In re: Proposed Annexation of Wilkinsburg by the City of Pittsburgh ~ Appeal of: T. Evans, M. Garcia, D. Raubenstrauch, V. Buffry and M. Rose ( 2023 )

N THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re: Proposed Annexation of :
Wilkinsburg by the City of Pittsburgh :
:
Petition of: Tracey Evans, Monica Garcia, :
Debra Raubenstrauch, Vanessa Buffry :
and Michael Rose :
: No. 1376 C.D. 2022
Intervenor Objectors: Carmen Brown, : Argued: May 10, 2023
Renee Haynes-Johnson, Borough of :
Wilkinsburg, Moira Kaleida, Angel :
Gober, Susan Oerkvitz, Pamela Harbin and :
Evan Gascoine :
:
Appeal of: Tracey Evans, Monica Garcia, :
Debra Raubenstrauch, Vanessa Buffry :
and Michael Rose :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: July 13, 2023
Five residents of the Borough of Wilkinsburg (Appellants) appeal
from the October 28, 2022 order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas
(trial court) that granted the objections of several residents of the Borough of
Wilkinsburg and of the City of Pittsburgh (City), and the Borough of Wilkinsburg
(Wilkinsburg) (together, Objectors),1 and dismissed Appellants’ Petition to Initiate
Annexation (Annexation Petition) filed under the 1903 Annexation Law (1903
Annexation Law).2 At issue is the validity of the 1903 Annexation Law, and whether
Appellants may seek annexation of Wilkinsburg to the City by way of the 1903
Annexation Law, or whether they must proceed under another method of annexation.
Appellants present three questions for our review. First, we consider
whether the 1903 Annexation Law was implicitly repealed in 1970 when the
legislature failed to pass a uniform municipal reapportionment law within two years
of the adoption of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. The second question is
closely related to the first and asks us to review whether the trial court erred by
failing to fully consider the effect of the Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act, 53
Pa. C.S. §§731-741,3 on the 1903 Annexation Law. Third, we consider whether the
1
Three Objectors, Kate Luxemburg, Renee Haynes-Johnson, and Carmen Brown, are
participating pro se. Ms. Haynes-Johnson filed a brief. Ms. Luxemburg and Ms. Brown did not
file briefs and were precluded from participating in oral argument by Order of this Court dated
April 20, 2023. In its order, the trial court also granted Objectors’ various petitions to intervene,
which Appellants did not contest.
2
Act of April 28, 1903, P.L. 332, as amended, repealed by the Act of July 7, 2022, P.L.
455, No. 41 (Act 41 of 2022), formerly 53 P.S. §§171-176.
3
The Act of October 13, 1994, P.L. 596, No. 90, consolidated at 53 Pa. C.S. §§731-741.
The parties sometimes refer to this act as Act 90 of 1994. The Municipal Consolidation or Merger
Act governs consolidation (combination of two or more municipalities to create a new
municipality) and mergers (combination of two or more municipalities to create one larger,
surviving municipality), but only for municipalities other than Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. See
53 Pa. C.S. §§731, 732. In general, these sections permit consolidations or mergers between
contiguous municipalities by way of joint agreement and enactment of ordinances by each affected
municipality, subject to voter approval in each municipality. In the alternative, voters in affected
municipalities may seek approval of consolidation or merger through voter initiatives. See 53 Pa.
C.S. §733. The Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act governs consolidations or mergers for
municipalities other than Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and it does not govern boundary changes or
clarifications.
2
trial court erred by failing to conclude that Act 41 of 20224 is unconstitutional when
the legislature violated several provisions of article III of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, such that Act 41 of 2022 did not repeal the 1903 Annexation Law.
After careful review of all three questions, we affirm.
The procedural background was summarized by our Court as follows
and is not in dispute.5
On September 29, 2022, Appellants filed an Annexation
Petition with the trial court seeking annexation of []
Wilkinsburg into the City [] pursuant to the [] 1903
Annexation Law. At the September 29, 2022 presentment
of the [Annexation] Petition, Appellants alerted the trial
court to [] Act 41 of 2022, which purported to repeal the
1903 Annexation Law. However, Appellants also claimed
that Act 41 [of 2022] violated article III (Legislation) of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. III, and was
therefore ineffective.
Thereafter, several [O]bjectors appeared at the scheduled
hearing and argued that the 1903 Annexation Law had
been implicitly rendered unconstitutional following the
Constitutional Amendments of 1968 (effective 1970),
when the Legislature did not enact uniform legislation
regarding annexation procedures by April 23, 1970.
4
The Act of July 7, 2022, P.L. 455, No. 41, which became effective on September 6, 2022,
and is consolidated at 53 Pa. C.S. §§711-729, governs boundary changes and boundary
clarifications for all municipalities, regardless of size. In general, these sections permit boundary
changes or clarifications between abutting municipalities by way of ordinances enacted by each
affected municipality, subject to objection by petition, and approval by referendum. In the
alternative, affected municipalities may seek judicial approval of a boundary change or
clarification by way of judicial ascertainment. See 53 Pa. C.S. §§715, 716. Although Act 41 of
2022 applies to all municipalities, it governs only boundary changes and boundary clarifications,
and not consolidations or mergers. See 53 Pa. C.S. §§711, 712. Critically, however, Act 41 of
2022 contained an explicit repeal of the 1903 Annexation Law that Appellants argue is invalid
because of the way the legislature adopted this act. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 460a.
Our Court considered and denied Appellants’ Application for Expedited Consideration in
5
a Memorandum Opinion filed on January 31, 2023.
3
Appeal of Evans (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1376 C.D. 2022, filed January 31, 2023), slip op.
at 2.
After a full hearing that focused on the parties’ legal arguments, the
trial court granted Objectors’ intervention, granted Objectors’ objections, and
dismissed Appellants’ Annexation Petition. Trial Court 12/9/22 Opinion at 2. The
trial court concluded, and the parties did not contest, that Appellants’ Annexation
Petition contained the required number of signatures under the 1903 Annexation
Law.6
The trial court then reviewed the parties’ legal arguments and
concluded that the 1903 Annexation Law “has been effectively repealed by the
Constitutional Amendments of 1968, effective 1970. Article IX, [s]ection 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution7 required the legislature to enact uniform legislation
6
Section 1 of the 1903 Annexation Law, formerly, 53 P.S. §171, provided that any
municipality seeking to become annexed to a contiguous city must present a petition signed by at
least five percent of the qualified voters in the last preceding general election in that municipality.
See R.R. at 470a. Section 2 of the 1903 Annexation Law, formerly, 53 P.S. §172, provided that
the city to which the proposed annexation is made must consent or disapprove of the annexation
by vote of the city council. See R.R. at 471a.
7
Pa. Const. art. IX, §8. Article IX, section 8, provides:
Uniform Legislation.—The General Assembly shall, within two
years following the adoption of this article, enact uniform legislation
establishing the procedure for consolidation, merger or change of
boundaries of municipalities.
Initiative.—The electors of any municipality shall have the right,
by initiative and referendum, to consolidate, merge and change
boundaries by a majority vote of those voting thereon in each
municipality, without the approval of any governing body.
(Footnote continued on next page…)
4
establishing the procedure for consolidation, merger or change of the boundaries of
municipalities.” Trial Court Opinion at 2. The trial court relied on Derry Township
Supervisors v. Borough of Hummelstown, 326 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. 1974)
(Hummelstown), quoting verbatim as follows. “‘Since the [l]egislature did not enact
uniform legislation regarding annexation procedures by April 23, 1970, all
annexation after that date must be by initiative, as set forth in [a]rticle IX, [s]ection
8.’” Trial Court Opinion at 2-3.
The trial court then confirmed the standard for reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute, which requires courts to presume that the statute is
constitutional unless it “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates constitutional rights,”
Study.—The General Assembly shall designate an agency of the
Commonwealth to study consolidation, merger and boundary
changes, advise municipalities on all problems that might be
connected therewith, and initiate local referendum.
Legislative Power.—Nothing herein shall prohibit or prevent the
General Assembly from providing additional methods for
consolidation, merger or change of boundaries.
In turn, article IX, section 14, defines “Initiative” as:
“Initiative” means the filing with the applicable election officials
at least ninety days prior to the next primary or general election of a
petition containing a proposal for referendum signed by electors
comprising five percent of the number of electors voting for the
office of Governor in the last gubernatorial election in each
municipality or area affected. The applicable election official shall
place the proposal on the ballot in a manner fairly representing the
content of the petition for decision by referendum at said election.
Initiative on a similar question shall not be submitted more often
than once in five years. No enabling law shall be required for
initiative.
Pa. Const. art. IX, §14.
5
citing Estate of Fridenberg v. Commonwealth, 33 A.3d 581, 591 (Pa. 2011). Trial
Court Opinion at 3. The trial court then concluded that because the Municipal
Consolidation or Merger Act “expressly excludes the City of Pittsburgh, the only
procedure for annexation is set forth in [a]rticle IX[,] [s]ection 8. Therefore, the
[Annexation Petition] under the 1903 [Annexation Law] was dismissed.” Trial
Court Opinion at 3.
The parties agree that the first issue is governed by Hummelstown, but
they disagree on how it should be applied. In Hummelstown, our Supreme Court
considered whether three boroughs could seek annexation of three neighboring
townships under The Borough Code, 8 Pa. C.S. §§101-3501. The boroughs filed
their annexation petitions sometime after April 23, 1970, the two-year deadline
mandated by article IX, section 8. Hummelstown, 326 A.2d at 343. The Court noted
that article IX, section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided for article IX,
section 8 to take effect two years after the effective date of the constitution, or on
the effective date of legislation adopted on the issue, whichever occurred first. Id.
at 344. The Court concluded that no legislation governing annexation had been
approved up to that point, so that the annexation procedures in article IX, section 8
governed. Again, the Court held that “[s]ince the [l]egislature did not enact uniform
legislation regarding annexation procedures by April 23, 1970, all annexation after
that date must be by initiative, as set forth in [a]rticle IX, section 8.” Id. at 344
(emphasis added).
As to the first issue, Appellants argue that the Court in Hummelstown,
decided in 1974, did not have the benefit of the Municipal Consolidation or Merger
Act, enacted in 1994, which they contend necessarily restricts its application.
Appellants argue that because the Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act does not
6
govern consolidations or mergers for Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and did not
explicitly repeal the 1903 Annexation Law, that the 1903 Annexation Law remains
in effect for the City’s annexation of Wilkinsburg. Appellants urge us to consider
the dissent in Hummelstown, that warned taking the majority’s holding to its logical
conclusion would produce the absurd result that the legislature would be prohibited
from enacting any consolidation, merger, or boundary dispute legislation when it
failed to do so by 1970. Hummelstown, 326 A.2d at 344. Objectors respond that
Hummelstown remains good law and has been approved by the Court numerous
times, most recently in Adams Township v. Richland Township, 154 A.3d 250 (Pa.
2017). Objectors argue that the plain language in Hummelstown applies to all
annexations, and that the quoted statement is part of the Court’s holding and not
dicta as Appellants argue.
Appellants’ second issue is closely related to the first issue, and a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Adams Township is relevant here. In
Adams Township, the Supreme Court considered whether the doctrine of
acquiescence may be applied to resolve a municipal boundary dispute when the
location of the municipal boundary is uncertain. Adams Township, 154 A.3d at 253.
Although Adams Township addressed a boundary dispute, not a consolidation or
merger, the Court reviewed the constitutional and statutory background “that
underlies the legal issues surrounding municipal boundaries.” Id. at 259. The Court
reviewed article IX, section 8, and noted:
Although this provision imposed a mandate upon the
General Assembly to enact uniform legislation regarding,
inter alia, changes of municipal boundaries, the General
Assembly failed to enact the required legislation within
the constitutionally-mandated two-year period.12
However, [a]rticle IX, [s]ection 8 specifies that, regardless
of the contemplated statutory procedures, boundary
7
changes may be effectuated by “initiative and referendum”
and “a majority vote of those voting thereon in each
municipality.” []
FN 12. In 1994 the General Assembly
enacted the Municipal Consolidation or
Merger Act[]. Although enacted over twenty
years beyond the constitutional deadline, the
legislation partially complied with [a]rticle
IX, [s]ection 8 by establishing procedures for
consolidation and merger of municipalities.
However, the statutory scheme does not
provide for changes to boundaries between
municipalities that are not undergoing
consolidation or merger, and therefore offers
no guidance in the instant case.
Adams Township, 154 A.3d at 259 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court applied this reasoning to the boundary change
dispute before it and recognized that the Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act did
not apply. “Accordingly, pursuant to [a]rticle IX, [s]ection 8, and in the absence of
a legislative enactment to the contrary, such boundary changes [(boundary disputes,
not boundary changes due to consolidation or merger)] must be accomplished
through initiative and referendum.” Adams Township, 154 A.3d at 260.
As to the second issue, Appellants argue that, despite the delay in
passing the Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act, courts have accepted it as valid
legislation governing municipal consolidations and mergers. Appellants argue that
the passage of the Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act in 1994 resolved some of
the issues expressed in Hummelstown, but not those affecting Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh. Appellants argue that the legislature’s omission of Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh from this act should be interpreted as its desire to treat annexation of a
smaller municipality by Philadelphia or Pittsburgh differently, because of the unique
factors present in these types of annexations. Objectors respond that article IX,
8
section 8 applies to the proposed annexation of Wilkinsburg to the City, as governed
by Hummelstown and Adams Township. Objectors respond that the Court’s article
IX, section 8 reasoning in Adams Township applies to boundary changes through
consolidation or merger.
As to the third issue, the parties do not dispute that Act 41 of 2022
formally repealed the 1903 Annexation Law by name.8 The parties also agree that
Act 41 of 2022 became effective on September 6, 2022, and that Appellants’
Annexation Petition was filed on September 29, 2022, after the effective date of Act
41 of 2022. The parties disagree about whether Act 41 of 2022, and its repeal of the
1903 Annexation Law, is constitutional under article III of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution governs the manner in
which the legislature must enact legislation. In relevant part, article III, section 4
requires that “[e]very bill shall be considered on three different days in each House.”
Pa. Const. art. III, §4. Article III, section 6 requires that “[n]o law shall be revived,
8
Section 4. Repeals are as follows:
(1) The General Assembly declares that repeals under Paragraph (2)
are necessary to effectuate the addition of 53 Pa. C.S. Ch. 7 Subch.
B.
(2) The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:
(I) The Act of April 28, 1903 (P.L. 332, No. 260), entitled “An
act for annexation of any city, borough, township, or part of a
township, to a contiguous city, and providing for the indebtedness
of the same.”
See R.R. at 460a, and former 1903 Annexation Law, 53 P.S. §§171-176, listed as repealed by Act
41 of 2022.
9
amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title
only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-
enacted and published at length.” Pa. Const. art. III, §6.9 Article III, sections 4 and
6, were considered at length by our Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Against
Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005)
(PAGE). In PAGE the Court considered whether the Pennsylvania Race Horse
Development and Gaming Act (Gaming Act), 4 Pa. C.S. §§1101-11, was
unconstitutional as passed in violation of article III, sections 1, 3, 4, 6, and 10, and
an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board.
Id. at 392. Relevant here, the Court concluded that the Gaming Act’s original
purpose, subject, and title did not violate article III, sections 1 and 3, when the
original bill related to criminal background checks for horse racing licensees, and
the amended bills and Gaming Act more broadly regulated the gaming industry. Id.
at 404, 406, and 409-10.
The general purpose of article III is to prevent “stealth legislation” in
which some legislators or the public might be misled about the contents of the bill.
Washington v. Department of Public Welfare, 188 A.3d 1135, 1147 (Pa. 2018). The
test to determine whether the original bill and its amendments satisfy article III is
“germaneness,” which “affords due regard for the necessity of preserving flexibility
9
In addition, article III, section 1 states, in relevant part, that “no bill shall be so altered or
amended, on its passage through either House, as to change its original purpose.” Pa. Const. art.
III, §1. Article III, section 3 states that “[n]o bill shall be passed containing more than one subject,
which shall clearly be expressed in its title, except in a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying
or compiling the law or a part thereof.” Pa. Const. art. III, §3. Although Appellants do not argue
that Act 41 of 2022 violated the original purpose rule in article III, section 1, or the single-subject
rule or clear title rule in article III, section 3, these issues are often intertwined with those raised
under article III, section 4 on the question of whether an amended bill is “germane” to the earlier
version of the bill.
10
in the legislative crafting process, while maintaining the strength of the safeguards
for the regularity and transparency of this process afforded by [a]rticle III, [s]ection
4.” Id. at 1151.
Amendments are germane to the original general subject
matter of a bill if both the subject of the amendments and
the subject of the original contents of the bill “have a nexus
to a common purpose.” [] In other words, the subject of
the amendments and the subject of the original bill
language must constitute “a unifying scheme to
accomplish a single purpose.” In making this
determination, a reviewing court may hypothesize a
“reasonably broad” unifying subject; however, such a
hypothetical subject cannot be unduly expansive, lest the
purpose of the constitutional provision be defeated.
Id. at 1151-52 (internal citations omitted).
Further, although article III, section 4 does not require that a new three-
day consideration begin on every amendment, “only when amendments are germane
to the bill’s original purpose will consideration of the original bill by each House on
a particular day count towards the requirements of [a]rticle III, [s]ection 4.”
Washington, 188 A.3d at 1151. Critically, in Washington, the amendment in
question entirely removed the title and contents of the original bill, leaving it, “in
every respect, a nullity.” Id. at 1150. Consequently, the Court held that the public
welfare bill at issue was unconstitutional under article III, section 4, because the
amendments to an empty bill could not be considered germane. Id. at 1154.
The parties agree that Act 41 of 2022 began as Senate Bill (SB) 477,
where it addressed municipal requirements to update county assessment offices with
building and demolition permits. After passing the Senate, the House amended SB
477 to add the municipal boundary change provisions and the repeal of the 1903
Annexation Law. The Senate had already considered the earlier version of SB 477
11
one time, and it considered the amended SB 477 two more times, passing it on the
third consideration. See R.R. at 409a-92a. Appellants argue that Act 41 of 2022
violates article III, section 4, because the amendment was not germane to the original
bill, and, therefore, the Senate failed to consider the bill three times. Objectors first
respond that Appellants waived their article III, section 4 claim when they failed to
include “section 4” in their original filing.10 If not waived, Objectors further respond
that the amendment to SB 477 was germane to the original bill, and thus satisfied
three considerations in the Senate, because municipal boundary changes are clearly
related to, and share a common purpose with, accuracy in county tax assessments.
As to the repealer provision, Appellants argue that Act 41 of 2022 is
unconstitutional and violates article III, section 6, because the act failed to provide
the full text of the 1903 Annexation Law being repealed. One of the purposes of
article III, section 6 along with other provisions of article III
“was to provide full notice and publicity to all proposed
legislative enactments, and thus to prevent the passage of
‘sneak’ legislation.” [] “The constitution does not make
the obviously impracticable requirement that every act
shall recite all other acts that its operation may incidentally
affect, either by way of repeal, modification, extension or
supply.”
PAGE, 877 A.2d at 411 (quoting L.J.W. Realty Corp. v. Philadelphia, 134 A.2d 878,
882 (Pa. 1957)). The Court held that
10
In the Annexation Petition, Appellants averred that Act 41 of 2022 violated article III,
section 6, and did not include article III, section 4. R.R. at 4a-16a. However, Appellants raised
their specific article III, section 4 challenge at the hearing before the trial court and in their motion
for reconsideration, and Objectors had the opportunity to respond. R.R. at 362a-91a; 531a-44a.
Because article III claims are intertwined and focus on germaneness, and Appellants raised both
sections at the hearing and in their appeal to this Court, we find that Appellants did not waive their
article III, section 4 claim.
12
[a]rticle III, [s]ection 6 requires, with regard to a directed,
specific repealer, the effectuation of which is not
otherwise apparent from the associated bill, that as much
of the law that is expressly repealed by the bill must be
published at length. In this way, legislators may see the
elimination of particular existing legislative provisions
from the face of a pending bill, without having to refer to
the existing piece of legislation for comparison.
Id. at 412.
In Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf, 198 A.3d 1205, 1226
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), our Court provided factors to consider in determining whether
publishing the full text is required, specifically, whether a provision is being directly
repealed or is more in the nature of a holiday or temporary inconsistency, and
whether it is alleged that legislators were misled by the absence of the entire text of
the prior law. Under these standards, Appellants argue that the repeal of the 1903
Annexation Law was a specific repealer, the effect of which was not apparent from
the face of Act 41 of 2022. Objectors respond that publication of the full text was
not required because the repealer included the full, accurate description of the 1903
Annexation Law, and there was no confusion as to the effect of the repealer, and no
allegations that legislators were misled. Objectors note that Act 41 of 2022 was an
uncontroversial measure, passed overwhelmingly by the legislature, and was not an
example of sneak legislation.
As to the first issue, we must reject Appellants’ argument that the 1903
Annexation Law remained in effect even though the legislature failed to enact a
uniform municipal reapportionment law by 1970. We are bound by the holding of
our Supreme Court in Hummelstown, 326 A.2d at 344, which requires that, in the
absence of legislation, article IX, section 8 governs the City’s annexation of
Wilkinsburg. The Supreme Court’s direction that “all annexation” be governed by
13
article IX, section 8 is not dicta, and is essential to the holding. Id. We further note
that courts have approved Hummelstown as recently as 2017 in Adams Township,
when the Supreme Court explained that it affirmed Middle Paxton Township v.
Borough of Dauphin, 308 A.2d 208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973), in Hummelstown, and
“agreed with the Commonwealth Court’s calculation of the constitutional deadline
and the consequence of the General Assembly’s failure to meet it.” Adams
Township, 154 A.3d at 260. An opinion decided by a majority of our Supreme Court
“becomes binding precedent on the courts of this Commonwealth. ” Commonwealth
v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. 1996). The majority opinion of the Supreme
Court “is binding not only on the parties before us, under the doctrine of law of the
case,[] but is precedent as to different parties in cases involving substantially similar
facts, pursuant to the rule of stare decisis.[]” Id. at 903 (footnotes omitted).
As to the second issue, we reject Appellants’ argument that the
enactment of the Municipal Consolidation or Merger Act should be interpreted as an
expression of the legislature’s desire to treat annexation of a smaller municipality by
Philadelphia or Pittsburgh differently. Instead, we must be guided by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Adams Township, which held that, in the absence of legislation
to replace the former Borough Code governing boundary changes resulting from
boundary disputes, such boundary changes are governed by article IX, section 8.
Adams Township, 154 A.3d at 260. The Court’s reasoning is equally applicable here,
where the boundary change sought is a result of an annexation, now defined as a
merger. Because the legislature has not enacted legislation governing mergers or
consolidations with Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, such mergers or consolidations are
governed by article IX, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
14
The trial court did not directly address the third issue, regarding the
constitutionality of Act 41 of 2022. We conclude that the passage of Act 41 of 2022
did not violate article III, section 4, or section 6, because the amendment was
germane to the original bill. Unlike Washington, the amendments to SB 477 shared
a nexus with the original bill when both related to the common purpose of accuracy
in county assessments. Washington, 188 A.3d at 1151-52. Therefore, we conclude
that the Senate considered SB 477 three times, and that its passage did not violate
article III, section 4. We also reject Appellants’ argument as to their article III,
section 6 claim. The full description of the 1903 Annexation Law was included in
the repeal, there were no allegations that legislators were misled, and there was no
evidence of stealth legislation. See PAGE, Phantom Fireworks.
Because we hold that Act 41 of 2022 was enacted in conformity with
article III and is not unconstitutional, any doubt as to the status of the 1903
Annexation Law has been removed. The specific repeal of the 1903 Annexation
Law within Act 41 of 2022 became effective before Appellants filed their
Annexation Petition. As such, Appellants may not utilize the procedures outlined in
the 1903 Annexation Law, and they are required to utilize the initiative and
referendum procedure in article IX, sections 8 and 14, unless legislation is enacted
that offers another procedure for consolidations or mergers with Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh. Finally, because we conclude that the 1903 Annexation Law is invalid,
we need not reach Objectors’ argument that the 1903 Annexation Law is
unconstitutional under the free elections clause in article I, section 5 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, §5.
15
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s
order.
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
Judge McCullough did not participate in the decision of this case.
16
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re: Proposed Annexation of :
Wilkinsburg by the City of Pittsburgh :
:
Petition of: Tracey Evans, Monica Garcia, :
Debra Raubenstrauch, Vanessa Buffry :
and Michael Rose :
: No. 1376 C.D. 2022
Intervenor Objectors: Carmen Brown, :
Renee Haynes-Johnson, Borough of :
Wilkinsburg, Moira Kaleida, Angel :
Gober, Susan Oerkvitz, Pamela Harbin and :
Evan Gascoine :
:
Appeal of: Tracey Evans, Monica Garcia, :
Debra Raubenstrauch, Vanessa Buffry :
and Michael Rose :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of July, 2023, the order of the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas dated October 28, 2022, is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge