L.C. Bouie v. PA DOC ( 2023 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Louis Charles Bouie,                        :
    Petitioner                :
    :
    v.                                    : No. 206 M.D. 2022
    :
    Pennsylvania Department                     :
    of Corrections,                             :
    Respondent                 : Submitted: April 14, 2023
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE CEISLER                                  FILED: July 10, 2023
    Petitioner Louis Charles Bouie (Bouie), an inmate currently incarcerated
    within our Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed a Petition for Review (PFR) in
    our original jurisdiction, through which he seeks relief regarding Respondent
    Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (Department) refusal to place him in what
    is known as the State Drug Treatment Program (SDTP or Program),1 a component
    1
    As explained by the Department, the SDTP
    is a [Department-administered] 24-month intensive treatment
    program
    ....
    for statutorily eligible inmates who have been convicted of
    substance use-related crimes who have undergone an assessment
    performed by the [Department], which assessment has concluded
    that the inmate is in need of drug and alcohol addiction treatment
    and would benefit from commitment to the SDTP and that
    placement in SDTP would be appropriate. This program follows
    guidelines set forth in 61 Pa. C.S. Ch. 41. The SDTP shall address
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    the individually assessed drug and alcohol abuse and addiction
    needs of a participant and shall address other issues essential to the
    participant’s successful reintegration into the community, including,
    but not limited to, educational and employment issues.
    ....
    [SDTP] replaced the former State Intermediate Punishment
    Program (SIP) within the Department . . . . This change is
    outlined in Act 115 of 2019[, Act of December 18, 2019, P.L. 776,
    No. 119] . . . JRI2[]. Unlike SIP, which was a 24-month flat
    sentence imposed by a judge to address substance use-related
    crimes, the SDTP is a treatment program to which an offender
    may be referred following evaluation and classification
    completed by the Department.
    ....
    The main differences between the SDTP and the former SIP
    Program are:
    • SDTP is not a sentence imposed by a judge. It is a treatment
    program offered to eligible offenders whom the Department
    believes will benefit from placement in the program.
    • In cases where a SDTP participant is unable to complete
    the mandatory program levels prior to his/her maximum
    release date, and is otherwise progressing well in the
    program, the Department may grant a program extension up
    to 30 months.
    • Upon certification by the Department of the participant’s
    successful completion of the program, the entire term of
    confinement that rendered the participant eligible to
    participate in the SDTP shall be deemed to have been served.
    The sentencing judge will be notified of an offender’s
    admission to the SDTP, and of successful completion of or
    removal from the program.
    • Upon unsuccessful completion or removal from the
    program, the offender will revert to his/her original sentence
    and may be eligible for consideration of parole at minimum
    sentence. The judge will be issued a program
    expulsion/removal letter but will not be asked to conduct a
    revocation/resentencing hearing to address the expulsion.
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    2
    of Justice Reinvestment Initiative 2 (JRI2).2 In response, the Department has filed
    preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. After thorough review, we sustain
    the Department’s preliminary objections and dismiss the PFR.
    I. Background
    On August 27, 2019, Bouie was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of
    Lehigh County (Common Pleas) of three counts of possession of a controlled
    substance with intent to deliver. PFR, Exs. A, C.3 Common Pleas then sentenced
    Bouie on October 29, 2019, to an aggregate term of 5 to 10 years in state prison,
    State Drug Treatment Program (SDTP), PA. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.cor.pa.gov/
    community-reentry/Documents/JRI%202/SDTP%20Brochure.pdf (last visited July 5, 2023)
    (emphasis added); see 61 Pa. C.S. § 4105 (articulating the particulars of the SDTP).
    2
    Per the Department:
    In Dec[ember] 2019, a collection of bills commonly known as
    [JRI2] were passed into law, which changed how select
    [Department] programs operate. Among the programs affected
    were: [SDTP]; Quick Dips; Short Sentence Parole; and Quehanna
    Boot Camp.
    Another change affects deductions from inmates’ accounts.
    Monetary deductions for restitution and other court-ordered
    financial obligations have increased from 20 [%] to 25 [%]. The
    [Department] will now make the mandatory monetary deductions of
    at least 25 percent of deposits made to inmate accounts.
    Justice Reinvestment      Initiative 2 (JRI2)/Act      115,     PA. DEP’T OF               CORR.,
    https://www.cor.pa.gov/community-reentry/Pages/JRI2.aspx (last visited July 5, 2023).
    3
    Bouie’s PFR does not comport with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1513’s
    formatting requirements. Rather than pleading each averment in its own, separate paragraph, along
    with properly labelled and articulated legal claims, Bouie instead properly enumerates some
    averments, but then shifts to a two-page narrative statement he has titled “Argument,” in which he
    blends additional averments with legal assertions and requests for relief. For reasons unknown, the
    Department elected not to attack these manifest deficiencies through its preliminary objections.
    Accordingly, and for simplicity’s sake, we cite to paragraph numbers where they have been
    provided, page numbers where they have not, and the attached exhibits using the designations used
    by Bouie.
    3
    with credit for time served in presentence detention. Id. ¶1, Ex. A. Thereafter, on
    April 22, 2021, Bouie sent a letter to Common Pleas, in which he stated that he was
    trying to overcome his addiction to alcohol and prescription drugs, and asked
    Common Pleas to help him secure placement in the SDTP. Id. ¶3, Ex. C. Common
    Pleas responded on April 28, 2021, and encouraged Bouie to pursue that goal by
    following the statutory guidelines governing admission. Id. ¶4, Ex. D. In doing so,
    Common Pleas also stated that it had not deemed Bouie ineligible for the SDTP, but
    cautioned Bouie that his “prior conviction for robbery in 2009 would seemingly
    disqualify [him] from the [P]rogram.” Id., Ex. D.
    Bouie then embarked upon an unsuccessful effort to convince the Department
    to place him in the SDTP. On June 14, 2021, the Department ran Bouie through a
    drug screening protocol, determined that he would benefit from treatment for
    substance abuse issues, and informed Bouie that he would be enrolled in an
    appropriate program once he drew closer to the minimum date on his 2019 sentence.
    Id. ¶5, Ex. E. However, at a roughly contemporaneous point, Bouie was informed
    by the Department that he was not eligible for the SDTP, because he had been
    sentenced prior to the Program’s creation. See id. ¶6, Ex. F. Bouie challenged this
    conclusion via letters to the Department, inmate requests, and grievances, none of
    which caused the Department to change its position regarding his SDTP eligibility.
    See id. ¶¶6-19, Exs. F, I-N, Q, S.
    On April 4, 2022, Bouie filed his PFR with our Court, in which he argues that
    the Department’s position regarding SDTP eligibility is legally erroneous. PFR at 5.
    As relief, Bouie requests that we “reverse” a JRI2 “Form”4 that has been
    4
    This “Form” is a single-sheet “inmate reference” that explains the eligibility requirements
    for, and the parameters of, several programs that were established through JRI2, including the
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    4
    promulgated by the Department and, in addition, direct the Department to admit him
    into the SDTP and/or refund to him the additional, JRI2-mandated deductions it had
    made from his inmate account since JRI2 went into effect. Id. at 5-6. The Department
    responded to the PFR by submitting its preliminary objections on September 13,
    2022, to which Bouie responded in opposition on October 3, 2022.
    II. Discussion
    In its preliminary objections, the Department demurs to the PFR for two
    reasons. First, the SDTP did not exist at the time of Bouie’s sentencing in 2019,
    which renders him ineligible for the Program. Department’s Br. at 10. Second, even
    if Bouie is eligible, he does not have a right to be placed in the SDTP, because such
    placement decisions are made at the Department’s discretion. Id. at 10-11.
    In ruling on preliminary objections, this Court accepts as
    true all well-pled allegations of material fact, as well as all
    inferences reasonably deducible from those facts. Key v.
    Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    185 A.3d 421
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    However, this Court need not accept unwarranted
    inferences, conclusions of law, argumentative allegations,
    or expressions of opinion. 
    Id.
     For preliminary objections
    to be sustained, it must appear with certainty that the law
    will permit no recovery. 
    Id.
     Any doubt must be resolved
    in favor of the non-moving party. 
    Id.
    Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    250 A.3d 1269
    , 1274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting
    Dantzler v. Wetzel, 
    218 A.3d 519
    , 522 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).
    Our analysis is complicated slightly by Bouie’s failure to identify the precise
    nature of the claim or claims he pursues against the Department, as well as his
    request that we “reverse” what appears to be nothing more than an informational
    pamphlet. In context, however, Bouie appears to rest his case on two propositions.
    SDTP. See PFR, Ex. G. The JRI2 Form expressly states that inmates are “[o]nly eligible [for these
    programs] if [they] were sentenced on or after 12/18/19.” 
    Id.
    5
    First, the Department’s determination that inmates can only enter the SDTP if they
    were sentenced on or after the date of the Program’s creation contravenes the
    language used in Sections 4103 through 4105 of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code),
    61 Pa. C.S. §§ 4103-4105, and, thus, is legally erroneous. See PFR at 4-5. Second,
    the Department was required to place him in the SDTP, because he was technically
    eligible for admission into the SDTP and had been assessed by the Department as
    someone who would benefit from treatment for his substance abuse issues. See id.
    In other words, he appears to seek a ruling that both states that the Department’s
    Code interpretation is incorrect and orders the Department to take nondiscretionary
    action. The gravamen of Bouie’s assertions can thus be most comfortably
    characterized as requests for declaratory judgment and for mandamus relief.
    As for the general nature of these types of claims,
    [a] declaratory judgment declares the rights, status, and
    other legal relations “whether or not further relief is or
    could be claimed.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 7532.[] It has been
    observed that “[d]eclaratory judgments are nothing more
    than judicial searchlights, switched on at the behest of a
    litigant to illuminate an existing legal right, status or other
    relation.” Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp[.], . . . 
    471 A.2d 1252
    , 1254 ([Pa. Super.] 1984). Stated otherwise, “[t]he
    purpose of awarding declaratory relief is to finally settle
    and make certain the rights or legal status of parties.”
    Geisinger Clinic v. Di Cuccio, . . . 
    606 A.2d 509
    , 519 ([Pa.
    Super.] 1992)[.]
    A declaratory judgment, unlike an injunction, does not
    order a party to act. This is so because “the distinctive
    characteristic of the declaratory judgment is that the
    declaration stands by itself; that is to say, no executory
    process follows as of course.” Petition of Kariher, . . . 
    131 A. 265
    , 268 ([Pa.] 1925).
    Eagleview Corp. Ctr. Ass’n v. Citadel Fed. Credit Union, 
    150 A.3d 1024
    , 1029-30
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (footnote omitted). By contrast, “mandamus is an extraordinary
    6
    writ which lies to compel performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where
    there is a clear legal right in the petitioner, a corresponding duty in the respondent,
    and a want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy.” Cooper v. City of
    Greensburg, 
    363 A.2d 813
    , 815 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976). “The purpose of mandamus is
    not to establish legal rights but only to enforce those legal rights that have already
    been established.” Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, Zoning Hearing Bd., 
    32 A.3d 287
    , 290 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “Mandamus will lie only to compel public
    officials to perform their duties in accordance with the law [when] those duties are
    ministerial in character and not discretionary.” Rakus v. Robinson, 
    382 A.2d 770
    ,
    772 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (citing Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Pub.
    Instruction, 
    244 A.2d 754
     (Pa. 1968)).
    Moving on, both of Bouie’s claims present us with pure questions of statutory
    interpretation.
    It is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, this Court’s
    objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of our
    General Assembly. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). The best
    expression of this intent is found in the statute’s plain
    language. Cagey v. Com[.], . . . 
    179 A.3d 458
    , 462 ([Pa.]
    2018). If the statutory language is “clear and free from all
    ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the
    pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). . . .
    “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous
    and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
    occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory
    interpretation and construction; the statute must be given
    its plain and obvious meaning.” Com[.] ex rel. Cartwright
    v. Cartwright, . . . 
    40 A.2d 30
    , 33 ([Pa.] 1944).
    O’Donnell v. Allegheny Cnty. N. Tax Collection Comm., 
    266 A.3d 2
    , 16 (Pa. 2021).
    Several statutory provisions guide our analysis. First, Section 4105 of the
    Code tasked the Department with establishing and administering the SDTP; sets the
    duration for which an inmate may be enrolled in the Program; specifies the minimum
    7
    amount of time an inmate must spend in each phase of the SDTP; and vests the
    Department with discretion to shift an inmate between different phases and, if
    necessary, to expel an inmate from the Program. 61 Pa. C.S. § 4105(a)-(c), (f). Next,
    Section 4104 of the Code governs the selection process for admission into the SDTP
    and reads as follows, in relevant part:
    (a) Duties of [the Pennsylvania Commission on
    Sentencing (Commission)] and sentencing judge.--
    (1) Through the use of sentencing guidelines, the
    [C]ommission shall employ the term “eligible
    person” as defined in this chapter to further identify
    persons who would be potentially appropriate for
    participation in the [SDTP]. The sentencing judge
    shall employ the sentencing guidelines to identify
    persons who are eligible for participation in the
    [SDTP]. The judge shall consider the position of a
    victim of the crime, as advised by the prosecuting
    attorney, on whether to exclude the person from
    eligibility for placement in the [SDTP]. The judge
    shall exclude the person from eligibility if the
    prosecuting attorney opposes eligibility. The judge
    shall note on the sentencing order if a person has
    been excluded from eligibility for the [SDTP]. If the
    person is not excluded from eligibility, the
    minimum sentence imposed shall operate as the
    minimum for parole eligibility purposes if the
    person is not placed in the [SDTP] by the
    [D]epartment under subsection (c) or if the person
    is expelled from the [SDTP] under section 4105(f)
    (relating to [the SDTP]).
    (2)(i) The prosecuting attorney shall advise the
    court if the prosecuting attorney or a victim of the
    crime opposes eligibility and, in the prosecuting
    attorney’s sole discretion, may advise the court that
    the Commonwealth has elected to waive the
    eligibility requirements of this chapter if the victim
    has been given notice of the prosecuting attorney’s
    intent to waive the eligibility requirements and an
    opportunity to be heard on the issue.
    8
    (ii) The court, after considering victim input, may
    refuse to accept the prosecuting attorney’s waiver of
    the eligibility requirements.
    (b) Assessment of addiction.--The [D]epartment shall
    conduct an assessment of the addiction and other treatment
    needs of an eligible person and determine whether the
    person would benefit from the [SDTP], public safety
    would be enhanced by the person’s participation in the
    [SDTP], and placement of the person in the [SDTP] would
    not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. The
    assessment shall be conducted using a nationally
    recognized assessment instrument or an instrument that
    has been normed and validated on the [D]epartment’s
    inmate population by a recognized expert in such matters.
    The assessment instrument shall be administered by
    persons skilled in the treatment of drug and alcohol
    addiction and trained to conduct assessments. The
    assessments shall be reviewed and approved by a
    supervisor with at least three years of experience
    providing drug and alcohol counseling services.
    (c) Placement in the [SDTP].--If the [D]epartment in its
    discretion believes an eligible person would benefit from
    the [SDTP] and placement in the [SDTP] is appropriate,
    the [D]epartment shall make the placement and notify the
    court, the eligible person, the [C]ommission and the
    attorney for the Commonwealth of the placement.
    Id. § 4104. Finally, Section 4108 directs that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision
    of law to the contrary,” the Code’s SDTP provisions are not to be construed as
    imbuing anyone with the right to “participate in a drug offender treatment
    program[.]” Id. § 4108-(1)(i).5
    5
    “Drug offender treatment program” is defined in Section 4103 of the Code as “[a]n
    individualized treatment program established by the Department . . . consisting primarily of drug
    and alcohol addiction treatment that satisfies the terms and conditions listed in [S]ection 4105 [of
    the Code] (relating to drug offender treatment program).” 61 Pa. C.S. § 4103. Section 4105 of the
    Code is titled “State drug treatment program.” Id. § 4105. Simply put, the SDTP is a Code-defined
    drug offender treatment program.
    9
    These statutes, through their plain language, enable us to make three salient
    conclusions. First, though the Department is ultimately responsible for determining
    whether an “eligible” inmate should be admitted into the SDTP, that determination
    can only occur after the relevant court has made a threshold eligibility decision
    during the course of sentencing that inmate. See id. § 4104(a)-(c). Second, the
    Department has broad latitude when considering whether to place an eligible inmate
    in the SDTP, as well as regarding how to handle an inmate post-admission. See id.
    §§ 4104(b)-(c), 4105(b)-(c), (f). Finally, and regardless of an inmate’s Program
    eligibility or the results of a Department-administered addiction assessment, nothing
    in the statutes that govern the SDTP gives an inmate a legally enforceable right to
    gain admission thereto. See id. §§ 4104(b)-(c), 4105(b)-(c), (f), 4108-(1)(i).
    Here, Bouie was sentenced by Common Pleas on October 29, 2019, nearly
    four months before February 18, 2020, when the laws establishing the SDTP went
    into effect. See id. § 4105; PFR, Exs. A, C. As the SDTP did not exist when Bouie
    was sentenced, Common Pleas obviously could not make a Program eligibility
    determination for him at that juncture. The timing of Bouie’s sentencing thus
    deprives him of SDTP eligibility.6 Furthermore, even if this was not the case, Bouie’s
    involvement with the SDTP would be at the Department’s discretion, and he would
    have no legally enforceable right to compel the Department to admit him into the
    Program. Consequently, we conclude that Bouie does not have a right, clear or
    otherwise, to the relief he seeks and, thus, has failed to state a legally viable claim
    in his PFR.
    6
    Indeed, only those individuals who were sentenced on or after February 18, 2020, can be
    allowed into the SDTP, because admission into the SDTP cannot occur without a predicate judicial
    eligibility decision.
    10
    III. Conclusion
    In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we sustain the Department’s
    preliminary objections and dismiss Bouie’s PFR.
    ____________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    11
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Louis Charles Bouie,                :
    Petitioner        :
    :
    v.                            : No. 206 M.D. 2022
    :
    Pennsylvania Department             :
    of Corrections,                     :
    Respondent         :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 10th day of July 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that
    Respondent Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ preliminary objections are
    SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Louis Charles Bouie’s
    Petition for Review is DISMISSED.
    ____________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 206 M.D. 2022

Judges: Ceisler, J.

Filed Date: 7/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024