P. Thomas v. WCAB (Merakey Philadelphia) ( 2021 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Patricia Thomas,                              :
    Petitioner        :
    :
    v.                              :   No. 462 C.D. 2020
    :   Submitted: October 9, 2020
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal                  :
    Board (Merakey Philadelphia),                 :
    Respondent             :
    BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge1
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE BROBSON                                           FILED: June 15, 2021
    Patricia Thomas (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Board), dated April 16, 2020. The Board affirmed an
    order of Workers’ Compensation Judge Lawrence Beck (WCJ Beck), granting the
    modification petition (Modification Petition) filed by Merakey Philadelphia
    (Employer). We now affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On June 2, 2014, Claimant sustained an injury to her back lifting a crate of
    milk while working for Employer. (Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 21 at 3.)
    Employer accepted liability for a lumbar sprain/strain pursuant to a medical-only
    1
    This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 4, 2021, when Judge Brobson
    became President Judge.
    Notice of Compensation Payable. (Id.) Thereafter, on July 2, 2015, Workers’
    Compensation Judge Erin Young (WCJ Young) issued a decision and order that,
    inter alia, granted the claim petition filed by Claimant. (Id.) In so doing, WCJ
    Young concluded that Claimant suffered a “disabling work injury in the nature of an
    aggravation of preexisting degenerative disc disease with multiple protrusions,
    particularly at the L5-S1 disc, resulting in right lower extremity radiculopathy” while
    working for Employer on June 2, 2014. (Id.)
    Subsequent thereto, on June 14, 2016, Employer filed a petition to modify
    Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits, alleging a labor market survey (LMS)
    demonstrated that work was generally available to Claimant. (Id.) In support of its
    modification petition, Employer presented the deposition testimony of Christian
    Fras, M.D., who performed an independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant
    on October 23, 2015. (Id.) Based upon the results of his IME, Dr. Fras opined that,
    while Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and had not fully
    recovered from her June 2, 2014 work-related injury, Claimant was capable of
    performing light-duty work. (Id. at 3-4.) Employer also offered the deposition
    testimony of John Dieckman (Dieckman), a certified rehabilitation counselor, who
    performed a vocational interview of Claimant and conducted a LMS to identify open
    and available employment positions that were within Dr. Fras’ light-duty work
    restrictions for Claimant. (Id. at 4-7.) By decision and order dated June 30, 2017,
    Workers’ Compensation Judge Marc Harrison denied Employer’s modification
    petition, concluding that Employer failed to satisfy its burden of proving that
    Claimant had an earning capacity as required by Section 306(b)(2) of the Workers’
    Compensation Act (Act).2 (Id. at 10-11.)
    2
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 512.
    2
    Thereafter, on March 8, 2018, Employer filed the Modification Petition
    presently at issue, alleging that, based upon a new LMS, Claimant had a residual
    earning capacity of $673.00. (C.R., Item No. 2.) In support of its Modification
    Petition, Employer offered the deposition testimony of Lucian Bednarz, M.D., who
    is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. (C.R., Item No. 17 at 6.)
    Dr. Bednarz performed an IME of Claimant on October 26, 2017, which included
    reviewing Claimant’s medical records, obtaining a history, and performing a
    physical examination. (Id. at 10-16.) Based upon the results of his IME, Dr. Bednarz
    opined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Claimant was capable of
    returning to work in a medium-duty capacity, lifting no more than fifty pounds at
    once or twenty-five pounds if the lifting is recurrent. (Id. at 16-17, 23.) Dr. Bednarz
    explained the basis for his opinion as follows:
    Well, based on the diagnosis as it was outlined[,] she, on examination,
    was found to be neurologically intact, so there was no ongoing evidence
    of radiculopathy, which would not be a progressive process to begin
    with.
    There w[ere] no surgical legions [sic] in her lower back. She basically
    had degenerative disc disease, which resulted in some range of motion
    deficits, and for those residual mild findings, I would restrict her from
    heavy lifting or repetitive bending.
    (Id. at 17-18.) Dr. Bednarz clarified that, while Claimant may have initially had
    radicular findings, by the time of his IME, there was no longer any evidence of
    radiculopathy. (Id. at 18.) Dr. Bednarz further testified that he reviewed the
    available jobs identified by Dieckman in his LMS, all of which were sedentary to
    light-duty positions, and approved them for Claimant—i.e., the available positions
    were within the range of Claimant’s functional capabilities. (Id. at 20-21.)
    Employer also offered the deposition testimony of Dieckman, who Employer
    again engaged to conduct a LMS to identify suitable positions for Claimant’s
    3
    physical and vocational abilities. (C.R., Item No. 18.) Dieckman testified that the
    only vocational interview of Claimant occurred on March 21, 2016, in connection
    with Employer’s first petition to modify Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits.
    (Id. at 6-7.) Dieckman testified that he did not perform a second vocational interview
    in December 2017, when Employer issued the Notice of Ability to Return to Work
    in connection with Dr. Bednarz’s IME report, because a relatively short period of
    time had elapsed since the first interview. (Id. at 8-9, 11-13.) He noted that, unless
    there is a specific change in educational or vocational history, typically there is no
    reason to conduct a second interview. (Id. at 12.) Dieckman also stated that he sent
    a letter to Claimant’s attorney, indicating that he would not conduct a second
    vocational interview unless Claimant’s attorney believed that it was necessary or
    there was a change in Claimant’s educational or vocational history, but Dieckman
    did not receive a response. (Id.) Thus, based on the findings of his March 21, 2016
    vocational interview, Dieckman conducted a LMS, wherein he identified twelve
    sedentary-duty positions that were open and available in January and February of
    2018, consistent with Claimant’s transferable skills, and within Claimant’s physical
    capabilities. (Id. at 25-41, 43, 46-47.) All of the positions were within a thirty-mile
    radius of Claimant’s home. (Id. at 44-45.) Dieckman explained that he provided
    Claimant with notice of the open and available positions in a series of three certified
    letters dated January 10, 2018, January 24, 2018, and February 9, 2018.
    (Id. at 10, 26.) Dieckman further explained that he also contacted Employer’s
    human resources manager, who informed him that there were no available positions
    with Employer. (Id. at 20.) Based upon his vocational interview of Claimant and
    his LMS, Dieckman calculated Claimant’s earning power in two different respects:
    first, based upon the highest paying position, Dieckman determined that Claimant
    4
    had an earning capacity of $673.20; and, second, based upon an average of all twelve
    positions, Dieckman determined that Claimant had an earning capacity of $480.68
    per week. (Id. at 42-43.)
    In opposition to Employer’s Modification Petition, Claimant offered the
    deposition testimony of Joseph P. Guagliardo, D.O., who is board certified in
    orthopedic surgery. (C.R., Item No. 13 at 6.) Dr. Guagliardo, who took over
    Claimant’s treatment when Norman B. Stempler, D.O., Claimant’s regular treating
    physician, became ill and was hospitalized, testified that he evaluated Claimant
    several times in 2018. (Id. at 7-8, 11, 13.) Dr. Guagliardo explained that, during
    that time, Claimant walked with a walker in a slightly flexed position, had difficulty
    with activities of daily living, and had minimal motion in her lumbar spine.
    (Id. at 9-10.) Dr. Guagliardo further explained that, due to Claimant’s increasing
    pain and positive results on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and
    electromyography, his office encouraged Claimant to undergo epidural steroid
    injections in her back. (Id. at 10-11.) Claimant did not respond to those epidural
    injections, however, and she continued to complain of back pain. (Id. at 11.)
    Dr. Guagliardo also stated that MRIs of Claimant’s lumbar spine performed on
    August 21, 2017, and September 27, 2018, revealed that there was no interval change
    to the level of disc protrusions and disc bulging. (Id. at 12.)
    Based upon his evaluation and treatment of Claimant, Dr. Guagliardo opined
    within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that, as a result of the June 2, 2014
    work-related incident, Claimant sustained lumbar disc protrusions that are putting
    pressure on the spinal nerves causing lumbar radiculopathy.             (Id. at 14.)
    Dr. Guagliardo disagreed with Dr. Bednarz’s medical conclusions relative to
    Claimant’s physical capabilities and opined that Claimant had ongoing
    5
    radiculopathy and damage to the spinal nerves that continued to prevent her from
    performing any work duties. (Id. at 15.) When questioned about the employment
    positions Employer identified for Claimant, Dr. Guagliardo noted that Claimant is
    limited in her ambulatory capacity, commenting “I feel that she is not capable of
    doing [those jobs]. She is not capable o[f] sitting for any period of time—sitting and
    standing. She is not capable of even filling a package up as a cashier. And her back
    pain and leg pain are too significant for that.” (Id. at 15-16.) Dr. Guagliardo did not
    believe that Claimant was capable of working in any capacity.             (Id. at 20.)
    Dr. Guagliardo admitted, however, that he was not aware of the surveillance video
    of Claimant, which depicted Claimant performing everyday activities without the
    use of a cane or walker for support. (Id. at 20-21; see also C.R., Item No. 20.)
    Claimant then testified on her own behalf, both by deposition on May 2, 2018,
    and at a hearing before WCJ Beck on October 15, 2018. (C.R., Item Nos. 16, 12.)
    At those times, Claimant testified that she continues to experience severe pain in her
    lower back that travels down her leg into her right foot, uses a cane or walker to aid
    with ambulation, treats with Dr. Stempler or Dr. Guagliardo every four to six weeks,
    and undergoes physical therapy once a week. (C.R., Item No. 16 at 9-11; C.R., Item
    No. 12 at 5-7.) Claimant indicated that she is significantly limited as a result of
    chronic back pain—e.g., she can only sit for thirty to forty-five minutes before she
    has to get up and lie down, she experiences severe pain when she stands for too long,
    she can only walk short distances before having to sit down, and she experiences
    pain when lifting. (C.R., Item No. 16 at 11-15.) Claimant indicated that she recalled
    receiving the Notice of Ability to Return to Work dated December 7, 2017, which
    indicated that she was capable of returning to work in a medium-duty capacity, and
    the correspondences from Dieckman during January and February 2018, which
    6
    identified twelve jobs that were within Claimant’s physical restrictions.
    (Id. at 20-23.) Claimant testified that she did not believe that any of the twelve jobs
    were suitable for her because of her chronic pain, adding that she does not believe
    she is capable of any type of gainful employment because of her worsening pain and
    condition. (Id. at 23-25, 28, 30; C.R., Item No. 12 at 7-10, 13.) Claimant explained,
    however, that she did contact two of the employers, leaving a voicemail with one
    but not the other because the phone continued to ring without giving her the option
    to leave a voicemail. (C.R., Item No. 16 at 25-27.)
    On March 14, 2019, WCJ Beck issued a decision, granting Employer’s
    Modification Petition. In so doing, WCJ Beck summarized the testimony and made
    the following credibility determinations and relevant factual findings:
    6.     This [WCJ] reviewed . . . Claimant’s testimony and finds her
    testimony regarding the extent of her disability and her abilities
    with regard to the found positions to be not credible. This [WCJ]
    bases this determination, in part, upon his personal viewing of
    her demeanor and deportment. Additionally, Claimant related
    that her condition has worsened, when even her medical expert
    indicated it has remained the same.
    7.     This [WCJ] has reviewed the testimony of . . . Dieckman and
    finds his testimony credible regarding the positions found. . . .
    Dieckman’s testimony is supported by his ample professional
    background and the work he performed in finding the subject
    positions. This [WCJ] finds his testimony as to the positions to
    be cogent, clear[,] and comprehensive.
    8.     This [WCJ] has reviewed the testimony of Dr. Bednarz and finds
    his testimony cogent, clear, comprehensive, uncontradicted[,]
    and supported by the medical record as a whole. This [WCJ]
    finds credible Dr. Bednarz’s testimony that Claimant could
    perform the presented positions. In accepting Dr. Bednarz’s
    opinions, this [WCJ] finds Claimant’s condition has changed:
    her abilities have improved since the prior litigation, as
    documented by Dr. Bednarz. Also[,] in accepting Dr. Bednarz’s
    testimony, this [WCJ] rejects the testimony of Dr. Guagliardo.
    7
    Dr. Guagliardo rejected the found positions based on Claimant’s
    complaints, which this [WCJ] rejects. Further, Dr. Guagliardo
    failed to review the surveillance and was unaware of Claimant’s
    daily activities.
    (WCJ Decision at 8-9.) Based on these credibility determinations and relevant
    factual findings, WCJ Beck concluded that Employer met its burden of proving that
    Claimant was capable of returning to work as of January 10, 2018. WCJ Beck
    further held that Claimant’s earning power is $480.68 per week—i.e., the average
    weekly pay of the twelve jobs that Dieckman identified in his LMS. WCJ Beck,
    therefore, modified Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits to $244.65 per
    week.       Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
    Claimant now petitions this Court for review.
    II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
    On appeal,3 Claimant argues that the Board erred by affirming WCJ Beck’s
    decision to grant Employer’s Modification Petition because: (1) WCJ Beck’s
    necessary findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) WCJ Beck did
    not issue a reasoned decision as it concerns the calculation of Claimant’s earning
    power.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A. Substantial Evidence
    Claimant’s argument that WCJ Beck’s findings in support of his decision to
    modify Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits are not supported by substantial
    evidence is twofold. First, Claimant argues that WCJ Beck’s finding concerning her
    physical ability to return to work is not supported by substantial evidence, because
    3
    “Our review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether
    necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence[,] and whether constitutional
    rights were violated.” Combine v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp.),
    
    954 A.2d 776
    , 778 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), appeal denied, 
    967 A.2d 961
     (Pa. 2009).
    8
    Dr. Bednarz failed to demonstrate an improvement or change in Claimant’s
    condition from the time of her previous IME with Dr. Fras in 2015. Claimant further
    asserts that Dr. Bednarz’s IME was not performed close enough in time to both the
    filing of Employer’s Modification Petition (alleged five-month difference) and
    Employer’s proffer of employment opportunities (alleged three-month difference)
    to be relevant. According to Claimant, the IME, thus, was not sufficient evidence
    upon which WCJ Beck could base a finding that Claimant’s condition had improved.
    Second, Claimant argues that WCJ Beck’s finding concerning the availability of
    suitable employment positions is not supported by substantial evidence, because the
    LMS and vocational examination were too outdated to have any bearing on
    Employer’s Modification Petition filed on March 8, 2018. In particular, Claimant
    takes issue with Employer’s failure to identify, as of March 8, 2018, which of the
    twelve positions were open and available. Because Employer failed to make such a
    showing, Claimant argues that WCJ Beck should not have relied upon those
    positions to establish Claimant’s earning power.
    In response, Employer argues that WCJ Beck’s finding that Claimant was
    capable of performing the jobs identified in the LMS is supported by substantial
    evidence—i.e., the credited testimony of Dieckman and Dr. Bednarz. Employer
    contends that Claimant’s arguments to the contrary are based on a
    mischaracterization of both the record and WCJ Beck’s findings. Employer points
    out that Dr. Bednarz testified that, at the time of his IME, Claimant exhibited no
    objective signs of ongoing radiculopathy, which, Employer alleges, was an
    improvement from her prior IME. Employer further argues that there is no case law
    to support Claimant’s contention that Dieckman’s LMS had to be performed within
    a certain timeframe of Dr. Bednarz’s IME—the important fact is that Dr. Bednarz
    9
    had cleared Claimant to perform modified-duty work as of October 26, 2017, which
    date was prior to the time that Dieckman informed Claimant of the availability of
    the twelve positions that were within her physical and vocational capabilities.
    Moreover, Employer argues that Claimant’s arguments regarding the timing of
    Dieckman’s LMS relative to the filing of Employer’s Modification Petition are
    misplaced. In that regard, Employer contends that WCJ Beck ultimately modified
    Claimant’s earning power as of January 10, 2018, the date on which Dieckman first
    notified Claimant of the availability of open and available positions. Thus, there
    was no need for Employer to demonstrate that the positions were still available as of
    March 8, 2018. Employer further suggests that Dieckman’s reliance on his prior
    vocational interview from March 21, 2016, was not improper because there is no
    evidence of record to suggest that Claimant’s vocational or educational history
    changed since that time. We agree with Employer.
    In workers’ compensation proceedings, the WCJ is the ultimate finder of fact.
    Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 
    862 A.2d 137
    ,
    143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). As fact-finder, matters of credibility, conflicting medical
    evidence, and evidentiary weight are within the WCJ’s exclusive province. 
    Id.
     If
    the WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are binding on
    appeal. Agresta v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Borough of Mechanicsburg),
    
    850 A.2d 890
    , 893 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In determining whether the WCJ’s findings
    are supported by substantial evidence, we may not reweigh the evidence or the
    credibility of the witnesses but must simply determine whether the WCJ’s findings
    have the requisite measure of support in the record as a whole. Elk Mountain Ski
    Resort, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tietz, deceased), 
    114 A.3d 27
    , 32 n.5
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). It is irrelevant whether there is evidence to support contrary
    10
    findings; the relevant inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s
    necessary findings. Hoffmaster v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Senco Prods., Inc.),
    
    721 A.2d 1152
    , 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    For an employer to succeed in a modification petition, the employer must
    demonstrate at the outset that the claimant’s condition has changed such that the
    claimant can work in some capacity. Kachinski v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.
    (Vepco Constr. Co.), 
    532 A.2d 374
    , 380 (Pa. 1987); Valenta v. Workers’ Comp.
    Appeal Bd. (Abington Manor Nursing Home & Rehab), 
    176 A.3d 374
    , 384
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), appeal denied, 
    186 A.3d 371
     (Pa. 2018). Thereafter, under
    Section 306(b)(2) of the Act, an employer must either:
    (1) offer to a claimant a specific job that it has available, which the
    claimant is capable of performing, or (2) establish “earning power”
    through expert opinion evidence including job listings with
    employment agencies, agencies of the Department of Labor and
    Industry, and advertisements in a claimant’s usual area of
    employment.[4]
    4
    In Kachinski, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the procedure for modification
    of a claimant’s existing benefits where the claimant was able to return to work in some capacity.
    Kachinski, 532 A.2d at 379-80. First, the employer must establish an improvement in the
    claimant’s medical condition, typically via medical evidence or expert testimony. Id. at 380. The
    employer then must identify available job openings that fit the occupational category of the
    claimant. Id. Once this showing has been met, the burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate a
    good faith attempt to secure employment, and if such attempt was unsuccessful, benefit payments
    would continue. Id. Section 4 of the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, which has been referred to
    as Act 57, amended Section 306(b)(2) of the Act, however, allowing for an employer to obtain
    modification of benefits based on evidence of earning power through expert testimony or by
    offering the claimant a different position with the employer. See 77 P.S. § 512(b)(2). In other
    words, Act 57 lowered an employer’s burden by no longer requiring the employer to offer a
    specific position and a claimant to obtain that position in order to modify the claimant’s benefits.
    See Riddle v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Allegheny City Elec., Inc.), 
    981 A.2d 1288
    , 1292 n.8
    (Pa. 2009); Edwards v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (MPW Indus. Servs., Inc.), 
    858 A.2d 648
    , 651
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). The Supreme Court has signaled that Kachinski still applies in certain
    circumstances, however, where the injury took place before Act 57’s enactment on June 24, 1996,
    11
    S. Hills Health Sys. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kiefer), 
    806 A.2d 962
    , 966
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Where an employer seeks to establish earning power through
    use of a vocational expert, the employer bears the burden of identifying open and
    available positions within a claimant’s field of vocation and by demonstrating that
    the claimant had a reasonable opportunity in which to apply for the positions.
    Phoenixville Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Shoap), 
    81 A.3d 830
    , 845-46
    (Pa. 2013). A claimant must also be given an opportunity to rebut an employer’s
    showing, but such evidence is only relevant and not dispositive of whether the
    claimant had a reasonable opportunity to apply. Id.; Valenta, 
    176 A.3d at 387
    . “The
    WCJ is charged with finding the facts necessary to support her or his decision . . .
    [regarding w]hether a claimant had a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to apply and did, in
    fact, apply” for an identified position. Phoenixville Hosp., 81 A.3d at 846. Finally,
    a modification petition shall not be granted where the record demonstrates a claimant
    did not have a reasonable opportunity to apply for an employer’s identified positions.
    Smith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Supervalu Holdings PA, LLC), 
    177 A.3d 394
    ,
    404 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    189 A.3d 983
     (Pa. 2018).
    Based upon our review of Dr. Bednarz’s testimony, we disagree with
    Claimant’s contention concerning Dr. Bednarz’s findings regarding an improvement
    or change in Claimant’s condition. Dr. Bednarz testified that Claimant no longer
    showed signs of ongoing radiculopathy, which he noted was present at the onset of
    her injury. WCJ Beck credited Dr. Bednarz’s testimony, finding his testimony to be
    “cogent, clear, comprehensive, uncontradicted and supported by the medical record
    as a whole.” (C.R., Item No. 5 at 8.) Keeping in mind that matters of credibility are
    or where an employer seeks to modify benefits based on an offer of a specific job with the
    employer. Riddle, 981 A.2d at 1292 n.8; see also S. Hills Health Sys. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
    Bd. (Kiefer), 
    806 A.2d 962
    , 967-68 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
    12
    entirely within the province of the WCJ, it is clear to this Court that Dr. Bednarz’s
    credible testimony established that Claimant’s physical condition had improved by
    the time of his IME. Claimant, nevertheless, contends that Dr. Bednarz’s testimony
    cannot constitute substantial evidence to support WCJ Beck’s finding that Claimant
    was capable of returning to work in any of the positions identified in the LMS
    because of the time that had elapsed between Dr. Bednarz’s IME and both the filing
    of Employer’s Modification Petition and the proffer of job opportunities. The need
    for a new IME depends on the circumstances of each case. Verizon Pa., Inc. v.
    Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Guyders), 
    999 A.2d 665
    , 670-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010),
    appeal denied, 
    14 A.3d 830
     (Pa. 2011). Here, Dr. Bednarz’s IME was conducted on
    October 26, 2017. Employer thereafter provided Claimant with a Notice of Ability
    to Return to Work dated December 7, 2017. Dieckman conducted the LMS and
    notified Claimant of the available positions in January and February of 2018. All of
    the positions were approved by Dr. Bednarz based on the results of his IME—i.e.,
    his opinion that Claimant was capable of returning to work in a modified-duty
    capacity.    While Employer ultimately filed its Modification Petition on
    March 8, 2018, WCJ Beck modified Claimant’s benefits not as of March 8, 2018,
    but rather, as of January 10, 2018, the date on which Dieckman first notified
    Claimant of the availability of open and available positions, which date was roughly
    two-and-a-half months after Dr. Bednarz performed his IME.            Based on the
    foregoing, we do not see any evidence of record that establishes a need for a more
    current IME. For all of these reasons, we cannot conclude that WCJ Beck’s finding
    concerning Claimant’s physical ability to return to work is not supported by
    substantial evidence.
    13
    Claimant’s arguments relative to the insufficiency of Dieckman’s vocational
    interview and LMS to support WCJ Beck’s finding concerning the availability of
    suitable employment positions are similarly misguided. With respect to the LMS,
    Dieckman credibly testified that he notified Claimant of the open and available
    positions that suited Claimant’s physical and vocational capabilities by certified
    letters dated January 10, 2018, January 24, 2018, and February 9, 2018, thus giving
    Claimant a reasonable opportunity to apply for the positions. Employer did not need
    to show again, at the time that it filed its Modification Petition, which of the
    positions remained open and available. Employer only needed to demonstrate that
    it identified open and available positions that were within Claimant’s physical and
    vocational capabilities and that it gave Claimant a reasonable opportunity to apply
    for those positions. See Phoenixville Hosp., 81 A.3d at 845-46. Furthermore, WCJ
    Beck modified Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits as of January 10, 2018—
    i.e., the date Dieckman mailed the first set of positions to Claimant—not
    March 8, 2018, the date on which Employer filed its Modification Petition. Thus,
    the date on which Employer filed its Modification Petition is irrelevant under these
    circumstances. With respect to the vocational interview, Dieckman credibly testified
    that, unless there is some change to a person’s vocational or educational history, a
    second vocational interview is not necessary. There is no evidence of record to
    suggest that Claimant’s vocational or educational history changed between the time
    of the vocational interview on March 21, 2016, and the time of the LMS. Claimant
    admitted that she did not work after the June 2, 2014 work-related injury. In
    addition, Dieckman did not receive a response from Claimant’s attorney regarding
    whether he believed it was necessary to conduct a second vocational interview. It
    is, therefore, disingenuous for Claimant to now assert that the lack of a second
    14
    vocational interview was somehow improper. For all of these reasons, we cannot
    conclude that WCJ Beck’s finding concerning the availability of suitable
    employment positions is not supported by substantial evidence.
    B. Reasoned Decision
    Claimant argues that WCJ Beck failed to issue a reasoned decision as required
    by Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834, because, in calculating Claimant’s
    earning power, WCJ Beck failed to properly identify which of the twelve jobs
    Claimant could actually perform. Claimant further argues that WCJ Beck erred in
    modifying Claimant’s benefits based on the average wage of the twelve positions,
    because WCJ Beck concluded that two of the positions were inappropriate for
    Claimant (Finding of Fact No. 2(h)) and that Claimant applied for two of the jobs
    but was not hired (Finding of Fact No. 4(e)). Employer responds that, contrary to
    Claimant’s contentions, the WCJ credited Dieckman’s testimony that all of the jobs
    identified were suitable for Claimant. Employer points out, moreover, that the WCJ
    did not conclude in Finding of Fact No. 2(h) that two of the jobs were inappropriate;
    rather, it simply noted that two of the positions were in the sedentary-light
    classification as opposed to sedentary. Employer suggests that, because Dr. Bednarz
    approved Claimant for medium-duty restrictions, however, the positions were
    nevertheless appropriate. Again, we agree with Employer.
    Section 422(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that all parties in a
    workers’ compensation case are “entitled to a reasoned decision containing findings
    of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole which clearly and
    concisely states and explains the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine
    why and how a particular result was reached.” The decision of a WCJ is “reasoned”
    if it allows for meaningful appellate review without further elucidation. Daniels v.
    15
    Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 
    828 A.2d 1043
    , 1052 (Pa. 2003). In
    order to satisfy this standard, a WCJ does not need to discuss every detail of the
    evidence in the record. Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr.
    Co.), 
    893 A.2d 191
    , 194 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal denied, 
    916 A.2d 635
    (Pa. 2007). Rather, Section 422(a) of the Act requires WCJs to issue reasoned
    decisions so that this Court does not have to “imagine” the reasons why a WCJ finds
    that the testimony of one witness was more credible than the testimony of another
    witness. Id. at 196. A WCJ must articulate the objective rationale underlying his or
    her credibility determinations where there is conflicting witness testimony. Id.
    A WCJ may satisfy the reasoned decision requirement if he summarized the
    witnesses’ testimony “and adequately explained his credibility determinations.”
    Clear Channel Broad. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Perry), 
    938 A.2d 1150
    , 1157
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), appeal denied, 
    951 A.2d 1167
     (Pa. 2008).          Thus, “while
    summaries of testimony alone would be insufficient to satisfy the reasoned decision
    requirement, where a WCJ summarizes testimony and also objectively explains his
    credibility determinations, the decision will satisfy the requirement.” Amandeo v.
    Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 
    37 A.3d 72
    , 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    Presently, the WCJ credited Dieckman’s testimony that all of the positions
    identified in the LMS were suitable for Claimant. The WCJ similarly credited
    Dr. Bednarz’s testimony approving the positions Dieckman identified as within the
    medium-duty work restrictions that he had established for Claimant. In other words,
    by crediting Dieckman’s and Dr. Bednarz’s testimony, the WCJ found that Claimant
    was capable of performing all of the twelve positions. In making these credibility
    determinations, moreover, WCJ Beck identified the reasons for finding the
    testimony credible, thereby allowing this Court to engage in an adequate review of
    16
    his decision. In addition, while WCJ Beck noted in Finding of Fact No. 2(h) that
    two of the positions were in a different classification than the other ten, being
    sedentary-light as opposed to sedentary, WCJ Beck did not find that the positions
    were inappropriate for Claimant. In fact, based on Dr. Bednarz’s and Dieckman’s
    credible testimony, the sedentary to light-duty positions were clearly within
    Claimant’s physical and vocational capabilities. WCJ Beck also did not find that
    Claimant applied for two of the jobs but was not hired. Rather, in Finding of Fact
    No. 4(e), WCJ Beck simply noted that Claimant testified that she called one of the
    employers but no one answered, and that she called a second employer and left a
    voicemail but received no response. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude
    that WCJ Beck failed to issue a reasoned decision as required by Section 422(a) of
    the Act.
    Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    17
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Patricia Thomas,                      :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                        :   No. 462 C.D. 2020
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal          :
    Board (Merakey Philadelphia),         :
    Respondent     :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 15th day of June, 2021, the order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board, dated April 16, 2020, is hereby AFFIRMED.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 462 C.D. 2020

Judges: Brobson

Filed Date: 6/15/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024