M.A. Serluco d/b/a Consolidated Properties v. Borough of Camp Hill ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Michael A. Serluco d/b/a                   :
    Consolidated Properties,                   :
    :
    Appellant      :
    :
    v.                              : No. 1239 C.D. 2020
    : Submitted: September 23, 2021
    Borough of Camp Hill                       :
    BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge1
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge (P.)
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                                  FILED: April 13, 2022
    Michael Serluco d/b/a Consolidated Properties (Applicant) appeals
    from the order of the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) that
    affirmed the decision of the Borough Council of the Borough of Camp Hill (Borough
    Council and Borough, respectively) that denied Applicant’s preliminary/final
    subdivision and land development application (SALDO Application). Applicant
    sought to consolidate seven properties and develop a Chick-fil-A fast food restaurant
    with a drive-thru window, on the corner of 32nd Street and Chestnut Street in the
    Borough. While the appeal was pending, Applicant filed an application for remand
    based on after-discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from the former
    1
    This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 7, 2022, when Judge Cohn
    Jubelirer became President Judge.
    Borough manager, alleging that the Borough conspired to thwart approval of the
    SALDO Application in an illegal private meeting.
    Applicant presents four questions for our review: (1) whether Borough
    Council abused its discretion or erred when it denied Applicant’s SALDO
    Application; (2) whether the trial court erred when it found that Borough Council
    acted in good faith regarding Applicant’s SALDO Application; (3) whether Borough
    Council abused its discretion in rejecting Applicant’s request for a waiver of the
    requirement for a preliminary plan under the Borough’s Subdivision and Land
    Development Ordinance (SALDO);2 and (4) whether the case should be remanded
    to the trial court to consider after-discovered evidence of Borough Council’s bad
    faith.3       After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s decision, and deny
    Applicant’s remand request.
    I.
    The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, describe the lengthy and
    complex history of this matter, and were summarized by the trial court as follows.
    Applicant is the owner of seven contiguous parcels totaling 1.39 acres, located on
    the southeast corner of the intersection of Chestnut Street and South 32nd Street,
    also known as U.S. Route 15, in the Borough (the Property). The six westernmost
    parcels are in the Borough’s General Commercial Zoning District (GC District) in
    which a restaurant is a permitted use. The easternmost seventh parcel is in the
    Borough’s Low Density Residential Zoning District (LDR District), in which a
    2
    Borough of Camp Hill, Pa. Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance
    (SALDO)(1993).
    Per this Court’s July 30, 2021 Order, Applicant’s application for remand and the
    3
    Borough’s answer will be considered with the merits of the appeal.
    2
    restaurant is not a permitted use. The Property would thus be split-zoned. The
    Property includes land that is encumbered by private alley easements. Applicant
    proposed using the north-south “alley” (north-south alley) on the eastern side of the
    Property for vehicular ingress/egress from and onto Chestnut Street, which would
    be significantly widened for traffic. There is also an east-west “alley” along the
    southern border of the Property (east-west alley) which would not be used for access
    to South 32nd Street, although Applicant proposed using this alley for emergency
    vehicle access using a “mountable curb.” Trial Court 10/30/2020 Opinion at 2-3
    (Trial Court Opinion).
    Applicant began discussing its plan with Borough staff in 2017, after
    which Applicant purchased a small piece of land at the intersection from the
    Borough, which gave Applicant ownership of the entire Property. Reproduced
    Record (R.R.) at 40a-49a. On June 7, 2018, Applicant submitted sketch plans to the
    Borough. Id. at 56a-59a. Applicant and the Borough were aware that the Property
    was split-zoned, and understood that the Borough would either have to rezone the
    parcel in the LDR District, or Applicant would request a variance. The Borough
    Planning Commission (Planning Commission) considered Applicant’s sketch plans
    at a November 2018 meeting, where members expressed concern about increased
    traffic in the area from the proposed development. Id. at 76a-82a, 84a. Applicant
    submitted its initial preliminary/final SALDO Application on December 4, 2018,
    (December 2018 Plan), which included the required Borough application; filing fees;
    Cumberland County application for review; the SALDO plans with sheets 1-14; the
    request to waive the SALDO requirement for a preliminary plan; and a stormwater
    narrative and calculations.   Applicant sought to waive the requirement for a
    preliminary plan and to essentially consolidate its preliminary and final plans
    3
    because “[t]he project involves the redevelopment of land in a commercial corridor,
    with existing supporting infrastructure already in place.         No new streets or
    significant utility improvements are needed.” Id. at 85a-161a.
    Although not on the agenda, some members of the public provided
    negative comments about the project, particularly regarding traffic, at the Borough
    Council meeting on December 12, 2018, and at a community meeting with Applicant
    the next day. R.R. at 141a-46a. An engineering company engaged by the Borough
    (Borough engineer) reviewed the December 2018 Plan and provided a report dated
    December 14, 2018, with 5 zoning comments and 22 SALDO comments. R.R. at
    147a-49a.    Although the Planning Commission was expected to consider the
    December 2018 Plan at its December 18, 2018 meeting, the review was postponed
    at Applicant’s request. Id. at 150a. Nevertheless, members of the public expressed
    negative comments about the project at this meeting.           Id. at 150a-59a.    The
    Cumberland County Planning Department issued its report dated December 20,
    2018, observing that the plat appeared to generally comply with applicable
    regulations, but that revisions may be required to address several substantive issues
    including parking in the LDR District; the need for a Traffic Impact Study (TIS);
    issues with the design of the drive-thru facilities; the proposed use of the north-south
    alley as the main entrance/exit; and some additional traffic concerns. Id. at 180a-
    82a.
    At the January 15, 2019 Planning Commission meeting, members of
    the public again expressed negative comments about the project, and the Planning
    Commission recommended accepting Applicant’s offer to extend the deadline for
    Borough action by 60 days. R.R. at 191a-221a. At that meeting, the Borough
    solicitor publicly stated that the Borough was required to act in good faith, and that
    4
    the extension would give the Borough more time to review the project, so that it
    would not run afoul of the time limits for review set forth in Section 508 of the
    Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC).4 Id. at 194a. At its February
    13, 2019 meeting, Borough Council accepted Applicant’s 60-day extension to allow
    for more time to review the plan. At that time, Applicant had not yet submitted the
    TIS, and legal issues concerning the alleys were still not resolved. Id. at 222a-25a,
    227a-32a.
    Applicant submitted a revised Preliminary/Final SALDO Application
    on February 27, 2019 (February 2019 Plan), which attempted to address the
    comments from the Borough engineer and Cumberland County, and again included
    the waiver request. Applicant eliminated parking in the LDR District in response to
    the County’s concern, addressed some other issues, and proposed submitting a TIS
    to the Borough for review within the next week. Applicant offered other revisions
    regarding stacking spaces for the drive-thru and the use of the north-south alley.
    R.R. at 233a-339a. On February 28, 2019, Borough Council issued a public
    statement that the Borough was required to work with Applicant to review and
    address any deficiencies in the project, to act in good faith, and to review the
    forthcoming TIS, so that the Borough could make a fair and responsible decision.
    Id. at 369a. On March 1, 2019, Applicant submitted the TIS to the Borough, to
    which the Borough engineer expressed a number of concerns related to the north-
    south alley, parking and pedestrian concerns, and the impact of the project on the
    4
    Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §10508. Section 508 of the MPC
    provides, in relevant part, that Borough Council must render its decision on the SALDO
    Application “not later than 90 days” after its regular meeting following the date that the application
    was filed. Id. If the next regular meeting occurs more than 30 days following the filing, the “90-
    day period shall be measured from the 30th day following the day the application has been filed.”
    Id. If Borough Council fails to render a timely decision, the application shall be “deemed an
    approval” unless the applicant has agreed in writing to an extension. Id.
    5
    already busy intersection. Id. at 340a-62a, 370a-73a. On March 13, 2019, the
    Borough retained special counsel to assist in its review of Applicant’s SALDO
    Application.     Id. at 376a-81a.   The Borough engineer provided comments to
    Applicant’s February 2019 Plan in a report dated March 15, 2019, which made
    recommendations regarding a lot merger agreement, review by local emergency
    services, paving, and a drainage easement. In this report and in its earlier report, the
    Borough engineer took no exceptions to granting the preliminary plan waiver as
    “there was no regulatory benefit to the Borough” in requiring separate submissions.
    Id. at 382a-84a.
    Applicant presented its February 2019 Plan to the Planning
    Commission at its March 19, 2019 meeting. At this meeting, two Commission
    members questioned whether the Property would be treated as a “corner lot,” which
    would require two fronts, a side, and a rear for purposes of setbacks and other
    requirements. Applicant’s counsel responded that although Applicant and Borough
    staff discussed this issue early in the process, he believed that the front of the
    Property would be on South 32nd Street, which was the Property’s street address.
    Applicant’s counsel indicated that Applicant would submit TIS revisions at a future
    meeting, and members of the public again expressed negative comments about the
    project. R.R. at 387a-428a. Because Applicant needed more time for revisions, it
    advised the Borough that it would present the plan at the May 2019 Planning
    Commission meeting, and it agreed to another extension until June 12, 2019, for the
    Borough to act on the plan. Id. at 432a-35a.
    On May 13, 2019, the Borough solicitor advised Applicant’s counsel
    that the Borough zoning officer was reviewing several zoning issues in connection
    with the February 2019 Plan, including measurement of the front yard setbacks, rear
    6
    yard setback, drive-thru location, the use of the north-south alley as an access drive
    for commercial use, and documentation for a fence easement outside the east-west
    alley. When Applicant’s counsel objected to what he perceived as a delay for these
    zoning comments, the Borough solicitor responded that these zoning comments were
    in response to recommendations from the Planning Commission and in response to
    the revised February 2019 Plan. R.R. at 436a-39a.
    On May 15, 2019, the Borough zoning officer’s written opinion was
    forwarded to Applicant’s counsel for review. In it, the Borough zoning officer
    advised that a corner lot must have two front lot lines; the front yard setbacks were
    not properly measured and must be measured from the street right-of-way line; the
    building canopy and building were not permitted within the front yard setbacks; the
    drive-thru facilities were not permitted within the front yard setbacks or facing an
    abutting property in the LDR District; the rear yard setback was not properly
    measured; the north-south alley could not be used for commercial purposes in the
    LDR District; and no documentation for the fence easement outside the east-west
    alley had been received. R.R. at 440a-41a. On May 27, 2019, Applicant’s counsel
    advised the Borough zoning officer that Applicant was in the process of revising its
    plan based upon review comments, and it agreed to extend the deadline for Borough
    action to September 11, 2019. Id. at 446a. On June 12, 2019, Borough Council
    again approved an extension to September 11, 2019, as had been recommended by
    the Planning Commission, overruling negative public comments. Id. at 460a-64a.
    On July 30, 2019, Applicant submitted to the Borough an updated TIS,
    crash analyses and a revised Preliminary/Final SALDO Application (July 2019
    Plan), which contained sheets 1-16 and a revised stormwater narrative and
    calculations. R.R. at 465a-518a. Applicant’s transmittal letter for the July 2019 Plan
    7
    included responses to the March 15, 2019 Borough engineer’s report, and certain
    zoning and pedestrian information. Importantly, the transmittal letter advised that
    the site layout had been adjusted to provide front yard setbacks for both South 32nd
    Street and Chestnut Street, based on existing building setbacks for adjacent
    properties. Applicant indicated that the July 2019 Plan included a one-half-foot-
    front setback on South 32nd Street, and a 16.5-foot-front setback on Chestnut Street.
    Id. at 471a-72a.
    In a separate memorandum to Borough counsel, Applicant’s counsel
    explained that the proposed front yard setbacks were based on Section 732.B of the
    Zoning Ordinance,5 which permits front yard setbacks to be reduced from the 35-
    foot front yard setback required in Section 503 of the Zoning Ordinance, so that the
    setback is similar to existing adjacent buildings and the street right-of-way on
    abutting lots. Applicant’s counsel also questioned the split-zoning issue and the
    Borough zoning officer’s comments regarding commercial use of the north-south
    alley. Applicant’s counsel described the north-south alley as “split-zoned along its
    centerline,” with the western portion in the GC District and the eastern portion in the
    LDR District. R.R. at 527a. Applicant’s counsel stated that zoning regulations
    should not apply to the north-south alley because it is a street, and, if they did apply,
    they could not prohibit the use of the alley to access the proposed restaurant. Id. at
    519a-33a.
    On August 19, 2019, in response to Applicant’s July 2019 Plan, the
    Borough zoning officer reported to the Planning Commission, in which he confirmed
    that the Property was a corner lot, with front yards on South 32nd Street and Chestnut
    5
    Borough of Camp Hill, Pa., Zoning Ordinance of 2015, as amended. The full Zoning
    Ordinance is included in the Original Record (O.R.) at Item 23. The relevant sections of the Zoning
    Ordinance are included in the Reproduced Record at 702a-34a.
    8
    Street, with the address on South 32nd Street.            The Borough zoning officer
    questioned whether the north-south and east-west alleys should be considered
    streets, and, if so, the lot lines should coincide with the right-of-way lines for the
    streets/alleys. Based on this measurement, the required rear yard setback would be
    30 feet, and the side yard setback would be 12 feet. The zoning officer also
    questioned whether the proposed front yard setbacks were properly calculated, based
    on the definition of “lot lines” in the Zoning Ordinance and the SALDO.6 R.R. at
    553a-54a. Also, on August 19, 2019, the Borough engineer provided reports to the
    Borough commenting on the updated TIS and the July 2019 Plan. The Borough
    engineer commented that the updated TIS addressed many of the earlier concerns,
    but that some remained inadequately addressed, including traffic flow in the
    intersection and perpendicular parking spaces along the north-south alley. Id. at
    548a-56a. In its more general response to the July 2019 Plan, the Borough engineer
    commented on stormwater review, paving, requirements for the fence and drainage
    easements, and several other suggestions for Applicant to make technical
    adjustments on its drawings. Id. at 544a-47a.
    Applicant again agreed to extend the deadline for Borough action on
    the July 2019 Plan to facilitate review of the comments and to revise the plan
    accordingly.     R.R. at 555a.     At its August 20, 2019 meeting, the Planning
    Commission recommended approving the extension and again received negative
    comments about the project from members of the public. Id. at 557a-85a. On
    6
    Camp Hill Borough Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance of 1993, as amended.
    The full SALDO is included in the Original Record at Item 23, and the relevant sections are
    included in the Reproduced Record at 735a-64a. The Borough enacted an amended SALDO
    effective December 2020, replacing the 1993 SALDO, which does not apply to this appeal. The
    amended               SALDO               may            be           found              at
    https://cms8.revize.com/revize/camphillborough/Departments/Code%20Enforcement-
    Zoning/CHB%20FINAL%20SALDO%20120920.pdf (last visited 4/12/22).
    9
    August 29, 2019, the Borough zoning officer amended his report to respond more
    accurately to Applicant’s July 2019 Plan, in which he addressed designation of front,
    side, and rear yards; setbacks for side and rear yards; conformity of streets under the
    Zoning Ordinance and the SALDO; front yard setbacks on Chestnut Street and 32nd
    Street; commercial use of driveways; and the updated TIS. Id. at 643a-45a. On
    September 5, 2019, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation commented on
    the updated TIS, in which it raised a concern about the unaligned accesses to the
    Property from Chestnut Street, and about the traffic patterns in the intersection. Id.
    at 650a-51a. Applicant again offered to extend the deadline for Borough action on
    the plan until December 11, 2019, to facilitate its submission of another revised plan
    to the Borough by October 22, 2019. Applicant’s counsel expressed frustration at
    receiving new zoning comments at this stage in the process. Id. at 655a-56a. At its
    September 11, 2019 meeting, Borough Council approved the extension to December
    11, 2019, to facilitate submission of Applicant’s revised plan by October 22, 2019.
    Id. at 657a-60a.
    On October 22, 2019, Applicant’s counsel informed the Borough
    solicitor that Applicant would not submit a revised plan or a revised TIS. R.R. at
    662a. On November 15, 2019 Applicant sent a “litigation hold” letter to the
    Borough, seeking preservation of all documents relating to the SALDO Application.
    Id. at 668a-73a. Applicant stated his belief that the Borough’s review of the SALDO
    Application had not been objective or in good faith. Id. at 665a-67a. At its
    November 19, 2019 meeting, at which members of the public again presented
    negative comments about the project, the Planning Commission voted to recommend
    denial of the July 2019 Plan, and denial of Applicant’s waiver request. Applicant
    did not attend this meeting. Id. at 674a-87a.
    10
    At its December 11, 2019 meeting, Borough Council voted to deny the
    July 2019 Plan and to deny Applicant’s waiver request. R.R. at 688a-95a. The
    Borough issued a written denial dated December 19, 2019, in which it enumerated
    33 reasons for the denial, with citations to the Zoning Ordinance or the SALDO. Id.
    at 696a-701a. As the trial court noted, several of the reasons for denial are “technical
    in nature and would not normally rise to the level of irremediable, fatal defects in
    the plan,” but also that Applicant declined to submit a revised plan to address those
    technical defects. Trial Court Opinion at 49. The trial court also noted that several
    reasons for denial were substantive in nature, focusing on lot lines, setbacks,
    unrestricted access from the lot along the length of the north-south alley, and
    deficiencies in the TIS. Id. at 49-52.
    Applicant appealed Borough Council’s December 19, 2019 decision to
    the trial court. The trial court took no additional evidence and upheld Borough
    Council’s decision in an opinion and order dated October 30, 2020, which comprised
    some 65 pages and over 200 footnotes. The trial court addressed the following
    issues: whether Borough Council’s denial of Applicant’s waiver request violated
    required timelines and resulted in a deemed approval; whether Borough Council
    acted in good faith; and whether Borough Council’s reasons for denial of the July
    2019 Plan were legally sufficient. The trial court concluded that Borough Council
    had not abused its discretion in denying Applicant’s waiver request; Borough
    Council acted in good faith; and Borough Council’s denial of the July 2019 Plan was
    legally sufficient because there were several substantive provisions of the Zoning
    11
    Ordinance and the SALDO that Applicant failed to meet. Applicant timely appealed
    the trial court’s decision to this Court.7
    II.
    As to the first issue, whether Borough Council’s denial was justified,
    Applicant argues that each of the 33 reasons Borough Council provided was
    factually inaccurate, ignored details of the plans, or was based on erroneous
    interpretations of the Zoning Ordinance or the SALDO. Applicant claims that some
    of the 33 reasons rely on inconsequential, administrative, or technical matters that
    are remediable and should not be grounds for denial. Although the trial court
    specifically discussed in detail only certain reasons, Applicant seeks a determination
    from this Court that none of the reasons justify denial of its SALDO Application, so
    that Applicant would not be bound in any future plan submissions on undecided
    issues or be barred from raising them in a later proceeding. The Borough responds
    that so long as Borough Council’s decision complies with the requirements of
    Section 508 of the MPC to specify the defects, describes the requirements that have
    not been met, and includes citations to the statute or ordinance upon which it relied,
    the denial will stand if even one of the reasons for denial is supported by substantial
    evidence.
    We note that when a plan complies with all “objective provisions” of
    the applicable ordinance or regulation, the plan must be approved. However, denial
    of a plan may stand if validly supported by even one reason for denial. Herr v.
    7
    When, as here, the trial court took no additional evidence, this Court’s standard of review
    is to determine whether Borough Council abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law.
    Allegheny Tower Associates, LLC v. City of Scranton Zoning Hearing Board, 
    152 A.3d 1118
    , 1121
    n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). On the issue of whether Borough Council acted in good faith, this Court’s
    standard of review is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter
    of law. 1050 Ashbourne Associates, LLC v. Cheltenham Township Board of Commissioners, 
    167 A.3d 828
    , 837 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
    12
    Lancaster County Planning Commission, 
    625 A.2d 164
    , 168-69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)
    (citations omitted). Here, Applicant has not argued that Borough Council’s decision
    failed to comply with the requirements of Section 508 of the MPC. Therefore, we
    need not determine if each reason is sufficiently supported by the record if we find
    that at least one reason, based on objective standards, justifies Borough Council’s
    denial. We further note that the party seeking approval of a land development plan
    bears the burden to show it is entitled to approval, Ball v. Montgomery Township
    Board of Supervisors, 
    598 A.2d 633
    , 637 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991), and that the Borough
    is entitled to deference in interpreting its ordinances. Kohl v. New Sewickley
    Township Zoning Hearing Board, 
    108 A.3d 961
    , 968 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
    Borough Council denied the July 2019 Plan because Applicant failed
    to provide a metes and bounds description of the proposed easements for a driveway,
    fence, and drainage onto adjacent property owned by 133 South 32nd Street, LLC,
    nor did Applicant provide proof of the right to construct these facilities on the
    adjacent property, as required by Section 407.1.A.(2) and (5) of the SALDO. R.R.
    696a-710a, reasons 1, 2, 6, 9, and 23. Applicant argues that Section 407.1.A.(2) and
    (5) of the SALDO does not require inclusion of a metes and bounds description, and
    that any disputes between private property owners over an easement are private
    matters between the owners and may not justify a land use denial. Applicant further
    argues that Section 407.1.A of the SALDO applies to review and approval of a final
    plat (or plan, as defined in the SALDO), and because the Borough failed to waive
    submission of a preliminary plan, it cannot now deny it based on Section 407.1.A.
    The Borough responds that although Applicant promised to provide confirmation of
    its right to construct these improvements, it failed to do so, and never provided
    certification of title or a detailed description of these proposed easements. Section
    13
    407.1.A of the SALDO requires that for approval of a final plat, an applicant must
    provide: “(2) [t]ract boundary lines, right-of-way lines of streets, easements, and
    other rights of way . . . with accurate dimensions”; and “(5) [c]ertification of title
    showing that the applicant is the owner of land, agent of the landowner or tenant
    with permission of the landowner.” SALDO §407.1.A(2), (5).
    We agree with the trial court that Borough Council did not abuse its
    discretion or commit an error of law when it denied the July 2019 Plan based on
    Applicant’s failure to properly describe the proposed driveway, fence, and drainage
    easements. Section 407.1.A(2) of the SALDO requires that the final plat or plan
    show easements with “accurate dimensions,” and Section 407.1.A(5) requires
    “certification of title” that the applicant has title as owner, agent, or tenant to use this
    property. We agree that Applicant must assert at least a colorable claim to develop
    driveway, fence, and drainage easements onto the adjacent property, which
    Applicant did not.      The July 2019 Plan, and the earlier versions, contained
    Applicant’s promise to provide this information, but Applicant failed to do so.
    Because Applicant failed to meet these objective requirements of the SALDO,
    reasons 1, 2, 6, 9, and 23 provide valid reasons to deny the July 2019 Plan.
    Borough Council also denied the July 2019 Plan because it failed to
    depict lot lines and setbacks as required by the Zoning Ordinance. Specifically,
    Borough Council concluded that Applicant failed to depict the required 30-foot rear
    yard setback from the right-of-way lines of the north-south alley, as required by
    Table 5-3 of the Zoning Ordinance, and as “lot line” is defined in Section 202 of the
    Zoning Ordinance. Borough Council also concluded that Applicant failed to depict
    the required 12-foot side yard setback from the right-of-way lines of the east-west
    alley for the same reasons. R.R. at 696a-701a, reasons 24-27.
    14
    Applicant argues that Borough Council erred in interpreting the Zoning
    Ordinance to determine that the July 2019 Plan did not include required lot lines and
    setbacks. This issue turns on the relevant definitions in Section 202 of the Zoning
    Ordinance. “Lot line” is defined as “[a] line that separates a lot from another lot or
    from a street or any public or private space.” R.R. at 705a. “Setback” is defined as
    “[t]he required horizontal distance between a required setback line and an abutting
    lot line or street right-of-way line, as applicable.” Id. at 707a. “Street line/right-of-
    way line” is defined as “[a] line defining the edge of a street right-of-way and
    separating the street from an abutting property or lot.” Id. at 709a. Under this
    definition the “street line” shall be the same as “the legal right-of-way line, or the
    ultimate right-of-way line.” Id. In addition, Section 202 of the Zoning Ordinance
    defines “street” to include an “alley” which is defined as a “minor way, which may
    or may not be legally dedicated, and is used primarily for vehicular service access
    to the rear or side of properties abutting on a street.” Id. Applicant argues that
    Borough Council erred in prioritizing one definition of lot line over another.
    Applicant claims that the Zoning Ordinance permits measurement of the rear yard
    setback from the lot line in the east, and the side yard setback from the center line of
    the east-west alley. In contrast, the Borough responds that the lot lines, and thus the
    rear and side yard setbacks, must be measured from the right-of-way lines of each
    proposed alley, not including the space within each proposed alley, as if they, too,
    were part of the Property.
    Based on our review of the relevant language of the Zoning Ordinance,
    we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law when
    it denied the July 2019 Plan for failing to meet the required rear yard and side yard
    setback requirements, using the right-of-way lines for each proposed alley. We
    15
    cannot conclude that the Board erred by not choosing Applicant’s preferred
    definition of lot line when the plain language of the Zoning Ordinance includes “or”
    in the definition. Because Applicant failed to meet these objective requirements of
    the Zoning Ordinance, reasons 24-27 provide valid reasons to deny the July 2019
    Plan.
    Borough Council also denied the July 2019 Plan because it would allow
    unrestricted access from the Property along a street or alley. R.R. at 696a-701a,
    reasons 12 and 29. The July 2019 Plan shows a row of perpendicular parking spaces
    along the north-south alley, and includes 50 feet of vertical curbing to direct
    vehicular traffic onto the site and to define parking areas. This curbing restricts
    access along part, but not all, of the length of the proposed north-south alley. This
    issue turns on our interpretation of Section 902.D of the Zoning Ordinance, which
    governs driveways and access drives, and states that “[i]n no case shall there be
    unrestricted access from a lot along the length of a street or alley.” Id. at 731a.
    Applicant argues that the July 2019 Plan does not allow unrestricted
    access along “the entire” length of the north-south alley because 50 feet of its length
    is restricted by curbing. The Borough responds that the plain language of Section
    902.D of the Zoning Ordinance prohibits unrestricted access “along the length” of
    the alley, and that the July 2019 Plan violates this requirement.
    We agree with the trial court that Borough Council did not err in its
    interpretation of Section 902.D of the Zoning Ordinance. As the trial court observed,
    the purpose of this requirement is “obviously to prevent the chaotic situation that
    would result from vehicles moving onto and off streets at innumerable points along
    a site’s frontage.” Trial Court Opinion at 60. Because Applicant failed to meet these
    16
    objective requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, reasons 12 and 29 provide valid
    reasons to deny the July 2019 Plan.
    III.
    As to the second issue, Applicant argues that Borough Council abused
    its discretion when it denied Applicant’s request to waive the requirement for a
    preliminary plan.8 This issue turns on the requirements for plan submissions under
    Sections 403, 404 and 901.1 of the SALDO. Section 403 of the SALDO provides
    that for a “minor subdivision and land development application” defined as one
    where “five (5) or fewer lots are proposed to be subdivided . . . or transferred,”
    Borough Council “being advised by the Planning Commission, in response to a
    written request by the [a]pplicant, may waive the requirements of Preliminary Plat
    requirements, provided such proposal is on an existing street and no new streets are
    involved.” R.R. at 747a. Section 404 of the SALDO governs requirements for filing
    and rendering a decision on preliminary plats. Id. at 748a-49a. Section 901.1 of the
    SALDO provides:
    Borough Council may grant a modification of the
    requirements of one (1) or more provisions of this Chapter
    [SALDO] if the literal enforcement will exact undue
    hardship because [of] peculiar conditions pertaining to the
    land in question, provided that such modification will not
    be contrary to the public interest and that the purpose and
    intent of this Chapter [SALDO] is observed.
    R.R. at 764a.
    8
    Although Applicant argued before the trial court that Borough Council’s failure to waive
    the preliminary plan requirement resulted in a deemed approval, Applicant does not argue the
    deemed approval issue before this Court. Therefore, we focus only on the waiver issue, as
    presented.
    17
    Applicant correctly argues that the Borough engineer advised several
    times that he had no objections to granting Applicant’s waiver request. However, as
    the Borough responds, it is Borough Council, not the Borough engineer or any other
    Borough staff, that has the authority to grant or deny such waivers. Applicant further
    argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Borough did not abuse its
    discretion in denying the waiver request, because Applicant elected not to make a
    presentation to the Planning Commission for the July 2019 Plan, and because
    Applicant failed to submit a revised plan to address the Borough’s concerns. The
    Borough responds that neither the July 2019 Plan nor any of the earlier versions
    qualify for submission under Section 403 of the SALDO as a “minor subdivision
    and land development application” because more than five lots, namely seven lots,
    are to be transferred for this project. Further, the Borough notes that the July 2019
    Plan is not a minor subdivision under Section 403 of the SALDO because new
    streets, in the form of the expanded north-south alley, are proposed as part of the
    project. The Borough also contends that Applicant failed to demonstrate that the
    submission of a preliminary plan “will exact undue hardship because [of] peculiar
    conditions pertaining to the land” under Section 901.1 of the SALDO. Finally, the
    Borough submits that granting such waivers is at Borough Council’s discretion, as
    evidenced by the use of “may” in Section 901.1 of the SALDO.
    We agree that Applicant’s failure to appear at the final Planning
    Commission meeting or to submit another revised plan are not reasons to deny its
    waiver request under the SALDO. However, based on the plain language of the
    applicable SALDO sections, we cannot conclude that Borough Council abused its
    discretion in denying this waiver. The July 2019 Plan does not qualify as a minor
    subdivision under Section 403 of the SALDO because it proposes transfer of more
    18
    than five lots, and it includes a new street, in the form of the expanded north-south
    alley. Further, Applicant failed to provide evidence that its waiver request should
    be granted based on undue hardship caused by peculiar conditions of the land, as
    contemplated under Section 901.1 of the SALDO. Based on the plain language of
    the applicable SALDO provisions, we cannot conclude that Borough Council abused
    its discretion in denying Applicant’s waiver request.
    IV.
    As to the third issue, Applicant argues that the trial court committed an
    error of law when it found that Borough Council acted in good faith in denying the
    July 2019 Plan. To determine whether Borough Council acted in good faith, we
    must examine relevant case law that discusses a municipality’s duty of good faith.
    This Court has established that a municipality has a legal obligation to proceed in
    good faith in reviewing and processing development plans. “‘The duty of good faith
    includes discussing matters involving technical requirements or ordinance
    interpretation with the applicant, and providing the applicant a reasonable
    opportunity to respond to objections or to modify plans where there has been a
    misunderstanding or difference of opinion.’” Delchester Developers, L.P. v. London
    Grove Township Board of Supervisors, 
    161 A.3d 1106
    , 1115-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)
    (quoting Raum v. Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township, 
    370 A.2d 777
    , 798
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977)).
    Applicant argues that Borough Council, the Planning Commission,
    Borough zoning officer, Borough engineer, other Borough staff, Borough solicitor
    and special counsel engaged in actions designed to thwart its ability to meet the legal
    requirements necessary for approval. Applicant asserts the following as evidence of
    19
    the Borough’s bad faith: Borough zoning officer withheld comments for eight
    months after the December 2018 Plan was filed; Borough changed and added new
    comments repeatedly throughout the process; Borough inaccurately and
    unreasonably interpreted its ordinances; Borough inaccurately cross-referenced
    comments within comment letters to create confusion; Borough applied its Zoning
    Ordinance and SALDO to Applicant differently than other applicants; Borough
    applied overlay provisions of the Zoning Ordinance, which were not enforceable;
    and Borough repeatedly created new hurdles that Applicant had to overcome to
    appease public opposition.
    The Borough responds that this Court has provided additional guidance
    in what constitutes good faith in reviewing land development plans. In Delchester,
    161 A.3d at 1116, this Court reviewed relevant case law including Raum, 
    370 A.2d 777
    , Highway Materials, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Whitemarsh Township, 
    974 A.2d 539
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), Arbanel v. Solebury Township, 
    572 A.2d 862
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1990), and Herr, 
    625 A.2d 164
    , to further outline what constitutes good
    faith and bad faith in the review process. In Highway Materials, this Court held that
    when a municipality refuses to advise an applicant on how to cure plan deficiencies,
    and refuses to advise an applicant on its interpretations of its ordinances, the
    municipality will be found to have acted in bad faith. 
    974 A.2d at 545
    . In Arbanel,
    this Court held that where a municipality reviewed plans in good faith, highlighted
    the plans’ deficiencies, and gave the applicant an opportunity to cure those
    deficiencies, the municipality did not act in bad faith. 
    572 A.2d at 865
    . Further, in
    Arbanel, this Court held that an applicant has a reciprocal good faith duty to submit
    revised plans in a reasonable and timely manner so that the municipality can comply
    with its duties under Section 508 of the MPC. 
    Id. at 864
    . Finally, in Delchester, this
    20
    Court held that the municipality acted in good faith by granting numerous extensions
    at the applicant’s request, and by granting waivers, although the applicant failed to
    correct issues of noncompliance with relevant ordinances during the four-year
    review process. 161 A.3d at 1116. The Borough also notes that “there is no
    requirement that the members of the municipal governing body leap with joy when
    an application for land development or subdivision approval is filed,” citing Robert
    S. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice, §11.2.8 (revised July 31, 2007).
    The trial court cited six factors against concluding that the Borough
    acted in bad faith to frustrate or delay Applicant’s approval. First, the Borough
    affirmatively transferred a parcel of land to Applicant so that the entire Property
    could be developed. Second, the Borough tried to accommodate Applicant’s idea
    that the Property was a non-corner lot, until it became clear that under its Zoning
    Ordinance the Property was a corner lot. Third, as public opposition to the project
    increased, Borough Council issued a public statement describing the Borough’s duty
    to act in good faith, and Applicant’s right to receive a fair review in compliance with
    objective standards. Fourth, the Borough solicitor issued a similar public statement
    at a public meeting. Fifth, Borough Council granted every deadline extension
    Applicant requested. Finally, “the record evidences a conscientious effort” by
    Borough officials and consultants to “properly resolve complex legal and practical
    issues presented by a controversial development plan that was significantly
    reconfigured” during the review process. Trial Court Opinion at 56.
    After review of the record and applicable case law, we cannot conclude
    that the trial court erred in finding that the Borough acted in good faith. The first
    five factors cited by the trial court demonstrate the Borough’s good faith. As to the
    sixth factor, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that the Borough,
    21
    its staff, and consultants provided detailed comments and reactions to the December
    2018 Plan, the revised February 2019 Plan, and the revised July 2019 Plan. The
    question of whether the Property was a corner lot under the Zoning Ordinance was
    not resolved until sometime after the Planning Commission’s March 2019 meeting,
    after which Applicant submitted its revised July 2019 Plan describing the Property
    as a corner lot, to which the Borough zoning officer provided comments on the
    requirements for the corner lot and other issues in his August 29, 2019 letter. Factors
    that this Court has found to demonstrate bad faith are not present here, including
    failing to confer with Applicant, failing to grant extensions, failing to consider
    Applicant’s revisions, waiting until the last possible moment to raise objections and
    then claiming there was insufficient time to review Applicant’s revision, or
    attempting to delay consideration of a project so that a zoning ordinance could be
    amended. See Raum, 370 A.2d at 799; Highway Materials, 
    974 A.2d at 544-45
    ; and
    Honey Brook Estates, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Honey Brook Township, 
    132 A.3d 611
    , 621-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
    V.
    As to the fourth issue, while this appeal was pending, Applicant
    requested that this Court remand the matter to the trial court to take additional
    evidence regarding the Borough’s bad faith, and to issue a decision. Applicant
    attached to its request an affidavit from Patrick Dennis, who was Borough manager
    from March 2016 through October 2020, while the Borough was considering
    Applicant’s SALDO Application. (Dennis affidavit).
    In his affidavit, Mr. Dennis states that Borough Council held a private
    meeting in January or February 2019, at which a quorum of Borough Council
    22
    members was present, to discuss the SALDO Application, public opposition to it,
    and “conspired to ensure that the review of the [SALDO] Application would be as
    difficult as possible so as to preclude the [SALDO] Application’s approval,
    including having discussions about hiring special counsel for the Borough
    specifically to identify and pursue reasons to challenge the [SALDO] [A]pplication.”
    Dennis affidavit ¶¶10, 11. Mr. Dennis stated that Borough Council engaged in
    discussion of the SALDO Application and hiring special counsel, “against [his]
    admonition.” Id. ¶11. Mr. Dennis further stated that on May 15, 2019, the Borough
    solicitor and special counsel, whom the Borough retained on March 13, 2019 to
    assist in its review of Applicant’s SALDO Application, provided a draft
    memorandum from Borough zoning officer to Applicant’s counsel, which was not
    Borough zoning officer’s “work product.” Id. ¶15. Mr. Dennis further attests that
    Borough Council members “further conspired” to prepare and fast-track a Zoning
    Ordinance amendment that would preclude the construction of a drive-thru
    restaurant on the Property, and that a draft amendment was prepared. Id. ¶¶18, 19.
    The affidavit is silent as to whether a Zoning Ordinance amendment was ever
    introduced or approved. Regardless, the Borough’s denial of Applicant’s July 2019
    Plan cited to provisions of the Zoning Ordinance and the SALDO in effect in
    December 2019, which did not preclude construction of a drive-thru restaurant on
    the Property.
    The Borough responds that this Court should deny Applicant’s remand
    request because the Dennis affidavit does not provide after-discovered evidence that
    the Borough acted in bad faith. The Borough claims that the Dennis affidavit seeks
    to “imply some undisclosed ill-will by the Borough or certain (unnamed) officials”
    toward the project. Borough’s Answer ¶10. The Borough further submits that this
    23
    Court should disregard the “florid characterizations” regarding illegal, secret
    meetings where Borough Council members allegedly conspired to thwart the
    SALDO Application, and consider the facts contained in the Dennis affidavit. Id.
    ¶11. The Borough contends that the facts alleged in the Dennis affidavit reveal what
    was already known and considered by the trial court, namely that Borough Council
    held an executive session to discuss retaining special counsel, which is a permitted
    reason to meet in executive session, that Borough Council interviewed candidates,
    that it retained special counsel in a public meeting, that special counsel worked with
    Borough solicitor to review the SALDO Application, and that Borough Council
    issued a decision denying it. The Borough further responds that bad faith does not
    turn on the subjective desires of Borough Council members, but on its actions and
    the denial decision.
    After review of the Dennis affidavit and the parties’ arguments, we
    deny Applicant’s remand request. Section 1005-A of the MPC9 permits the trial
    court to hold a hearing to receive additional evidence and to remand a case to the
    body whose decision has been appealed. Applicant cites Quest Land Development
    Group, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Heidelberg Township, 
    934 A.2d 686
    (Pa. 2007), to support its contention that remand is appropriate for consideration of
    after-discovered evidence. In its per curiam order in Quest, our Supreme Court cited
    Brannagan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 
    41 A.2d 869
     (Pa. 1945), for
    the standard for evaluating after-discovered evidence. In Brannagan, our Supreme
    Court stated:
    To entitle a defendant to a new trial on this ground (after-
    discovered evidence) the evidence must have been
    discovered since the trial, and be such as could not have
    9
    Added by the Act of July 21, 1988, as amended, 53 P.S. §11005-A.
    24
    been obtained at the trial by the use of reasonable
    diligence; it must not be simply corroborative or
    cumulative, or merely to impeach the credibility of a
    witness; and it must be such as would likely result in a
    different verdict if a new trial were granted.
    41 A.2d at 870 (citation omitted).
    In Kensington South Neighborhood Advisory Council v. Zoning Board
    of Adjustment of Philadelphia, 
    471 A.2d 1317
    , 1320 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984), this Court
    denied a remand request on the issue of whether hardship existed to justify a
    variance, stating that “[a]ppellant has failed to allege that new evidence, not
    previously available, exists which would warrant a remand. We will not issue a
    remand merely to strengthen weak proofs.” Here, the Dennis affidavit proffered by
    Applicant is cumulative and corroborative of the evidence the trial court already
    considered. Remand is not warranted to “strengthen weak proofs.” 
    Id.
    Further, although not raised by the parties, Applicant’s remedy to what
    it describes as the Borough Council’s illegal, private meeting is found in Section 703
    of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. C.S. §703, which requires that a legal challenge to a
    meeting that was not open may not be “commenced more than one year from the
    date of said meeting.” Here, Applicant challenges Borough Council’s private
    executive session that was held in January or February 2019, and its application for
    remand was filed on July 12, 2021, well outside the one-year limitation.
    25
    VI.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order and
    deny Applicant’s request for remand.
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision of this case.
    26
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Michael A. Serluco d/b/a                :
    Consolidated Properties,                :
    :
    Appellant    :
    :
    v.                            : No. 1239 C.D. 2020
    :
    Borough of Camp Hill                    :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 2022, the order of the Cumberland
    County Court of Common Pleas dated October 30, 2020, is AFFIRMED. The
    Application for Remand of Michael A. Serluco d/b/a Consolidated Properties is
    DENIED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge