Somerset Area S.D. v. Rockwood Area S.D. ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Somerset Area School District, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Rockwood Area School District, :
Joseph E. Archer, Nancy J. Bonati, :
Christopher C. Bosworth, Deborah A. :
Bosworth, Belita J. Brown, Stephen C. :
Brown, Deborah A. Cunningham, Paul :
V. Cunningham, Candace DiMarco, :
Ross F. DiMarco Jr., Janeen Dupre, :
Karen A. Farmerie, Wilson J. :
Farmerie, David A. Fetchko, Mary :
Ellen Fetchko, Clifford J. Forrest, :
Tracy L. Forrest, Gary D. Gadley, :
Annette D. Ganassi, Hemlock Property :
LLC, Georgia C. Hernandez, Robert :
M. Hernandez, Martha E. Hildebrandt, :
Mark J. Hileman, Rebecca L. Hileman, :
James A. Nassif, Qualified Personal :
Residence Trust, Susan A. Jurik, Kurt J. :
Lesker III, William J. Lloyd, David P. :
Mendis, Lisa B. Mendis, Joseph C. :
Metzgar, Lynette E. Metzgar, Erin :
Morris, Michael A. Morris, Netco Inc., :
Mary Jo Ochson, John C. Prentice, :
Douglas Keith Rosetti, Ronald T. :
Rosetti, Seven Springs Farm, Inc., :
Matthew Tarosky, Three Rivers :
Enterprises Inc., David A. Tonnies, :
Cynthia G. Urgo, Donald J. Urgo, :
Virginia’s Pheasant Run Limited :
Partnership, David A. Webber, Lorie A. :
Webber, Harold Wiegel, Steven H. :
Wiegel, James P. Wilhelm, Paige M. :
Wilhelm, Jackie Wolfe, Jacquelyn K. :
Wolfe, Tim Wolfe, and Timothy W. :
Wolfe (Pennsylvania Department of :
Education), : No. 175 C.D. 2022
Respondents : Argued: April 3, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 5, 2023
Somerset Area School District (Somerset) petitions this Court for
review of the Secretary of Education’s (Secretary) February 4, 2022 order (Order)
approving Respondents’1 Petition to Establish an Independent School District for
Property Situated in Jefferson Township, Somerset County for Purposes of Transfer
from Somerset to Rockwood Area School District (Rockwood) (Petition). Somerset
presents six issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether this Court should revisit
Archer v. Rockwood Area School District, 249 A.3d 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021),
wherein this Court concluded that Respondents’ desire to lower their tax millage is
relevant to educational merit since there are presently no students in the proposed
independent school district; (2) whether the Secretary, on remand, erred by merely
reciting rather than analyzing the evidence this Court considered potentially
relevant; (3) whether the Secretary erred by considering Somerset’s and Rockwood’s
1
Respondents, various property owners, among others, include: Rockwood Area School
District, Joseph E. Archer, Nancy J. Bonati, Christopher C. Bosworth, Deborah A. Bosworth,
Belita J. Brown, Stephen C. Brown, Deborah A. Cunningham, Paul V. Cunningham, Candace
DiMarco, Ross F. DiMarco Jr., Janeen Dupre, Karen A. Farmerie, Wilson J. Farmerie, David A.
Fetchko, Mary Ellen Fetchko, Clifford J. Forrest, Tracy L. Forrest, Gary D. Gadley, Annette D.
Ganassi, Hemlock Property LLC, Georgia C. Hernandez, Robert M. Hernandez, Martha E.
Hildebrandt, Mark J. Hileman, Rebecca L. Hileman, James A. Nassif, Qualified Personal
Residence Trust, Susan A. Jurik, Kurt J. Lesker III, William J. Lloyd, David P. Mendis, Lisa B.
Mendis, Joseph C. Metzgar, Lynette E. Metzgar, Erin Morris, Michael A. Morris, Netco Inc., Mary
Jo Ochson, John C. Prentice, Douglas Keith Rosetti, Ronald T. Rosetti, Seven Springs Farm, Inc.,
Matthew Tarosky, Three Rivers Enterprises Inc., David A. Tonnies, Cynthia G. Urgo, Donald J.
Urgo, Virginia’s Pheasant Run Limited Partnership, David A. Webber, Lorie A. Webber, Harold
Wiegel, Steven H. Wiegel, James P. Wilhelm, Paige M. Wilhelm, Jackie Wolfe, Jacquelyn K.
Wolfe, Tim Wolfe, and Timothy W. Wolfe.
2
(collectively, the Districts) tax millage differences when there was no evidence of
the effect on the Districts; (4) whether the Secretary erred by finding a difference in
management quality without considering all relevant factors; (5) whether substantial
evidence supports the Secretary’s finding of educational merit in the proposed
transfer; and (6) whether the Secretary’s finding of educational merit was against the
weight of the evidence.2 After review, this Court vacates and remands.
I. Background
On June l, 2012, Respondents filed the Petition in the trial court
pursuant to Section 242.1 the Public School Code of 1949 (School Code),3 24 P.S.
§ 2-242.1, therein seeking to transfer territory consisting of a portion of property
located within Jefferson Township (Territory) out of the Districts for educational
and real estate tax improvement purposes. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 400a.
Section 242.1(a) of the School Code provides, in relevant part:
A majority of the taxable inhabitants of any contiguous
territory in any school district or school districts, as herein
established, may present their petition to the court of
common pleas of the county in which each contiguous
territory, or a greater part thereof, is situated, asking that
the territory be established as an independent district for
the sole purpose of transfer to an adjacent school district
contiguous thereto. Where the territory described in any
such petition is to be taken from two or more school
districts, such petition shall be signed by a majority of all
the taxable inhabitants of the part of each school district
which is to be included in such independent district for
transfer. Such petitions shall set forth a proper description
of the boundaries of the territory to be included in such
proposed independent district, and the reasons of the
2
This Court has reordered and summarized Somerset’s issues for ease of discussion herein.
3
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101 - 27-2702. Section 242.1
was added by Section 1 of the Act of June 23,1965, P.L. 139.
3
petitioners for requesting such transfer to another school
district and the name of the district into which its territory
is proposed to be placed.
24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a).
Somerset is located in Somerset County, which is comprised of four
municipalities: Lincoln Township, Jefferson Township, Somerset Township, and
Somerset Borough. See R.R. at 9a. None of Somerset’s school buildings are located
in Jefferson Township. See id. Somerset had a total of 2,263 students enrolled for
the 2014-2015 school year. See id. The Territory is located south of Forbes State
Forest within Jefferson Township in the southwestern part of Somerset County and
is the part of Somerset that is contiguous to Rockwood. See id. The Territory
consists of 39 parcels of real property situated in Jefferson Township, all of which
pay real estate taxes to Somerset. See id. Of the 39 parcels, 25 property owners
joined the Petition (Joinders). See id. Many properties within the Territory are on
dead-end roads that originate in Middlecreek Township, which is assigned to
Rockwood, but end in Jefferson Township. See id. Nine of the 39 properties are
owned by entities rather than individuals. See R.R. at 10a. Only 2 property owners
among the 25 Joinders have established permanent residency, are voters registered
at those addresses, and pay earned income tax and per capita tax or adult residence
tax to Somerset. See id. Approximately half of the 39 parcels are not improved by
a home or residential building structure and, of those that are (aside from possibly 8
full-time residents associated with an unknown quantity of parcels as asserted by
Respondents), the residences are not primary residences. See id.
Rockwood is located in Somerset County, and is comprised of eight
municipalities: Black Township, Casselman Borough, Middlecreek Township,
Milford Township, New Centerville Borough, Rockwood Borough, Seven Springs
Borough, and Upper Turkeyfoot Township. See R.R. at 11a. During the 2013-2014
4
school year, 729 students were enrolled in Rockwood and 23 students were enrolled
in non-public schools. See id.
Respondents alleged in the Petition that there is a greater distance
between the Territory and Somerset’s schools than between the Territory and
Rockwood’s schools. See R.R. at 399a. Respondents further asserted that the
property owned by Seven Springs Farm, Inc., (Seven Springs Farm) located within
the Territory, is the only portion of Seven Springs Farm’s property that is not located
within Rockwood. See id. In addition, the plan of lots known as Pheasant Run is
located partly in Somerset and partly in Rockwood. See id. Respondents also
averred that the 13:1 teacher-to-student ratio in Rockwood is better than the 14:1
ratio in Somerset, and that Rockwood offers a superior educational opportunity. See
R.R. at 400a. Additionally, Respondents alleged that the 2010 tax millages for
Rockwood and Somerset were 21.89 and 37.96 respectively. See id. Their 2011 tax
millages were 21.89 and 39.50 respectively. See id.
On August 22, 2012, the Somerset County Common Pleas Court (trial
court) held a hearing to consider whether the Petition complied with the preliminary
requirement of Section 242.1(a) of the School Code that Respondents qualify as “[a]
majority of taxable inhabitants of a[] contiguous territory[.]” 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a).
