T.A. Lawson v. Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Prothonotary Office ( 2023 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Tyree A. Lawson, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 277 M.D. 2022
: SUBMITTED: April 21, 2023
Court of Common Pleas of :
Montgomery County :
Prothonotary Office, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: December 21, 2023
Introduction
In this somewhat confusing matter, before the Court is the Montgomery
County Prothonotary’s Office’s1 preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer2
1
While the complaint refers to the “Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Prothonotary Office,” we note that the Prothonotary, while a clerk of the trial court, see
Pennsylvania Constitution, Schedule to article V, § 15, is not synonymous with the court of
common pleas, which is not a party and has not been served. Although not personally named, for
purposes of considering this matter in our original jurisdiction, we treat the Prothonotary as
synonymous with his office.
2
In addition to the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, the Prothonotary also
raised a preliminary objection for lack of personal jurisdiction due to an alleged failure to make
(Footnote continued on next page…)
to the filing by Tyree A. Lawson, who is an inmate incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution (SCI)-Phoenix, pro se, purporting to be a “Petition for
Review . . . And/Or In The Alternative Nunc Pro Tunc Appeal.” (Reproduced R.
“R.R.” at 4a.)
An understanding of this dual filing is essential to our disposition.
Lawson’s pleading is styled both as an original jurisdiction petition for review from
a refusal to act by the Prothonotary and an appeal from an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County in underlying litigation issued in November
2020. In the action brought in our original jurisdiction, Lawson seeks mandamus
and declaratory relief to compel the Prothonotary to accept his filings and payment
of filing fees in the underlying prisoner litigation (R.R. at 10a). With respect to the
petition for review, we overrule the preliminary objection.
With respect to his appeal, Lawson asks for review nunc pro tunc of the
trial court’s order, albeit without meeting any of the substantive or procedural
requisites of a notice of appeal. Specifically, Lawson asks “[w]here the [trial] court
failed to do such[,] and must [sic] reissue an accurate [o]rder to allow such” and “any
other relief the [C]ourt deems just and proper.” As to the appellate aspect of
Lawson’s filing, we quash the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to consider it.
The Underlying Litigation
proper service of original process. The Prothonotary’s Office has withdrawn the objection to
personal jurisdiction. (Respondent’s Br. at 8 n.4.)
Lawson filed a pleading styled as “preliminary objections to . . . [the Prothonotary’s]
preliminary objections[’] misrepresentations.” The Court directed the matter to be submitted on
briefs without oral argument.
2
The essential facts alleged by Lawson regarding the underlying
litigation are as follows.3 In July 2018, Lawson, an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, was relocated from SCI-Graterford to SCI-
Phoenix. During that move, Lawson avers that his personal property (records of
other litigation) was lost, stolen, or otherwise confiscated by Department of
Corrections staff. As a result of the alleged July 2018 confiscation of his property,
Lawson filed an action in federal court against the former Secretary of Corrections
and other officials of the agency. After the action was dismissed in federal court,
Lawson refiled in the trial court in June 2020, seeking to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). The request to proceed IFP was initially granted.
The defendants in the underlying litigation filed a motion to revoke
Lawson’s IFP status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f),
and Lawson filed a response. On November 16, 2020, the trial court issued an order
revoking Lawson’s IFP status and dismissing the matter without prejudice.4 [Order,
Lawson v. Wetzel (C.C.P. Montgomery Cnty., Civil Division, Docket No. 2020-
10757, filed Nov. 16, 2020).] Lawson did not appeal within 30 days or seek
reconsideration of the trial court’s order. Rather, over a protracted period, on dates
not identified, Lawson attempted to revive the underlying litigation by tendering the
filing fee to the Prothonotary. The Prothonotary has refused to accept the filing fee,
3
We note that the recitation of the facts of the underlying litigation are drawn from Lawson’s
filing; other than the order of the trial court dismissing the action and a printout of docket entries
attached to the petition for review, there is a lack of any documentation of the underlying litigation
in the record of the instant case.
4
Without records of the underlying litigation, we are left to surmise that the trial court revoked
IFP status and dismissed the matter in reliance upon Section 6602 of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602, as suggested by Lawson. As discussed infra, whether that decision was
correct is not properly before us.
3
stating cursorily in various responses that the underlying case was closed. Lawson
wishes to rekindle the underlying litigation under its original docket number because
the statute of limitations on the underlying action has since run.
Issues Before the Court
The Prothonotary raises the following issues:
[1] After a [trial] court order revokes a pro se plaintiff’s
[IFP] status and dismisses his complaint without giving
the plaintiff an opportunity to pay his filing fee, must the
Prothonotary . . . nevertheless accept . . . [Lawson’s]
subsequent tender of the filing fee and “reinstate” his
dismissed complaint under the case’s original docket
number? [and]
[2] May a plaintiff in a mandamus action against the
Prothonotary[] . . . properly request and obtain leave to file
a nunc pro tunc appeal of an order of dismissal entered in
a different case which the plaintiff filed in a different court
against different defendants.
(Prothonotary’s Br. at 2.)
The Original Jurisdiction Action
With regard to the first issue, the Prothonotary’s arguments generally
track two of the three elements necessary for mandamus relief, i.e., that it has no
duty to provide the relief sought and that Lawson failed to take advantage of other
adequate or appropriate remedies.5 The Prothonotary argues that without reversal or
modification of the trial court’s order dismissing the underlying action, it lacked the
legal duty to accept Lawson’s subsequent tender of the filing fee and to “reinstate”
5
To prevail, the petitioner seeking mandamus relief must establish the following: (1) a clear
right to relief; (2) a corresponding duty in the respondent; and (3) the lack of any other adequate
and appropriate remedy. Baron v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 169 A.3d 1268, 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017) (en banc).
4
the dismissed complaint under its original docket number. The Prothonotary further
argues that Lawson could have sought reconsideration of the trial court’s order or
filed a timely notice of appeal. The Prothonotary also argues that mandamus is
improper because to accept a filing fee and “reinstate” a complaint that has been
closed for (at the time of the brief) two years would be “futile and ineffectual” given
the trial court’s order. Com. ex rel. McLaughlin v. Erie Cnty., 100 A.2d 601, 604
(Pa. 1953) (“mandamus will not issue . . . where it is apparent that the writ will be
futile or ineffectual by reason of the inability of the respondent to comply
therewith”). The Prothonotary argues that Lawson’s issue is with the trial court, and
not with him.
In one of our early cases, cited many times by the courts of this
Commonwealth, we observed as follows:
A [p]rothonotary may have the power, and even the duty,
to inspect documents tendered for filing and to reject them
if they are not on their face in the proper form . . . but this
power is limited. He is not in the position of an
administrative officer who has discretion to interpret or
implement rules and statutes . . . . Any question of
construction must be resolved by the courts, not by the
[p]rothonotary nor the parties. The [p]rothonotary must
accept papers and file them. He must also collect fees fixed
by the legislature. He has no discretion in this matter nor
does he act in a judicial capacity.
Warner v. Cortese, 288 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972) (emphasis supplied). The
Prothonotary cannot say that he has no legal duty to accept the fee tendered—for the
legislature has set the fee for filings.6 Whether Lawson could have or should have
availed himself of the ability to seek reconsideration by the trial court of its order or
6
Section 1 of Act of February 14, 1986, P.L. 7, 42 P.S. § 21161.
5
pursued an appeal is irrelevant to the issue of whether a fee must be accepted.
Further, whether the payment would be futile is not properly before us. As the
Prothonotary takes pains to remind us, whether Lawson’s suit may proceed as filed
is a matter properly to be decided by the trial court.
At this stage, we must accept as true and accurate the averments in
Lawson’s complaint (including the two attachments), which is the only information
we have regarding the underlying civil complaint or the subsequent events. We can
see from the order that IFP status was revoked, and that the complaint was dismissed
without prejudice, but we cannot tell the basis for that order. While we assume, from
Lawson’s pleading, that it was based upon the Prison Litigation Reform Act (see
infra note 4), was it on the basis of financial ineligibility,7 or on the ground of
multiple past instances of abusive litigation, or bad faith? If the latter, the dismissal
without prejudice would seem to be an unlikely result but, at all events, we do not
know the reason for the order. Moreover, we cannot tell whether Lawson’s alleged
attempts to pay the filing fee occurred within the statute of limitations. Without
development of facts such as these, we cannot say with certainty that the
Prothonotary did not, by refusing to perform a mandatory duty to accept a filing fee,
thwart Lawson’s legitimate attempts to reinstate his complaint before it was barred
by the statute of limitations. If that were to be found, it might entitle Lawson to some
form of equitable relief, but that is certainly not before us at this point. All we can
say is that at the stage of preliminary objections we cannot say with certainty that
Lawson is not entitled to any form of relief.
The Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc
7
Since Lawson has stated that he attempted to pay the filing fee, IFP status could have been
revoked because he had, in fact, sufficient funds in his account.
6
Turning to the appeal nunc pro tunc, we quash this portion of Lawson’s
filing because we lack jurisdiction.8
Lawson argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his case and
denied him the opportunity to pay the filing fee when it revoked his IFP status.
(Petition for Review/Notice of Appeal ¶ 34, R.R. at 9a.) However, the trial court’s
order was filed on November 16, 2020, and Lawson did not file his appeal nunc pro
tunc in this Court until May 15, 2022, some 16 months later. An appeal from a trial
court’s order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order from which the
appeal is taken. Section 5571(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(a) (“[t]he
time for filing an appeal . . . in . . . the Commonwealth Court shall be governed by
general rules”); Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a), Pa. R.A.P. 903(a)
(“the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order
from which the appeal is taken”). An appellate court “may not enlarge the time for
filing a notice of appeal.” Rule 105(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 105(b). Appeals filed after the expiration of the 30-day appeal
period are untimely and deprive the appellate court of subject matter
jurisdiction. Com. v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014); Szura v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of Wyoming Borough, 397 A.2d 33, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).
While the appellate courts may, under certain circumstances, enlarge
time to file an appeal, the reason for filing a late appeal “must be extraordinary and
involve fraud or some breakdown of the court’s operation through a default of its
officers, whereby the party has been injured.” Nixon v. Nixon, 198 A. 154, 157 (Pa.
1938). An application to appeal nunc pro tunc must set forth “some legitimate
basis” for the delay, that is, “sufficient facts upon which to conclude that the delay
8
Because of our disposition, we do not reach the argument raised by the Prothonotary.
7
was justified and should be overlooked.” Robinson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
582 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1990). No such facts have been alleged here. Moreover, the
appeal nunc pro tunc must be filed within a reasonable time. Nixon, 198 A. at 157.
Sixteen months from an order of a trial court is, quite simply, not reasonable.
As we have no jurisdiction, we must quash the appeal. See Szura, 397
A.2d at 34.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Prothonotary’s Office’s preliminary
objection in the nature of a demurrer is overruled. Furthermore, Lawson’s filing, to
the extent it seeks to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, is quashed.
_____________________________________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
President Judge Emerita
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Tyree A. Lawson, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 277 M.D. 2022
:
Court of Common Pleas of :
Montgomery County :
Prothonotary Office, :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2023, the Preliminary
Objection of Respondent, Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Prothonotary Office, to the Petition for Review of Petitioner, Tyree A. Lawson, is
OVERRULED. Respondent is directed to file an answer within 30 days of the date
of this order with regard to the original jurisdiction aspect of the above-captioned
matter.
Petitioner’s Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is QUASHED. To the extent that
Petitioner sought to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, we relinquish
appellate jurisdiction of the above-captioned matter.
_____________________________________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
President Judge Emerita