F. Rodriguez v. Super. Oberlander ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Fredil Rodriguez, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 715 C.D. 2022
: Submitted: March 24, 2023
Superintendent Oberlander :
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: June 23, 2023
Fredil Rodriguez (Inmate), a former inmate at the State Correctional
Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest),1 appeals, pro se, the order of the Northumberland
County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his Petition for Common Law Writ of
Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum (Habeas Petition) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure (Pa.R.Civ.P.) 240(j)(1).2 We affirm.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has summarized the facts underlying
Inmate’s current judgment of sentence, in relevant part, as follows:
[Inmate’s] conviction follows a bizarre
incident in which he stabbed his next door neighbor
[37] times with her own kitchen knives. In his
confession, [Inmate] stated that the victim . . .
1
By a February 3, 2023 letter, Inmate states that he has been transferred to SCI-Dallas.
2
Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) states, in pertinent part: “If, simultaneous with the commencement
of an action or proceeding . . . , a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action [or] proceeding . . . if it is satisfied
that the action [or] proceeding . . . is frivolous.”
stepped out onto her front porch on the morning of
June 10, 2005, wearing only her undergarments.
When she saw [Inmate], who was outside smoking,
she asked if he was locked out of his home or if he
needed to use a telephone. [Inmate] responded no
to both questions and the victim turned and went
into her house. For reasons not established by the
record, [Inmate] followed the victim into her home
and, when she attempted to ward him off with a
knife, [Inmate] punched her, disarmed her, and then
stabbed her multiple times. He first used the knife
he had taken from her and then others that he took
from the kitchen, as some of the knife blades bent
during the multiple stabbings. After [Inmate] had
inflicted [37] stab wounds, he took off his bloody
clothes and placed them inside two plastic garbage
bags. He then locked the front door of the victim’s
house, washed his hands in the victim’s sink, and
exited through the back door, returning to his own
home. The victim died from her injuries.
[Commonwealth v. Fuentes (Pa. Super., No. 1288 MDA
2006, filed Oct. 10, 2007), slip op. at 1-2].
On March 17, 2006, [Inmate] entered an open guilty
plea, with the assistance of counsel and an interpreter, to
one count each of criminal homicide and criminal trespass,
and two counts of aggravated assault.[3] At the April 17,
2006 degree of guilt hearing, the trial court found [Inmate]
guilty of murder of the first degree. On June 26, 2006, the
court sentenced him to a term of life without the possibility
of parole plus not less than three nor more than seven
years’ incarceration. [Inmate] appealed and th[e Superior]
Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on October 10,
2007. [See id., slip op. at 1]. [Inmate] did not seek review
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
3
“[Sections 2501(a), 3503(a)(1)(i), and 2702(a)(1) and (4) of the Crimes Code,] 18 Pa. C.S.
§§2501(a), 3503(a)(1)(i), [and] 2702(a)(1) and [(4)], respectively. The aggravated assault
convictions merged for purposes of sentencing. [Notes of Testimony], Sentencing, 6/26/06, at
25.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes (Pa. Super., No. 174 MDA 2018, filed October 5, 2018), slip op.
at 2 n.1.
2
Commonwealth v. Fuentes (Pa. Super., No. 174 MDA 2018, filed October 5, 2018),
slip op. at 1-2 (citation omitted).
On February 15, 2022, Inmate filed his Habeas Petition4 against former
Superintendent Derek Oberlander at SCI-Forest (Respondent) alleging, inter alia,
that “Respondent is unlawfully depriving [Inmate] of his liberty in violation of all
known rights afforded [him] in violation of the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitution[]s,” in that Respondent “possesses no lawful documentation that can
authorize any commitment or imprisonment . . . .” Habeas Petition at 2, 3.
Specifically, Inmate accused Respondent of False Imprisonment based on “the lack
of any lawful Commitment Order[5] to grant jurisdictional authority to permit []
4
As this Court has explained:
Initially, we note that “a claim that a defendant’s sentence is
illegal due to the inability of the [Department of Corrections (DOC)]
to produce a written sentencing order related to [his] judgment of
sentence constitutes a claim legitimately sounding in habeas
corpus.” Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A writ of habeas
corpus “is an extraordinary remedy that is available after other
remedies have been exhausted or are ineffectual or nonexistent . . .
[and] is not a substitute for appellate review.” Department of
Corrections v. Reese, 774 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Primarily, “the writ of habeas corpus has functioned . . . to test the
legality of the petitioner’s commitment and detention,”
Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110[, 112] (Pa.
1971), and “lies to correct void or illegal sentences or an illegal
detention.” Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 180 A.2d 923,
924 (Pa. 1962).
Commonwealth ex rel. Connelly v. Gilmore (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1919 C.D. 2016, filed August 25,
2017), slip op. at 3-4; see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“[A]n unreported memorandum opinion of the
Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008,” “may be cited for [its] persuasive value.”).
5
Section 9764(a)(8) of the Judicial Code states, in pertinent part:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
3
Respondent to lawfully restrain [Inmate].” Id. at 4. Inmate asserted that “[f]or []
Respondent to arbitrarily delegate authority upon any other document other tha[n] a
lawful Commitment Order is contrary to ‘Precedent[i]al Law’ and establishes an
encroachment by [] Respondent upon the judicial powers and authority of the
legislature[.]” Id. at 4-5. Accordingly, Inmate asked the trial court to “GRANT [his
Habeas Petition] without unnecessary delay.” Id. at 5. Along with his Habeas
Petition, Inmate also filed a Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP Petition) in
the trial court that same day.
On February 15, 2022, as well, the trial court issued an order stating the
following, in pertinent part:
[U]pon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the
action is DISMISSED pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. [] 240(j)(1)
as frivolous,[6] that is, it lacks an arguable basis in law and
fact inasmuch as [Inmate’s] confinement is pursuant to his
[judgment of] sentence of life without parole entered by
this court at No. CR-05-657 following [his] guilty plea to
(a) General rule.--Upon commitment of an inmate to the custody
of the [DOC], the sheriff or transporting official shall provide to the
institution’s records officer or duty officer, in addition to a copy of
the court commitment form DC-300B generated from the Common
Pleas Criminal Court Case Management System of the unified
judicial system, the following information:
***
(8) A copy of the sentencing order . . . .
42 Pa. C.S. §9764(a)(8).
6
As this Court has observed: “A frivolous action has been defined as one that ‘lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact.’ Note to Pa.R.C[iv].P. [] 240(j) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989)). Stated differently, a frivolous action fails to state a valid cause of action on its
face. McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).” Laramy v. Garman (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 928 C.D. 2018, filed February 12, 2020), slip op. at 4.
4
criminal homicide and related charges, which [judgment
of] sentence has been repeatedly upheld by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court on his multiple petitions for
post-conviction relief. His claim here of false
imprisonment is frivolous.
Trial Court 2/15/22 Order (footnote omitted). Inmate then filed the instant timely
appeal of the trial court’s order.7
On appeal,8 Inmate claims: (1) Respondent did not have statutory
authority to accept or commit Inmate at intake without the particular authenticated
or certified records required by Section 9764 of the Judicial Code; (2) Respondent
had a statutory responsibility to turn Inmate away at intake absent the particular
authenticated or certified records required by Section 9764, and not to commit or
hold him as an inmate; (3) Section 9764 does not authorize Respondent to fabricate
sentencing and/or commitment forms to commit Inmate after intake; and (4) there is
no authority outside of Section 9764 that authorizes Respondent to commit and/or
hold Inmate where the requirements of Section 9764 have not been met.
As this Court has elucidated:
In Travis v. Giroux (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 489 C.D.
2013, filed December 18, 2013)[,] a prisoner argued in his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus that “the DOC’s
regulations and the Judicial Code require a sentencing
order and other documentation before the DOC may
confine an individual” and “because no sentencing order
exists for his conviction, the DOC was without authority
to confine him.” Slip op. at 7. On appeal, this Court
affirmed the dismissal of the prisoner’s petition,
7
Inmate filed this appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. However, by a June 3, 2022
order, the Superior Court transferred the appeal to this Court.
8
In reviewing a trial court’s order dismissing a petition pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1),
this Court is limited to determining whether the appellant’s constitutional rights were violated, and
whether trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Jones v. Doe, 126 A.3d 406,
408 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
5
concluding that “the absence of a sentencing order does
not make his confinement illegal.” Id. Likewise, where a
prisoner was unable to secure a copy of his sentencing
order through the [Right-to-Know Law9] and thereafter
filed a petition for habeas corpus, the Superior Court held
that the prisoner “has no basis on which to argue that the
DOC does not have the authority to incarcerate him merely
because it does not possess a copy of his sentencing
order.” O’Hara v. Giroux (Pa. Super., No. 15 WDA 2015,
filed August 11, 2015)[,] slip op. at 6. The rationale
supporting these decisions is that, even though the DOC
does not possess a prisoner’s sentencing order, this fact
fails to demonstrate that the prisoner was not convicted of
or sentenced for a crime, and there is no legal authority,
statutory or otherwise, that provides a prisoner with
grounds for discharge in such a scenario. See Joseph[ v.
Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2014)] (stating that
“the trial court correctly concluded that, even in the
absence of a written sentencing order, the [DOC] had
continuing authority to detain [the prisoner].”)
Conversely, both this Court and our Superior Court
have held that where the criminal docket sheet, or other
comparable evidence, reflects that the prisoner was
convicted and sentenced, there is “sufficient authority to
maintain a prisoner’s detention notwithstanding the
absence of a written sentencing order[.]” Joseph, 96 A.3d
at 372; see Travis, slip op. at 6.
This Court may take judicial notice of official court
records and public documents in a connected case. See,
e.g., Pa.R.E. 201(b)(2); Germantown Cab Company v.
Philadelphia Parking Authority, 27 A.3d 280, 283 n.8 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2011); Doxsey v. Commonwealth, 674 A.2d
1173, 1174 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
Commonwealth ex rel. Connelly, slip op. at 4-5.
Upon our review, we note that the entries for criminal docket number
CP-49-CR-0000657-2005 in the trial court clearly evidence that on March 17, 2006,
9
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.
6
Inmate pleaded guilty to one count each of criminal homicide and criminal trespass
and two counts of aggravated assault. See Docket Sheets, CP-49-CR-0000657-2005,
at 4, 8. The docket entries also clearly evidence that on June 26, 2006, Inmate was
sentenced on his homicide conviction to a judgment of sentence of life without
parole, and to consecutive terms of three years, six months, to seven years on each
of his aggravated assault convictions. See id. at 4, 10. As a result, there is sufficient
authority by which Respondent may hold Inmate in custody, and the trial court did
not err in dismissing Inmate’s Habeas Petition without a hearing. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Connelly, slip op. at 7 (“A hearing is not required where, as
here, the petitioner’s allegations are refuted by the record and/or the law, or where
the petition does not make out a prima facie case for allowing the writ.”).
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
7
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Fredil Rodriguez, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 715 C.D. 2022
:
Superintendent Oberlander :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of June, 2023, the order of the
Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas dated February 15, 2022, is
AFFIRMED.