On November 16, 2012, the trial court concluded that Respondents failed to meet
the statute’s preliminary procedural requirements because only two of the Petition
signers qualified as taxable inhabitants and, even if the trial court included four
properties that are contiguous to the parcels owned by those taxable inhabitants, that
area was not adjacent to Rockwood into which it was proposed to be transferred.
Thus, the trial court dismissed the Petition.
Respondents appealed to this Court. On August 9, 2013, this Court held
“that the trial court erred in concluding that a ‘taxable inhabitant,’ as used in the
[School Code], must be a human being who permanently resides in the proposed
5
independent school district to participate in a transfer proceeding[.]” In re Indep.
Sch. Dist. for Prop. Situate in Jefferson Twp., 74 A.3d 389, 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)
(footnote omitted). Accordingly, this Court reversed the trial court’s order and
remanded for further proceedings.
On April 22, 2014, the trial court forwarded the Petition to the Secretary
to evaluate the Petition’s educational merits in accordance with Section 242.1 of the
School Code. The Department of Education (Department) forwarded Educational
Impact Projection Questionnaires to the Districts. The Districts responded to the
questionnaires and the matter was assigned to the Deputy Secretary for
consideration. The Deputy Secretary concluded that it was impossible to evaluate
the proposed transfer’s educational merit because no students lived in the proposed
independent school district. Absent students living in the proposed school district,
the Deputy Secretary determined that the Petition lacked educational merit.
Respondents sought a formal administrative hearing to challenge the
Deputy Secretary’s decision. On August 1, 2019, a hearing examiner conducted a
hearing at which the parties presented a joint stipulation and witness testimony.
Following the hearing, the Secretary issued a decision adopting the Deputy
Secretary’s determination as his adjudication.
Respondents again appealed to this Court, see Archer, arguing that the
Secretary erred by concluding that the absence of any students residing in the
proposed school district was fatal to the Petition. In Archer, this Court reversed the
Secretary’s order, explaining:
Section 242.1(a) [of the School Code] contains a detailed
list of what must be contained in a petition to establish an
independent school district. The petition must contain: (1)
the boundaries of the proposed independent school
district; (2) a verification that a majority of “taxable
inhabitants” in the “contiguous territory” agree to the
transfer; (3) the reasons for the transfer; and (4) an
6
identification of the school district to be joined. 24 P.S. §
2-242.1(a). This list does not include a statement that
students currently reside in the independent school district.
Likewise, it does not require any information about the
number of students that may be affected or how a transfer
would benefit them.
Section 242.1(a) [of the School Code] requires the
Secretary to consider the “merits of the petition” from an
“educational standpoint.” 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a) (emphasis
added). In In re Weaverland Independent School District,
. . . 106 A.2d 812, 813-14 ([Pa.] 1954), the phrase “merits
. . . from an educational standpoint” was challenged as
vague and an impermissible delegation of legislative
power. Acknowledging that a statute must prescribe “with
reasonable clarity the limits of power delegated,” the
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court held that “educational
merit” met that clarity standard. Id. at 814 (quotation
omitted). It held that “educational merit” referred to
“school considerations,” giving the phrase “educational
merit” its “ordinary meaning.” Id. at 814-15. Specifically,
the review requires the Secretary to determine whether
“the establishment of a proposed independent school
district will advance or hinder the educational facilities in
the designated area.” Id. at 815.
This Court has explained that the term “educational”
means “of, relating to, or concerned with education or the
field of education” and “[s]erving to further education.”
[In re Petition for Formation of Indep. Sch. Dist.
Consisting of the Borough of Highspire], 228 A.3d [584,]
593 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), rev’d, 260 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2021)
(Highspire II)] (citing Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 723 (2002)). The term “education” refers to a
course of study, learning, instruction, and training. Id.These are abstract precepts.
Archer, 249 A.3d at 624-25 (footnote and citation omitted).
The Archer Court expounded:
The Secretary’s analysis of educational merit must be
done without regard to a discrete student population.
Indeed, any student population changes over the
course of years, as students move in or out of the
district or graduate. It is noteworthy that it took the
7
Secretary five years to make a determination on the
educational merit of the proposed independent school
district.
The Secretary’s conclusion is also inconsistent with this
Court’s holding that standing to file a transfer petition is
based upon liability for real estate taxes, not upon
parenthood or residency. [See] Jefferson Twp. . . . A
petition for an independent school district transfers
territory from one school district to another, [In re:
Petition for Formation of Indep. Sch. Dist. (]Riegelsville
II[),] 17 A.3d [977,] 988 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)]; it does not
transfer people.
Archer, 249 A.3d at 625 (bold emphasis added). Thus, this Court held that the
Secretary erred by dismissing the Petition based on the lack of students residing in
the proposed independent school district.4
The Archer Court further emphasized:
Merit from an educational standpoint begins with “school
considerations.” [] Weaverland, 106 A.2d at 814. We
have held that “school considerations” include[] the
proximity of schools to the proposed independent school
district. Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 990-91. It also includes
consideration of the educational outcomes of each district.
There is no requirement that a petition involve an exit from
4
Senior Judge Leadbetter dissented, explaining:
I fully agree with the majority that the absence of school-aged
students in an area for which a district transfer is proposed does not,
in and of itself, bar the transfer or automatically mean that there can
be no educational merit to the transfer. However, I disagree that the
Secretary . . . based his decision on any such conclusion. In
discussing his agreement with the recommendation of the hearing
examiner, he stated[:] “I do not believe the Deputy Secretary
imposed a specific requirement that there be school[-]age[d]
students to approve the Petition.” (Sec’y’s Op. at p.4.) Rather, he
found that under the highly unusual circumstances here, evidence
regarding the traditional factors would be too speculative to form
the basis of a conclusion regarding educational merit.
Archer, 249 A.3d at 627 (Leadbetter, S.J., dissenting).
8
a severely deficient school district in order to show
educational merit.
Archer, 249 A.3d at 625 (citation omitted). In addition, the Archer Court considered
the parties’ stipulation which, inter alia, reflected that Rockwood’s schools are
closer to the proposed independent school district than Somerset’s schools. With
respect thereto, the Archer Court noted that “[a] reduction in students’ travel time
has been held to demonstrate educational merit.” Id. The Archer Court also
referenced Rockwood’s better student/teacher ratio, lower tax millage rates and
fewer administrators, stating that “[b]etter management has been held to demonstrate
educational merit.” Id. at 626. The Archer Court further observed that Rockwood
students scored better than Somerset students on various proficiency tests over a
seven-year period, and that the School Code “makes district performance a factor in
the evaluation of educational merit.” Id.
Concluding that the Secretary had refused to evaluate the stipulated
facts and hearing testimony because of the absence of any students in the proposed
territory, this Court reversed the Secretary’s order and remanded the matter to the
Secretary to “evaluate all of the evidence against the factors that, according to
precedent, have been held to demonstrate merit from an educational standpoint.” Id.
at 627.
On October 7, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its
decision in Highspire II, wherein the Supreme Court explained:
Transfer petitions under Section []242.1 [of the School
Code] are factually unique and depend upon the
circumstances raised in a particular case. In those
petitions where financial conditions may play a role in
the Secretary’s assessment of educational merit, there
should be no constraints on his or her ability to take
them into consideration. Moreover, it must be
acknowledged that in reviewing a petition for
educational merit, the Secretary must take a holistic
approach, looking not just at the students who would
9
be transferred, but at the students in each of the
affected school districts. See, e.g., Wash[.] Twp. [Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Pa. State Bd. of Educ., 153 A.3d 1177,] 1181
[(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)]. No language in Section 242.1 [of
the School Code] requires the Secretary to limit his or her
review only to the newly proposed school district, and
neither the Secretary nor the Commonwealth Court have
ever limited an educational merits analysis in this way.
Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 941 (italic, bold and underline emphasis added; footnote
omitted).
On February 4, 2022, the Secretary issued his opinion on remand
(Opinion) and the Order. See R.R. at 8a-33a. In his Opinion, the Secretary
referenced Archer, stating:
[L]ooking at many of the traditional factors of
“educational merit” present in its previous cases, the
[Archer] Court has found that the record in this matter
contains evidence of educational merit. Notably in
Archer[,] the Commonwealth Court did not accept former
Secretary Rivera’s conclusion that the weight of the
academic merits presented by this transfer could not be
determined due to a lack of students or prospective
students in the territory. The Court has also implicitly
rejected former Secretary Rivera’s conclusion that
because there was no evidence that travel times of any
potential students would be reduced by the transfer (as
opposed to simply travel distance) that was not a measure
of educational merit. Further in Archer, [the]
Commonwealth Court rejected former Secretary Rivera’s
conclusion that the School Code states an educational
preference for keeping a township (in this case, Jefferson
Township) as part of one school district. Instead, the
[Archer] Court stated that the Secretary must focus on
the need to keep a “community of interest” together
which it found would be the case in this matter by
bringing the real estate development of Seven Springs
Farm []. together in one school district.
R.R. at 23a-24a (bold emphasis added).
10
Acknowledging that he was constrained by Archer, the Secretary then
concluded that reduced travel distance, better academic results, better school district
management, and more favorable taxes demonstrate educational merit favoring the
transfer. Somerset appealed to this Court.5
II. Discussion
Initially, the Highspire II Court explained:
Section []242.1 of the [] School Code ([]Section 242.1[])
provides a means for a majority of the taxable inhabitants
within a geographical territory to file a petition to create
an independent school district for the purpose of
transferring that territory to another school district that is
territorially contiguous with that of the petitioning district.
24 P.S. § 2-242.1. The petition must initially be filed with
the court of common pleas, which determines if the
petition meets certain basic procedural requirements, e.g.,
that a majority of the taxable inhabitants of the would-be
independent district have signed the petition and that the
proposed receiving district is contiguous to that territory.
See In re Establishment of Indep. [Sch.] Dist. of
Wheatland, 846 A.2d 771 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 2004). The
court of common pleas then sends the petition to the
Secretary, who then must pass on “the merits of the
petition for its creation, from an educational standpoint.”
24 P.S. § 2-242.1.
If the Secretary approves the petition, it is returned to the
trial court to sign a decree establishing the independent
school district, along with a statement of the obligations of
the school district from which the independent school
district is being severed and a statement prorating the state
subsidies payable between or among the former school
district and the new school district. Wheatland, 846 A.2d
at 773. The matter is then transferred to the State Board
5
“This Court’s review determines whether constitutional rights have been violated,
whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, whether the proceedings relating to practice
and procedure before an agency were violated, and whether necessary findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence.” Archer, 249 A.3d at 622 n.5.
11
[of Education] under Section 292.1 of the School Code,[6]
Wash[.] T[wp.], 153 A.3d at 1187, to determine whether
the transfer would “violate the adopted [State] Board [of
Education] standards or express statutory standards that
govern the organization of school districts.” Riegelsville
II, 17 A.3d at 981-82. If the State Board [of Education]
approves, then the independent district is merged into the
new and reconstituted school district. Id.
Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 936.
Even though the School Code neither defines the phrase
“merits from an educational standpoint” nor any of the
component words therein, the phrase is not vague, is not a
technical term, and must be given its ordinary meaning.
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 985 n.10. Specifically[,]
regarding the scope and meaning of the Secretary’s
statutory authority to “pass” on the merits, we have held
that his or her authority is not open-ended but instead
restricted to the substantive provisions of the School Code.
Id. at 991. Further, analogizing the Secretary’s role to a
veto power, id. at 982, we have held: “[W]hen the
Secretary exercises his [or her] discretion to determine
whether a proposed transfer has ‘merit from an
educational standpoint,’ he [or she] must be guided by the
policy choices made by the legislature in the [School
Code] and not by his [or her] own personal sense of what
constitutes good education policy.” Id. at 991. This
“manifest restriction” on the Secretary’s power is
“necessary lest the statute violate the proscription against
delegating legislative power to an administrative agency.”
Id. at 988-89.
Wash. Twp., 153 A.3d at 1184.
The [] School Code . . . creates comprehensive
accountability mechanisms. It includes provisions
requiring school districts to submit yearly financial reports
with budget statements, [See Sections 218,[7] 687, 2133[8]
of the School Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 2-218, 6-687, 21-2133,
and establishes auditing and reporting requirements. [See
6
Added by the Act of June 23, 1965, P.L. 139, as amended, 24 P.S. § 2-292.1.
7
Added by the Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 44, No. 16, § 1.1.
8
Added by the Act of February 4, 1982, P.L. 1, § 5.
12
Sections 2401-2462, 24 P.S.] §§ 24-[2]401 - 24-2462.
Records of these reports are required to be retained by the
district for at least six years. [See Section 518 of the
School Code, 24 P.S.] § 5-518. The General Assembly
has created a framework for identifying and monitoring
school districts in financial distress and to assist them in
financial recovery through the development and
implementation of recovery plans. [See Sections 601-A-
695-A of the School Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 6-601-A - 6-695-
A.[9] The General Assembly developed a special system
to assess school districts’ financial practices and establish
public financial accountability. [See Sections 2501-2511
of the School Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 25-2501 - 25-2511 . . . .
Districts that use “best practices” because of demonstrated
financial management “instill public confidence,” while
those who do not exhibit best practices are required to
provide an action plan to remedy issues identified by the
assessment. See [Sections 2507-A - 2508-A of the School
Code, 24 P.S.] §§ 25-2507-A - 25-2508-A.[10] These
provisions are supplemented by regulations in [Chapter 18
of the State Board of Education’s Regulations,] 22 Pa.
Code [§§ 18.1-18.8], and together they aim to identify
school districts with negative financial conditions that
might impact their ability to provide and maintain
educational programs for students and methods to rectify
those conditions.
These provisions of the [] School Code reflect our General
Assembly’s unmistakable recognition that a school
district’s financial health is an essential factor in its ability
to provide a suitable education to its students. To require
the Secretary to attempt to fulfill his [or her] duty to
ascertain the educational merits of a school district transfer
under Section 242.1 [of the School Code] without
considering the issues of financial viability undermines his
or her ability to make a meaningful determination. The []
School Code demonstrates the legislature’s obvious
recognition that a school district cannot educate students
without adequate resources. Educational resources are not
free - teachers, buildings, school supplies, computers, etc.
9
Sections 601-A - 695-A of the School Code were added by Section 10 of the Act of July
12, 2012, P.L. 1142.
10
Sections 2507-A and 2508-A of the School Code were added by Section 36 of the Act
of December 23, 2003, P.L. 304.
13
all need to be financed. To the extent that a proposed
independent school district results in undermining the
ability of the remaining school district to finance the
educational needs of its students, that detriment is a
legitimate consideration in the Secretary’s analysis. For
these reasons, in conducting a review of the educational
merits of a proposed school district transfer petition, the
Secretary may undoubtedly consider financial conditions
that would result from the transfer.
Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 940.
Moreover,
[t]he leading case on the construction of th[e] words[,
“merits from an educational standpoint,”] is . . .
Weaverland . . . . It addressed the meaning of “merits from
an educational standpoint” and the extent of the
Secretary’s power to determine those merits.
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 986.
[The Weaverland Court] explained:
The statute directs the [s]uperintendent to
pass upon the merits of the petition “from an
educational standpoint.” Giving those words
their usual and ordinary meaning, [see]
Statutory Construction Act of 1937, P.L.
1019, Sec[tion] 33, [formerly] 46 P.S. § 533,
[repealed by the act of December 6, 1972,
P.L. 1339,] they can have no other intended
import than that the Superintendent must
determine whether, on the basis of his expert
knowledge in the field of education, the
establishment of a proposed independent
school district will advance or hinder the
educational facilities in the designated area.
It is difficult to imagine how the legislature
could have more explicitly expressed its
intention in the premises.
[Weaverland], 106 A.2d at 815 (emphasis added).[11]
11
The Riegelsville II Court further stated:
14
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 988.
Weaverland interpreted “merits from an educational
standpoint” at a time when approval of an independent
school district effected a new district, not a transfer, and
the reason for a proposed new district was limited to
“better facilities.” Nevertheless, Weaverland continues
to control the construction of “merits from an
educational standpoint” in two important respects.
First, the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court held that the
Secretary’s power under Section 242 [of the School Code]
In 1954, when Weaverland was decided, the [School Code]
contained a provision at Section 241 [of the School Code] that
explains the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court’s above-quoted
analysis. Section 241 [of the School Code] stated, in relevant part,
as follows:
Such petition shall set forth a proper description of
the boundaries of the territory to be included in such
proposed independent school district, and the desire
of the petitioners for better school facilities than are
or would be provided and maintained by the district
or districts of which such independent school district
is a part.
24 P.S. § 2-241 (emphasis added). Section 241 [of the School Code]
has been replaced with the following provision:
Such petition[s] shall set forth a proper description of
the boundaries of the territory to be included in such
proposed independent district, and the reasons of the
petitioners for requesting such transfer to another
school district and the name of the district into which
its territory is proposed to be placed.
Section 242.1(a) of the [School Code], 24 P.S. § 2-242.1(a)
[(emphasis added)]. The current law, i.e., Section 242.1(a) [of the
School Code], does not mention school facilities. Petitioners are
now free to cite reasons other than “better school facilities” for their
proposed transfer.
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 988.
15
is “manifestly restricted,” which is necessary lest the
statute violate the proscription against delegating
legislative power to an administrative agency. Second, in
ruling that “merits from an educational standpoint” was
not vague, the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court turned to
other, relevant provisions in the [School Code] to give the
standard substance. That continues to be the appropriate
approach to discerning the meaning and application of the
statutory standard.
Riegelsville II, 17 A.3d at 988-89 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
A. Law of the Case
Somerset first argues that given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
holding in Highspire II, this Court should revisit its Archer decision. Despite
approving the Petition, the Secretary expressed his unease in finding educational
merit in the transfer where there are no students in the Territory. He questioned
Archer’s continued applicability in light of our Supreme Court’s Highspire II
decision. The Secretary observed:
[W]hile I am required to follow the ruling of [the]
Commonwealth Court in Archer remanding this matter, I
believe the [Commonwealth] Court’s opinion to be in
tension with the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court’s
subsequent ruling in [Highspire II]. While Somerset did
not appeal Archer and the cases involve different issues,
the fact that Archer prevents me from considering that
there are no students here, or in my view[,] no
reasonable prospect of students, is difficult to reconcile
with [Highspire II]. Indeed, the Archer [C]ourt’s
statements that the definition of educational merit
involves “abstract precepts” and that “[t]he Secretary’s
analysis of educational merit must be done without regard
to a discrete student population” is [sic] difficult to
square with [our] Supreme Court’s statement in
[Highspire II] that in reviewing such petitions “the
Secretary must take a holistic approach, looking not
just at the students who would be transferred, but at the
students in each of the affected school districts.”
16
[Highspire II], [260 A.3d] at 941[] ([italic] emphasis
added). Compare also with Archer, 249 A.3d at 627
([s]tating that “[a] petition for an independent school
district transfers territory from one school district to
another . . . does not transfer people”[]). Indeed, it is
arguable that the Supreme Court’s approach to viewing
these cases, following the values set forth in the School
Code, is a student-based approach and the approach
embodied in the Archer opinion is not. It is also clear in
[Highspire II] that the Secretary’s role in determining
educational merits is to weigh educational values when
they may be competing. Accordingly, it is problematic to
require the Secretary to ignore discrete student populations
impacted, or in this case that no actual students will be
benefited by improved transportation times or
improvements in test scores or school district
management. Without actual students, it appears the
only educational benefit here is reduced taxes for
certain taxpayers, which the Commonwealth Court
itself has held is not sufficient in its own to constitute
educational merit. Archer, 249 A.3d at 627. If I were to
be permitted to consider the lack of students involved
in this transfer, I would weigh the educational benefits
to this transfer to the hypothetical students in this
territory to be negligible.
R.R. at 30a-31a (bold emphasis added).
Respondents counter that, notwithstanding the Secretary’s misgivings,
the “law of the case” doctrine prevents this Court from revisiting its earlier holding
in Archer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described:
Th[e law of the case] doctrine refers to a family of rules
which embody the concept that a court involved in the
later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen
questions decided by another judge of that same court or
by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.
Among the related but distinct rules which make up the
law of the case doctrine are that[] (1) upon remand for
further proceedings, a trial court may not alter the
resolution of a legal question previously decided by the
appellate court in the matter; (2) upon a second appeal,
an appellate court may not alter the resolution of a
legal question previously decided by the same appellate
17
court; and (3) upon transfer of a matter between trial
judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court
may not alter the resolution of a legal question previously
decided by the transferor trial court.
Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) (emphasis added; citations
omitted). “Departure from . . . these principles is allowed only in exceptional
circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the
controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the
dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would
create a manifest injustice if followed.” Id. at 1332 (emphasis added). Further, “[i]t
is well[ ]settled that changes in decisional law which occur during litigation will be
applied to cases pending on appeal.” Pa. State Police v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Bushta), 149 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 184 A.3d 958 (Pa. 2018)
(quoting Cipic v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Consolidation Coal Co.), 693 A.2d
1009, 1011 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (emphasis omitted)).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Highspire II decision effected a
change in the controlling law from the Archer Court’s reasoning. Unlike Archer,
which prohibits the Secretary’s educational merit analysis from considering a
discrete student population, Highspire II requires the Secretary to “take a holistic
approach, looking not just at the students who would be transferred, but at the
students in each of the affected school districts.” Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 941
(emphasis added). Further, Highspire II holds that “[i]n those petitions where
financial conditions may play a role in the Secretary’s assessment of educational
merit, there should be no constraints on his or her ability to take them into
consideration.” Id. This Court’s directive in Archer is irreconcilable with our
Supreme Court’s mandate in Highspire II. Accordingly, this Court concludes that
the Secretary should have rendered his Opinion in accordance with the law as
described in Highspire II.
18
B. Secretary’s Analysis of the Evidence
Somerset next contends that the Secretary, on remand from this Court’s
Order, erred by merely reciting (without analyzing) the evidence that the Archer
Court considered possibly relevant, and improperly deferred to the Archer Court’s
findings. Specifically, Somerset argues:
The Secretary’s report . . . conflates [the] Commonwealth
Court’s identification and discussion of evidence of
educational merits in the record to findings of fact, when
the statute clearly requires the Secretary’s independent
educational merit determination. There is no basis for the
Secretary to assert that his authority and responsibility to
act under the terms of applicable Pennsylvania [l]aw can
be abrogated by the Commonwealth Court. The
Secretary’s refusal to conduct the inquiry and
determination imposed upon the Department . . . is entirely
unjustified. Due process and common sense require the
Secretary’s full and adequate review and action.
Somerset Br. at 20.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared in Highspire II:
[W]eighing of interests are not in the purview of the
Commonwealth Court. . . . [I]t is for the Secretary to
weigh [] factor[s] in determining the educational merits
of the petition. In doing so, students in all of the affected
school districts over time are part of the analysis. . . . It is
the Secretary, applying his “expert knowledge in the
field of education” through the lens of the [] School
Code, who makes the determination of educational
merits in light of the factors.
Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 940-41 (bold and underline emphasis added).
By complying with this Court’s directives in Archer, the Secretary
applied a more constrained approach to weighing educational merits of the
Territory’s proposed transfer than was his role as later prescribed in Highspire II -
19
where financial conditions may play a role in the
Secretary’s assessment of educational merit, there should
be no constraints on his or her ability to take them into
consideration. . . . [I]n reviewing a petition for educational
merit, the Secretary must take a holistic approach,
looking not just at the students who would be transferred,
but at the students in each of the affected school districts.
Highspire II, 260 A.3d at 941 (bold and italic emphasis added; citation and footnote
omitted). Consistent therewith, the Secretary should have considered the entirety of
the impact on all of the affected school districts and weighed that impact on
Somerset’s students and on Rockwood’s students and those students in the
proposed independent district (including consideration of the current absence of any
such students and the lack of any record evidence that the student population will
likely increase in the near future, or record evidence of how the change will impact
Rockwood’s students’ education). Accordingly, as stated above, because Highspire
II was decided after Archer and was decided by our Supreme Court, the Secretary
should have applied the law as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared in
Highspire II.12
For all of the above reasons, the Secretary’s Order is vacated, and the
matter is remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.13
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
12
This Court notes that the Secretary’s decision reflects that the Secretary did more than
merely recite the evidence that the Archer Court considered relevant and analyzed the evidence.
Nonetheless, in weighing the evidence, it is clear that the Secretary relied, in large part, on the
Archer Court’s review, and the Archer Court’s constraints on such review. Given the Highspire
II decision, the Secretary must conduct his own independent review as informed by Highspire II.
13
Given this Court’s disposition of the first two issues, it does not reach Somerset’s
remaining issues on appeal.
20
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Somerset Area School District, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Rockwood Area School District, :
Joseph E. Archer, Nancy J. Bonati, :
Christopher C. Bosworth, Deborah A. :
Bosworth, Belita J. Brown, Stephen C. :
Brown, Deborah A. Cunningham, Paul :
V. Cunningham, Candace DiMarco, :
Ross F. DiMarco Jr., Janeen Dupre, :
Karen A. Farmerie, Wilson J. :
Farmerie, David A. Fetchko, Mary :
Ellen Fetchko, Clifford J. Forrest, :
Tracy L. Forrest, Gary D. Gadley, :
Annette D. Ganassi, Hemlock Property :
LLC, Georgia C. Hernandez, Robert :
M. Hernandez, Martha E. Hildebrandt, :
Mark J. Hileman, Rebecca L. Hileman, :
James A. Nassif, Qualified Personal :
Residence Trust, Susan A. Jurik, Kurt J. :
Lesker III, William J. Lloyd, David P. :
Mendis, Lisa B. Mendis, Joseph C. :
Metzgar, Lynette E. Metzgar, Erin :
Morris, Michael A. Morris, Netco Inc., :
Mary Jo Ochson, John C. Prentice, :
Douglas Keith Rosetti, Ronald T. :
Rosetti, Seven Springs Farm, Inc., :
Matthew Tarosky, Three Rivers :
Enterprises Inc., David A. Tonnies, :
Cynthia G. Urgo, Donald J. Urgo, :
Virginia’s Pheasant Run Limited :
Partnership, David A. Webber, Lorie A. :
Webber, Harold Wiegel, Steven H. :
Wiegel, James P. Wilhelm, Paige M. :
Wilhelm, Jackie Wolfe, Jacquelyn K. :
Wolfe, Tim Wolfe, and Timothy W. :
Wolfe (Pennsylvania Department of :
Education), : No. 175 C.D. 2022
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2023, the Secretary of Education’s
(Secretary) February 4, 2022 order is vacated. This matter is REMANDED to the
Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge