J. Marvelli v. U.S. Foods, Inc. (WCAB) ( 2023 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Joseph Marvelli,                      :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                              : No. 22 C.D. 2023
    :
    U.S. Foods, Inc. (Workers’            :
    Compensation Appeal Board),           :
    Respondent         : Argued: November 9, 2023
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE CEISLER                                     FILED: December 21, 2023
    Joseph Marvelli (Claimant) petitions this Court for review of a December 12,
    2022 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed a
    decision by a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) granting a Termination Petition
    filed by U.S. Foods, Inc. (Employer). Claimant argues that the Termination Petition
    could not have been adjudicated on its merits because the description of Claimant’s
    injury description was at issue in a then-pending appeal. Furthermore, Claimant
    maintains that the WCJ erred while addressing the Termination Petition on its merits
    by improperly disregarding evidence and testimony presented by Claimant. Upon
    review, we affirm the Board.
    I. Background
    At the time of the incidents leading to this case, Claimant worked for
    Employer, a foodservice distributor, as a territory sales manager. Reproduced
    Record (R.R.) at 27a. On September 14, 2017, while retrieving a stack of 3 10-
    pound boxes from the back of his truck, Claimant experienced sudden pain in his
    neck, shoulders, and upper back. Id. An occupational health practice treated
    Claimant for neck pain three days later. Id. Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation
    Act (Act),1 Employer accepted liability for the injury through a medical-only Notice
    of Compensation Payable (NCP), which described the injury as a strain or tear of the
    shoulder. Id.
    A. Claimant’s Petitions and Marvelli I
    On February 16, 2018, Claimant submitted Claim, Reinstatement, and Review
    Petitions, in which he alleged that the injury description should be expanded to
    include injuries to his neck and back, including lumbar radiculopathy. Id. at 9a.
    Employer filed a Review Petition of its own, in which it sought to amend the injury
    description from a shoulder injury to a strain of the cervical spine, consistent with
    the results of an independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant. Id. at 27a.
    In its defense, Employer submitted the deposition testimony of Dr. Robert Mauthe,
    the doctor who performed the IME. Id. at 29a. Dr. Mauthe opined that any
    symptoms of lumbar radiculopathy stemmed not from the work injury but from an
    incident on September 30, 2017, in which Claimant suddenly experienced severe
    lower back pain while attending a youth soccer game. Id. at 30a.
    In a December 31, 2018 decision, WCJ Bruce Doman credited Dr. Mauthe’s
    testimony and denied Claimant’s Claim, Reinstatement, and Review Petitions. Id.
    at 32a. Regarding Claimant’s lower back issues, WCJ Doman concluded that the
    Claimant “failed to offer expert testimony . . . to prove that the work injury
    include[d] a herniated lumbar disc.”           Id. at 31a.      WCJ Doman also granted
    1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
    2
    Employer’s Review Petition, and thus amended the description of the work injury to
    a “cervical spine strain with strain of the surrounding paravertebral area.” Id. at 32a.
    On appeal to the Board, Claimant argued, inter alia, that his proposed
    amendment of the injury description was erroneously rejected. Id. at 35a. In a
    January 27, 2020 order, the Board remanded on the ground that the language of WCJ
    Doman’s order contained “an apparent contradiction,” which the Board instructed
    him to rectify.2 Id. at 37a-38a. The Board explained that it was not ruling on the
    merits of Claimant’s appeal arguments, and therefore declined to discuss “the
    relevant testimony and evidence.” Id. at 37a. On remand, WCJ Doman corrected
    the mistake in a July 22, 2020 decision, while adopting and reissuing all of the factual
    findings and legal conclusions in his December 31, 2018 decision. Id. at 54a.
    Claimant appealed again to the Board, arguing that substantial evidence did
    not support the conclusion that his lower back symptoms were unrelated to the
    September 14, 2017 work injury. Id. at 70a. The Board declined to disturb the
    WCJ’s “complete authority over questions of credibility, conflicting medical
    evidence and evidentiary weight,” and affirmed. Id. at 69a (citing Greenwich
    Collieries v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Buck), 
    664 A.2d 703
    , 706 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1995)). Claimant appealed to this Court; we agreed with the Board, holding that
    WCJ Doman’s credibility determinations were “well supported by the record.”
    Marvelli v. US Foods Inc. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 561 C.D.
    2
    In his December 31, 2018 decision, WCJ Doman ordered Claimant’s wage loss benefits
    to be “SUSPENDED as of Claimant’s return to light duty work on April 15, 2018.” R.R. at 32a.
    Claimant, however, never received wage loss benefits, as Employer had issued a medical-only
    NCP. While remanding, the Board noted that this aspect of the WCJ’s decision created a
    contradiction: if Claimant’s Claim, Reinstatement, and Review Petitions were denied, then “the
    WCJ should not order wage loss benefits to be suspended. On the other hand, if the WCJ wanted
    Claimant to receive compensation until the return of work on April 15, 2018, the WCJ should grant
    Claimant’s Petitions, at least in part.” 
    Id.
     at 37a.
    3
    2021, filed Nov. 2, 2022), appeal denied, 
    297 A.3d 398
     (Pa. 2023) (Marvelli I), slip
    op. at 7.
    B. The Termination Petition
    While Claimant’s appeal of WCJ Doman’s December 31, 2018 decision was
    pending before the Board, Employer filed a Termination Petition, in which it alleged
    that Claimant was fully recovered from his work injury as of March 15, 2019. R.R.
    at 41a. The Termination Petition was assigned to WCJ Brian Puhala, who dismissed
    it in an April 22, 2019 decision, on the basis that the injury description was “not
    settled and currently on appeal to the [Board].” 
    Id.
     at 43a. On June 9, 2020, the
    Board vacated WCJ Puhala’s dismissal of the Termination Petition. 
    Id.
     at 51a. The
    Board explained that the December 31, 2018 WCJ decision had only been remanded
    for clarification of the language in its order, not to reexamine the issue of the injury
    description. 
    Id.
     The Board thus remanded WCJ Puhala’s April 22, 2019 decision
    with instructions to adjudicate the Termination Petition on its merits.3 
    Id.
     at 50a.
    On remand, WCJ Puhala heard live testimony from Claimant at hearings on
    June 23, 2021, and August 23, 2021. Claimant also presented testimony from his
    treating physician, Dr. Jeffrey McConnell, who testified at a deposition on October
    26, 2021. Employer presented testimony from Dr. Mauthe, who performed a second
    IME of Claimant on March 15, 2019, and who testified at a July 22, 2021 deposition.
    The parties also offered the prior testimony of Dr. McConnell (who testified at
    depositions on July 28, 2018, and October 26, 2021), Dr. Mauthe (who testified at
    an August 14, 2018 deposition) and Claimant (who testified at an April 10, 2018
    3
    Claimant petitioned this Court for review of the Board’s decision; we quashed, holding
    that Claimant was seeking an improper review of an interlocutory order. See Marvelli v. Workers’
    Comp. Appeal Bd. (US Foods, Inc.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 588 C.D. 2020, filed Aug. 26, 2020), appeal
    denied, 
    251 A.3d 775
     (Pa. 2021) (Marvelli II), slip op. at 5.
    4
    hearing before a WCJ), all of which had been given in the litigation involving
    Claimant’s Claim, Reinstatement, and Review Petitions. R.R. at 351a-52a.
    1. Employer’s Evidence
    Dr. Mauthe explained that Claimant’s work injury, a strain of the cervical
    spine and surrounding paravertebral area, consists of “trauma to the muscles in the
    form of a stretching[-]type injury,” which results in neck pain. C.R., Item No. 41,
    Mauthe Dep., 7/22/2021, at 9. In contrast to radiculopathy, which causes pain over
    a wider area and for longer periods, the pain from a cervical spine strain is “confined
    to the neck and midline area,” and tends to resolve within weeks. 
    Id.
     At the time of
    Dr. Mauthe’s first examination of Claimant, on March 22, 2018, Claimant’s chief
    complaint was of back pain. Id. at 13. As for his neck, Claimant explained that it
    was “not that bad” at the time, and that he no longer sought treatment for it. Id. In
    Dr. Mauthe’s view, a February 28, 2018 magnetic resonance image (MRI),
    conducted on February 28, 2018, showed “no real significant findings other than
    some mild degenerative changes, no herniations, and no foraminal compression.”
    Id. at 12. Nonetheless, Dr. Mauthe determined that Claimant did exhibit “focal
    tenderness” in the neck, a symptom of persistent cervical strain resulting from the
    September 14, 2017 work injury. Id. at 37-38.
    On March 15, 2019, Dr. Mauthe conducted a second IME of Claimant. Id. at
    13. The examination revealed “normal range of motion” in Claimant’s neck,
    shoulders, elbows, wrists, and hands. Id. at 15. Dr. Mauthe found no objective
    evidence of ongoing strains as a result of the September 14, 2017 work injury. Id.
    at 16-17. A “chronic” cervical strain, persisting for a year and a half, would have
    manifested itself through two symptoms: the loss of range of motion and the
    presence of spasm or tenderness in the muscles. Id. at 17. The March 15, 2019
    5
    IME revealed neither in Claimant’s case. Id. Thus, Dr. Mauthe opined within a
    reasonable degree of medical certainty that Claimant was fully recovered from his
    work injury. Id. Asked to account for Claimant’s persistent pain complaints, Dr.
    Mauthe explained that any remaining symptoms, such as numbness or tingling in his
    arms and hands, are not causally related to a cervical strain. Id. at 45-46. While
    acknowledging that cervical strains can “[i]n some cases” cause headaches, Dr.
    Mauthe dismissed the suggestion that headaches were proof that Claimant was not
    fully recovered from his work injury; after all, “[e]verybody has headaches,” Dr.
    Mauthe explained, and they “can be caused by anything.” Id. at 60-61.
    2. Claimant’s Evidence
    In his testimony, Claimant maintained that he was not fully recovered from
    his September 14, 2017 work injury. Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 32, Hr’g Tr.,
    8/23/2021, at 11. Claimant explained that he continued to experience neck pain
    when engaging in daily activities such as opening a refrigerator, reading a book, or
    driving. Id. at 12. In addition, Claimant testified that he felt “spasming” in his neck
    area, which he described as “like muscle contraction . . . in between [his] shoulder
    blade[] area,” up to his head and outward into his arms. Id. at 13. Furthermore,
    Claimant described migraine headaches that cause “severe” pain.             Id. at 14.
    Claimant testified that the headaches have been “consistent” ever since the work
    injury, and that they have been “getting worse and worse.” Id. at 18. For these
    symptoms, Claimant continued to receive physical therapy, pain medication, and
    something he described as “electrical acupuncture.” Id. at 18. Claimant testified
    that, while he would be eager to return to his former position with Employer, it
    “would be impossible” given the persistence of his headaches and other symptoms.
    Id. at 19.
    6
    Dr. McConnell recalled in deposition testimony that his most recent
    examination of Claimant occurred on March 26, 2019.4                        C.R., Item No. 36,
    McConnell Dep., 10/26/2021, at 6. During the examination, Dr. McConnell noted a
    persistent “limitation of movement in [Claimant’s] lumbar spine” and some
    “pinprick sensation on the outside of his right foot.” Id. at 8. Dr. McConnell also
    noted Claimant’s complaints of headaches felt near the back of his head, which Dr.
    McConnell believed could originate in Claimant’s neck. Id. at 40. Dr. McConnell’s
    notes from the March 26, 2019 visit do not indicate that he performed an examination
    of Claimant’s cervical spine. Id. at 33-34. However, Dr. McConnell acknowledged
    that, when palpating Claimant’s neck and paravertebral muscles, Claimant did not
    complain of pain or tenderness in those areas. Id. at 32-33.
    Despite the absence of objective test results, Dr. McConnell diagnosed
    Claimant with cervical radiculopathy based entirely on his subjective pain
    complaints. Id. at 34. Since Dr. McConnell concluded that Claimant had reached
    maximum medical improvement in that area, he referred Claimant to a pain
    management specialist, ruling out additional surgery. Id. at 34-35.
    3. The WCJ’s Remand Decision
    In an April 13, 2022 decision, WCJ Puhala granted the Termination Petition
    and terminated Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits as of March 15, 2019.
    See C.R., Item No. 23, WCJ Decision, 4/13/2022.                     WCJ Puhala credited Dr.
    Mauthe’s testimony over Dr. McConnell’s, explaining that Dr. Mauthe undertook “a
    4
    Dr. McConnell first examined Claimant in October, 2017, when Claimant presented with
    pain in his lower back and right leg. Marvelli I, slip op. at 2. In a questionnaire completed for Dr.
    McConnell, Claimant stated that those symptoms suddenly began while he was attending a soccer
    game on September 30, 2017. Id. Dr. McConnell diagnosed a herniated disc in the lumbar spine,
    for which he performed an L5-S1 discectomy in December, 2017. McConnell Dep., 10/26/2021,
    at 6.
    7
    detailed examination of Claimant’s cervical spine,” and offered a thorough
    explanation of why there were no objective indications of an ongoing cervical strain.
    Id. at 7. By contrast, Dr. McConnell focused almost entirely on Claimant’s lower
    back symptoms, WCJ Puhala wrote. Id. As for Claimant’s testimony, WCJ Puhala
    found him credible as to his treatment history, but found that the continuing pain
    symptoms complained of in his testimony were “clearly not associated with the
    [September 14, 2017] work injury.” Id. WCJ Puhala also concluded that the
    witnesses’ testimony from the previous litigation before WCJ Doman was
    “irrelevant,” but noted that the summaries of the two medical experts’ testimony in
    WCJ Doman’s decision was “controlling.” Id. at 6 n.8, 7 n.14.
    Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed. See C.R., Item No. 26. This
    appeal followed.5
    II. Issues
    Claimant first argues that WCJ Puhala erred by addressing Employer’s
    Termination Petition while Claimant’s appeal of the injury description, as
    determined by WCJ Doman, was still pending before the Board. In addition,
    Claimant argues that WCJ Puhala erred by dismissing deposition testimony from
    previous litigation as “irrelevant” after the parties agreed to present that testimony
    as evidence.      Claimant also argues that WCJ Puhala improperly dismissed
    Claimant’s complaints of headaches as evidence of continued disability, and
    erroneously determined March 15, 2019 to be the relevant date when considering
    whether Claimant was fully recovered from his work injury. Lastly, Claimant
    5
    Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were
    supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether
    constitutional rights were violated. Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
    (Bosco), 
    260 A.3d 1053
    , 1058 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
    8
    maintains that Dr. Mauthe’s testimony was equivocal, and thus cannot support WCJ
    Puhala’s factual findings.
    III. Discussion
    A. The Bechtel Power Doctrine
    Claimant first argues that Employer was barred from filing its Termination
    Petition while his appeal from WCJ Doman’s December 31, 2018 decision was on
    appeal to the Board. In support, Claimant cites Bechtel Power Corporation v.
    Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Miller), 
    452 A.2d 286
    , 288 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1982), in which this Court recognized that when an appeal is pending, a party may
    not file a petition that would essentially relitigate issues identical to those to be
    reviewed on appeal.
    In Bechtel Power, a referee6 granted a claim petition and awarded disability
    benefits for an injury sustained in the course of his employment. Id. at 287. The
    employer appealed that decision to the Board, disputing that the work injury was the
    cause of the claimant’s disability; the Board ultimately affirmed the referee, as,
    subsequently, did this Court. Id.; see also Bechtel Power Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp.
    Appeal Bd., 
    439 A.2d 1265
    , 1266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). While the employer’s appeal
    was pending, the employer also petitioned to terminate the claimant’s benefits,
    alleging that the disability had ceased. 
    Id.
     Framing the question before the Court as
    whether “the employer should be permitted to attack the referee’s finding of
    disability, alleging that no disability occurred, while at the very same time
    petitioning for termination of benefits alleging that the disability has ceased,” we
    held in Bechtel Power that it would not be “conducive to judicial or administrative
    economy” to permit such an attack. Id. at 287-88.
    6
    WCJs were referred to at the time as referees. See Section 401 of the Act, amended by
    the Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 190, 77 P.S. § 701.
    9
    While reaffirming the doctrine set forth in Bechtel Power, we explained in
    Davis v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (H.M. Stauffer Sons, Inc.), 
    760 A.2d 899
    , 901 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) that the prohibition of a subsequent petition applies
    when both the issues and facts in the two petitions are identical. Alternately, when
    the petitions are based on different sets of facts, “i.e., different medical opinions,”
    there is no relitigation of issues that have already been decided. 
    Id. at 902
    . Thus, a
    party is not barred from filing a subsequent petition while the previous petition is on
    appeal. 
    Id.
    Claimant argues that the Termination Petition was “untimely” because his
    appeal, still pending at the time of the Termination Petition’s filing, involved the
    issue of Claimant’s injury description. “Because there are common issues involving
    [] Claimant’s one body,” he explains, WCJ Puhala should never have reached “the
    merits of the [T]ermination [P]etition before the description of the injury was ever
    made final.” Claimant’s Br. at 52. Claimant argues that it “does not matter” whether
    it is the same party that files both appeals, or opposing parties. Id. at 44. Bechtel
    Power must apply, Claimant further argues, whenever two appeals do not involve
    “completely separate issues.” Id. at 43. Because Claimant continued to maintain on
    appeal that he sustained lumbar radiculopathy resulting from the September 14, 2017
    work injury, he argues that Employer should not have been allowed to seek a “partial
    termination” of benefits based solely on an allegation of full recovery from the neck
    injury. Id. at 49.
    Claimant’s arguments are unavailing. In Bechtel Power, the employer filed a
    petition alleging that a disability had ceased while simultaneously arguing, on its
    own appeal, that the disability never existed. Employer’s Termination Petition, by
    contrast, does not seek to relitigate any factual findings settled by the previous
    10
    litigation. As in Davis, and in contrast to Bechtel Power, the Termination Petition
    is based on a different set of facts from those underlying Claimant’s Claim,
    Reinstatement, and Review Petitions. Specifically, the Termination Petition alleges
    a full recovery based on the March 15, 2019, IME by Dr. Mauthe, in contrast to the
    doctor’s earlier opinion (explained in his testimony in the prior litigation) that
    Claimant continued to exhibit symptoms of a cervical strain in 2018.
    Most notably, Employer’s Termination Petition does not challenge the injury
    description as it was already determined by WCJ Doman. Rather, it is only Claimant
    who disputed that injury description in his own, ultimately unsuccessful, appeal.
    While it is obviously true that a WCJ’s judicial determinations have a preclusive
    effect on future litigation, Claimant fails to cite any legal authority suggesting that
    an opposing party’s allegations have a similar effect. Thus, the Board properly
    concluded that the WCJ was not barred from adjudicating the Termination Petition.
    B. The Relevance of the Experts’ Prior Testimony
    Next, Claimant argues that WCJ Puhala improperly disregarded the prior
    deposition testimony of Drs. Mauthe and McConnell during the litigation before
    WCJ Doman, after “both parties agreed [the depositions] were admissible.”
    Claimant’s Br. at 58. Such testimony is indeed relevant, according to Claimant,
    because WCJ Puhala “may well not have credited the testimony of Dr. Mauthe” in
    the present litigation had he “been able or willing to weigh the serious flaws in [Dr.
    Mauthe’s] credibility” made clear in his prior testimony. Id. at 60. Claimant further
    argues that WCJ Puhala’s ruling on the testimony’s relevance raises a question of
    law, subject to this Court’s plenary review, and that it must be overturned.
    Claimant’s argument is without merit. Whether Dr. Mauthe gave credible
    testimony in the proceedings before WCJ Doman was a question for WCJ Doman,
    11
    who accepted Dr. Mauthe’s testimony as fact. C.R., Item No. 49, WCJ Decision,
    12/31/2018, at 7. Claimant was, of course, free to dispute that determination in his
    appeal of WCJ Doman’s decision, but he is not free to revisit the question in
    subsequent litigation. The sole question before WCJ Puhala was whether Claimant
    was fully recovered from his work injury as of March 15, 2019. As Drs. Mauthe
    and McConnell’s prior testimony (which was given during the August 14, 2018 and
    July 28, 2018 depositions, respectively) did not address that question, WCJ Puhala
    reasonably determined that such testimony was irrelevant.7 Contrary to Claimant’s
    assertions, it is well settled that a WCJ’s determination regarding the admission of
    evidence will not be overturned without a showing of an abuse of discretion.
    Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bromley), 
    161 A.3d 446
    , 467
    n.26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). For the foregoing reasons, we will not disturb the WCJ’s
    determination.
    C. Claimant’s Headaches
    Next, Claimant argues that the WCJ erred as a matter of law when he ruled
    that Claimant’s complaints of continued headaches was irrelevant, since “the
    headaches that Claimant suffers derive directly from the recognized work injury.”
    Claimant’s Br. at 62. In support, Claimant cites his own testimony that he “gets
    migraine[-]type headaches deriving from the . . . clearly recognized work injuries.”
    Id. at 65-66. Claimant also points to remarks made by both Drs. McConnell and
    Mauthe acknowledging that a cervical strain is one possible source of headaches.
    See C.R., Item No. 36, McConnell Dep., 10/26/2021, at 40; C.R., Item No. 41,
    Mauthe Dep., 7/22/2021, at 60.
    7
    To reiterate, this evidence was irrelevant since Employer’s burden was to prove that
    Claimant was fully recovered as of March 15, 2019, the date of the IME. The deposition testimony
    from the earlier litigation was given in 2018.
    12
    We first note that Claimant admitted in his testimony that he has been
    consistently suffering from the headaches in question ever since the injury itself. See
    C.R., Item No. 32, Hr’g Tr., 8/23/2021, at 18.                 Yet, Claimant’s Claim,
    Reinstatement, and Review Petitions, which were filed on February 16, 2018, did
    not allege that headaches were among the conditions caused by his work injury. See
    Marvelli II, slip op. at 2. When an employee is aware of injuries or conditions related
    to the work injury at the time of proceedings on a review petition but fails to include
    them in his litigation, a later attempt to raise the issue is barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata. Weney v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mac Sprinkler Sys., Inc.), 
    960 A.2d 949
    , 956 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). As Claimant is now attempting to add headaches to
    his work injury for the first time, well after the filing of his Claim, Reinstatement,
    and Review Petitions, his claim is legally impermissible.
    Even if Claimant were not barred from newly alleging that he suffers from
    headaches resulting from the work injury, he would carry the same burden of proof
    at this stage in the case as he did when litigating his Claim, Reinstatement, and
    Review Petitions. See Liveringhouse v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (ADECCO),
    
    970 A.2d 508
    , 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (noting that an effort to add injuries not
    previously accepted by the employer carries the same burden of proof as a claim
    petition). Thus, to establish the causal connection between the work incident and
    the claimed injury would require “unequivocal medical testimony.” Jeannette Dist.
    Mem’l Hosp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mesich), 
    668 A.2d 249
    , 251 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1995). Other than Claimant’s own fact testimony, the only support for his
    contention involving headaches consists of remarks by both medical experts that
    cervical spine strains are one possible cause of headaches, which would not support
    Claimant’s burden of proof. For this additional reason, we see no error in the WCJ’s
    13
    conclusion that Claimant’s complaints of headaches were “clearly not associated
    with the accepted . . . work injury.” See C.R., Item No. 23, WCJ Decision,
    4/13/2022, at 7.
    D. The Relevant Date of the WCJ’s Remand Decision
    Claimant next argues that WCJ Puhala erroneously assumed that he was
    limited to determining whether Claimant was fully recovered from his work injury
    as of March 15, 2019, the date of Dr. Mauthe’s second IME of Claimant. In fact,
    Claimant argues, WCJ Puhala disregarded the Board’s “clear direction” in its
    remand order to decide “whether Claimant is fully recovered from” the work injury.
    C.R., Item No. 52, Board Op., 6/9/2020, at 4 (emphasis added). In Claimant’s view,
    the Board’s use of the present tense “is” clearly indicates that WCJ Puhala was to
    determine Claimant’s condition as of the date of the order, rather than March 15,
    2019. Claimant then argues that WCJ Puhala improperly disregarded evidence that
    Claimant was not fully recovered from his work injury as of March 26, 2019, the
    date of his most recent examination by Dr. McConnell. Specifically, Claimant
    alleges that his referral by Dr. McConnell to a pain management specialist
    establishes that Claimant continued to be disabled by the work injury after March
    15, 2019.
    We first note that Claimant’s proposed interpretation of the Board’s June 9,
    2020 remand order, although novel, is unconvincing. Had the Board intended to
    direct the WCJ to take the unusual step of adjudicating the Termination Petition as
    of June 9, 2020, it was free to clarify its position in its review of the WCJ’s remand
    decision after Claimant appealed. The Board declined to do so; instead, in affirming
    the WCJ, the Board rejected Claimant’s argument as one of mere “semantics.” C.R.,
    Item No. 26, Board Op., 12/12/2022.
    14
    Employer’s Termination Petition unambiguously alleged “[f]ull [r]ecovery”
    as of March 15, 2019. C.R., Item No. 2. Thus, the question before the WCJ was
    whether Claimant remained disabled from his work injury on that date. If Claimant
    seeks to reinstate benefits based on symptoms occurring after that date, then it is his
    burden to show that his earning power is “once again adversely affected by his . . .
    disability, and that such disability is a continuation of that which arose from his . . .
    original claim.” Bufford v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (North Am. Telecom), 
    2 A.3d 548
    , 558 (Pa. 2010). As Claimant made no attempt to do so in this instance,
    we see no error in the WCJ’s decision to disregard any evidence of Claimant’s
    condition after March 15, 2019.8
    E. The Sufficiency of Dr. Mauthe’s Testimony
    Finally, Claimant argues that the WCJ committed legal error by relying on the
    “equivocal” medical testimony of Dr. Mauthe. Claimant’s Br. at 74. Claimant
    explains that Dr. Mauthe’s two examinations of Claimant were “objectively
    identical,” yet resulted in two, conflicting conclusions by Dr. Mauthe. Id. at 75.
    Such a discrepancy proves, according to Claimant, that those conclusions were the
    products of Dr. Mauthe’s own “whim.” Id. at 74.
    Claimant’s argument is meritless. During his first examination of Claimant,
    on March 22, 2018, Dr. Mauthe observed “focal tenderness,” a cervical strain
    symptom, and opined that Claimant was not fully recovered from that injury. C.R.,
    8
    Even if Claimant had properly argued for a reinstatement of benefits as of March 26,
    2019, it should be noted that Dr. McConnell’s referral to a pain management specialist is irrelevant.
    Dr. McConnell did not testify that he referred Claimant to a pain management specialist because
    of continued pain symptoms in Claimant’s neck. See C.R., Item No. 36, McConnell Dep.,
    10/26/2021, at 34. Indeed, Dr. McConnell’s decision was based on Claimant’s subjective pain
    complaints, rather than any objective finding of persistent neck injury; as discussed previously,
    Dr. McConnell’s records of the March 26, 2019 visit do not even indicate a specific examination
    of Claimant’s cervical spine or surrounding area. Id. at 33-34.
    15
    Item No. 41, Mauthe Dep., 7/22/2021, at 37-38. At the second examination, on
    March 15, 2019, Dr. Mauthe observed no such symptoms of the work injury, and
    therefore opined that Claimant was fully recovered. In other words, while Dr.
    Mauthe may have employed identical methods in both examinations, they were not
    “objectively identical,” because Dr. Mauthe had a basis for concluding after the
    second examination that Claimant’s condition had changed between those two dates.
    Thus, the WCJ did not err by crediting Dr. Mauthe’s testimony.
    IV. Conclusion
    Employer was not barred by the Bechtel Power doctrine from filing its
    Termination Petition, and met its burden of proof before WCJ Puhala that Claimant
    was fully recovered from his work injury as of March 15, 2019. Claimant provides
    no legitimate basis for this Court to disturb WCJ Puhala’s decision granting the
    Termination Petition. Accordingly, we affirm the Board.
    __________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    16
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Joseph Marvelli,                  :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                          : No. 22 C.D. 2023
    :
    U.S. Foods, Inc. (Workers’        :
    Compensation Appeal Board),       :
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2023, the order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter, dated December 12,
    2022, is hereby AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22 C.D. 2023

Judges: Ceisler, J.

Filed Date: 12/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2023