Seneca Leandro View LLC v. Lycoming County TCB ( 2021 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Seneca Leandro View LLC, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 388 C.D. 2020
: Argued: February 8, 2021
Lycoming County - Tax Claim Bureau :
:
In Re: Consolidation Return of the :
Tax Claim Bureau of Lycoming :
County From the September 11, 2019 :
Upset Sale for Delinquent Taxes :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: July 22, 2021
Seneca Leandro View, LLC (Appellant) appeals from an order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County (trial court) denying its Motion for
Leave to Amend Pleading (Motion to Amend) and dismissing its Petition of Upset
Tax Sale Objections and Exceptions (Exceptions) on the grounds of notice, undue
prejudice, and surprise. Appellant argues that the trial court erred or abused its
discretion by denying its Motion to Amend and dismissing its Exceptions. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Background
Appellant is a California limited liability company authorized to do
business in the Commonwealth. On November 7, 2019, following the Lycoming
County Tax Claim Bureau’s (Bureau) 2019 Lycoming County Upset Tax Sale held
on September 11, 2019 (2019 Sale), Appellant filed Exceptions challenging the
bidding process and alleging certain irregularities in the Bureau’s administration of
the 2019 Sale. Specifically, Appellant challenged the Bureau’s sale of tax parcel no.
37-0020-0414, a single-family residence located at 211 Sherman Street, Muncy,
Pennsylvania, 17756 (Muncy Property), to Edward Lyons (Lyons). Appellant
alleged that the Bureau required each bidder to qualify/register for the 2019 Sale in
advance by providing certain bidder information and receiving a bidder number to
participate in the auction-style sale. Appellant alleged that its agent at the 2019 Sale,
Alvin Cox (Cox), satisfied the preregistration requirement, but Lyons had not. The
Bureau awarded the parcel to Lyons despite his failure to preregister for the 2019
Sale and obtain a bidder number. Appellant claimed that the award constituted a
violation of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (RETSL).1 As for relief, Appellant
requested the disqualification of Lyons in favor of the next highest bidder, Cox.
Alternatively, Appellant requested that the sale be stricken and the Muncy Property
be re-exposed at the next upset sale.
The trial court heard argument on the Exceptions on December 9, 2019,
at which time the parties agreed to grant Lyons’ motion to intervene. The trial court
then scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Exceptions for January 13, 2020.
On January 6, 2020, Appellant filed a Motion to Amend. In the Motion,
Appellant asserted that it had misidentified the relevant purchaser and property in its
1
Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5860.101-5860.803.
2
Exceptions. According to Appellant, it did not realize its mistake until after the
Bureau provided Appellant with a copy of the “Sale Masterlist,” which identified all
of the registered bidders present at the 2019 Sale. Appellant asked to amend its
pleading to reflect that the correct purchaser is Devon Buck (Buck), principal of DC
Landscaping, LLC (DC Landscaping),2 and the correct property is tax parcel no. 26-
0170-0317, located in Loyalsock Township (Loyalsock Property). Otherwise, the
cause of action remained the same in all other respects.
The trial court denied Appellant’s Motion to Amend. The trial court
explained that a party may amend its pleadings to add a party or correct the name of
the party when that party consents or by leave of court. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1033(a).
“Amendments are to be liberally permitted except where surprise or prejudice to the
other party will result, or where the amendment is against a positive rule of law.”
Trial Court Op., 1/28/20, at 2 (quoting Burger v. Borough v. Ingram, 697 A.2d 1037,
1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)). Pursuant to the RETSL, a party wishing to challenge an
upset sale may do so by filing exceptions or objections within 30 days after the trial
court has entered a confirmation nisi. Section 607(b) of the RETSL,
72 P.S. §5860.607(b). While Appellant timely filed Exceptions to the sale of the
Muncy Property to Lyons, it did not do so with regard to the sale of the Loyalsock
Property to Buck/DC Landscaping. The first instance that DC Landscaping received
notice of a claim against it was when Appellant filed the Motion to Amend,
approximately two months after the statutory period for filing objections and
exceptions had expired. Appellant’s failure to properly identify the correct parcel
2
We note that DC Landscaping attempted to participate in the appeal by joining in the
Bureau’s brief and appearing before this Court at oral argument. Appellant objected to DC
Landscaping’s participation. Because DC Landscaping did not intervene in the proceedings below
and is not a proper party in this appeal, we did not permit DC Landscaping to participate in oral
argument. See Pa. R.A.P. 908.
3
and purchaser was the result of its own error. Upon determining that the allowance
of the amendment would result in undue surprise and prejudice to DC Landscaping,
the trial court denied the Motion to Amend. Because Appellant conceded that it has
no claim against either the Bureau or Lyons regarding the sale of the Muncy
Property, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s Exceptions. This appeal now
follows.3
II. Issues
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying its Motion to
Amend without considering application of Rule 1033(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.C.P. No. 1033(b) (Rule 1033(b)), which affords a 90-day
extension of the 30-day appeal period.4 Appellant also contends that the trial court
erred by dismissing its Exceptions, which included a claim against the Bureau for an
3
In tax sale cases, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion, erred as a matter of law, or rendered a decision without supporting evidence.
Maya v. County of Erie Tax Claim Bureau, 59 A.3d 50, 54 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “An abuse of
discretion exists where the judgment exercised by the trial court is manifestly unreasonable or is
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Burger, 697 A.2d at 1040 n.3.
4
“Generally, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to statutory
proceedings brought under the [RETSL].” Battisti v. Tax Claim Bureau of Beaver County, 76
A.3d 111, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Nevertheless, “[t]he procedures in Section 607 [of the RETSL]
direct that ‘[i]n case any objections or exceptions are filed they shall be disposed of according to
the practice of the court.’ 72 P.S. § 5860.607(d).” Id. at 114-15. Because Rule 1033 was cited in
the proceedings before the trial court and in this appeal without objection, and because its
provisions were relied upon by the trial court in its disposition of the petition filed in this matter,
we will assume for purposes of addressing the claims raised in this appeal that the practice of the
trial court includes the application of Rule 1033 in disposing of petitions filed under the RETSL.
See, e.g., Nguyen v. Delaware County Tax Claim Bureau, 244 A.3d 96, 107 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2020) (“For example, some counties utilize standing orders or local rules to specify the procedures
for petitions challenging an upset tax sale. If a court of common pleas chooses to have the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure apply to this type of statutory proceeding, it can certainly
make that known through a standing order or a local rule.”).
4
irregularity at the 2019 Sale when the Bureau failed to follow its own preregistration
protocol and denied or disregarded an objection made during the sale.
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Amend
First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion
when it denied its Motion to Amend. Although Appellant did not realize that it had
identified the incorrect property and purchaser in its Exceptions until after the 30-
day statutory period ended, the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Amend is
manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances. The trial court failed to consider
Rule 1033(b) when ruling on the Motion. The RETSL’s 30-day appeal period may
be extended up to 90 days by operation of Rule 1033(b) when the party knew or
should have known, but for a mistake in the identity of the party and parcel, that
litigation would be brought against it. DC Landscaping knew or should have known
it was the proper party to the suit. DC Landscaping, through its agent Buck, failed
to register for the 2019 Sale, which was a prerequisite for participation. Buck was
the successful bidder, but Appellant’s agent lodged an objection to the sale. Under
the circumstances, DC Landscaping knew or should have known that litigation may
follow based on the objection, and it should not have been unduly surprised or
prejudiced by the Motion to Amend. From the date that Appellant filed its
Exceptions on November 7, 2019, to January 13, 2020, when the trial court
dismissed the action, the total time elapsed was 68 days – well within the 90-day
period to amend under Rule 1033(b). Therefore, the trial court should have
permitted Appellant to amend its Exceptions accordingly and decided this matter on
the merits.
5
Section 607 of the RETSL provides that an objection challenging a sale
conducted under the law must be filed within 30 days of the trial court’s issuance of
confirmation by decree nisi. 72 P.S. §5860.607. Specifically, Section 607(a) and
(c) states in relevant part:
(a) . . . Within thirty (30) days of presentation of the
consolidated return, if it shall appear to said court that such
sale has been regularly conducted under the provisions of
this act, the consolidated return and the sales so made shall
be confirmed nisi. . . .
***
(c) In case no objections or exceptions are filed to any such
sale within thirty (30) days after the court has made a
confirmation nisi, a decree of absolute confirmation shall
be entered as of course by the prothonotary.
72 P.S. §5860.607(a), (c).
The RETSL’s 30-day appeal period may be extended up to 90 days by
operation of Rule 1033(b), which provides:
(b) An amendment correcting the name of a party against
whom a claim has been asserted in the original pleading
relates back to the date of the commencement of the action
if, within 90 days after the period provided by law for
commencing the action, the party received notice of the
institution of the action such that it will not be prejudiced
in maintaining a defense on the merits and the party knew
or should have known that the action would have been
brought against the party but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party.
Pa. R.C.P. No. 1033(b) (emphasis added).
“The decision about whether to allow an amendment is within the
discretion of the trial court, but such discretion is not unfettered.” Burger, 697 A.2d
at 1041. “Amendments are to be liberally permitted except where surprise or
6
prejudice to the other party will result, or where the amendment is against a positive
rule of law.” Id. However,
[the courts] will not permit the amendment of a complaint,
after the statute of limitations has run, to bring a new and
distinct party into an action. Gilbert v. School District of
Philadelphia, [511 A.2d 258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)]. Our
Supreme Court has stated that if the effect of an
amendment to a complaint is to correct the name under
which the right party has been sued, then the amendment
will be permitted. Saracina v. Cotoia, [208 A.2d 764 (Pa.
1965)]. However, if the effect of an amendment is to bring
in a new party, then it will be refused. Id.697 A.2d at 1041 (emphasis added); accord Girardi v. Laquin Lumber Co., 81 A.
63, 64 (Pa. 1911). In other words, “[i]f the right party was in court as the result of
service of process and it was merely his or its designation which was sought to be
changed,” the courts are prone to permit the amendment. Saracina, 208 A.2d at 766.
For example, in Girardi, an action was timely brought against Laquin
Lumber Company, a corporation. “The amendment proposed was to name as
defendant a partnership, composed of six persons, trading as the Laquin Lumber
Company.” Girardi, 81 A. at 64. The Supreme Court determined that the allowance
of the amendment would have brought new parties on the record after the statute of
limitations had run, which is not permitted. Id. The Court explained that only “[i]f
the effect of the amendment is to correct the name under which the right party is
sued,” will it be allowed; “if it is to bring in a new party, it will be refused.” Id.
In Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 89 A.2d 527 (Pa. 1952), the
amendment was permitted. There, the plaintiff had brought a trespass action against
“Steelton Taxicab Company, a corporation.” Id. at 527. After the statute of
limitations had expired, the plaintiff learned that the “Steelton Taxicab Company”
was not a corporation but a fictitious name used by Anthony Kosir. Id. The trial
7
court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to substitute as defendant
the name of “Kosir trading and doing business as the Steelton Taxicab Company.”
Id. at 528. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, upon determining that “the
correct agency charged with responsibility was served, even though under a wrong
name,” and that the naming of Kosir would not bring in a “new party,” but would
merely correct the name of a party already on the record. Id.
Here, on October 8, 2019, the trial court entered a decree nisi
confirming all sales at the 2019 Sale. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a. No objection
was filed to the Loyalsock Property within the statutory 30-day period. Neither Buck
nor DC Landscaping were named as defendants in the Exceptions, nor were they
served with the Exceptions. Although Appellant filed timely Exceptions, the
exceptions pertained exclusively to the sale of the Muncy Property to Lyons.
Because the sale of the Loyalsock Property was not timely challenged, a deed was
executed and issued to DC Landscaping for the Loyalsock Property on December 2,
2019. R.R. at 59a.
It was not until January 6, 2020, when Appellant filed its Motion to
Amend, that Appellant attempted to redirect its objection to DC Landscaping’s
purchase of the Loyalsock Property.5 At the time that Appellant filed its Motion to
Amend, the statute of limitations under the RETSL had expired. Appellant’s Motion
to Amend did not seek to merely correct the name of the party but to add a “new
party” to the suit – DC Landscaping. Appellant did not obtain DC Landscaping’s
consent and therefore sought leave of court to make the amendment.
5
Even during oral argument heard by the trial court on December 9, 2019, Appellant raised
no issues regarding the sale of the Loyalsock Property or whether Buck/DC Landscaping acted as
an unregistered purchaser at the sale. See R.R. at 105a-12a.
8
The trial court determined that to allow such an amendment after the
30-day statutory period had run would result in undue surprise or prejudice to DC
Landscaping. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the trial court considered Rule
1033(b)’s “relation back” principle in its determination. See Trial Court Op., at 2
n.7. DC Landscaping was not originally served with the Exceptions. The first
instance that DC Landscaping received notice of a claim against it was when
Appellant filed the Motion to Amend. There was no evidence that DC Landscaping
had any notice of the litigation prior to January 2020. Although DC Landscaping,
through its agent Buck, knew or should have known an objection was lodged at the
2019 Sale, and may have even anticipated the possibility of litigation, once the
statutory appeal period ran and the Loyalsock Property was deeded to DC
Landscaping without objection, there was no basis upon which to conclude that DC
Landscaping knew or should have known that Appellant’s Exceptions filed with
regard to Lyons’ purchase of the Muncy Property actually pertained to DC
Landscaping’s purchase of the Loyalsock Property. Neither the Loyalsock Property
nor DC Landscaping were mentioned in any way within Appellant’s original
Exceptions. “The effect of allowing an amendment in this case would be to
introduce a new party after the statute of limitations has run and, in effect, to modify
the statute of limitations which this Court cannot and should not do.” Saracina, 208
A.2d at 766. Upon review, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by
denying Appellant’s Motion to Amend.
B. Exceptions
Next, Appellant contends that the trial court erred or abused its
discretion when it dismissed Appellant’s Exceptions. Under Section 607(d) and (g)
of the RETSL, 72 P.S. §5860.607(d), (g), objections and exceptions may be filed
9
contesting the regularity of the sale. Appellant’s Exceptions, as filed, clearly alleged
an irregularity of the 2019 Sale when the Bureau’s auctioneer accepted a bid from a
nonregistered bidder over Appellant’s objection. The Bureau’s auctioneer was
asked to determine the objection, which he either failed to determine or erroneously
determined. Despite Appellant’s objection, the Bureau’s auctioneer presented the
accepted bid to the trial court for confirmation by decree nisi. Appellant’s
Exceptions went straight to the heart of the regularity of the sale and the
determination of the objection. The trial court should have considered Appellant’s
Exceptions as to the regularity of the sale. While recognizing statutory standing
constraints as set forth in C. Everett, Inc. v. Tax Claim Bureau, 494 A.2d 52(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), Appellant contends that equitable principles should permit this
action. Otherwise, there are no enforceable rules governing the conduct of upset tax
sales.
Section 607 of the RETSL governs the process for filing objections or
exceptions. Section 607(b) provides that “objections or exceptions thereto may be
filed by any owner or lien creditor within thirty (30) days after the court has made a
confirmation nisi of the consolidated return or that the return will be confirmed
absolutely.” 72 P.S. §5860.607(b) (emphasis added). In addition, Section 607(d)
and (g) provides:
(d) Any objections or exceptions to such a sale may
question the regularity or legality of the proceedings of the
bureau in respect to such sale, but may not raise the
legality of the taxes on which the sale was held, of the
return by the tax collector to the bureau or of the claim
entered. In case any objections or exceptions are filed they
shall be disposed of according to the practice of the court.
If the same are overruled or set aside, a decree of absolute
confirmation shall be entered by the court.
10
***
(g) If no objections or exceptions are filed or if objections
or exceptions are finally overruled and the sale confirmed
absolutely, the validity of the tax, its return for
nonpayment, the entry of the claim, or the making of such
claim absolute and the proceedings of the bureau with
respect to such sale, shall not thereafter be inquired into
judicially in equity or by civil proceedings by the person
in whose name such property was sold, by a grantee or
assignee, by any lien creditor or by any other person,
except with respect to the giving of notice under the act, to
the time of holding the sale, or to the time of petitioning
the court for an order of sale. There shall be no period of
redemption after such sale and the sale shall be deemed to
pass a good and valid title to the purchaser, free from any
liens or encumbrances whatsoever, except such liens as are
hereafter specifically saved, and in all respects as valid and
effective as if acquired by a sheriff’s deed.
72 P.S. §5860.607(d), (g) (emphasis added). Section 102 of the RETSL defines
“owner” as:
the person in whose name the property is last registered, if
registered according to law, or, if not registered according
to law, the person whose name last appears as an owner of
record on any deed or instrument of conveyance recorded
in the county office designated for recording and in all
other cases means any person in open, peaceable and
notorious possession of the property, as apparent owner or
owners thereof, or the reputed owner or owners thereof, in
the neighborhood of such property; as to property having
been turned over to the bureau under Article VII [(relating
to property purchased by taxing districts prior to the
RETSL)] by any county, ‘owner’ shall mean the county.
72 P.S. §5860.102. The legislature has made clear that “only owners or lien creditors
may file objections or exceptions to the return of the [tax bureau] and confirmation
nisi by the trial court of the tax sale.” CR 2018 LLC v. Columbia County Tax Claim
Bureau, 229 A.3d 398, 402-03 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).
11
In C. Everett, Inc., we examined whether an unsuccessful purchaser had
standing to file objections or exceptions under the RETSL. Therein, C. Everett, Inc.,
the prospective purchaser of a parcel sold at an upset tax sale, had its purchase denied
because its agent attempted to pay by personal check. Published notice of the tax
sale stated that purchasers were required to pay by cash, money order or certified
check.6 The bidding process was immediately repeated and the property was sold to
another party. C. Everett, Inc. filed exceptions to the sale, which the trial court
dismissed. On appeal, this Court held that C. Everett, Inc., as a successful bidder
but unsuccessful purchaser, was not an owner or lien creditor. Consequently, it did
not have standing to file objections or exceptions to a decree nisi under Section 607
of the RETSL. C. Everett, Inc., 494 A.2d at 52-53. Only owners or lien creditors
have standing to contest the sale. Id. at 53 (citing Section 607(d) of the RETSL).
More recently, in Nguyen, 244 A.3d at 102, this Court reiterated the
statutory rule that “persons who are not owners or lien creditors of the property at
the time of the tax sale do not have standing to file objections or other exceptions.”
However, we recognized that “equitable owners” or persons with an equitable
interest in the property at the time of the tax sale are owners for purposes of standing
to challenge the tax sale. Id.; see, e.g., Matos v. Berks County Tax Claim Bureau,
228 A.3d 976 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (a tenant’s option to purchase a leased property
sold at a tax sale created an equitable interest sufficient to establish standing); Moore
v. Keller, 98 A.3d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (the executrix of the estate of a deceased
record owner, who had lived and invested in the property, was an equitable owner
with the requisite substantial, direct and immediate interest in the sale of the property
6
See In re I & M Investments Inc., 370 A.2d 443, 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (the mere
presentation of an uncertified check does not constitute payment under Section 606 of the RETSL,
72 P.S. §5860.606).
12
to challenge the tax sale); Shipley v. Tax Claim Bureau of Delaware County, 74 A.3d
1101, 1104 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (a wife had standing as an owner to challenge
the tax sale where she possessed an equitable interest in a property purchased with
joint funds while she and her husband were married, even though her name was not
recorded on the deed); Husak v. Fayette County Tax Claim Bureau, 61 A.3d 302 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2013) (owners who acquired a property by quitclaim deed but failed to
record the deed until after the tax sale possessed equitable title in the property for
standing purposes).
Even under traditional standing principles, a person must be aggrieved
or have a legally sufficient interest in the matter to have standing. CR 2018 LLC,
229 A.3d at 402. As stated by our Supreme Court:
[A]n individual can demonstrate that he is aggrieved if he
can establish that he has a substantial, direct, and
immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation in order
to be deemed to have standing. An interest is ‘substantial’
if it is an interest in the resolution of the challenge which
‘surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring
obedience to the law.’ Likewise, a ‘direct’ interest
mandates a showing that the matter complained of ‘caused
harm to the party's interest,’ i.e., a causal connection
between the harm and the violation of law. Finally, an
interest is ‘immediate’ if the causal connection is not
remote or speculative.
Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 659
(Pa. 2005) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added); accord William Penn Parking
Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 280-81 (Pa. 1975) (plurality);
Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. Their Members v. Pennsylvania Game
Commission, 903 A.2d 117, 122 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Here, Appellant is not an owner or lien creditor as defined under the
RETSL. See 72 P.S. §§5860.102, 5860.607(b). Appellant is not an equitable owner
13
and does not have an equitable interest in either of the properties. See Nguyen.
Rather, like the company in C. Everett, Inc., Appellant is merely a prospective
purchaser/disappointed bidder. Even under traditional standing principles,
Appellant’s purported interest in ensuring the regularity of the 2019 Sale is no
greater than that of the general citizenry. Consequently, Appellant lacks standing to
contest the sale.7 We, therefore, discern no error in the trial court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s Exceptions.8
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
7
Even if Appellant could establish standing, Appellant did not present sufficient grounds
to set aside the sale. Having failed to properly identify the Loyalsock Property in its Exceptions,
Appellant attempts to recharacterize its Exceptions as a general contest to the regularity of the
2019 Sale. Yet, Appellant’s Exceptions make no objection to or mention of the other 81 properties
sold that day and focus exclusively on the sale of the Muncy Property. See R.R. at 13a-16a, 121a.
The asserted irregularity is that the Bureau permitted a party to bid without first preregistering.
Appellant has cited no case or statute requiring preregistration as part of a regularly conducted
sale. Although preregistration is not required by the RETSL, it appears to be required by local
procedure. In fact, recent attempts to amend the RETSL to include such preregistration
requirements have failed to pass. See House Bill 1559, Regular Session 2019-2020 (available at
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2019
&sessInd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr=1559&pn=2042 (last visited 6/24/2021)). The
Bureau’s decision to accept the highest bid from a party that did not preregister was discretionary
in terms of how the Bureau conducted the sale and was not an irregularity under the RETSL
warranting invalidation. Furthermore, Appellant has identified no prejudice that it has suffered as
a result of the Bureau’s failure to strictly adhere to a local procedure regarding preregistration.
8
We “may affirm on other grounds where grounds for affirmance exist.” FP Willow Ridge
Associates, L.P. v. Allen Township, 166 A.3d 487, 496 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Kutnyak v.
Department of Corrections, 748 A.2d 1275, 1279 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)); accord CR 2018 LLC,
229 A.3d at 404 n.8.
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Seneca Leandro View LLC, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 388 C.D. 2020
:
Lycoming County - Tax Claim Bureau :
:
In Re: Consolidation Return of the :
Tax Claim Bureau of Lycoming :
County From the September 11, 2019 :
Upset Sale for Delinquent Taxes :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of July, 2021, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lycoming County, dated January 28, 2020, is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge