Rev. A.S. Enoxh v. J. Carter ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Rev. Augustus Simmons Enoxh, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 243 C.D. 2022
: Submitted: July 21, 2023
J. Carter, T. Pauley, K. Patterson, :
Mr. Geardner, Librarian, B. Hoffman, :
T. Stewart, N. Wilson :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 25, 2023
Appellant Rev. Augustus Simmons Enoxh (Appellant)1 appeals from the
Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) on
November 17, 2021, denying him in forma pauperis (IFP) status and dismissing his
pro se “Complaint in Civil Action” (Complaint) as frivolous.2 Appellant filed his
Complaint against: J. Carter; T. Pauley; K. Patterson; Mr. Geardner, Librarian (Mr.
Geardner); B. Hoffman; T. Stewart; and N. Wilson (collectively, Appellees),
individuals employed at various State Correctional Institutions (SCI), namely SCI-
1
Appellant, whose given name appears to be Augustus Simmons, refers to himself as the
“Revered Magi Augustus Simmon[s] Enoxh,” “the holy protector and founder of the Fellowship
of Spiritual Science.” (Complaint in Civil Action (Complaint) ¶ 6.)
2
Appellant’s request for IFP status was docketed on November 1, 2021, and was
accompanied by his Complaint; however, the Complaint was not docketed until July 17, 2023,
when the Prothonotary of this Court requested that the trial court file the Complaint on the docket
to enable appellate review of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint.
Greene, where Appellant was housed when he brought his cause of action,3 and SCI-
Forest and SCI-Coal Township, where Appellant previously had been housed.4
(Complaint ¶¶ 6-7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 25.) In his Complaint, Appellant makes
numerous allegations regarding his inability to receive his Social Security card, his
birth certificate, and his inmate identification. He also claims numerous legal
documents belonging to him were lost and challenges the prison law library policies
at SCI-Greene. (Id. ¶¶ 6-20.) Following our review, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Appellant alleges that on April 7, 2021, he filed a grievance
against SCI-Greene inmate accounts when his request slip filed on June 12, 2019,
for his Social Security card and birth certificate went unanswered. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Appellant avers he received a response to his grievance that his Social Security card
was at SCI-Greene, but his birth certificate was not. (Id. ¶ 22.) Appellant then filed
a second request slip on June 17, 2018,5 asking for two copies of his Social Security
card, and that they be personally delivered to him or given to his counselor. (Id.) In
a response dated June 20, 2019,6 Appellant was told his Social Security card would
be “safeguarded in [his] property envelope only.” (Id. ¶ 23.) On March 26, 2021,
Appellant states he asked that a copy of his birth certificate, Social Security card,
3
In his brief, Appellant lists his address as SCI-Phoenix in Collegeville, Pennsylvania.
(Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 1-2.)
4
With the exception of Mr. Geardner, whom Appellant identifies as a librarian, the other
Appellees are identified as working in various capacities in the business office of one of the SCIs.
5
This date appears to be in error as Appellant states this request followed his June 12, 2019
request.
6
This date appears to be an error in light of Appellant’s earlier allegation that he filed the
grievance in April 2021.
2
and inmate identification be sent to his mother, and he was told the “[d]ocuments
have not been received yet.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Appellant states he was “stonewalled for
information about his birth certificate for several months,” which prompted him to
file a grievance related to the missing document. (Id. ¶ 25.) According to Appellant,
he was told SCI-Greene contacted SCI-Coal Township to inquire as to the
whereabouts of his Social Security card and birth certificate. He avers he was told
the Social Security card had arrived at SCI-Greene and was placed in the safe there,
but the birth certificate had not yet been received by either SCI-Coal Township or
SCI-Greene; he would be notified of its arrival. (Id.) Appellant claims he has a
“stub” from Albany, New York, which reflects his birth certificate was delivered to
SCI-Greene, which SCI-Greene denies. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Appellant avers Appellees
J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson, the only individuals with access to the
institutional safe, are responsible for, among other things, securing the personal
property of inmates held in the safe, which they did not do in this case, and that T.
Stewart, B. Hoffman, and N. Wilson as business managers ignored their duty to
investigate the missing birth certificate. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 32, 46.) Appellant also
alleges Mr. Geardner who, consistent with Department of Corrections (DOC) policy
should personally collect legal mail, “mis[]plac[ed] recklessly” multiple pages of
Appellant’s legal documents by requiring him to place those documents in the
inmate mailbox, despite flaws in the inmate mail system. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35, 48, 54.)
Appellant posits that Appellees were at all times “acting under the color of the
law, to wit, under color of the statutes, ordinance, regulations, policies, customs, and
usages of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania[,]” and engaged in willful
misconduct; thus, Appellees are not immune from liability under Section 8550 of
the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. (Id. ¶¶ 7-20, 44-45, 48.) Appellant contends
Appellees committed fraud and numerous criminal offenses, tampered with public
documents, and violated his constitutional rights, including due process. (Id. ¶¶ 31,
3
36-65.) Specifically, Appellant argues that Appellees have deprived him of clearly
established and well-settled constitutional rights while committing violations of the
following statutory provisions:
(a.) Freedom from the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law;
(b.) Freedom from illicit deprivation of personal property due
to the commission of this tort;
(c.) 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550 willful misconduct[;]
(d.) 18 Pa.C.S. § 4911 tampering with public records or
information;
(e.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4113 misapplication of entrusted property
of government or financial institutions[;]
(f.) [Section 13(a) of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device
and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as
amended,] 35 P.S. § 780-113(a) failure to keep records[;]
(g.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4911 tampering w[ith] public records or
information[;]
(h.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4113 misapplication of entrusted
property[;]
(i.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4104 tampering with records or
identification.
(Id. ¶ 64 (unnecessary capitalization and periods omitted).) Appellant seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of changing law library policies and the
manner in which personal property is secured, along with compensatory and punitive
damages in an amount of $750,000.00. Appellant also requests that Appellees be
terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 66-70.)
II. TRIAL COURT ORDER
Simultaneously with his Complaint, Appellant filed his petition seeking IFP
status. Prior to service of the Complaint on Appellees, on November 17, 2021, the
trial court issued its Order denying Appellant IFP status and dismissing the
Complaint upon its determination that the Complaint is frivolous. (Trial Court
4
Order, filed 11/17/2021 (Order) at 7.) In doing so, the trial court relied upon Section
6602(e)(2) of the Act known as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42
Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2), which states:
Notwithstanding any filing fee which has been paid, the court shall
dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time, including prior to
service on the defendant, if the court determines . . . [t]he prison
conditions litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted or the defendant is entitled to assert
a valid affirmative defense, including immunity, which, if asserted,
would preclude the relief.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2).
In dismissing the Complaint, the trial court concluded Appellant’s claims
constituted prison conditions litigation that fell within the PLRA because Appellant
“challenges [] Department of Corrections [(DOC)] policies and procedures relating
to inmate personal property and the procedures to secure such personal property,
i[.]e.[,] [S]ocial [S]ecurity cards, in the institutional safe.” (Order at 6.) The trial
court further reasoned:
[I]t is the understanding of the instant [c]ourt that [] [DOC] rules and
regulations regarding personal property are policies implemented by []
[DOC] to ensure, among other things, health and safety concerns within
the institution. Therefore, based on [] [DOC] procedures, the PLRA,
and precedent related to challenges to [] [DOC] policies and procedures
relating to inmate personal property and the procedures to secure such
personal property, i[.]e.[,] [S]ocial [S]ecurity cards, in the institutional
safe, [Appellant]’s Complaint is determined to be frivolous.
(Id. at 7.)
5
Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the trial court, which was stamped filed
December 28, 2021.7 On January 6, 2022, the trial court filed its Opinion Pursuant
to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.)
(1925(a) Op.), wherein it indicated that it had not ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal and that it would be relying upon its
reasoning contained in its Order for this appeal, with no additions to the record.
(1925(a) Op. at 1 (unnumbered).)8
III. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Appeal
Before we address Appellant’s substantive issues, we first must determine
whether this appeal is properly before us, for when an appeal has been untimely
filed, the defect is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Miller, 570 A.2d 1386, 1388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the docket entry of
the order from which the appeal is taken. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also Pa.R.A.P.
105(b) (providing “[a]n appellate court . . . may not enlarge the time for filing a
notice of appeal”). Herein, the trial court’s Order was entered on November 17,
2021, but Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until December 28, 2021,
making it facially untimely. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
However, a review of the record reveals that Appellant completed a
handwritten notice of appeal dated December 16, 2021, wherein he indicated that he
7
The appeal was originally taken to the Superior Court, which transferred the appeal to
this Court on February 11, 2022.
8
When a trial court dismisses an inmate’s complaint sua sponte for its failure to state a
cause of action for which relief may be granted, this Court’s scope of review of the trial court’s
order is plenary. Whitaker v. Wetzel, 170 A.3d 568, 572 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
6
had been transferred from SCI-Greene to SCI-Phoenix and had not received notice
of the trial court’s Order until that date. (Original Record No. 13). The Greene
County Prothonotary Docket Entries support this assertion as they indicate that mail
for Appellant had been returned as undeliverable on December 3, 2021, and again
on December 14, 2021. Moreover, at the conclusion of his handwritten notice of
appeal, Appellant states that he served the notice of appeal on the Greene County
Prothonotary on December 16, 2021, the same day that he learned of the Order and
one day before he had to file a timely notice of appeal. Under the prisoner mailbox
rule, a prisoner’s pro se appeal is deemed filed at the time it is given to prison
officials or put in the prison mailbox. Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426
(Pa. 1997); Sweesy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 955 A.2d 501, 502 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2008). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly has applied the prisoner mailbox
rule to all inmate appeals where an inmate is not represented by counsel. Jones, 700
A.2d at 426; Kittrell v. Watson, 88 A.3d 1091, 1097 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
In light of the foregoing, and upon applying the prisoner mailbox rule, we
conclude that Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on December 16, 2021.9
Accordingly, we proceed to address the substantive issues Appellant raises in his
9
Normally, Appellant’s statement on the certificate of service, without more, would be
insufficient as proof that the prisoner mailbox rule applies herein. See Sweesy, 955 A.2d at 503(holding that the court needs “reasonably verifiable evidence” of the date an inmate deposits an
appeal, including, for example, “certificates of mailing, cash slips, affidavits, and prison operating
procedures”). However, the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s late receipt of the trial court’s
Order as described by Appellant, which are supported by the Greene County Prothonotary Docket
Entries, substantiate Appellant’s claim that December 16, 2021, was the first opportunity he had
to file an appeal from the Order as it appears the Order was twice returned as undeliverable. Thus,
the breakdown in the administration of the court would also permit the appeal to be considered.
See Best Courier v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.Off. of Unemployment Comp. Tax Servs., 220 A.3d 696,
701 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
7
brief pertaining to the denial of his request to proceed IFP and dismissal of his
Complaint.
B. Substantive Issues
Appellant first argues the trial court erred in determining his Complaint
constitutes prison conditions litigation and denying what he describes as his
“professional liability tort” claims against Appellees. (Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 2.)
Appellant states that contrary to the trial court’s determination, he did not file the
action seeking items Appellees refused to give him but, rather, he did so to challenge
their “gross negligence” resulting in the loss of his original birth certificate, as well
as pages of documents pertaining to an unrelated litigation. (Id. at 2-3.) Appellant
relies upon this Court’s holding in Williams v. Beard, 67 A.3d 182 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2013), wherein we reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court upon finding
the trial court had erred in basing its finding that the action was frivolous on
balancing the costs of litigation against the cost of the damaged footlocker for which
the defendant requested reimbursement. Id. at 184-85.
Herein, unlike the situation presented in Williams, the trial court did not base
its finding of frivolity upon the monetary value of the items which Appellant seeks.
Rather, the trial court found Appellant’s Complaint “challenges [] [DOC’s] policies
and procedures relating to inmate personal property and the procedures to secure
such personal property, i[.]e.[,] [S]ocial [S]ecurity cards, in the institutional safe.”
(Order at 6.) Following our review, we find this is only partly correct.
Appellant’s allegations against the named prison officials regarding the
handling of his personal documents and his requests for reforms in the prison law
library and its mailing procedures assert claims that constitute “prison conditions
litigation.” Section 6601 of the PLRA defines prison conditions litigation as:
8
[a] civil proceeding arising in whole or in part under Federal or State
law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of
actions by a government party on the life of an individual confined in
prison. The term includes an appeal. The term does not include
criminal proceedings or habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact
or duration of confinement in prison.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6601. Because it concerns prison conditions litigation, the Complaint
is subject to Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA, which allows a trial court to dismiss
prison conditions litigation where the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted[,] or [that] the defendant is entitled to assert a valid affirmative
defense, including immunity, which, if asserted, would preclude the relief.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2); Bailey v. Miller, 943 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
“Accordingly, the defense of sovereign immunity can provide a basis for dismissal
of a prison conditions lawsuit.” McCool v. Dep’t of Corr., 984 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2009).
This Court previously explained the applicability of sovereign immunity as
follows:
Sovereign immunity acts as a bar to suits against Commonwealth
parties, including its officials and employees acting within the scope of
their duties. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. Establishing a limited list of exceptions
to immunity, the General Assembly adopted what is commonly referred
to as the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8502, 8521-
8527. Section 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act waives “immunity
as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages
arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable
under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the
injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of
sovereign immunity,” for specifically enumerated categories of acts.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. A “Commonwealth party” is defined in Section
8501 as “[a] Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but
only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or
employment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. Thus, when an employee of a
Commonwealth agency, such as a DOC employee, is acting within the
scope of his or her duties, the employee is shielded by the doctrine of
9
sovereign immunity from liability for tort claims arising from negligent
acts that do not fall within the statutory exceptions listed in Section
8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8522(a)-(b). Sovereign immunity is not waived for intentional acts
committed by a Commonwealth employee acting within the scope of
his or her employment. La Frankie v. Miklich, . . . 618 A.2d 1145, 1149
([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992).
Paluch v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 175 A.3d 433, 437-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). One of the
enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity is for “damages caused by . . . [t]he
care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of
Commonwealth parties, including . . . property of persons held by a Commonwealth
agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3).
“Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction; consequently, a pleading must
not only apprise the opposing party of the asserted claim, [but] it must also formulate
the issues by summarizing those facts essential to support the claim.” Richardson v.
Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353, 356-57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Appellant casts his Complaint, on the one hand, as sounding in negligence.
For instance, Appellant alleges J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson owed a duty to
safeguard his personal documents, which was breached when they were lost.
(Complaint ¶¶ 28-30.) However, Appellant also asserts that T. Stewart, B. Hoffman,
and N. Wilson “intentional[ly] ignored the fact that his personal property was
missing and[/]or destroyed.” (Complaint ¶ 32.) He also claims Mr. Geardner
engaged in “willful misconduct.” For example, he describes Mr. Geardner’s willful
misconduct in requiring legal materials to be passed through the inmate mailing
system which he “knowingly” knew to be “flawed.” (Id. ¶ 48.) This Court has held
that for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, willful misconduct is viewed as
synonymous with an intentional tort. Delate v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1995). As stated above, generally, intentional tort claims are barred by
10
sovereign immunity.10 Paluch, 175 A.3d at 438. Notwithstanding, where, as here,
an inmate pleads both negligence and intentional tort claims, we have held that
because a “plaintiff is the master of his claim” and can plead causes of action in the
alternative, it was error for a trial court to dismiss an inmate’s complaint in its
entirety as frivolous. Nifas v. Williams (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 319 C.D. 2019, filed July
25, 2019), slip op. at 7.11 Thus, to the extent the Complaint alleges negligence
against J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson with regard to their duty to secure
documents pertaining to an inmate’s identity, (Complaint ¶¶ 28-30), the trial court
erred in dismissing those claims as frivolous.12
Appellant also avers Appellees “committed intentional fraud.” (Complaint ¶
31.) As stated above, intentional acts are barred by sovereign immunity. Paluch,
175 A.3d at 438. Furthermore, under Pennsylvania’s pleading rules, averments of
fraud must be stated with particularity, although Appellant’s Complaint presents
only vague generalizations in this regard. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1019(b), Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(b). Accordingly, to the extent Appellant attempts to
assert claims against Appellees for fraud, we conclude the trial court did not err in
dismissing those claims as frivolous.
10
Pursuant to Section 8550 of the Judicial Code, sovereign immunity is waived where the
injury is caused by willful misconduct of an employee. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. However, Section
8550 applies only to local agency employees. See id. (“In any action against a local agency or
employee thereof . . . .”) DOC employees, such as Appellees, are Commonwealth agency
employees. Williams v. Shawley (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1250 C.D. 2018, filed June 27, 2019), slip op.
at 16.
11
While not binding, this Court’s unreported opinions may be cited for their persuasive
authority pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1)-(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2), and Section 414(a) of our Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §
69.414(a).
12
It appears from Appellant’s own allegations that his Social Security card was received
at SCI Greene and kept in the prison safe; therefore, he has not stated a claim for the loss of this
document. (Complaint ¶25.)
11
The Complaint further alleges Appellees violated numerous criminal statutes
and seeks for Appellees to be criminally charged as a result thereof. (Complaint ¶¶
36-41.) In Pennsylvania, there is a procedure by which private criminal complaints
can be lodged. See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506, Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.
This involves the affiant submitting the complaint first to the attorney for the
Commonwealth for approval and, if the complaint is not approved, the affiant may
petition the court of common pleas for review of that decision. Pa.R.Crim.P. 506
(A). Appellant did not follow this procedure. Instead, Appellant filed a civil action
alleging Appellees violated various criminal statutes and seeking to have them
criminally charged. These allegations are outside the trial court’s jurisdiction in a
civil action, and, thus, dismissal of those claims was not in error.
Appellant also claims Mr. Geardner, who was required to safeguard his
documents, was “recklessly” responsible for losing “dozens” of his legal documents
by requiring him to deliver them through the prison mail system with “no care of its
return or delivery.” (Complaint ¶¶ 33-35, 48, 53, 62-63.) Specifically, Appellant
refers to 27 pages of legal documents consisting of “[d]ecl[a]rations, [l]egal
evidence, and procedural documents.” (Id. ¶ 34.) However, while these allegations
pertain to intentional action on the part of Mr. Geardner, Appellant also sets forth
allegations sounding in negligence that as the “head librarian,” Mr. Geardner
through “a very flawed system” “process[ed] sensitive legal mail with no care of its
return or delivery.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Initially, we observe that this Court appears to have
viewed personal legal documents and mail under the umbrella of personal property.
See White v. Walter (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1341 C.D. 2019, filed Feb. 9, 2021), slip op.
at 9-10 (finding inmate’s allegations in his complaint that prison officials negligently
mishandled his “personal property (mail)” failed where they had not been pled with
specificity); Samuels v. Walsh (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 318 C.D. 2014, filed Nov. 17,
2014), slip op. at 2-4, 9-10 (finding that where an inmate’s “personal property and
12
legal documents” were left unattended and were subsequently lost, and the items
were in the “care, custody and control” of prison employees, inmate was “not
prohibited from pursuing a negligence action against [prison employees] for the loss
of his property” as “[a] factfinder could conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable
that in a prison, an inmate’s personal property would be misplaced or stolen if not
secured”). Thus, following our review of the Complaint, we find that Appellant pled
in his Complaint that Mr. Geardner had a duty to “secure and protect” his property
(legal documents) once those materials were deposited in the inmate mailbox. See
Samuels, slip op at 9-10. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding this claim to
be wholly frivolous and dismissing it at this stage of the proceedings.
To the extent Appellant seeks injunctive relief due to DOC mailing policies,
it is axiomatic that Appellees’ decisions addressing internal prison operations are
largely outside this Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction. Bronson v. Cent. Off.
Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998); Winton v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 263
A.3d 1240, 1243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
reasoned that, “internal prison operations are more properly left to the legislative and
executive branches, and . . . prison officials must be allowed to exercise their
judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain
security free from judicial interference.” Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358.
Finally, Appellant avers that J. Carter has committed numerous criminal
offenses against him
pursuant to the statutory provisions found at 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4113[]
misapplication of entrusted property of government or financial
institutions; § 4911[] Tampering with public records or information; §
8550[] Willful misconduct; § 7507[] Breach of privacy; § [sic] Invasion
of privacy; Failure to keep records, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a); Tampering
w[ith] public records or information [§] 4911; Misapplication of
entrusted property, [§] 4113 and Tampering with records or
identification [§] 4104(a)M1.
13
(Complaint ¶ 36.) Appellant further alleges that P. Pauley, K. Patterson, T. Stewart,
B. Hoffman, and N. Wilson each “has committed a criminal offense(s) against
[Appellant named] in paragraph 36[] [i]ncluding and not limited to criminal
conspiracy to commit all the above[-]named offenses.” (Complaint ¶¶ 37-38, 40-
41a.)13 In addition, Appellant alleges Mr. Geardner has committed “the following
offense(s) 18 Pa.C.S. § 8550 willful misconduct; misapplication of entrusted
property, [§] 4113; Failure to keep records, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a).” (Complaint ¶
39.)
Other than his bald allegations punctuated with statutory citations, Appellant
has failed to plead material facts to support a viable claim that Appellees committed
any of the enumerated criminal offenses or violated any of his constitutional rights.
In fact, Appellant does not even mention, let alone apply to the named Appellees or
their specific actions, any of the elements of the enumerated offenses. Tedesco v.
Link (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 709 C.D. 2020, filed May 16, 2023), slip op. at 7-8.
Moreover, “[a] complaint claiming civil conspiracy must allege material facts which
will either directly or inferentially establish elements of conspiracy.” Brown v.
Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Appellant does not allege specific
facts indicating a plan or an agreement among Appellees to act unlawfully, but
merely makes general allegations that they did so. “Because he has not pled
sufficient facts to plead a conspiracy as well as the necessary predicate illegal act
necessary for there to be a civil conspiracy, the trial court properly dismissed this
count.” Id.13
There are two paragraphs numbered 41 in the Complaint. We refer to the second as 41a.
14
IV. CONCLUSION
This Court may affirm a trial court’s dismissal of claims on grounds different
from those upon which the trial court relied. McCool, 984 A.2d at 570-72; Guy M.
Cooper, Inc. v. E. Penn Sch. Dist., 903 A.2d 608, 618 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Even
though we find the Complaint is not barred in its entirety, we do find the trial court
properly dismissed Appellant’s intentional tort claims, fraud claims, prison reform
claims, and his claims pertaining to violations of his constitutional rights and
criminal offenses against Appellees. However, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s negligence claims against J. Carter, T.
Pauley, and K. Patterson for their alleged failure to secure his identifying documents.
We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s negligence claim against
Mr. Geardner in connection with his alleged loss of Appellant’s legal documents.
We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
__________________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Rev. Augustus Simmons Enoxh, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 243 C.D. 2022
:
J. Carter, T. Pauley, K. Patterson, :
Mr. Geardner, Librarian, B. Hoffman, :
T. Stewart, N. Wilson :
ORDER
NOW, August 25, 2023, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene
County date November 17, 2021, is AFFIRMED IN PART with regard to the
court’s dismissal of Appellant’s intentional tort claims, fraud claims, prison reform
claims, and his claims pertaining to violations of his constitutional rights and
criminal offenses against Appellees and REVERSED IN PART with regard to
Appellant’s negligence claims against J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson relating
to their alleged failure to secure his birth certificate and inmate identification card,
and against Mr. Geardner relating to the alleged loss of Appellant’s legal documents.
The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
__________________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge