V. Gurvich v. Bd. of Property Assessment Appeals & Rev. of Allegheny County, PA ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Victor Gurvich, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Board of Property Assessment Appeals :
and Review of Allegheny County, : No. 717 C.D. 2022
Pennsylvania : Submitted: April 6, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: August 3, 2023
Victor Gurvich (Gurvich), pro se, appeals from an order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that rejected Gurvich’s
challenges to the tax reassessment of his real property. Gurvich asserts that the
decision of the Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review of Allegheny
County (Board) increasing the assessed value of his property following his 2019
purchase of the property, without also increasing the assessments of his neighbors’
properties, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment1 of
1
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Sec[tion] 1. [Citizens of the United States.] All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
the United States Constitution and the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution2 and discriminated against him based on his Russian national origin in
violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.3 Upon review, we affirm the
trial court’s order.
I. Background
In 2019, Gurvich purchased real property in Shaler Township,
Allegheny County (County), for $245,000.00. Original Record (O.R.), Item #11 at
1. In the County’s 2013 countywide reassessment, using 2012 as the base year4 for
valuations, the property had been assessed at $164,300.00. Id. The Shaler Area
School District (School District) appealed that assessment after Gurvich purchased
the property. Following a hearing, the Board assigned a new assessed value of
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
2
Article VIII, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, entitled “Uniformity of taxation,”
provides: “All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Pa. Const.
art. VIII, § 1.
3
Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.
4
Section 8802 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law (Assessment Law), 53 Pa.C.S.
§§ 8801-8868, defines “base year” as “[t]he year upon which real property market values are based
for the most recent countywide revision of assessment of real property or other prior year upon
which the market value of all real property of the county is based for assessment purposes.” 53
Pa.C.S. § 8802.
2
$211,200.00, calculated by applying the County’s then-current common level ratio
(CLR)5 of 86.2% to Gurvich’s purchase price. Id.; O.R., Item #8 at 3.
Gurvich challenged the reassessment before the Board, which
transferred the matter to the trial court. O.R., Item #11 at 1-2. Gurvich argued that
his property’s reassessment was not uniform with those of surrounding properties
because those properties were still assessed at their 2012 base year values while
Gurvich’s property alone had been subjected to reassessment.6 Id. at 2. Gurvich
also argued that the reassessment discriminated against him because he was born in
Russia. Id.
After a hearing, the trial court issued a memorandum and order on
March 15, 2022. O.R., Items #11 & #12. The trial court rejected Gurvich’s
uniformity challenge, finding that applying the CLR to the sale price was “the most
fair method of reassessing the property . . . .” Id., Item #11 at 4. The trial court also
rejected Gurvich’s discrimination claim, finding that such a claim was better left to
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC)7 and that, in any event,
Gurvich failed to show any discrimination. Id. at 2-4.
5
The CLR is “[t]he ratio of assessed value to current market value used generally in the
county and published by the State Tax Equalization Board on or before July 1 of the year prior to
the tax year on appeal . . . .” In re Appeal of Springfield Sch. Dist., 101 A.3d 835, 838 n.2 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2014), overruled in part on other grounds by Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v.
Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist., 163 A.3d 962, 975 (Pa. 2017).
6
At the outset of its memorandum opinion of March 15, 2022, the trial court described
Gurvich’s argument as a challenge to the constitutionality of the county’s “system of real property
assessment . . . .” Original Record (O.R.), Item #1 at 1. Gurvich insists this characterization
constitutes reversible error because he is not challenging the entire system of property assessment,
but merely the reassessment of his property. However, as discussed below, the trial court’s initial
description was, at most, harmless error.
7
Gurvich did file a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission, but that agency dismissed the complaint. The agency’s case closure form indicated
3
Gurvich appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. The School
District moved to quash the appeal, asserting that the trial court’s order was
interlocutory because the trial court had not made a final determination of the correct
reassessed value. By order dated June 1, 2022, this Court remanded the matter to
the trial court for further proceedings. Gurvich v. Gd. Of Prop Assessment Appeals
& Rev. of Allegheny Cnty. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 323 C.D. 2022, filed June 3, 2022) (per
curiam). The trial court held another hearing, after which it issued an order dated
June 30, 2022, setting the assessed value of Gurvich’s property at $211,000.00 for
2020, $236,250.00 for 2021, and $251,410 for 2022. O.R., Item #20. This appeal
by Gurvich followed.8
II. Issues
On appeal,9 Gurvich raises several interrelated issues for review, which
we reorder, consolidate, and summarize as follows. Gurvich asserts that the Board’s
reassessment improperly failed to use the 2012 base year assessment for his property
and that, as a result, the reassessed value of his property is not uniform with the
assessments of his neighbors, in violation of state and federal constitutions. He also
maintains that the trial court mischaracterized his reassessment argument as a
challenge to the County’s entire reassessment system and thereby failed to consider
the case was untimely, the agency lacked jurisdiction, or the complaint was frivolous on its face.
O.R., Item #21 at 30.
8
Gurvich’s appeal of the final order also included the previous interlocutory order. Sunoco
Partners Mktg. & Terminals, L.P. v. Clean Air Council, 219 A.3d 280, 295 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)
(explaining that “an appeal of a final order subsumes challenges to previous interlocutory
decisions”) (quoting Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012) (additional quotation
marks omitted)).
9
Our review of a trial court’s decision in an assessment appeal is limited to determining
whether the trial court committed an error of law or reached a decision not supported by substantial
evidence. Jackson v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Cumberland Cnty., 950 A.2d 1081, 1085 n.4
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
4
his actual uniformity challenge. In addition, Gurvich reiterates his assertion that the
reassessment of his property constituted discrimination based on his national origin.
III. Discussion
At the outset, we observe that Gurvich has not organized the argument
section of his brief to correspond to his statement of the questions involved as
required by Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). As a result, this Court has had some difficulty determining which
portions of the argument are intended to address which questions for review. In
addition, Gurvich has not cited any legal authority in support of any of his arguments
as contemplated by Rule 2119(a). Nonetheless, we address Gurvich’s arguments to
the extent that they are sufficiently developed to allow meaningful appellate review.
See Hillside Villas Condo. Ass’n v. Bottaro Dev. Co., 177 A.3d 456, 465 n.9 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018) (“declin[ing] to find waiver of arguments that contain no legal
citations but are otherwise sufficiently developed to allow meaningful appellate
review”).10
A. Uniformity
Gurvich does not present any developed argument challenging either
the specific assessed value assigned to his property or the accuracy of the CLR.
10
However, this Court cannot develop Gurvich’s arguments for him. Skytop Meadow
Cmty. Ass’n v. Paige, 177 A.3d 377, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). The trial court noted that it advised
Gurvich “on more than several occasions” that he should retain an attorney, but he did not do so.
O.R., Item #11 at 2 n.1. As we have repeatedly observed, “[w]hile this Court is sympathetic to the
difficulty facing all pro se parties, it is axiomatic that a party seeking to represent himself assumes
the risk that his lack of legal knowledge might prove to be his undoing.” Commonwealth v. Geatti,
35 A.3d 798, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citing Hinds v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, 740 A.2d 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Accordingly, to the extent that any arguments
Gurvich may have intended to raise are not identified and addressed herein, such arguments are
not sufficiently developed to allow meaningful appellate review and are waived. See Lerch v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); Hill v. Kilgallen, 108
A.3d 934, 943 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
5
Rather, the essence of Gurvich’s uniformity argument appears to be simply that
increasing the assessed value of his property without also increasing the assessments
of surrounding properties was unconstitutional. Gurvich cites no legal authority in
support of this assertion. The law is to the contrary.
Section 8855 of the Assessment Law grants a school district or other
taxing body “the right to appeal any assessment within its jurisdiction in the same
manner, subject to the same procedure and with like effect as if the appeal were taken
by a taxable person with respect to the assessment.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855 (emphasis
added). Section 8855 does not restrict the method by which a school district
determines which assessments to appeal. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of
Revenue Appeals of Northampton Cnty., 225 A.3d 212, 219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).
Nonetheless, in selecting properties for assessment appeals, the school
district’s methodology must fit within constitutional boundaries. Bethlehem, 225
A.3d at 219. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that no state or governmental entity may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Pennsylvania
Constitution’s Uniformity Clause requires that “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon
the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
It is well-settled law that the acts of a governmental entity are presumed
constitutional. GM Berkshire Hills LLC v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment, 257 A.3d
822, 829 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 290 A.3d 238 (Pa.
2023)11 (citing Bethlehem Area, 225 A.3d at 218). Accordingly, a taxpayer asserting
11
Where our Supreme Court is equally divided, the effect of the split is to affirm the
intermediate appellate court decision. Borkey v. Twp. of Ctr., 847 A.2d 807, 814 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004).
6
a constitutional uniformity challenge to a tax assessment bears the burden of proving
that the taxing authority engaged in constitutionally prohibited conduct. GM
Berkshire, 257 A.3d at 829 (citing Bethlehem Area, 225 A.3d at 218).
In GM Berkshire, this Court considered issues and arguments closely
analogous to those asserted by Gurvich in this matter. The school district in GM
Berkshire calculated that whenever the sale price of a property, reduced by the
applicable CLR, resulted in a potential assessed value of at least $150,000.00 more
than the current assessed value, an assessment appeal would be cost-effective. Id. at
825. The property at issue had recently been sold for millions of dollars more than
its then-current assessed value. Id. Accordingly, the school district appealed the
assessment. Id.
Like Gurvich here, the property owner in GM Berkshire argued that the
school district’s choice to appeal the assessments of recently sold properties based
on their sales prices violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Uniformity Clause. Id. at 827.
The property owner insisted that the school district could not selectively seek
reassessment of properties based on their recent sales prices without also appealing
the assessments of unsold properties that might be similarly underassessed. Id. The
property owner argued that the school district’s selective assessment appeals would
tax new owners unfairly compared to owners of similar properties that had not
recently been sold, and therefore would violate constitutional uniformity
requirements. Id.
This Court rejected the property owner’s arguments. We specifically
explained that assessment appeals based on recent sales prices and use of a monetary
threshold to determine the cost-effectiveness of appeals do not violate constitutional
7
principles of uniformity, provided the selection criteria are not based on distinctions
in property type or classification, such as appeals limited to commercial properties.
GM Berkshire, 257 A.3d at 830-31; see also Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP
v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist., 163 A.3d 962, 978 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that
taxing bodies may not select properties for assessment appeals based solely on
classifications such “as commercial, apartment complex, single-family residential,
industrial, or the like”).
The School District here, like that in GM Berkshire, selected properties
for assessment appeals based on recent sale prices that, after adjustment by the CLR,
would offer potential tax revenue increases sufficient to justify the costs of pursuing
the appeals. The County’s most recent countywide reassessment occurred in 2013
and used 2012 as the base year for valuations. At that time, the property Gurvich
later purchased had an assessed value of $164,300.00. Gurvich bought his property
for $245,000.00 in 2019. In that year, the CLR was 86.2%. Using the $245,000.00
sale price of the property as the then-current fair market value and applying the CLR
of 86.2% yielded a potential assessed value (rounded to the nearest $100.00) of
$211,200.00.12 The School District’s policy was to appeal the assessment of any
recently sold property where the sale price adjusted by the CLR would result in an
assessed value $20,000.00 or more higher than the 2012 assessed value. O.R., Item
#8 at 6; Tr. of Proceedings, Feb. 15, 2022, at 39-40. Applying that formula, the
potential increase in assessed value of Gurvich’s property was approximately
$46,700.00,13 so the School District filed an assessment appeal. Id. at 53. The
12
$245,000.00 x .862 = $211,190.00. The trial court, without explanation, apparently
further rounded the assessed value to $200,000.00. See O.R., Item #20.
13
$211,000.00 – $164,300.00 = $46,700.00.
8
School District appealed the assessments of a total of 392 properties for the 2019 tax
year based on the same formula. Id. at 48; see also O.R., Item #11 at 3. Consistent
with our analysis and holding in GM Berkshire, we likewise find no uniformity
violation here.
Gurvich also insists that “the law of Allegheny County published in the
County official web site . . . forbids a reassessment based solely on the sale of the
property . . . .” Gurvich Br. at 21. This assertion is without merit. The web page
cited by Gurvich sets forth the limited circumstances in which the County may
unilaterally choose to reassess a property during the period between countywide
reassessments. O.R., Item #8 at 23. However, a separate page on the County’s
website discusses tax assessment appeals and expressly states that “[t]he assessed
value of a property may be appealed annually, by the owner, school district or
municipality”14 (emphasis added). Here, the School District properly exercised its
legal right to file an assessment appeal regarding Gurvich’s property.
Finally, Gurvich maintains that the trial court mischaracterized his
reassessment argument as a challenge to the County’s entire reassessment system,
rather than simply a challenge to the reassessment of his specific property. Gurvich
asserts that the trial court therefore failed to consider his actual uniformity challenge.
We disagree. Although the trial court described Gurvich’s constitutional claim as
relating to the County’s reassessment system, it nonetheless addressed the claims
Gurvich raised alleging lack of uniformity. Any error in labeling Gurvich’s claim
was harmless.
14
ALLEGHENY CNTY., ANNUAL APPEALS, HOW TO APPEAL AN ASSESSED VALUE,
https://www.alleghenycounty.us/real-estate/assessment-appeals/annual-appeal.aspx (last visited
August 2, 2023). Courts may take judicial notice of information made publicly available by
government entities, including on their websites. See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189,
205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017).
9
B. Discrimination Based on National Origin
In his second argument, Gurvich maintains that the increased tax
assessment discriminated against him unlawfully based on his national origin, as he
was born in Russia. The trial court suggested that he should pursue that claim before
the PHRC. However, the trial court also rejected Gurvich’s discrimination claim,
finding that the evidence did not support that claim. O.R., Item #11 at 4. We discern
no error in that finding.15
The trial court posited that the only record evidence of discrimination
was one reference to Gurvich as a Russian-speaking person. O.R., Item #11 at 4.
Our review of the record reveals that the statement the trial court referenced was in
the hearing officer’s notes from the School District’s assessment appeal, which
stated, in full:
SCHOOL DISTRICT SEEKING CMV[16] OF $245,000
THE SALE PRICE. THEY [sic] PRESENTED THREE
SIMILAR COMPS CLOSE TO THE SUBJECT. HO[17]
CALLED THE OWNER AND HE SAID THE CMV
SHOULD STAY THE SAME. HE JUST GOT HIS
CITIZENSHIP IN 2010. HE IS FROM RUSSIA AND
DIDN’T UNDERSTAND WHAT HE SHOULD DO. HE
DID SEND A LETTER, BUT NO EVIDENCE. HO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CMV BE $245,000.
O.R., Item #8 at 26.
The trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to believe all, some, or
none of the evidence presented, to make all credibility determinations, and to resolve
15
We note that the parties have not addressed the question of whether Gurvich has properly
pleaded a discrimination claim by raising it in the context of a tax assessment appeal. For purposes
of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that the claim was properly asserted.
16
Presumably “CMV” refers to the current market value.
17
Presumably “HO” refers to the hearing officer.
10
all conflicts in the evidence. Boro Constr., Inc. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 992 A.2d 208(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). This Court is bound by the findings of the trial court that have
adequate support in the record, so long as those findings do not reflect capricious
disregard of competent and credible evidence. Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002). Capricious disregard occurs
only when the fact-finder deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence. Id.Here, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to carry Gurvich’s
burden of proving discrimination based on national origin. The hearing officer’s
note, the only record evidence cited by Gurvich, can easily be interpreted as
explaining Gurvich’s failure to offer evidence in the School District’s tax assessment
appeal rather than as suggesting discrimination by the hearing officer. In any event,
it was the trial court’s province to determine what inference to draw from that
evidence. We cannot say that the trial court capriciously disregarded competent and
credible evidence in finding the hearing officer’s note insufficient to support
Gurvich’s discrimination claim.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s order.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
Judge Dumas dissents.
11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Victor Gurvich, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Board of Property Assessment Appeals :
and Review of Allegheny County, : No. 717 C.D. 2022
Pennsylvania :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2023, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated June 30, 2022 is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge