, in relevant part:
(b) Procedure.--
....
(3) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing, . . .
transmit . . . to the [Department] . . . copies of all orders for
restitution and amendments or alterations thereto,
reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties. This paragraph
also applies in the case of costs imposed under [S]ection
9721(c.1) [of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(c.1)6]
(relating to sentencing generally).
6
Section 9721(c.1) of the Sentencing Code provides:
6
....
(5) Deductions shall be as follows:
(i) The [Department] shall make monetary
deductions of at least 25% of deposits made to
inmate wages and personal accounts for the
purpose of collecting restitution [and] costs
imposed under [S]ection 9721(c.1) [of the
Sentencing Code] . . . and any other court-
ordered obligation.
....
(iv) The [Department] . . . shall develop
guidelines relating to its responsibilities under
this paragraph. The guidelines shall be
incorporated into any contract entered into
with a correctional facility.
(b.1) Restitution file.--Upon receipt of each order from the
clerk of courts as provided in subsection (b)(3), the
department of probation of the respective county . . . shall
open a restitution file for the purposes of recording the
amounts of restitution deducted by the [Department] . . . .
(b.2) Mandatory payment of costs.--Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, in the event the court fails
to issue an order under subsection (a) imposing costs upon
the defendant, the defendant shall nevertheless be liable for
Notwithstanding the provisions of [S]ection 9728 [of Act 84] (relating
to collection of restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties)
or any provision of law to the contrary, in addition to the alternatives
set forth in subsection (a), the court shall order the defendant to pay
costs. In the event the court fails to issue an order for costs pursuant
to [S]ection 9728 [of Act 84], costs shall be imposed upon the
defendant under this section. No court order shall be necessary for
the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. The
provisions of this subsection do not alter the court’s discretion under
[Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 706(C) (relating to fines
or costs).
42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(c.1). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 706(C) states: “The court, in
determining the amount and method of payment of a fine or costs shall, insofar as is just and
practicable, consider the burden upon the defendant by reason of the defendant’s financial means,
including the defendant’s ability to make restitution or reparations.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C).
7
costs, as provided in [S]ection 9721(c.1) [of the Sentencing
Code], unless the court determines otherwise pursuant to
[Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 706(C) (relating
to fines or costs). The absence of a court order shall not
affect the applicability of the provisions of this section.
(c) Period of time.-- . . . [T]he period of time during which
such judgments shall have full effect may exceed the
maximum term of imprisonment to which the offender
could have been sentenced for the crimes of which he was
convicted or the maximum term of confinement to which
the offender was committed.
....
(g) Costs, etc.--Any sheriff’s costs, filing fees and costs of
the . . . appropriate governmental agency, including, but not
limited to, any reasonable administrative costs associated
with the collection of restitution, transportation costs and
other costs associated with the prosecution, shall be borne
by the defendant and shall be collected by the . . .
appropriate governmental agency along with the total
amount of the judgment and remitted to the appropriate
agencies at the time of or prior to satisfaction of judgment.
(g.1) Payment.--No less than 50% of all moneys collected
by the county probation department . . . and deducted
pursuant to subsection (b)(5) shall, until the satisfaction of
the defendant’s restitution obligation, be used to pay
restitution to victims. Any remaining moneys shall be used
to pay fees, costs, fines, penalties and other court-ordered
obligations.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9728.
In accordance with Section 9728(b)(5)(iv) of Act 84, the Department
developed the collection guidelines set forth in DC-ADM 005 Section 3. Boyd v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 831 A.2d 779 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), aff’d, 886 A.2d 222 (Pa. 2005).
DC-ADM 005 Section 3.A (“Collection of Restitution, Reparation, Fees, Costs,
Fines, and Penalties . . . Act 84[]”) provides:
1. When the County Clerk of Courts provides official
court documents showing that restitution, reparation, fees,
8
costs, fines, and/or penalties were assessed against the
inmate, the Inmate Records Supervisor/designee shall file
the original and forward a copy of the official court
documents to the business office of the facility having
custody of the inmate.
2. The Business Manager/designee shall:
a. If the Department is in possession of a
court order or sentencing transcript, then the
Business Manager/designee shall determine if
the order that imposes financial obligations
on the inmate defers the payment of those
obligations to a later date or event (‘delay
language’). If so, collection of costs as a
result of that court order must not begin until
the date or event indicated in the court order.
In all such cases, the specific terms of a court
order will control. Questions concerning the
terms of a court order shall be referred to the
Act 84 Coordinator.
b. Determine the type of financial obligation
and the amount to be entered into the Inmate
Accounting System as set forth below.
....
(2) Court costs – if the official court
documents show that court costs were
assessed against the inmate, then the
Business Manager/designee shall determine
the date the inmate was sentenced.
....
(b) If the sentencing took place on or
after December 26, 2010, then the
costs reflected in the official court
documents are collectible unless the
court specifically waives the court
costs.
....
9
c. Determine the amount of [CVC] costs that
are owed . . . and enter them into the Inmate
Accounting System.
DC-ADM 005, Section 3.A (italic and bold emphasis in original). Accordingly, a
sentencing court’s orders govern the Department’s collections from inmate accounts.
Here, the Sentencing Order specified, in relevant part:
AND NOW, this 12th day of December 2011, [Freemore]
having been found guilty after trial by jury of Count I,
Murder [i]n the First Degree, it is the sentence of the
[sentencing] court that [Freemore] shall undergo
incarceration to be served in the [SCI] for the remainder of
his natural life without the possibility of parole.
WE ALSO DIRECT that with respect to Count II,
Criminal Conspiracy To Commit Criminal Homicide, a
felony of the first degree, it is the sentence of the
[sentencing] court that [Freemore] undergo
incarceration to be served in the [SCI] for a period of not
less than ninety-six (96) months with the maximum not to
exceed two hundred sixteen (216) months, and pay the
costs of these proceedings.
This sentence shall run consecutive [sic] with that
imposed on Count I.
With respect to Count IV, Tampering and/or Fabricating
Physical Evidence, a second degree misdemeanor, WE
DIRECT that [Freemore] undergo incarceration in the [SCI]
for a period of not less than six (6) months with the
maximum not to exceed twenty-four (24) months, for a total
aggregate [] sentence of life imprisonment followed by a
period of incarceration of not less than eight and [one-]half
(8½) years with the maximum not to exceed twenty (20)
years.
[Freemore] shall receive a time credit with respect to the
ultimate sentence of life imprisonment commencing the
11th of February 2009.
Sentencing Order at 1-2 (emphasis added).
10
The parties do not dispute that the sentencing court imposed Freemore’s
Act 84 costs relative to Count II, and that Freemore’s Count II sentence is to be
served consecutive to Count I. See Department Br. at 7. The sole issue is whether
the Department may collect Freemore’s Act 84 financial obligation now or wait until
his Count II sentence commences.
Freemore does not cite to any provision in Act 84, or case law
interpreting it, to support his position that where sentences are to be served
consecutively, the Department’s collection of fines, costs and restitution is delayed
until the consecutive sentence commences. Section 1921 of the Statutory
Construction Act of 1972 (SCA) declares, in pertinent part:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the
intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by
considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
....
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. Section 1922 of the SCA provides, in relevant part:
11
In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the
enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among
others, may be used:
(1) That the General Assembly does not intend a result that
is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.
....
(5) That the General Assembly intends to favor the public
interest as against any private interest.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1922.
Although both Act 84 and Section 3.A of DC-ADM 005 authorize the
Department to deduct costs, fines and restitution from inmate accounts, neither
expressly impose specific dates or deadlines for doing so. However, Section
9728(b)(3) of Act 84 directs the county clerk of courts to send orders for payment of
costs to the Department “upon sentencing[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(3); see also DC-
ADM 005 Section 3.A.1. Once in possession of the sentencing order, the SCI’s
business manager must determine if it expressly “defers the payment of those
obligations to a later date or event” and, only if it does, may the Department delay
making deductions from an inmate account therefor. DC-ADM 005 Section 3.A.2.a
(emphasis omitted). Otherwise, Section 9728(b)(5)(i) of Act 84 mandates that “[t]he
[Department] shall make [the] monetary deductions . . . .”7 42 Pa.C.S. §
9728(b)(5)(i). Notably, Section 9728(b.2) of Act 84 makes the inmate liable for
paying costs even if the sentencing court fails to order them.8 See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9728(b.2), (g); see also DC-ADM 005 Section 3.A.2.b (the SCI’s business manager
7
“The term ‘shall’ rather than ‘may’ imports the mandatory, rather than discretionary,
nature of the statute.” Gillespie v. Dep’t of Corr., 527 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
8
The CVC fund is also statutorily mandated and does not require imposition by a
sentencing court. See Section 1101(a), (e) of the Crime Victims Act ((a) requiring a person
convicted of a crime to “pay costs of at least $60[.00]” to the CVC fund and (e) stating that “[n]o
court order shall be necessary in order for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this
section”); Tate (holding that deductions from an inmate account to pay into the CVC fund are
statutorily authorized).
12
calculates costs and CVC). Moreover, Section 9728(c) of Act 84 anticipates that an
inmate’s cost judgments “may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment[.]” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9728(c). Accordingly, this Court concludes that the General Assembly did
not intend by Act 84 that the Department is authorized to collect costs, fines and
restitution only during the corresponding confinement. Such conclusion is consistent
with this Court’s ruling that “whether incarcerated or not, persons have an obligation
to pay [] costs, fines and restitution.” Sweeney v. Lotz, 787 A.2d 449, 452 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001); see also Russell v. Donnelly, 827 A.2d 535 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Moreover, based upon this Court’s research, the reference in DC-ADM
005 Section 3.A.2.a to sentencing orders that defer an inmate’s financial obligations
to a later date or event, are those in which the sentencing court clearly and expressly
specified a date or event, like parole or release. See Morgalo v. Gorniak, 134 A.3d
1139 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); see also Lambing v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 488
M.D. 2017, filed December 19, 2018); Zellie v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 97
M.D. 2011, filed March 1, 2012).9 This Court located no case law in which the mere
association of such payments to a consecutive sentence were deemed delayed until
the commencement of that consecutive term of incarceration. In fact, when faced
with a similar argument in Rega v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa.
Cmwlth. No. 244 M.D. 2017, filed January 31, 2018), aff’d, (Pa. No. 12 WAP 2018,
filed January 23, 2019), this Court stated:
Rega argues that his sentence . . . was to run consecutive to
another sentence and therefore, his fines are not due until
that sentence is completed. Rega cites no authority for this
position. Nor are we convinced that the sentencing court
intended that Rega pay the fines after his other sentence
9
This Court acknowledges that its unreported memorandum opinions may only be cited “for
[their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Accordingly, the unreported
opinions cited herein are cited for their persuasive value.
13
was completed, particularly since that sentence was
death.
Slip op. at 9 (emphasis added). This Court is no more convinced that the sentencing
court in the instant matter intended to delay Freemore’s costs and CVC fee until after
he completed his life sentence (i.e., after his death). Certainly, where the
Commonwealth’s interest in Act 84 is “rehabilitation of the criminal and
compensation to the victim of wrongful conduct[,]” Sweeney, 787 A.2d at 452,
weighing public policy of reimbursing taxpayers and victims against Freemore’s
private interest, this Court must conclude that the public interest is better served by
promptly collecting Freemore’s costs and CVC fee than, in effect, waiving them.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, accepting the allegations in Freemore’s Petition
as true, as we must, because it “appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit
recovery,” Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245, this Court sustains the Department’s
Preliminary Objections and dismisses Freemore’s Petition.
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Shawn Freemore, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
:
Department of Corrections, : No. 536 M.D. 2019
Respondent :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of May, 2020, the Department of Corrections’
preliminary objections to Shawn Freemore’s (Freemore) pro se petition for review in
the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief (Petition) are
SUSTAINED, and Freemore’s Petition is DISMISSED.
Freemore’s motion for preliminary injunction is DISMISSED as moot.