O.A. Barner Jr. v. PPB ( 2023 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Oris A. Barner Jr.,                      :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                                 : No. 795 C.D. 2022
    :
    Pennsylvania Parole Board,               :
    Respondent             : Submitted: May 19, 2023
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE CEISLER                                                FILED: July 25, 2023
    Petitioner Oris A. Barner, Jr., petitions this Court for review of a June 2, 2022
    order by Respondent Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) affirming the Board’s May
    5, 2022 decision that recommitted Barner as a convicted parole violator and assigned
    him a parole violation maximum date of July 6, 2023. Barner, who has not submitted
    a brief to this Court, argues that the Board erred by failing to grant him all due credit
    for time spent in custody. Also before this Court is an Application for Withdrawal
    of Appearance (Withdrawal Application), submitted by David Crowley, Esq.
    (Counsel), Barner’s court-appointed attorney. Therein, Counsel contends that the
    issues raised in Barner’s Petition for Review are without merit. After review, we
    grant the Withdrawal Application and affirm the Board’s order.
    I. Background
    Following his conviction of narcotics offenses, Barner was sentenced on
    January 17, 2014, to a period of imprisonment not to exceed five years and six
    months. Certified Record (C.R.) at 1. Barner was paroled on April 24, 2017, and
    informed that, if he was convicted of another crime while on parole, the Board
    maintained the authority to recommit him to the balance of the sentence which he
    had been serving, with no credit for time at liberty on parole. Id. at 8. Barner
    absconded from supervision on April 11, 2018, and was declared delinquent by the
    Board as of that date. Id. at 13. On April 24, 2018, Barner was arrested by Easton
    Police on suspicion of committing new criminal offenses. Id. at 22.
    On March 12, 2019, the Board issued an arrest warrant for Barner, who was
    still absconded from supervision. Id. at 14. The record indicates that Barner was
    detained on the Board’s warrant from March 12, 2019, until March 28, 2019. Id. at
    116. On the latter date, Northampton County authorities continued to detain Barner
    in connection to criminal charges stemming from his April 24, 2018 arrest. Id. at
    56. Due to the new criminal charges, the Board recommitted Barner as a technical
    parole violator on April 11, 2019. Id. at 51. Accordingly, Barner was informed that
    his parole violation maximum date was extended to January 16, 2020, subject to
    further extension if the latest charges resulted in conviction. Id. at 52. On January
    16, 2020, upon the expiration of the Board’s detainer, Barner remained incarcerated
    due to the Northampton County charges. Id. at 94.
    On August 25, 2021, following guilty pleas, Barner was sentenced in
    Northampton County to a period of imprisonment not to exceed seven years and six
    months.1 Id. at 111. Accordingly, the Board recommitted Barner as a convicted
    parole violator to serve his unexpired term as of September 29, 2021, the date on
    which it issued a new detainer warrant for Barner. Id. at 113. In a subsequent
    decision, the Board set Barner’s parole violation maximum date to July 6, 2023,
    1
    Barner was additionally sentenced to 18 to 60 months’ imprisonment for a separate
    conviction, to be served consecutively. C.R. at 60.
    2
    giving Barner just 16 days of confinement credit.2 Barner was informed that he
    would not be awarded any credit for time at liberty on parole, because his new
    convictions were similar to his original charges, and because he had absconded while
    on parole. Id. at 112. Additionally, Barner’s sentence for the Northampton County
    convictions would not begin until the July 6, 2023 completion of his prior sentence.3
    Barner timely filed an administrative appeal of the Board’s determination on
    May 23, 2022. Id. at 114. The Board affirmed its decision in a response mailed on
    June 1, 2022. Id. at 116.         Therein, the Board explained that, when Barner was
    paroled on April 24, 2017, 661 days of his original sentence remained. Id. When
    Barner returned to custody on March 12, 2019, he was only detained for the
    following 16 days in connection to the Board’s warrant. Id. From March 28, 2019
    until April 11, 2019, Barner was incarcerated due to the Northampton County
    charges. Id. From April 11, 2019, until January 16, 2020, Barner was incarcerated
    in connection with his technical violations, a period which also was not to be credited
    to his original sentence. Id. at 116-17. Thus, the Board explained, 645 days of
    imprisonment were properly imposed on Barner due to his previous sentence,
    resulting in a new maximum date of July 6, 2023.4 Id. at 117.
    2
    The 16 days of credit correspond to the period of detention following the issuance of the
    Board warrant on March 12, 2019, until March 28, 2019, the date on which Barner continued to
    be detained in lieu of bail on the charges stemming from his April 24, 2018 arrest. C.R. at 49.
    3
    Section 6138(a)(5)(i) of the Prisons and Parole Code provides that, if a new sentence is
    imposed on an offender, “the service of the balance of the term originally imposed by a
    Pennsylvania court shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed . . . [i]f a person is
    paroled from a State correctional institution and the new sentence imposed on the person is to be
    served in the State correctional institution.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5)(i).
    4
    It should be noted that, pursuant to Taylor v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
    Parole, 
    746 A.2d 671
    , 674 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), “the expiration of a parolee’s maximum term
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    3
    On July 21, 2022, Barner petitioned this Court for review of the Board’s
    decision. In an August 12, 2022 order, we appointed Counsel to represent Barner.
    Counsel then filed an Amended Petition for Review on Barner’s behalf on
    September 12, 2022. Therein, Barner maintained that the Board erred when it “failed
    to credit [his] original sentence with all the time to which he was entitled.” Am.
    Pet. for Review ¶ 7.
    Counsel filed his Withdrawal Application on December 27, 2022. Therein,
    Counsel averred that he had reached the “unfortunate conclusion that [Barner’s]
    appeal is without merit.” Withdrawal Application (App.) ¶ 2. Counsel also certified
    that he informed Barner of his intent to withdraw, and advised him “of his right to
    retain new counsel or raise any points that he might deem worthy of consideration.”
    Id. ¶ 3. A copy of the Withdrawal Application was served upon Barner via first-
    class mail, pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 121(c)(2).5 See Certificate of
    Service, 12/29/2022.         Alongside the Withdrawal Application, Counsel also
    submitted a so-called Turner letter to this Court,6 in which he explained his
    conclusion “that there exists no legal basis to challenge the Board determinations.”
    renders an appeal of a Board revocation order moot.” However, since Barner is currently
    completing his sentence on the Northampton County charges, and the issues raised here may affect
    his new maximum date in the future, the passing of Barner’s July 6, 2023 maximum date does not
    render the instant matter moot. See Mesko v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 
    245 A.3d 1174
    , 1178
    n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (explaining that the appeal of a Board order “is not rendered moot” by the
    expiration of a parolee’s maximum term, where “the issues raised . . . may affect his new maximum
    date on [new] charges in later proceedings”).
    5
    Rule 121(c)(2) provides that service may be by first class, express, or priority United
    States Postal Service mail, and that the service is “complete upon mailing.” Pa.R.A.P. 121(c)(2).
    6
    Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), an attorney may seek to
    withdraw from representation of a parole violator through the issuance of a letter explaining that
    the violator’s case “lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed wholly frivolous.”
    Anderson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 
    237 A.3d 1203
    , 1204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).
    4
    Turner Letter at 1. Counsel certified that a copy of the Turner letter, too, was served
    upon Barner via first-class mail. See Certificate of Service, 12/27/2022.
    Upon consideration of Counsel’s Withdrawal Application, this Court issued
    an order dated January 6, 2023, directing Barner either to obtain substitute counsel
    at his own expense or to file a brief on the merits of the Amended Petition for Review
    on his own behalf. We also directed Counsel to serve a copy of the order upon
    Barner. Accordingly, Counsel filed a certificate of service confirming that he had
    served a copy of the order upon Barner via first class mail. We issued an additional
    order on May 22, 2023, in which we directed the parties to submit briefs on the
    Withdrawal Application as well as on the merits of Barner’s appeal. As of the date
    of this opinion, Barner has still not submitted a brief to this Court.7
    II. Discussion
    A. The Withdrawal Application and Turner Letter
    Before addressing the merits of Barner’s arguments,8 we must first determine
    the validity of Counsel’s Withdrawal Application. Because Counsel concluded that
    the sole issue in Barner’s appeal (that is, whether the Board erred in recalculating
    Barner’s maximum date) was without merit, Counsel properly elected to file the
    Withdrawal Application along with a Turner letter. In the later document, court-
    appointed counsel who seeks to withdraw must detail the nature and extent of
    counsel’s review, list each issue that would be raised, and explain why the issues are
    7
    In addition, the Board has not submitted a brief or other document supporting its
    determination.
    8
    Our standard of review in the context of Board decisions is limited to determining whether
    the Board violated a petitioner’s constitutional rights or committed an error of law and whether
    the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the
    Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
    5
    lacking in merit. Turner, 544 A.2d at 928-929. Counsel must then comply with the
    technical requirements set forth in Craig v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
    Parole, 
    502 A.2d 758
    , 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985): counsel must notify the client of his
    request to withdraw, provide the client with a copy of his Turner letter, and advise
    the client of his right to retain new counsel or raise any points he may deem worthy
    of consideration. 
    Id.
     If the court agrees with counsel’s assessment of the issues after
    its own, independent review, counsel will be permitted to withdraw. Turner, 544
    A.2d at 929.
    In this case, the Turner letter presented by Counsel to this Court outlines the
    issue raised in Barner’s appeal, and explains Counsel’s conclusion that the issue is
    without merit. Counsel also certifies that he has notified Barner of his intent to
    withdraw, furnished Barner with a copy of his Turner letter, and advised him of the
    right to retain new counsel or raise any points he may deem worthy of consideration,
    pursuant to Craig. Counsel’s Withdrawal Application and Turner letter therefore
    meet the relevant requirements. Thus, before we grant the Withdrawal Application,
    it becomes this Court’s responsibility to examine the proceedings and make an
    independent judgment as to whether the appeal itself is lacking in merit.
    B. The Amended Petition for Review
    In Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
    412 A.2d 568
    , 571
    (Pa. 1980), our Supreme Court adopted the rule that, “if a defendant is being held in
    custody solely because of a detainer lodged by the Board and has otherwise met the
    requirements for bail on the new criminal charges, the time which he spent in custody
    shall be credited against his original sentence.” The Gaito rule further provides that,
    if the defendant “remains incarcerated because he has failed to satisfy bail
    requirements on the new criminal charges, then the time spent in custody shall be
    6
    credited to his new sentence.” 
    Id.
     By the same token, the Board may not apply
    credit to the defendant’s original sentence if the defendant is in custody because of
    his failure to meet bail requirements along with a Board detainer. Smith v. Pa. Bd.
    of Prob. and Parole, 
    171 A.3d 759
    , 771 (Pa. 2017).
    Instantly, Barner was paroled on April 24, 2017, with 661 days remaining of
    his prison sentence. C.R. at 8. Having absconded from supervision, Barner was
    arrested on a Board detainer on March 12, 2019, and remained in custody solely due
    to that detainer until March 28, 2019. Id. at 110. From the latter date until
    September 29, 2021, Barner remained in custody because of new criminal charges
    issued in Northampton County. Id. The Board then recommitted Barner as a
    convicted parole violator to the unserved balance of his original sentence as of
    September 29, 2021. Id. at 108. The Board informed Barner that, pursuant to Gaito,
    he was given credit for the 16 days in 2019 that he was in custody solely because of
    the Board detainer. Id. at 117. Accordingly, as of September 29, 2021, Barner was
    required to serve the 645 remaining days of his original sentence, resulting in a
    recalculated maximum date of July 6, 2023. Id.
    Barner maintains that he is entitled to credit not only for the time spent in
    custody solely on the Board detainer, but also for the time spent in custody on the
    Northampton County charges.9 Such an argument is baseless. As explained above,
    Barner is only entitled to credit for the 16 days he spent in custody solely due to the
    Board’s detainer, not when he was also in custody on the Northampton County
    charges. Thus, the Board correctly added the unserved balance of Barner’s original
    sentence of 645 days to the date on which he was detained on the new Board warrant.
    9
    To understand the basis of Barner’s appeal in the absence of a brief, we rely in part on
    the summary of Barner’s arguments given in Counsel’s Turner letter.
    7
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we grant Counsel’s Withdrawal Application and
    affirm the Board’s June 2, 2022 order.
    ____________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Oris A. Barner Jr.,                 :
    Petitioner    :
    :
    v.                            : No. 795 C.D. 2022
    :
    Pennsylvania Parole Board,          :
    Respondent        :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 25th day of July, 2023, David Crowley, Esquire’s
    Application for Withdrawal of Appearance is hereby GRANTED, and the June 2,
    2022, order of the Pennsylvania Parole Board is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 795 C.D. 2022

Judges: Ceisler, J.

Filed Date: 7/25/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/25/2023