R.O. v. Mr. T.C. Blocker, State Police Commissioner ( 2023 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    R.O.,                                            :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                        :    No. 256 M.D. 2020
    :    Submitted: September 30, 2022
    Mr. Tyree C. Blocker, State                      :
    Police Commissioner,                             :
    Respondent              :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                       FILED: August 28, 2023
    Before the Court are cross-applications for summary relief filed by R.O.
    (Petitioner) and Mr. Tyree C. Blocker, now former State Police Commissioner
    (Respondent). Petitioner commenced this action in the Court’s original jurisdiction
    in March 2020 by filing a pro se Petition for Review,1 challenging the
    constitutionality of subchapter I of the most recent enactment of a sexual offender
    registration scheme, Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29 (Act 29), 42 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 9799.10-9799.75.2 Therein, Petitioner averred he was convicted in June 1988 of
    1
    Although entitled “Application for Summary Relief,” the Court treated the pleading as a
    petition for review in the Court’s original jurisdiction. See May 12, 2020 order.
    2
    Act 29 amended the Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (Act 10). Act 10 and Act
    29 are collectively referred to herein as Act 29. Through Act 29, the General Assembly passed
    the newest version of a sexual offender registration and notification act in response to the Supreme
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    kidnapping, and because kidnapping is not a sexual offense, he is not required to
    register under any sexual offender registration scheme. According to Petitioner,
    applying Act 29 to him violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws3 as his
    offense occurred before any sexual offender registration laws were enacted.
    Petitioner previously filed an application for summary relief on those bases, which
    this Court denied in a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed May 24, 2021.4 (See
    May 24, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order.)
    Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant Application for Summary Relief,
    wherein he asserts because he and the mother of the minor he was convicted of
    kidnapping were married, he should not have been convicted of kidnapping but
    rather unlawful restraint of a minor. (Petitioner’s Application ¶¶ 1-3; see also
    Petitioner’s Brief at 2-3.) In support of his Application, Petitioner attaches to his
    brief what purportedly is a handwritten letter dated December 28, 1987, from an
    individual identifying herself as Petitioner’s wife, claiming she was drugged and
    coerced into giving statements against her will to police about Petitioner. Also
    attached thereto is a divorce decree dated June 1, 1998, from the Court of Common
    Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    164 A.3d 1189
     (Pa. 2017). Section 9799.51(b)(4)
    of Act 29, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(b)(4). In subchapter I, the General Assembly also established
    new registration requirements for: (1) individuals who committed offenses between April 22,
    1996, and December 20, 2012, whose registration period had not expired; and (2) offenders who
    were required to register under a prior Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act statute
    between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012, whose registration period had not yet expired.
    See Section 9799.52 of Act 29, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52.
    3
    Article I, section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, “No ex post facto law . . .
    shall be passed.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 17. The United States Constitution has two provisions that
    prohibit ex post facto laws, one, contained in Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States
    Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, which applies to Congress, and the other, contained in
    Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1,
    which applies to the states.
    4
    Petitioner filed a notice of appeal of the May 24, 2021 Order, which the Supreme Court
    administratively closed on September 24, 2021.
    2
    Pleas of Crawford County between the individual identified in the letter and
    Petitioner.
    Respondent also filed an Application for Summary Relief.              Therein,
    Respondent argues that, despite Petitioner’s assertions to the contrary, Subchapter I
    of Act 29 applies to Petitioner, and, under Supreme Court precedent, Act 29 does
    not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. (Respondent’s Application ¶¶
    7-8.)   Consistent with this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
    Petitioner’s prior application for summary relief, Respondent asks this Court to grant
    his Application.
    In considering an application for summary relief, the Court “may grant
    summary relief where the dispute is legal rather than factual,” there are no facts in
    dispute, and the “right to relief is clear.” Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v.
    Wolf, 
    198 A.3d 1205
    , 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Further, when ruling on an
    application for summary relief, “we review the record in the light most favorable to
    the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of disputed material
    facts against the moving party.” Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 
    216 A.3d 448
    , 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). “Even if the facts are undisputed, the moving
    party has the burden of proving that its right to relief is so clear as a matter of law
    that summary relief is warranted.” Naylor v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    54 A.3d 429
    ,
    431 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    With these principles in mind, we begin with Petitioner’s Application.
    Petitioner argues he should not be subject to the registration requirements because
    he was married to the victim’s mother and, therefore, was not guilty of kidnapping.
    There are a number of reasons Petitioner’s Application cannot succeed. First, it is a
    collateral attack on a 35-year-old criminal conviction, and this is not the appropriate
    3
    forum for challenging that conviction.           Second, Petitioner cannot support his
    application for summary relief through inadmissible hearsay or unverified
    statements. “An application for summary relief is properly evaluated according to
    the standards for summary judgment.” Myers v. Commonwealth, 
    128 A.3d 846
    , 849
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.4
    provides:
    Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
    knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
    evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the signer is competent to
    testify to the matters stated therein. Verified or certified copies of all
    papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
    thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
    supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
    further affidavits.
    Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.4.
    Courts have held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse
    to consider unsworn statements. Welsh v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
    154 A.3d 386
    , 391 (Pa. Super. 2017).5 Similarly, “a motion for summary judgment cannot be
    supported or defeated by statements that include inadmissible hearsay evidence.”
    Botkin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
    907 A.2d 641
    , 649 (Pa Super. 2006). The letter
    Petitioner attaches in support of his application is both unsworn and inadmissible
    hearsay evidence.      Thus, the Court will not consider it.          For these reasons,
    Petitioner’s Application is denied.
    Turning to Respondent’s Application, as set forth in our May 24, 2021
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, this matter is controlled by the Supreme Court’s
    5
    In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
    persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Rev., 
    180 A.3d 545
    , 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
    4
    decisions in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 
    234 A.3d 602
     (Pa. 2020), and T.S. v.
    Pennsylvania State Police, 
    241 A.3d 1091
     (Pa. 2020). Accordingly, we grant
    Respondent’s Application.
    __________________________________________
    RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
    5
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    R.O.,                                     :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                    :   No. 256 M.D. 2020
    :
    Mr. Tyree C. Blocker, State               :
    Police Commissioner,                      :
    Respondent       :
    ORDER
    NOW, August 28, 2023, the Application for Summary Relief filed by R.O. is
    DENIED. The Application for Summary Relief filed by Mr. Tyree C. Blocker, State
    Police Commissioner (Respondent), is GRANTED, and judgment is entered in
    favor of Respondent.
    __________________________________________
    RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge